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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
1.1 Equity and fairness in climate change 
Questions of fairness and equity are central to the challenge of tackling 
global climate change. The complexity of the question arises form the global and 
long-term nature of the problem. At the same time, the impacts are localized and 
differentiated, so that states least able to respond are those that will be hardest hit. 
Policies and measures to abate – mitigate – greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
demand the decision-making under conditions of uncertainty and the commitment 
of resources beyond the time horizon of politics-as-usual. And while international 
environmental law has achieved notable successes, it has arguably not confronted a 
challenge with so many dimensions, including lifestyles, energy policies, and 
inequality in global community. Some analysts have argued that questions of fairness 
and equity are of secondary, largely rhetorical significance: willingness to pay is what 
matters.1 Such views grow from a realist perspective on the relations between states 
and skepticism about international law. The argument presented in this thesis is that 
a fair distribution of benefits and burdens is at the heart of the matter. Individual and 
collective responses to the climate change problem are shaped and determined by 
social and political factors, as much as by technical and as scientific ones. Normative 
analysis has a role to play in analyzing the problem of climate change and identifying 
solutions. 
Within two decades emissions from developing countries of carbon dioxide, 
the most important greenhouse gas, will exceed the share from industrialized 
countries. The United States and countries argue that reduction measures therefore 
are only meaningful if developing countries are prepared to trim their emissions. In 
turn, developing countries look forward, contending that they ought not bear the 
burden of abatement at this critical stage in their development. They point also to 
the historical responsibility of the developed countries, invoking the polluter pays 
principle. Small islands and other particularly vulnerable developing countries seek to 
emphasize global solidarity and fairness when pressing claims for assistance to adapt 
to the adverse impacts of climate change. These are only some of the issues entwined 
in the debate on climate change, and which lead directly or indirectly to the question 
of fairness.   
Climate change stems from the activities at the very heart of our economies 
and way of life. Of world energy, around 85 per cent is supplied from fossil fuels – 
coal, gas, and oil.2 Altogether, carbon dioxide from the combustion of fossil fuels is 
responsible for well over half of all GHG emissions, approximately another quarter 
comes from carbon dioxide released in the process of deforestation, and various 
gases released from agricultural and other activities.3 Many of environmental 
problems stem from human activity, but none relate so directly to the driving force 
of modern economies. Stabilizing emissions at the level that would prevent large-
scale, irreversible damage to the biosphere will require not merely an incremental 
                                                 
1 See DAVID VICTOR, THE COLLAPSE OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL AND THE STRUGGLE TO SLOW 
GLOBAL WARMING (2001). 
2 INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK (2006). 
3 WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, NAVIGATING THE NUMBERS 5-7 (2006). 
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adjustment of our energy system, but over time a full-scale transition to new modes 
of low-carbon consumption and production.   
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), which was adopted in 1992 and came into force three years later, is the 
foundation of the global response to climate change.4 The ultimate objective of the 
Convention is the stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere 
at a level that would prevent dangerous human interference with the climate system. 
It does not contain binding emission targets. For this reason countries initiated a 
negotiating process that culminated in the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997.5 
The Protocol, which entered into force in February 2005, commits industrialized 
countries – so-called Annex 1 parties to the UNFCCC - to reduce their GHG 
emissions by an average of 5.2 per cent from 1990 levels during the first 
commitment period from 2008 to 2012. However, this binding target applies only to 
some 36 countries, representing about 30 per cent of global GHG emissions. The 
non-participation of the United States, coupled with various compromises made in 
the process of bringing the Protocol into operation, means that the real reduction 
will be well below 5.2 per cent. The Protocol is thus only a modest first step in the 
direction of stabilizing global emissions.  
Studies suggest that depending on the stringency of chosen target, global 
GHG reductions of 25-70 percent below 2005 levels may be necessary by 2050, 
while by the end of the 21st century emissions must be 80 per cent below current 
levels.6 Should the international community commit to holding the temperature 
increase below 2 degrees Celsius (3 degrees Fahrenheit), a target proposed by the 
European Union, global emissions would have to peak in 2015 at the latest and 
decline rapidly for the rest of the century (see table below). 
 
Characteristics of post-TAR stabilization scenarios 
CO2 
concentration - 
Parts per 
million  
(ppm) 
CO2-eq 
concentration 
 
 
(ppm) 
Global mean 
temperature 
increase above 
pre-industrial 
(Celsius) 
Year in 
which CO2 
emissions 
peak 
(year) 
Change in CO2 
emissions in 
2050 (% of 2000 
emissions) 
(%) 
350-400 445-
490 
2.0-2.4 2000-
2015 
-85 to -50 
400-440 490-
535 
2.4-2.8 2000-
2020 
-60 to -30 
440-485 535-
590 
2.8-3.2 2010-
2030 
-30 to +5 
485-570 590-
710 
3.2-4.0 2020-
2060 
+10 to +60 
Source: Adapted from IPCC, 2007, WGIII, table SPM. 5 
                                                 
4 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, adopted on May 9, 1992, art. 3(1), 1771 
U.N.T.S 164 Article 3(1) [hereinafter UNFCCC]. 
5 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nation Framework Convention on Climate Change, December 11, 
1997, 37 I.L.M. 22, text available on the website of the UNFCCC secretariat, 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf.   
6 NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE, THE STERN REVIEW, CABINET OFFICE, 
HM TREASURY 193 (2006),  http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/independent_reviews/stern_review_economics_climate_change/stern_review_report
.cfm 
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1.1.1 Changing nature 
In the developed world technology has permitted humans to remove 
themselves from the forces of nature, so that the shelter, food, work, and recreation 
can be provided, save in rare circumstances, independent of the climate. Today the 
climate penetrates the public consciousness predominantly through natural disasters, 
like Hurricane Katrina and droughts and phenomena such as the El Niño effect. 
Despite its inherently unpredictable and dynamic character, society clings to the 
belief that like nature in general, climate can be conquered and controlled through 
technology. Even as the threat of climate change is understood, the reflex on the part 
of many policy-makers and some scientists is to set store first by further research, 
and second by technology. Both are essential parts of the solution, yet they may also 
serve to avoid a more searching approach to the problem.   
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
surface temperatures have increased by 0.7 degrees Celsius over the past century, 
with current concentrations making some further warming inevitable.7 Depending on 
their degree of vulnerability, countries will have to adapt more or less to the impacts 
of climate change. Adaptation will be particularly challenging for those societies that 
are already have difficulty providing for their people. Further, the record of human 
adaptation – in pre-historical and modern eras – to climate change has not been 
simple or easy.8 Adaptation requires changes in technology, as well as social and 
cultural ways of life. Not for nothing is there frequent mention in myths and 
histories of calamitous climatic events. 
Even as climate change serves to make society aware of its renewed 
vulnerability to extremes of climate - rattling the notion that nature has been tamed - 
it challenges the very conception of nature. For even as society has built up defenses, 
channeling and domesticating nature, we have retained a belief in the “wildness” of 
nature, with wilderness an iconic value, as evidenced, in banal form, in popular media 
advertising. As William McKibben notes, our faith in the essential strength of nature 
endures so long as we consider damage as local. However, shifting from the local to 
the global destroys that faith:9 
“The idea of nature will not survive the new global pollution – the carbon 
dioxide and the chlorofluorocarbons and the like. This new rupture with 
nature is different not only in scope but also in kind from the salmon tins in 
an English stream. We have changed the atmosphere, and thus we are 
changing the weather. By changing the weather, we make every spot on earth 
man-made and artificial. We have deprived nature of its independence, and it 
is fatal to its meaning. Nature’s independence is it’s meaning; without it there 
is nothing but us.” 
                                                 
7 IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS. CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING 
GROUP I TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE 5 (Susan Solomon et al, eds., 2007). 
8 Donald Worster, Climate Change and History: Lessons from the Great Plains, in EARTH, AIR, FIRE, WATER 
65, 72 (John K. Conway et al eds., 1999). Worster refers to the efforts to make the Plains viable for 
agriculture concludes, among other things, that adapting to a volatile environment with technology is 
more unreliable strategy than is thought, often bringing with it unforeseen consequences. He also 
underlines how we underestimate the challenge of cultural adaptation to environment. 
9 WILLIAM MCKIBBEN, THE END OF NATURE 58 (1989). 
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While this view is quite stark, it usefully underlines two important points. 
First, that global climate change, once-and-for-all, dispenses with the illusion that 
human impact on the climate is confined to the local and can be treated as such. 
Second, and following from the first, our relationship to, and conception of nature, 
must be re-evaluated. The notion that humanity’s knowledge and technological 
prowess also implies mastery over the physical world is bumping up against its limits. 
A related issue concerns fundamental assumptions concerning economic growth and 
whether there may be limits to growth.10 Certainly any climate policy predicated on, 
or implying, any significant limits on growth would be political non-starter in 
developing countries, but also in the industrialized world. Nonetheless, it is not 
certain that a stringent global climate change target is in practice compatible with 
economic growth of the kind the world has become accustomed to. 
The ideas sketched here are a reminder that global climate change presents a 
fundamental challenge to our social, cultural and political systems. It is worth bearing 
in mind that climatic change reaches far back to the origins of humankind, playing a 
role in the evolution of the human species.11 Climate change poses a challenge for 
scientists, philosophers, economists, and, most crucially, politicians and 
policymakers. Climate change is a classical over-the-horizon problem – bold policy 
steps need to be taken today, with largely no return in the near term, even while 
scientists are still engaged in putting the precise outlines to the threat. As 
demonstrated by the halting effort to address it international legal instruments, 
climate change poses enormous challenges for the international environmental 
governance. From this perspective, the response to date can be regarded as failure to 
fully acknowledge the scale of the problem. The question could justifiably be asked 
whether decision-makers and citizens have faced up to the kinds of decisions that 
will need to be made.  
One question that emerges is whether climate change poses a problem of a 
fundamentally different nature, or whether it distinguishes itself only scope from 
other global environmental issues such as biodiversity loss, or even larger 
development issues such as poverty and inequality. On the one hand it may be the 
sheer global scale of climate change, the size of the natural system - our biosphere - 
whose functioning is being affected. More important may be that while the there are 
large number of environmental and development challenges (health, water, 
sanitation) vying for attention, climate change is linked in multiple ways with almost 
all of them. It has recently been found that climate change will be one of main causes 
of biodiversity loss, threatening ecosystems such as coral reefs, and subjecting fragile 
ecosystems to change on time scales that in many cases do not permit adaptation. 
Changes in temperature and precipitation patterns threaten agriculture, settlements 
                                                 
10 DONELLA H. MEADOWS ET AL, THE LIMITS TO GROWTH (1972). The specific projections of 
resources shortages projected in the book proved wrong, and the analysis adopted in the book was 
heavily criticized.  
11 A compelling hypothesis explains the sudden extinction of species and the appearance of new ones, 
to which the fossil record testifies, with reference to environmental change, specifically climatic 
change. See WILLIAM K. STEVENS THE CHANGE IN THE WEATHER: PEOPLE, WEATHER, AND THE 
SCIENCE OF CLIMATE 19 (2001), referring to the work of Elisabeth Vrba, On the Connections between 
Paleoclimate and Evolution, in PALEOCLIMATE AND EVOLUTION, WITH EMPHASIS ON HUMAN ORIGINS 
24-25 (Vrba et al., eds., 1996). 
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and development efforts. In many cases the most severe impacts will occur where 
people are poor, directly dependent on natural systems for survival and without the 
capacity or resources to adapt. Climate change is thus relevant to development and 
poverty alleviation and is likely to worsen existing distributional inequalities.12  
 
1.1.2 The importance of economics 
Addressing climate change is in effect also a discussion concerning the 
structure of our economies and the energy systems that drive them. Almost 
invariably any debate on responses to climate change will be refer to costs – either of 
mitigation measures, or of the likely losses stemming from climate impacts. And this 
is not surprising, because the economic implications of climate change are 
significant, with considerable uncertainty. Traditional economic analysis tends to put 
a lower value on committing resources to guard against damage in the future, such as 
climate change, as opposed to other concerns such as fighting disease and providing 
access to clean water and sanitation.13 A recent study commissioned by the United 
Kingdom comprehensively analyzed the cost of climate change, coming to the 
conclusion that the early action would be considerably less costly than further delay.14 
Economic analysis provides very useful tools to evaluate the costs and 
benefits of various courses of action. Nonetheless, the very dictates of such analysis 
– focused on what is the most efficient allocation of resources in the present – may 
mean it is less useful in informing decisions which have profound, irreversible 
impacts on systems whose value cannot be analyzed adequately in monetary terms. 
For instance, how is it possible to compare a percentage loss of Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) with the potential destruction of ecosystems such as the Great 
Barrier Reef? The framework of the analysis, while potentially maximizing human 
welfare in the present, does not account adequately for irreversible impacts on the 
biosphere.  
This thesis advances the argument that a proper consideration of norms and 
values should guide the collective response to climate change, including the manner 
in which economic analysis is used to aid the decision-making process. In this 
respect, equity and fairness are guiding norms.  
Energy and its various dimensions– sources, growth rates, technology - are at 
the heart of the climate change problem. Accordingly the next section provides an 
overview of the energy challenge. The intention is to capture a few key aspects 
without doing a disservice to this complex topic. 
 
                                                 
12 See UNDP, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007/2008, FIGHTING  CLIMATE CHANGE: HUMAN 
SOLIDARITY IN A DIVIDED WORLD (2007). 
13 See for instance the “Copenhagen Consensus”, which featured a panel of prominent economists, 
including three Nobel Prize winners, who were asked to rank the spending priority of a number of 
development challenges given an extra $50 million in aid resources. Controlling HIV/Aids ranked at 
the top, while measures to combat climate change were ranked at the bottom. See Putting the World to 
Rights, THE ECONOMIST, June 3, 2004. The basic reason for coming to this conclusion is that under a 
cost-benefit analysis the economic benefits of reducing global warming are largely not felt until well 
into the 21st century—and the costs are felt immediately. See also GLOBAL CRISES, GLOBAL 
SOLUTIONS (Bjørn Lomborg, ed., 2004). 
14 STERN, supra note 6. 
  6 
 
1.1.3 The energy challenge 
Even as the steady rise in greenhouse gas emissions is beginning to make its 
effects felt, access to safe energy and effective energy remains largely out of reach in 
many developing countries. It is estimated that some 2 billion people–one-third of 
the world’s population–rely almost completely on traditional energy sources, and are 
unable to take advantage of modern forms of energy, such as electricity, that are 
taken for granted in the developed world.15 For instance, combined rural and urban 
electrification rate for sub-Saharan Africa is 26 per cent, while the figure for rural 
areas is only 8 per cent.16 The developing countries’ share of primary energy demand 
is forecast to grow from 40 per cent in 2004 to 50 per cent in 2030.17 Global energy 
demand is projected to double over this period, with over 70 per cent of the increase 
coming from developing countries.18  
Access to modern energy is increasingly widely recognized crucial to stepping 
out of poverty and for meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).19 The 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are the international community’s 
commitment to halving poverty in the world’s poorest countries by 2015. The role of 
energy in sustainable development and poverty reduction has been recognised in a 
number of United Nations declarations and other soft-law instruments. For example, 
the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation, adopted at the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development in 2002, refers extensively to energy in the context of 
sustainable development and highlights the need to enhance access to energy, 
including from renewable sources.20 Similarly, the eighth Conference of the Parties to 
the United Nations Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in New Delhi in 
2002, affirmed that “economic and social development and poverty eradication are 
the first and overriding priorities of developing country Parties” and that energy 
policies should be supportive of developing countries’ efforts to eradicate poverty.21 
The resolution adopted at the 2005 World Summit of Heads of State and 
Government addressed the question of climate change and underlines that the 
international community faced “serious and multiple challenges in tackling climate 
change, promoting clean energy, meeting energy needs and achieving sustainable 
development”.22 
Providing access to a basic minimum of energy services for household 
cooking, heating and lighting for the poor in Africa and South Asia would have only 
a modest impact on emissions.23 However, the path to full-scale industrialization, as 
is taking place in the emerging economies of Asia, is on a different scale. Overall, 
                                                 
15 U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME ET AL, WORLD ENERGY ASSESSMENT 3 (2000). 
16 INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 2, at 567. 
17 Id. at 68. 
18 Id. at 68. 
19 U.N DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME & THE WORLD BANK, ENERGY SERVICE FOR THE MILLENNIUM 
DEVELOPMENT GOALS 1 (2005). 
20 Report of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, Resolution 2, Annex, Plan of Implementation of 
the World Summit on Sustainable Development, paras. 19-20, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.199/20. 
21 Decision 1/CP.8, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Eighth Session, Addendum, Part II: Action 
taken by the parties, vol. 1, FCCC/CP/2002/7/Add.1. 
22 G.A. Res. 60/1, para. 50, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1. 
23 VIJAY MODI ET AL, ENERGY AND THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS 30-31 (2006). 
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energy consumption in developing countries remains low in both absolute terms and 
per capita terms. Per capita energy consumption in developing countries is about 
one-sixth that in Europe and one-eighth that in North America.24 
 
Commercial primary energy use by region 
Million tonnes of oil 
equivalent (Mtoe)  
Region 
2000 2006 
2006 as share 
of world total 
(percentage) 
Percentage 
growth 
2000-2006 
North America 2,737.5 2,803.0 25.8 2.4 
South & Central 
America 
456.2 528.6 4.9 15.8 
Middle East 402.9 554.2 5.1 37.5 
Africa 275.8 324.1 4.0 17.5 
Europe and 
Eurasia 
2829.2 3,027.2 27.8 6.9 
Asia Pacific 2607.0 3641.5 33.5 28.4 
World Total 9308.7 10878.5 100 16.8 
EU 27 1709.7 1781.9 16.4 4.2 
OECD 5359.6 5553.7 51.1 3.6 
Former Soviet 
Union 
941.3 1046.1 9.6 11.1 
United States 2311.9 2326.4 21.4 0.6 
Japan 514.8 520.3 4.8 1.0 
Germany 330.5 328.5 3.0 -0.6 
China 966.7 1697.8 15.6 43.0 
India 320.4 423.2 3.9 32.0 
Source: Adapted from BP, Statistical Review of World Energy (2007) 
 
The above table bears out that energy consumption has grown in all regions, 
developed and developing alike, albeit much more slowly in the former. In fact, the 
only instance in which energy demand has fallen is in the case of economic 
downturns, as in the case of the states of the former Soviet Union after the end of 
Communism. Yet as noted earlier, global energy demand is set to increase by half by 
2030 then go on to double by 2050. Over the same period, a continuation of current 
trends would see emissions more than doubling from current levels.25 To stabilize 
GHG concentrations at roughly double pre-industrial levels, which would limit 
warming to about 2 degrees Celsius, would require that global emissions fall to about 
50 per cent below 1990 levels in 2050.26 This will be a challenging task. A recent report 
by the International Energy Agency concluded that the accelerated deployment of 
                                                 
24 WRI, EARTHTRENDS ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION, http://earthtrends.wri.org/text/energy-
resources/variable-351.html (online searchable database, last accessed 8 August 2007). 
25 PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, THE WORLD IN 2050: THE IMPLICATIONS OF GLOBAL GROWTH FOR 
CARBON EMISSIONS AND CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY 3 (2006), 
http://www.pwc.com/extweb/pwcpublications.nsf/docid/dfb54c8aad6742db852571f5006dd53;  
INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, ENERGY TECHNOLOGY PERSPECTIVES – SCENARIOS AND 
STRATEGIES TO 2050 25 (2006); STERN, supra note 6, at 176-177. 
26 Michel den Elzen & Malte Meinshausen, Multi-gas Emission Pathways for Meeting the EU 2 degree Celsius 
Climate Target , in AVOIDING DANGEROUS CLIMATE CHANGE 299 (Hans Joachim Schellnhuber et al, 
eds., 2006) 
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energy technologies could return energy-related carbon dioxide emissions to their 
current levels by 2050.27 
Stabilizing concentrations at around double pre-industrial levels would entail 
a massive increase in the supply of carbon-free energy, in the order of the entire 
current global energy demand.28 A strategy to mitigate emissions must begin by 
improving the efficiency with which energy is produced – for instance, installing 
more efficient power plants - and consumed by end users, for instance through more 
efficient household appliances or compact fluorescent light bulbs (CFLs). 
Improvements in efficiency, along with changes in the source of energy, are the main 
reason that carbon dioxide emissions have risen only half as fast as world economic 
output (1.5 versus 3 percent per year).29  
Second, and crucial in the long term, it will be necessary increase energy from 
carbon-free energy sources such as renewables. Renewable energy has important co-
benefits in that it when substituted for fossil energy it reduces air pollution and 
contributes to energy security, particularly for countries that face high fuel import 
costs such as small island states. However, as the table below illustrates indicates the 
actual contribution of renewables – especially wind, solar and geothermal - is very 
low, meaning that even with dramatic increases in capacity, the share overall share is 
projected to remain fairly modest. Studies of the combined technical potential of 
bio-energy, wind, geothermal and hydro suggest that these sources will not be able to 
meet the demand for carbon-free energy.30 Theoretically solar energy, which has the 
greatest technical potential of all renewable energies, could meet global energy 
demand, but it faces technical and cost barriers. Moreover, the existing share in 2004 
of only 0.039 per cent of global energy supply underlines the limits faced in scaling 
up solar energy.31 Moreover, with some exceptions, in the absence of subsidies, 
renewable energy is currently not competitive with other energy sources.32 Naturally, 
when carbon is priced – either through a cap-and-trade scheme or a carbon tax – 
renewable energy will become more competitive. Economies of scale and technical 
innovation will over time bring down the cost of renewables. Biofuels as a substitute 
for fossil fuels in road transportation have been the subject of increased attention, 
driven energy security and climate concerns. According to one estimate biofuels 
could meet 4-7 per cent of road-transport fuel demand,33 but net greenhouse gas 
reductions from displacing fossil fuels depends on the feedstock, with corn ethanol, 
for instance, delivering significantly lower climate benefits than ethanol produced 
                                                 
27 INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, ENERGY TECHNOLOGY PERSPECTIVES, supra note 25, at 25. 
28 Martin I. Hoffert et al, Energy implications of future stabilization of atmospheric CO2 content, 395 (6704) 
NATURE, 881 (1998). 
29 Roberta Hotinski et al, Solving the Climate Problem, 46 (10) ENVIRONMENT 10 (2004). 
30 See VACLAV SMIL ENERGY AT THE CROSSROADS: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES AND UNCERTAINTIES 
(2003). RICHARD DOORNBOSCH & SIMON UPTON, INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, DO WE HAVE 
THE RIGHT R&D PRIORITIES TO SUPPORT THE ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES OF THE FUTURE? 
SG/SD/RT(2006)1 25 (2006). 
31 INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, RENEWABLES IN GLOBAL ENERGY SUPPLY: AN IEA FACT 
SHEET 3 (2007). 
32 The implicit subsidies made available for fossil fuels must be borne in mind. 
33 INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 2, at 385. 
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from sugar cane.34 Unintended consequences of increased cultivation of crops for 
biofuels production may include rising food prices, impacts on land and water 
supplies, and increased release of carbon dioxide from land cleared for cultivation.35 
Many analyses acknowledge that meeting the need for clean energy will 
depend on utilizing a number of options, which would include nuclear and carbon 
capture and storage.36 Carbon capture and storage is increasingly seen as a vital part 
of a clean energy future, and major research and development efforts are underway 
in the United States and other industrialized countries.37. This technology involves 
the separation, compression and long-term storage of carbon dioxide associated with 
from fossil fuel combustion at power plants.38 This technology, while featuring in all 
modeling of mitigation scenarios, has not yet been demonstrated on a commercial 
scale in a power plant. 
 
World Primary Energy Demand – percentage share 
 
Source: Adapted from IEA World Energy Outlook (2006) 
*Includes biomass used for heating and cooking, especially in developing countries 
**So-called “new renewables” like wind, solar, geothermal 
 
                                                 
34 INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, BIOFUELS FOR TRANSPORT: AN INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE 13 (2004). 
35 UN-ENERGY, SUSTAINABLE BIOENERGY: A FRAMEWORK FOR DECISION-MAKERS (2007), 
http://esa.un.org/un-energy/pdf/susdev.Biofuels.FAO.pdf. The clearing of land for palm oil 
production in the process releasing large amounts of carbon dioxide stored in peatlands, is turning out 
to be one of the unintended consequences of rising demand for biofuels. See e.g. Elisabeth Rosenthal, 
Once a Dream Fuel, Palm Oil May Be an Eco-nightmare, NY TIMES, January 31, 2007. 
36 Steven Pacala  & Robert Socolow, Stabilization Wedges: Solving the Climate Problem for the Next 50 Years 
with Current Technologies, 305 (5686) SCIENCE (2004); IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: MITIGATION, 
CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP III TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (Bert Metz et al eds., 2007). Some prominent 
environmental thinkers, e.g. John Lovelock now advocate nuclear energy as a crucial to combating 
climate change. See JOHN LOVELOCK, THE REVENGE OF GAIA (2007). 
37 See e.g. NATIONAL ENERGY TECHNOLOGY LABORATORY, U.S DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, 
CARBON SEQUESTRATION TECHNOLOGY ROADMAP AND PROGRAM PLAN 2007 (2007). In February 
2003, President Bush announced US$ 1 billion to construct the world’s first coal-based, zero-
emissions electricity and hydrogen power plant, also known as FuturGen. See Statement by President 
Bush, White House press release, February 27, 2003, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030227-11.html. In a February 2008 the 
Department of Energy effectively withdrew its support from the FuturGen project. See Andrew C. 
Revkin, A ‘Bold’ Step to Capture an Elusive Gas Falters, N.Y. TIMES, February 3, 2008. 
38 INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, PROSPECTS FOR CO2 CAPTURE AND STORAGE (2004); MIT, 
THE FUTURE OF COAL: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY MIT STUDY (2007), http://web.mit.edu/coal/.  
 1980 2004% 2030 2004-2030 annual 
growth 
Coal 24.6% 24.7% 26.0% 1.8% 
Oil 42.8% 35.2% 32.5% 1.3% 
Gas 17.0% 20.4% 22.5% 2.0% 
Nuclear 2.6% 6.4% 5.0% 0.7% 
Hydro 2.0% 2.1% 2.39% 2.0% 
*Biomass and waste 10.4% 10.5% 9.2% 1.3% 
**Other renewables 0.44% 0.50% 1.7% 6.6% 
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It is widely acknowledged that current expenditures on energy R&D, from 
both public and private sources, are inadequate.39 This presents a major challenge. 
Equally, the cycle running from innovation and through commercial deployment will 
need to be compressed if critical technologies are to be brought into operation at the 
scale to make a difference.  
Finally, it must be borne in mind that fossil fuels are abundant and 
convenient, with few ready substitutes in sectors such as transportation, where 
emissions are growing rapidly. The world’s poor, who tend to be on the lowest rung 
of the energy ladder, are indifferent to the source of improved energy services, fossil 
or otherwise, provided these are safe, reliable and affordable. They cannot be 
expected to pay a premium for more expensive, albeit cleaner, energy. Convenience 
and cost will always influence energy policies and as well as the choices made by 
households and individuals. New technologies and sources of energy face the 
challenge of competing with fuels that are ubiquitous, reliable and supported by well-
developed, sophisticated infrastructure. The central role of energy in modern life 
means that this is where the battle against climate change must be joined. 
The next section briefly outlines the science of climate change. 
 
1.2 The science of climate change 
The remainder of this chapter provides and overview of the science of 
climate change drawing largely on the reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC), an international, multi-disciplinary assessment body 
established by the United Nations.40 The material covered is intended to frame and 
inform the analysis in subsequent chapters. The information is based on the 
consensus contained in the reports of the IPPC, especially the Fourth Assessment 
Report (4AR). An understanding of the general methodology employed to arrive at 
these consensus conclusions is important as it informs and underpins the ideas 
advanced in this thesis. Science is coming to the fore in new ways, influencing 
institutions, including those setting norms at the international level. Science 
influences how the problem is framed. At same time, political processes bear on the 
way in which scientific output is received and used in policymaking. 
 
1.2.1 Emission trends 
The primary contributor to global climate change is carbon dioxide (CO2), 
which is released by the burning of fossil fuels, as well as land-use change. CO2 
emissions from fossil fuel use have risen to 26.4 billion metric tons per year in 2000–
2005, with the contribution of carbon dioxide emissions from land-use change 
(mainly deforestation) being estimated at 5.9 billion metric tons per year during the 
1990s.41  
                                                 
39 See for the statistics from the OECD group of industrialized countries, Doornbosch & Upton, supra 
note 30, at 31-32. They note that in most industrialized countries public sector R&D expenditure has 
been rising in real terms, while energy R&D has declined steeply from a peak in the early 1980s, 
although there are recent signs of a rise in spending. 
40 See chapter 2. 
41 IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, supra note 7, at 2-3. 
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Beginning a sharp rise after 1945, global CO2 emissions from fossil fuel 
combustion increased by over 70 per cent between 1973 and 2005.42 Over the period 
from 1990-2004, overall GHG emissions in industrialized countries experienced a 
slight decline, but this was largely due to a fall in emissions from countries with 
economies in transition as a result of economic contraction and restructuring, which 
offset the rise in emissions from highly industrialized countries.43  In developing 
countries, CO 2 emissions nearly doubled between 1990 and 2002.44 At the same time, 
economic growth in the large emerging economies of Asia has been significantly 
faster than growth in CO2 emissions, so that their emissions intensity has fallen. The 
percentage rise in emissions from some developed countries such as the United 
States (13 per cent) and Canada (22 per cent) appears modest alongside the torrid 
growth rates of some developing countries, such as China (50 per cent), Indonesia 
(97 per cent) and the Republic of Korea (97 per cent). However, the sheer size of the 
United States means that its increase in CO2 emissions was roughly equal to the 
combined increase from Brazil, India, Indonesia and Mexico.45 It is worth noting that 
a comparatively small number of countries produce the largest share of global GHG 
emissions: 25 countries account for account for around 83 percent of global 
emissions.46  The United States is the largest emitter, with 21 per cent of global 
emissions, followed by China with 15 percent. Some 140 countries contribute only 
10 percent of annual emissions. On a per capita basis, developing regions continue to 
emit far less CO2 than developed regions. Australia, the United States and Canada 
rank in the top ten countries with the highest per capita emissions, and their per 
capita emissions are more than twice those of the European Union, six times those 
of China, and 13 times those of India.47 An individual in sub-Saharan Africa accounts 
for roughly one tenth of the CO2 produced by an average person in the developed 
world.48 
 
1.2.2 The greenhouse gases 
According the IPCC, atmospheric concentrations of the three main 
greenhouse gases - carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide - have increased 
sharply as a result of human activities since 1750 and now far exceed pre-industrial 
values determined from ice cores spanning thousands of years.49 The concentration 
of carbon dioxide in 2005 stood at 379 parts per million (ppm), an increase of 35 per 
cent over the pre-industrial level of about 280 ppm. This exceeds by far the natural 
range over the last 650,000 years as determined from ice cores.50  Atmospheric 
concentrations of methane (148 per cent) and nitrous oxides (18 per cent) have also 
                                                 
42 INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, KEY WORLD ENERGY STATISTICS 44 (2007). 
43 UNFCCC SECRETARIAT, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE: 
THE FIRST 10 YEARS 24 (2004). 
44 WRI, supra note 3,at 13. 
45 See id. 
46 See id. at 11. 
47 See id. at 21. 
48 INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, STATISTICS, supra note 42, at 48. 
49 IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, supra note 7, at 2. 
50 See id. 
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increased relative to pre-industrial levels.51 These, together with three other fluorine-
containing gases, constitute the “basket” of greenhouse gases controlled under the 
Kyoto Protocol. Although concentrations of the industrial fluorinated gases - 
hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), which are used as substitutes for ozone-depleting 
substances, some of which are also GHGs, perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and sodium 
hexafluoride (SF6) – are only small contributors to warming, their concentrations are 
increasing rapidly.52 
The concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere is a function of the amount of 
CO2 emitted – from the burning of fossil fuels and changes in land use – and the 
capacity of sinks, such as the oceans and biosphere, to absorb CO2. Over the past 
two hundred years the about half the carbon emitted from fossil fuel use has been 
absorbed by the oceans, with the rate of absorption increasing.53 In the long run, the 
absorptive capacity of the oceans and the terrestrial ecosystems marks the ultimate 
stabilization level for human carbon dioxide emissions.  
Greenhouse gases remain in the atmosphere for decades, with residency 
periods for some gases ranging from decades to hundreds of years. During their 
residence in the atmosphere, the molecules concerned generally retain their warming 
potential, meaning that those emitted today will still exert their influence years from 
now. Furthermore, because the oceans store and release solar energy more slowly 
than the air – a characteristic known as thermal inertia – some additional warming 
and sea level rise is already in the system. For policy makers this time lag is another 
reason not to delay action until the consequences of GHG emissions become fully 
apparent. According to the IPCC, even if GHG concentrations were held steady at 
2000 levels, a further warming of 0.1 degrees Celsius per decade would be expected.54  
 
1.2.3 Key findings of the IPCC 
The scientific consensus is reflected in the reports of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The latest reports date from 2007. The IPCC 
carries out its scientific assessment via three thematic working groups addressing: the 
scientific basis for climate change (WGI); the impacts, adaptation and vulnerability 
(WGII); and mitigation (WGIII). Each voluminous report is accompanied by a more 
accessible “summary for policymakers”. The Second Assessment Report, issued in 
1995, stated that: “The balance of evidence suggests a discernible human influence 
on global climate.”55 By the time of the Third Assessment Report, issued in 2001, the 
IPCC concluded that: “In the light of new evidence and taking into account the 
remaining uncertainties, most of the observed warming over the past 50 years is 
                                                 
51 See id. at 3. 
52 See id. at 13. HFCs have been used as substitute for CFCs in refrigeration, while PFCs are emitted 
during the production of aluminum. Ozone depleting substances that are also GHGs are regulated 
under the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer of 1987. The climate 
impact of such gases has peaked and is declining.  
53 Christopher L. Sabine et al., The Oceanic Sink for Anthropogenic CO2, 305 (5682) SCIENCE 367 (2004). 
54 IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, supra note 7, at 12. 
55 IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 1995: THE SCIENCE OF CLIMATE CHANGE, CONTRIBUTION OF 
WORKING GROUP I TO THE SECOND ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL 
ON CLIMATE CHANGE (John Haughton et al, eds., 1996). 
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likely to have been due to the increase in greenhouse gas concentrations.”56 (In the 
parlance of the IPCC, “likely” denotes a 60-90 per cent likelihood). The 2007 Fourth 
Assessment Report described warming of the climate system as “unequivocal”, based 
on increases in global average air and ocean temperatures and other observations.57 It 
is very likely, in other words greater than 90 per cent likelihood, that most of the 
warming is due to the increase in the concentration of greenhouse gases from human 
activities.58 
Among the other key findings of the IPCC in the fourth assessment report 
are:   
· The last 12 years (1995-2006) rank as among the 12 warmest since 
measurements of surface temperatures began in 1850. 
· Warming during the past 100 years was 0.74 degrees Celsius, with most of 
the warming occurring during the past 50 years. The warming for the next 20 
years is projected to be 0.2 °C per decade. 
· The global increases in atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations are due to 
fossil fuel use and land-use changes (deforestation). 
· Atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide in 2005 exceeded by far the 
natural range over the past 650,000 years. 
· Various long-term changes in climate have been observed, including rising 
Arctic temperatures and reduced sea ice, the frequency of heavy precipitation 
events (flooding) has increased, as have change in extreme temperatures 
(more hot days and heat waves). 
 
In understanding temperature projections, a number of things ought to be 
borne in mind: first, this is a global average, meaning that some regions, such as the 
sub-Arctic regions, have warmed by as much as double that;59 second, this warming 
is likely to have been the largest of any century during the past 1000 years; third, 
ecological systems, and the social systems dependent on them, are complex and 
sensitive, so that even seemingly small shifts in temperature may have unpredictable 
consequences.  
 
1.2.4 Climate impacts 
Human systems that are sensitive to climate change include water resources, 
agriculture and forestry, fisheries, human settlements and human health. Projected 
impacts are largely negative – aside from increased potential crop yields in some 
regions at mid-latitude, increased water supply in some water-scarce regions such as 
South-East Asia, and reduced energy demand for space heating due to higher winter 
temperatures.60 Potential adverse impacts include a general reduction in crop yields in 
                                                 
56 IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I TO 
THE THIRD ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 10 
(John Houghton et al eds., 2001). 
57 IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, supra note 7, at 5. 
58 See id. at 5, 10. 
59 See id. at 7. 
60 IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY,  CONTRIBUTION OF 
WORKING GROUP II TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL 
ON CLIMATE CHANGE (Martin L. Parry et al eds., 2007). 
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most tropical and sub-tropical regions; decreased water availability in many water 
scarce regions, particularly in the sub-tropics; an increase in the number of people 
exposed to vector-borne diseases (malaria) and water-borne diseases, and increase in 
heat stress mortality; a widespread increase in the risk of flooding and from heavy 
precipitation events and sea-level rise; and increased energy demand for space 
cooling due to higher summer temperatures.61  
According to the IPCC, by mid-century, annual average river runoff and 
water availability will increase at high latitudes and in some wet tropical areas, but 
will decrease by 10-30 per cent over some dry regions at mid-latitudes and in the dry 
tropics. Some of the affected areas are water stressed, and coincide with regions 
where poverty is widespread, for example Africa. Provision of clean drinking water is 
a key challenge in developing countries, where currently some 1.1 billion people lack 
access to safe water and 2.6 billion lack access to improved sanitation. Linked to this 
are 4 billion cases of diarrhea per year, which cause 1.8 million deaths, mostly among 
children under five.62 
Climate change will also have an uneven impact on food production. 
Moderate temperature increases will see a rise in productivity at the global level, but 
at lower latitudes, especially seasonally dry and tropical regions, crop productivity is 
projected to decrease for even small local temperature increases (1-2°C), increasing 
risk of hunger.63 Increased CO2 concentrations stimulate crop growth and yield, but 
the negative effects of heat and drought may counteract this effect. Recent research 
that compared actual data on rice yields and temperatures over 25 years found that 
crop yields had dropped by 10 per cent.64 In some African countries, yields from 
rain-fed agriculture could be reduced by up to 50 per cent by 2020. Farmers in such 
areas are unlikely to be able to afford adaptive technologies such as improved 
irrigation or new cultivars. 
There is evidence that climate change is already having adverse impacts on 
health, for instance in the case of increased mortality from heat waves.65 Projected 
health impacts of climate are likely to affect millions of people, particularly the poor 
and those lacking access to medical are, through increased deaths resulting from heat 
waves and higher incidence of waterborne disease, such as diarrhea. While it is true, 
as is sometimes contended, argued that public health interventions can cope with the 
spread of diseases resulting from climate change, this cannot necessarily be said of 
developing countries characterized by weak public health systems.  
A range of natural systems – the IPCC specifically mentions coral reefs, 
glaciers, atolls, and mangroves – are at risk from climate change. A key factor in 
determining impact is the rate of change – in many cases ecosystems that have in 
                                                 
61 See id. at 16. 
62 UNICEF & WHO, MEETING THE MDG DRINKING WATER AND SANITATION TARGET: A MID-
TERM ASSESSMENT (2004). 
63 IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, supra note 60, at 11. 
64 The fact that warming leads to increased night-time temperatures, when rice plants respire, is 
behind the adverse impact. See Fred Pearce, Rice Yields Plummet Due to Balmy Nights, NEW SCIENTIST, 
June 29, 2004, accessible at http://www.newscientist.com/news/news.jsp?id=ns99996082; Shaobing 
Peng et al, Rice yields decline with higher night temperature from global warming, 101(27) PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE UNITED STATES 9971-9975 (2004). 
65 IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, supra note 60, at 9. 
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past adapted to gradual temperatures may simply not be able to adapt to such 
comparatively rapid change. Understanding the adaptive capacity of ecosystems is 
complex, research indicates that climate change is already having an impact on 
biodiversity and could rival habitat destruction as a cause of extinctions.66 In coral 
reefs mild temperature changes, in the range of 1-2 degrees Celsius, can result in 
“bleaching” – the expulsion of the symbiotic algae that nourish the coral polyps.67 A 
majority of corals are expected to exceed their bleaching thresholds by 2030 to 
2050.68 Furthermore, recent studies suggest that the absorption of CO2 by the oceans 
has reduced the natural alkalinity of seawater, which could have a negative effect on 
the reef-building ability of corals and shell production in some mollusks and 
plankton.69 On land, fragile mountain ecosystems also face rapid change.70 The IPCC 
states that there has been widespread retreat of mountain glaciers in non-polar 
regions during the 20th century.71 In the Andes it is estimated that glaciers have 
retreated by us as much as 25 per cent in the last 30 years, which could mean water 
shortages in the future.72 
The global mean sea level is projected to rise by 0.18 to 0.59 meters by the 
last decade of the 21st century, largely due to the thermal expansion of the oceans 
and freshwater inflows from melting glaciers and ice caps.73 Low-lying islands and 
the mega-deltas of Africa (Nile) and Asia (Bangladesh) are most at risk from the risk 
from rising seas. The effects of rising sea levels and storm surges are already being 
experienced in the form of accelerated coastal erosion, forcing some communities to 
contemplate retreat from the ocean or the construction of costly coastal defenses.74 
Rising sea levels from thermal expansion are projected to continue for hundreds of 
years after the stabilization of GHG concentrations (even at present levels), as a 
consequence of time it takes for the deep ocean layers to adjust to warming. 
Similarly, melting ice sheets will feed rising sea levels thousands of years after 
emissions have stabilized. While recent years have witnessed dramatic collapses of ice 
                                                 
66 James Gorman, Scientists Predict Widespread Extinction by Global Warming, N.Y. TIMES, January 8, 2004, 
at A4. MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING: CURRENT 
STATE AND TRENDS, FINDINGS OF THE CONDITION AND TRENDS WORKING GROUP (2005). 
67 ROBERT W. BUDDEMEIER ET AL, CORAL REEFS AND GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE: POTENTIAL 
CONTRIBUTIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE TO STRESSES ON CORAL REEF ECOSYSTEMS (Report 
Prepared for the Pew Center on Global Climate Change, 2004).  
68 IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, supra note 60, at 235. 
69 Andrew C. Revkin, Carbon Dioxide Extends its Harmful Reach to Oceans, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2004, F3. 
See also Sabine, supra note 53, at 367-371; Richard A. Feely et al, The Impact of Anthropogenic CO2 on the 
CaCO3 System in the Oceans, 305 (5682) SCIENCE 362-366 (2004). 
70 E.g., alpine meadows in the Rocky Mountains are likely to disappear. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE, THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S THIRD NATIONAL COMMUNICATION UNDER THE 
UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE (2002). Andean cloud forests, 
a biodiversity “hotspot” are another example of an ecosystem at immediate risk. See Mark B. Bush et 
al, 48, 000 Years of Climate and Forest Change in a Biodiversity Hot Spot, 303(5659) SCIENCE 827 (2004). 
71 IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, supra note 7, at 5. 
72 Juan Forero, As Andean Glaciers Shrink, Water Worries Grow,  N.Y. TIMES, November 24, 2002, at A3. 
73 IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, supra note 7, at 13-14. Sea-level 
estimates from the Fourth Assessment are for 2090-2099. 
74 Massachusetts v. EPA 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007). The Court found that the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts had standing to sue the EPA for denial of a rulemaking petition under the Clean Air 
Act, based actual and imminent harm, including damage to coastal areas caused by rising sea-levels. 
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shelves – masses of floating ice that are extensions of terrestrial ice sheets – these do 
not have any effect on sea levels.75  If fully melted, the Antarctic and Greenland ice 
sheets hold enough water to raise global sea levels by 64 meters.76 Recent research 
suggests that the Antarctic ice sheet appears to be losing mass, in part due to 
accelerated ice flows, but significant uncertainty remains.77 There is somewhat greater 
certainty that loss of ice mass is occurring in Greenland, driven by increased melting 
and accelerated ice flow.78  
Besides raising sea levels, the inflow of freshwater from the melting 
Greenland ice cap could contribute to a slowing of the ocean conveyor during the 
21st century, but a halt is regarded as unlikely.79 The ocean circulation occurs as cold, 
dense water near Iceland and Greenland sinks and flows southward in the deep as 
warm water from the tropics drifts slowly northward nearer the surface, allowing 
Northern Europe to enjoy a climate significantly milder than it otherwise would 
given its latitude. A weakening of the circulation would lead to a reduction of heat 
transport to the Northern Hemisphere, but models nonetheless project a warming 
over Europe due to increased GHGs.80 There is some evidence that salinity in the 
deep water of the North Atlantic and Arctic has decreased, with increased salinity 
observed in the tropical Atlantic.81 Other irreversible changes with major impacts but 
low probabilities include accelerated global warming due to carbon cycle feedbacks 
in the terrestrial biosphere and releases of terrestrial carbon from permafrost regions 
and methane from hydrates in coastal sediments.82  
Potentially serious impacts may also result from the increase in climate 
extremes, as reflected in the damage caused by droughts, floods, heat waves and 
windstorms. The IPCC states that it is very likely (greater than 90 per cent likelihood) 
that hot extremes, heat waves and heavy precipitation events will increase in 
frequency.83 Although it is methodologically not possible to establish a causal link 
between specific instances of more extreme or frequent extreme events and climate 
                                                 
75 The Larsen B ice shelf in Antarctica, 200 meters thick and 3,250 square kilometers in size, collapsed 
suddenly in March 2002. See Andrew C. Revkin, Large Ice Shelf in Antarctica Disintegrates at Great Speed, 
N.Y. TIMES, March 20, 2002, at A13. 
76 IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, supra note 7, at 361. 
77 See id. at 361.  
78 Andrew C. Revkin, An Icy Riddle as Big as Greenland, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2004, at F1. Research 
indicates that inland melting can have outsize effects on the ice sheets because meltwater formed on 
the surface percolates down through cracks in the ice, acting like a lubricant causing ice to slide more 
smoothly over the bedrock and onward to the sea. 
79 IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, supra note 7, at 16. 
80 See id. 
81 See Bob Dickson et al, Rapid Freshening of the deep North Atlantic Ocean over the past four decades, 416 
NATURE 832 (2002); Bogi Hansen, Decreasing overflow from the Nordic seas into the Atlantic Ocean through the 
Faroe Bank channel since 1950, 411 NATURE 927 (2001). Researchers found that hydrographic records 
and other observations show that the flows of cold, dense water from near Greenland and Iceland to 
the Atlantic had decreased. The water that cools and becomes dense near Greenland sinks, but before 
it can drive the circulation effectively it must push cold bottom water over the sills of the Greenland-
Scotland ridge and into the deep Atlantic.  
82 IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY, CONTRIBUTION OF 
WG II TO THE THIRD ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE 6 (Osvaldo F. Canziani et al, eds., 2001). 
83 IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, supra note 7, at 15. 
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change, it is likely that the increase in some areas in droughts and more intense high 
precipitation events is the result of climate change. The summer of 2003 saw record 
temperatures across Europe. The heat wave was blamed for unusually high mortality 
in France and elsewhere in Europe.84 By the reckoning of the insurance industry 
there has been an increase in the frequency of extreme weather events and a 
concomitant increase in losses from weather-related events. 
Climate change will have a disproportionate effect on developing countries, 
especially the least developed countries. The reasons are twofold. First, the ability of 
human systems of adapt to and cope with climate change depends on factors such as 
wealth, technology, education, skills, infrastructure, access to resources, and 
management capabilities. For instance, while the Netherlands, with some half its 
surface area below sea level has the resources to further enhance its very extensive 
(and expensive) system of dykes and controls, a nation such as Bangladesh simply 
cannot afford similar protective measures. Developing countries lack adaptive 
capacity and more vulnerable to climate change, as they are to other stresses. Second, 
regional projections, although not perfect, provide an outline of more severe impacts 
in regions where most developing countries are situated. E xamples are the likelihood 
of increased drying over mid-latitude continental interiors, with decreased water 
availability in water scarce regions, a reduction in crop yields in most tropical and 
sub-tropical regions, and flooding from heavier rainfall, as well as sea level rise, 
which is already impacting island states. Populations reliant on rain-fed subsistence 
agriculture that lack access to technology (drought resistant crops) and live in 
geographical areas that will be hard hit (such sub-Saharan Africa) are therefore 
doubly at risk. The distribution of impacts and the relative capacity to adapt raises 
questions of equity and sustainable development.   
 
1.2.5 Uncertainties and feedbacks 
Scientists studying climate change are usually quick to acknowledge the 
uncertainties that accompany their findings. Estimates of emissions suggest a 
doubling of CO2 concentrations by mid-century, resulting in a warming of more than 
1 to nearly 6 degrees Celsius by the end of the 21st century.85 Warming at the upper 
end of this range, more likely for tripling of CO2, could very well trigger to large-
scale, irreversible events such as massive flooding from melting of the Antarctic ice 
sheets, with a dramatic effect on human and natural systems. While future climate 
change was once regarded as a gradual warming, it is now accepted that abrupt, non-
linear change is a possibility. Abrupt climate change can occur when the Earth 
system is pushed across a threshold, either by a natural occurrence, such as a 
volcanic eruption, or possibly forcing from anthropogenic emissions.86 Scientists and 
policymakers alike face challenges when dealing with uncertainty. It is difficult to 
                                                 
84 The French Health Ministry estimated that there were an estimated 11 435 additional deaths during 
the first two weeks of August than in the same period during recent years. See Heat wave killed 11,000 in 
France, ASSOCIATED PRESS, August 29, 2003. According to the insurer Munich Re, the heat wave 
caused some 20 000 deaths in Europe and resulted in property damages of US $13 billion. See 
MUNICH RE, TOPICSGEO ANNUAL REVIEW: NATURAL CATASTROPHES 2003 23-25 (2004), available at 
http://www.munichre.com.  
85 IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS, supra note 56, at 12-13. 
86 NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES ABRUPT CLIMATE CHANGE: INEVITABLE SURPRISES (2002). 
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incorporate low probability, high impact events into models and assessments, so that 
most researchers produce analyses that are essentially surprise free.87 
At times the media, when it takes note of the issue, seizes on the remote, 
catastrophic possibilities, ignoring the less head-line-grabbing aspects of climate 
change. There is also a tendency to equate local experiences of extreme weather 
events with climate change; global warming entered the public consciousness in the 
United States in 1988, in the middle of a heat wave, and a more recent surge interest 
can probably be attributed to Hurricane Katrina, as well as the Al Gore 
documentary, An Inconvenient Truth. In many cases scientists, while agreeing that 
change is occurring, disagree about the severity, the timescales involved, or even the 
cause. The process of testing hypotheses leaves specific questions unanswered, with 
in contradictory explanations being posited, to be resolved only through new 
observations or improved computer modeling. The existence of complex 
interactions and feedbacks in the climate system sometimes contributes to the lack of 
ready-made and definitive answers. This should not, however, detract from the 
urgent need for action, particularly because in many cases climate impacts will be 
irreversible. Early action also constitutes a form of insurance against climate 
“surprises”. 
 
1.3 Thesis outline 
The thesis continues in chapter two with an examination of the institutional 
dimension of climate change science and the process of integrating contested 
knowledge into the climate change regime. The widely held view that scientific 
conclusions are properly arrived at in isolation from policy-making and politics is 
increasingly being challenged. Rather, it is increasingly recognized that science is 
subjected to the push and pull of various stakeholder interests, and its claims to 
validity are contested. This leads to the question of which interests are advanced in 
the interaction between the climate science assessment process and international 
policymaking. How does the assessment process contribute to setting the climate 
change agenda? How does the politics around climate change interact with and 
potentially influence “accepted” conclusions in science of climate change? The role 
of science in policymaking at the national level has been studied extensively;88 rather 
less attention has been paid to science and its role in international environmental 
governance. By examining the genesis and working methods of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), this chapter highlights the 
manner in which the science has influenced the political process and the creation of 
new norms at the international level. It will be seen that the politics around the 
international climate change negotiating process had a major hand in shaping the 
IPCC, a unique institution that operates on the basis of intergovernmental 
consensus, but at the same time must maintain its scientific credibility.  
                                                 
87 Stephen H. Schneider & Kirstin Kuntz-Duriseti, Uncertainty and Climate Change Policy, in CLIMATE 
CHANGE POLICY: A SURVEY 58 (Stephen H. Schneider et al eds., 2002). 
88 Sheila Jasanoff, Contingent Knowledge: Implications for Implementation and Compliance, in ENGAGING 
COUNTRIES: STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDS 63 
(Edith Brown Weiss & Harold K. Jacobson, eds., 1998); YARON EZRAHI, THE DESCENT OF ICARUS: 
SCIENCE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACY (1990). 
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The third chapter provides an overview of the United Nations Framework 
Convention (UNFCCC) and its Kyoto Protocol in greater detail. The chapter covers 
the genesis of these two instruments and introduces their key provisions. It then 
goes on to trace the operation and elaboration of the climate change regime through 
successive meetings of supreme bodies of these two instruments, respectively the 
Conference of the Parties (COPs) of the UNFCCC and Conference of the Parties 
serving as the Meeting of the Parties (COP/MOP) to the Kyoto Protocol.  
Chapter four maps out various approaches and conceptions to fairness. 
Fairness and equity claims are a major part of the climate change regime. The 
Framework Convention - the universally accepted legal instrument for action to 
combat climate change - assigns a prominent place to equity.89 In December 2007, 
the parties agreed to launch negotiations on a post-2012 climate agreement, which to 
be successful will need to deliver both bigger emission cuts and engage a wider group 
of states than is currently the case under the Kyoto Protocol. The climate policy 
negotiated in the next few years will decide how the burden of responding to climate 
change will be apportioned. It is no surprise then that equity and fairness concerns 
are moving into the limelight. The analysis in this chapter aims to outline the 
foundations of fairness and equity, before moving on to identify a number of 
principles that could contribute to a rough, working consensus on fairness and equity 
in climate change. While general dimensions of fairness are considered, the analysis 
focuses on allocating responsibility for addressing climate change through mitigation 
action.  
Having analyzed fairness at a theoretical level in the previous chapter, 
chapter five proceeds to identify and analyze the fairness and equity principles 
embedded in the Convention and the Protocol. Extensive reference is made to the 
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, which is a mainstay of the 
international discourse on climate change. As potential examples of fairness and 
equity in practice, the implementation of provisions relating to technology transfer 
and financial assistance are also examined in more detail.  
Chapter six evaluates a selection of proposals for a future climate policy 
against the equity and fairness principles identified in chapter four, as well as a set of 
policy criteria. A good, albeit preliminary, indication of the usefulness of equity and 
fairness principles would appear from the extent to which climate change policy 
proposals do – or do not - reflect a balance of equity principles. This chapter also 
identifies and applies a selection of policy assessment criteria drawn from the 
literature. At this point it should be noted that to a considerable degree the 
discussion of equity and fairness in chapters four and five could be applicable to 
both adaptation to the impacts of climate change and the mitigation of greenhouse 
gas emissions. Both adaptation and mitigation are undeniably important. The focus 
in chapter six, however, is on mitigation and, in particular, specific proposals for 
climate policy, the emphasis of which tends to be on mitigation efforts. This word of 
                                                 
89 The European Commission and 191 States have ratified or acceded to the Convention, leaving as 
the only non-parties Andorra, The Holy See, Iraq and Somalia. See  website of the UNFCCC 
secretariat, 
http://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/convention/status_of_ratification/application/pdf/unf
ccc_conv_rat.pdf (last accessed 7 February 2008). 
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caution is necessary because adaptation raises equity concerns that, while important, 
fall outside the scope of this thesis.90 
The conclusion seeks to draw together the strands of the analysis, and then 
proceeds to make a number of proposals for future climate policy. It is suggested 
that these proposals would contribute to a post-Kyoto climate agreement that is 
consonant with fairness and equity principles as articulated in the prior analysis, 
while also being capable of implementation taking into prevailing economic and 
political realities. 
 
 
 
                                                 
90 For a discussion of fairness in the context of adaptation, see FAIRNESS IN ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE 
CHANGE (Neil Adger et al, eds., 2006). 
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Chapter 2 - Science and politics 
 
2.1 Climate change as a policy concern  
During the course of the 19th and early 20th centuries a number of attempts 
were made to improve the understanding of the relationship between the surface 
temperature of the Earth and the chemical composition of the atmosphere.1 From 
the 1950s onwards, scientists continued assemble the various pieces of the puzzle, 
working on such projects as accurately measuring CO2 concentrations in the 
atmosphere to detecting samples in ice cores. These scientists were working in 
different disciplines, within national funding priorities and disconnected from an 
international legal or institutional framework concerning climate change. A further 
development began to take place when the scientific concern started to be reflected 
in the national and international policy agenda. A key step was the awareness of 
environmental issues that came about following the United Nations Conference on 
Human Development, held in Stockholm in 1972. Although environmental agenda 
that flowed from Stockholm tended to focus on tackling particular pollutants whose 
effect was generally local such as oil spills, the heightened awareness of 
environmental degradation ushered in by Stockholm did set the stage for 
international and intergovernmental attention to climate change.  
A tentative step in the migration from the realm of science to that of policy 
occurred in 1979, with the First World Climate Conference in Geneva, at which the 
World Climate Research Programme (WCRP) was launched, setting in motion a 
series of international meetings organised under the auspices of the World 
Meteorological Organization (WMO), the United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP), and the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU).2 At the Villach 
conference in Austria in 1985, an international group of scientists reached the 
consensus conclusion that as a result of an increase in the concentration of 
greenhouse gases a significant rise in global mean temperatures could occur in the 
next century and that States should initiate consideration of developing a climate 
change convention. This and other international meetings, as well as the activities of 
national research bodies, resulted in a significant degree of consensus-building 
among climate scientists. Attempts made to expand the research agenda under the 
umbrella of the ICSU brought together the geophysical and biological sciences in an 
International Geosphere-Biosphere Programme (IGBP).3  
The emerging concern among scientists would probably not have been 
sufficient to lead to political action had it not been for number of additional factors.4 
First, the immediate threat posed by the “ozone hole” alarmed the public and 
galvanized politicians into action; it was an important example of scientific advice 
appearing to play a key role in initiating an international agreement. The geophysical 
                                                 
1 See chapter 1. 
2 Tora Skodvin, The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, in SCIENCE AND POLITICS IN 
INTERNATIONAL REGIMES: BETWEEN INTEGRITY AND INVOLVEMENT 164 (Steinar Andresen, Tora 
Skodvin, Arild Underdal & Jorgen Wettestad, eds., 2000). 
3 SPENCER R. WEART, THE DISCOVERY OF GLOBAL WARMING 151-152 (2003). 
4 Daniel Bodansky, The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A Commentary  18 YALE J. 
INT’L L. 451, 460-461 (1993) 
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research had borne fruit with the identification of the hazards posed to the ozone 
layer. When evidence of effect of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) emerged, states 
adopted the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer5 and its 
Montreal Protocol that provided for the phasing out of ozone depleting substances.6 
Second, a number of leading scientists acted to raise the profile of climate change as 
an issue at every opportunity.7 Finally, several authors have attributed the increased 
public awareness of climate change to the effect of the unusual weather events of 
1988 – a series of heat waves struck the United States – and the hearings on climate 
change held before the United States Congress.8  
A further milestone in the process of bringing climate change to the attention 
of policy makers occurred in 1988 at the “World Conference on the Changing 
Atmosphere: Implications for Global Security”, known as the Toronto Conference. 
Some 340 individuals, among them more than one hundred government officials, as 
well as scientists, industry representatives and environmentalists participated in the 
meeting.9 Government officials did not attend in their representative capacities, and 
the meeting was not vested with a formal mandate; nonetheless, the Conference 
issued an influential set of recommendations, including that by 2000 global CO2 
emissions should be cut by 20% below 1988 levels, and that States should develop a 
comprehensive framework convention on the law of the atmosphere. The Toronto 
Conference is generally seen as a turning point as far as the discussion of climate 
change as an international issue is concerned. 
 
2.2 Establishing the IPCC 
Even as climate change gained in public prominence the first steps were 
already being taken to address climate change at the intergovernmental level. A 
sometimes-overlooked fact is that the movement to establish the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) had been set in motion well before the Toronto 
Conference and in advance of the hot summer of 1988. A close observer traces the 
genesis of the IPCC to the activism of the Director of United Nations Environment 
Programme (who had written to the US administration suggesting a climate 
convention), the dissatisfaction of the US with an early international panel to study 
the issue, and the disagreement on the climate change issue between the various U.S. 
agencies.10 A crucial actor was the United States, which as the largest greenhouse gas 
                                                 
5 Vienna Convention for the Protect ion of the Ozone Layer, March 22, 1985, 1513 U.N.T.S. 293. 
6 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, September 16, 1987, 26 ILM 1541, 
1522 U.N.T.S. 3. The text of Montreal Protocol as amended is available on the website of the Ozone 
Secretariat at http://www.unep.org/ozone/pdfs/Montreal-Protocol2000.pdf 
7 Bodansky, supra note 4, at 460-461. 
8 WEART, supra note 3, at 154-155; W ILLIAM K. STEVENS, THE CHANGE IN THE WEATHER: PEOPLE, 
WEATHER AND THE SCIENCE OF CLIMATE 132-133 (2001). 
9 Bodansky, supra note 4, at 461-462. 
10 SHARDUL AGRAWALA, EXPLAINING THE EVOLUTION OF THE IPCC STRUCTURE AND PROCESS, 5 
(ENRP Discussion Paper E-97-05, Kennedy School of Government, 1997). Bodansky supra note 4, at 
464 points out that the United States, before any other Western country, approached climate change 
from an economic perspective, due to the involvement of domestic bureaucratic actors such as the 
Departments of Energy, Interior and Commerce. See also SONJA BOEHMER-CHRISTIANSEN AND 
AYNSLEY KELLOW, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: INTERESTS AND THE FAILURE OF 
THE KYOTO PROCESS 131 (2002). Boehmer-Christiansen and Kellow support the view that 
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emitter had a great deal at stake in relation to potential mitigation measures. A 
powerful domestic fossil fuel lobby was also in a position to have its voice heard. 
Lastly, the various agencies had significant experience with domestic with climate 
assessment programs.11 Against this backdrop the proposal for an intergovernmental 
scientific assessment process was regarded as a good option, serving also to assert 
governmental control over the assessment process, which had been begun earlier 
under the auspices of the Advisory Group on Greenhouse Gases, a body composed 
of scientists that was not affiliated with governments, and which was involved in 
carrying out early assessments.12  
In May 1987 the Executive Council of the World Meteorological 
Organization (WMO) requested its Secretary-General, “in coordination with the 
Executive Director of UNEP to establish an intergovernmental mechanism to carry 
out internationally coordinated scientific assessments of the magnitude, impact and 
potential timing of climate change”.13 In turn, the UNEP Governing Council 
adopted a resolution welcoming the WMO initiative and requesting Executive 
Director to work with WMO to establish such an intergovernmental assessment 
body.14 Discussions among these two bodies and member countries, especially the 
United States, led to drawing up of the tentative terms of reference of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), as it came to be known. As has 
been pointed out, a number of key decisions were made at this early stage, prominent 
among them the decisions to opt to bestow a comprehensive assessment mandate on 
the IPCC, looking at the science, the impacts of climate change and responses.15 
Ahead of the first meeting of the IPCC in November 1988, Malta introduced an 
agenda item entitled “Conservation of climate as part of the common heritage of 
mankind” in the United Nations General Assembly. The resolution that was adopted 
endorsed the decision to establish the IPCC and requested the Secretary-General of 
the WMO and the Executive Director of UNEP, through the IPCC, to begin a 
comprehensive review and to make “recommendations with respect to: (a) the state 
of knowledge of the science of climate and climatic change; (b) programmes and 
studies on the social and economic impact of climate change, including global 
warming; (c) possible response strategies to delay, limit or mitigate the impact of 
adverse climate change; (d) the identification and possible strengthening of relevant 
existing international legal instruments having a bearing on climate; [and] (e) 
elements for inclusion in a possible future international convention on climate.”16  
                                                                                                                                     
governments, particularly the U.S., wished to re-assert control over the climate assessment process 
from the Advisory Group on Greenhouse Gases (AGGG), which had been formed at Villach in 1985.  
11 AGRAWALA, supra note 10, at 3. 
12 Shardul Agrawala, Early Science-Policy Interactions in Climate Change: Lessons from the Advisory Group on 
Greenhouse Gases, 9(2) GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE: HUMAN AND POLICY DIMENSIONS 157 
(1999); BOEHMER-CHRISTIANSEN & KELLOW, supra note 10, at 30. 
13 Report of the Thirty-Ninth Session of the Executive Council, June 1-5, 1987, 7, WMO Doc. 687 (1987). 
14 UNEP: Report of the Governing Council, U.N. GOAR, 42nd Sess., Supp. No. 25, U.N. Doc. A/42/25 
(1987). (See also Jack Fitzgerald, The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change: Taking the First Steps 
Towards a Global Response, 14 SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL 231 (1990). 
15 AGRAWALA, supra note 10, at 9. 
16  G.A. Res. 43/53, paras. 5 and 10, U.N. Doc. A/RES/43/53. The draft resolution referred to the 
climate as the “common heritage of mankind”, but this was later changed to refer to climate change as 
the “common concern of mankind” (para. 1). 
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2.2.1 Working methods of the IPCC 
The IPCC is an intergovernmental body, carrying out a scientific assessment 
function; participation is open to all Member countries of the UNEP and the 
WMO.17 Reports of the IPCC are subjected to both peer and government review. 
The Panel, its Working Groups and task forces established endeavor to reach 
decisions on the basis of consensus. Where this is not possible in relation to reports, 
differing views are explained; disagreements on scientific, technical or socio-
economic questions are to be appropriately represented in the relevant document.18 
Generally, the reports of the IPCC tend towards a centrist position – the 
combination of intensive peer review and review by governments tends to weed out 
extreme positions. Its plenary (the Panel) consists of government representatives, 
who usually meet at least once a year. As is the norm for United Nations 
intergovernmental bodies, the IPCC is headed by a bureau, which consists of a Chair 
and three vice-chairs. Two co-chairs and a number of vice-chairs head each of the 
three Working Groups.19 Membership in the bureaus of the IPCC and its Working 
Groups is by election; elections are held approximately every five years. Unlike 
plenary sessions of the Panel, where governmental representatives are present, 
bureau members are in the first order scientific and technical experts and not acting 
under instructions from their countries of nationality. Nonetheless, they are selected 
on the basis of a regional formula to provide for geographic balance; furthermore, 
for some time it has been a practice that one co-chair of each WG should be from a 
developing country. It is common for the bureau of the IPCC to meet two to three 
times a year, usually in the days prior to the plenary sessions of the Panel, to plan, 
monitor and coordinate the work of the IPCC. 
The work of the IPCC is organized around assessment cycles, with 
assessment reports being published about twice a decade. Since its establishment the 
IPCC has completed four assessment reports - the first in 1990 and the most recent 
in 2007. The IPCC has also produces special reports designed to provide, on shorter 
schedule, assessments relevant to decision-makers.20 The assessment cycle – from the 
drawing up of the work program to the publication of the report – lasts about four 
years. It begins with a plenary session of the Panel, which sets the agenda and work 
program for the forthcoming assessment.21 The Working Groups, based on the 
program of work and general outlines set by the Panel, develop more detailed 
outlines for each part (volume) of the assessment, which are then accepted by the 
Panel at one of its sessions.22 Thereafter nominations for experts are invited from 
                                                 
17 Principles Governing IPCC Work, approved at the Fourteenth Session (Vienna, 1-3 October 1998) on 
1 October 1998, and amended at the 21st Session (Vienna, 3 and 6-7 November 2003), available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/about/procd.htm. 
18 Id. 
19 Report of the Nineteenth Session of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Geneva, Switzerland, 17-
20 September 2002, Appendix H, available at http://www.ipcc.ch/meet/rep19session.pdf ). 
20 AGRAWALA, supra note 10, at 23. 
21 WMO & UNEP, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE: 16 YEARS OF SCIENTIFIC 
ASSESSMENT IN SUPPORT OF THE CLIMATE CONVENTION 5 (2004), available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/10th-anniversary/anniversary-brochure.pdf.  
22 See e.g, Draft Report of the Twenty-first Session of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Vienna, 
Austria, 3 and 6-7 November 2003, available at http://www.ipcc.ch/meet/drepipcc21.pdf. 
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governments and international organizations. The bureaus of the Working Groups 
finalize the writing teams for each respective Working Group report.23 Each writing 
team works in coordination with its respective Working Group Chair, Bureau and 
Technical Support Units to draft their relevant section of the IPCC report in an 
iterative process that typically takes between one and one-and-a-half years.24  
 
2.2.2 Peer review 
Every chapter of a draft IPCC report undergoes an intensive review process. 
Agrawala notes that draft chapters of the 1995 Working Group II Second 
Assessment report underwent a first review review-involving between twenty to sixty 
expert reviewers per chapter, with a total of 700 experts from 58 countries.25 This 
was followed by a second review involving all IPCC member governments, as well as 
the experts who had submitted reviews in the first round. The practice of peer 
review in the IPCC has developed from the less regulated format common and 
understood among small groups of scientists into a more formal procedure. Outside 
criticism has played its part26, leading to the adoption of formal rules governing the 
peer review procedure.27 
Peer review is among the oldest certification processes in science, and its 
primary purpose is to strengthen the quality of work by making it undergo criticism 
and evaluation at the hands of those best qualified to judge it.28 The process has been 
faulted for failing as a reliable way to gauge research quality29 It has been argued that 
these criticisms rest on a particular conception of peer review as a type of “truth 
machine” that weeds out “bad science”, resting on the implicit assumption that 
scientists agree closely on most things.30 In fact, it may be that disagreement among 
                                                 
23 The bureau selects the coordinating lead authors and lead authors, who in turn select the 
contributing authors for the report. The bureau is also responsible for choosing review editors. Their 
tasks are to ensure consistency in the relevant report and that authors take account of comments 
received in the course of the peer review process. 
24 AGRAWALA, supra note 10, at 11. 
25 Id. 
26 In a notorious case, Dr. Frederick Seitz, a physicist, alleged in an article in the Wall Street Journal op-
ed page that the lead authors of a chapter in the WG I contribution to the 1995 Second Assessment 
Report had “corrupted the peer review process”. See Paul N. Edwards & Stephen H. Schneider, Self -
Governance and Peer Review in Science-for-Policy: The Case of the IPCC Second Assessment Report , in CHANGING 
THE ATMOSPHERE: EXPERT KNOWLEDGE AND ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE 219 (Clark A. 
Miller and Paul N. Edwards, eds., 2001). Edwards and Schneider examine the incident in detail and 
ultimately conclude that the charge was baseless and that the scientists in question acted properly.  See 
also STEVENS, supra note 8, at 226-233, who provides further background to the incident, leaving the 
clear impression that that the attacks were less than honest and more concerned with discrediting the 
findings of the IPCC than with any flaws in the IPCC process. See further ROSS GELBSPAN, THE 
HEAT IS ON: THE HIGH STAKES BATTLE OVER THE EARTH’S THREATENED CLIMATE (1997). 
27 See for applicable rules, Procedures for the Preparation, Review, Acceptance, Adoption, Approval and 
Publication of IPCC Reports, adopted at the Fifteenth Session of the IPCC (San Jose, 15-18 April 1999) 
and revised, on a provisional basis, at the Twentieth Session of the IPCC (Paris, 19-21 February 
2003). 
28 Edwards & Schneider, supra note 26, at 229. 
29 Id. at 230, provide examples of studies, including one where experiments showed that agreement 
between referees on the same article was only slightly better than chance. Other critiques are that peer 
review tends to be biased towards confirming existing beliefs, regardless of their quality.  
30 Id. at 231-232. 
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scientists is more common -and acceptable-than some have supposed. According to 
Edwards and Schneider: “We maintain that peer review ought to be regarded as a 
human process whose primary functions are to improve the quality of scientific 
work, to maintain accountability both inside and outside the scientific community, 
and to build a scientific community that shares core principles and beliefs even when 
it does not agree in detail.”31 In this view the peer review has the aim of minimizing 
disagreements, but cognizant that disagreement is part and parcel of science as a 
human practice. Perhaps most important of all, in relation to the IPCC, peer review 
plays a major role in establishing the credibility of expert knowledge for policy 
purposes.32 It is no accident that when reference is made to the IPCC’s conclusions 
the number of scientists is prominently mentioned, all but a few of whom will have 
been engaged in reviewing and commenting on the work of the much smaller 
number of lead and contributing authors. 
In the preparation of reports, the Working Group lead authors draw on peer-
reviewed and internationally-available literature, as well as the submissions of 
experts, where these are also based on peer-reviewed literature. The terms under 
which recourse may be had to non-peer-reviewed literature and unpublished material 
are specified in the IPCC’s procedures.33 Where there is significant scientific or 
technical support for disparate views, lead authors are required to identify these in 
the draft report. The IPCC procedures explicitly spell out the principles governing 
the review process- inclusion of the best possible scientific and technical advice, a 
wide circulation to ensure representation of independent experts, and objectivity, 
openness and transparency. To ensure that reports provide a balanced and complete 
assessment of current information, each Working Group selects two Review Editors, 
one of whom is normally a member of the bureau of the Working Group and the 
other an independent expert; neither should be involved in the preparation or review 
of material for which they are an editor. Review Editors, introduced in a 1999 
revision of the IPCC procedures, are tasked with ensuring that “all substantive expert 
and government review comments are afforded appropriate consideration”.34 This 
serves to minimize the risk that lead authors, who are required “to take account of 
expert and government review comments when revising text”, might not adequately 
reflect such comments.  
The core peer-review process of draft reports takes place in two stages. First, 
the draft report are circulated to: specialists who have significant publications in the 
relevant area; experts nominated by governments as coordinating lead authors, lead 
authors, contributing authors or expert reviewers included in the lists maintained by 
the IPCC Secretariat; and expert reviewers nominated by appropriate organizations.35 
In practice drafts are therefore widely circulated, including to international scientific 
organizations and intergovernmental organizations, as well industry and lobby 
groups. Second, the revised draft report is distributed to governments, coordinating 
lead authors, lead authors and contributing authors and experts. A final draft report 
                                                 
31 Id. at 232. 
32 Id. at 233. 
33 See Procedures for the Preparation, Review, Acceptance, Adoption, Approval and Publication of IPCC Reports, 
supra note 27, Annex 2. 
34 Id. Annex 1.  
35 Id. 
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is then prepared taking into account government and expert comments for 
submission to a Session of Working Group for acceptance. After the reports of the 
three Working Groups have been accepted by their respective plenary sessions, the 
entire IPCC assessment is then approved at a full IPCC plenary session. 
Nonetheless, some have faulted the IPCC for the quality of its peer review process.36 
Assessment reports consist of two parts: the scientific and technical analysis, 
usually written in fairly dense prose, and the much less technical Summary for 
Policymakers (SPM). This summary is intended to be policy-neutral and more 
accessible document outlining the key points contained in the underlying report.37 
The two different types of outputs are subject to different formal levels of 
endorsement. Thus, in the last part of the review process, IPCC reports are accepted 
at a Session of the relevant Working Group, where all member countries are 
represented. Acceptance means that the material has not been subject to a line-by-
line discussion and agreement, but that it nevertheless presents a comprehensive, 
objective and balanced view of the subject matter. By contrast, the Summaries for 
Policymakers are subject to line-by-line approval by government representatives in 
plenary sessions of the Panel. It is here that governments negotiate over every word 
in an arduous process.38 This is not surprising, given the fact that it is the summaries 
that are usually quoted and referred to in the media, especially those emanating from 
Working Group I, on the science. This leads to the question whether the politics 
distorts the science. 
 
2.3 Evaluation of the IPCC 
The point has been made that international environmental agreements are 
distinguished from most other types of international agreements in their reliance on 
science and technology.39 Scientific findings have played a key role in identifying and 
defining the existence of transboundary environmental issues, as well as outlining 
options for mitigation and protection of the environment. The use of scientific 
advice and monitoring has a long history in international law.40 
                                                 
36 See BOEHMER-CHRISTIANSEN & KELLOW, supra note 10, at 141-143. The authors criticize the IPCC 
for what they views as the close involvement of the chapter authors in the process and the absence of 
a disinterested editor. Given the double layer of the full IPCC review process and the inclusion of 
Review Editors, these criticisms seem misplaced. 
37 Aside from Assessment Reports, the other materials are Synthesis, Special Reports and 
Methodology Reports, with the former two also being accompanied by a separate Summary for 
Policymakers. 
38 For a view on the 2007 Fourth Assessment Report, s ee Andrew C. Revkin, Melding Science and 
Diplomacy to Run a Global Climate Review, N.Y. Times, February 6, 2007. 
39 Sheila Jasanoff, Contingent Knowledge: Implications for Implementation and Compliance, in ENGAGING 
COUNTRIES: STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDS, 63 
(Edith Brown Weiss and Harold K. Jacobson, eds., 1998). 
40 See e.g., LEE A. KIMBALL, TREATY IMPLEMENTATION: SCIENCE AND TECHNICAL ADVICE ENTERS 
A NEW STAGE (1996).  She cites as early examples of international scientific bodies the International 
Council for the Exploration of the Sea, established in 1902 to promote marine observations in the 
North Atlantic. She also notes that the 1946 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling 
appears to be the first to explicitly link the collection and analysis of data to the management of whale 
fisheries and the first also to require that conservation measures “shall be based on scientific 
findings”. 
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The IPCC may be regarded against the backdrop of the increased 
implications of science in policymaking. This trend has for some time been well 
advanced at the national level in liberal democratic states, as seen in public debates 
around risks from toxics and environmental regulation in general. At the 
international level, the inter-linkage between science and policymaking reached a new 
level with the negotiation of the Montreal protocol.41 With greater reliance on the 
output of scientific expert bodies, the working methods and procedures have 
become increasingly formalized, with application of stricter legal procedures; the 
IPCC has, as examined above, adopted formal peer review procedures. 
Compared to other bodies the IPCC has been remarkably successful, even as 
the area of work it is concerned with has become politically contentious. As an 
assessment body that aims to periodically take stock of the latest science, it has 
consciously steered clear of overtly presenting policy prescriptions. Early in its life, 
and before the negotiation of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC), it was thought by some that the IPCC would be the 
forum for the negotiation of a future climate treaty. The perception existed that the 
IPCC was a vehicle for the interests of the industrialized countries. As a consequence 
the developing countries acted through the General Assembly to establish the 
Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC).42  
The IPCC has also proved adept at anticipating and responding to the needs 
of various constituencies. For instance, as noted previously, after being criticized 
initially for not contributing in a timely fashion to the needs of the 
Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) - the body that negotiated the 
Framework Convention - the IPCC rapidly adapted and has produced various special 
reports at the request of the parties to the Convention. A further innovation has 
been the development of Technical Papers, which draw on existing material from 
assessment reports. Recently, the IPCC has also begun to respond to requests from 
the Convention on Bio-Diversity and the Desertification Conventions.43 In this 
respect, the current procedure is that the Panel considers requests from multilateral 
environmental treaties on a case-by-case basis. In its later reports the IPCC also has 
broadened its scope to cover not just the scientific causes and effects of climate 
change, but also economic and social impacts.44 A genuine attempt has been made to 
take a multi-disciplinary approach to investigate climate change, as evidence by the 
use of cross-cutting themes such as sustainable development. In this respect, the 
relative paucity of social science research on climate change and its impacts remains a 
concern.  
Efforts also have been made to enhance the diversity of the panel by 
ensuring balanced representation from Northern and Southern countries, which is 
                                                 
41 RICHARD ELLIOT BENEDICK, OZONE DIPLOMACY 7 (1991). 
42 Bodansky, supra note 4. 
43 See e.g., BIODIVERSITY AND CLIMATE CHANGE,  IPCC TECHNICAL PAPER V (Habiba Gitay, Robert 
Watson, Avelino Suarez, & David Jon Dokken, eds., 2002). This report was produced in response to a 
request from the Subsidiary Body for Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity. For more on formal interaction between IPCC and MEAs, see 
discussion of SBSTA below. 
44 NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, KNOWLEDGE AND DIPLOMACY: SCIENCE ADVICE IN THE 
UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM 41 (2002). 
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critical to the acceptance by the developing countries of the work of the IPCC. After 
early experiences with the framing of the climate change debate, developing 
countries are keenly aware of how important it is to participate to the full extent 
possible in a body such as the IPCC.45 It has been pointed out that reliance on peer-
reviewed literature potentially discriminates against scientific input from countries 
whose scientists do not have the opportunity to have their research published in the 
peer-reviewed journals.46 
  
2.3.1 Criticism of the IPCC – the skeptics 
Producing assessments on the science of climate change is a contentious 
matter. A range of skeptics has sought to discredit global warming and has also 
attacked the IPCC.47 It has been asserted that the IPCC is dominated by scientists 
who have an interest in climate change being identified as problem in order from 
them to secure government grants.48 It is known that some skeptics have been 
funded by the fossil fuel industry or groups associated with them.49 While skeptics 
frequently complain that their views are ignored, they have made skilful use of the 
media, exploiting the media’s practice of seeking to achieve balance by presenting 
“both sides of the story”. A well-known study of the peer-reviewed literature on 
climate change found that of almost 1000 articles none disputed the consensus view 
of human-induced climate change.50 Although some objectors continue to question 
the underlying the science – for instance by positing alternative explanations, such as 
the discredited “sun spot” activity thesis – this position has become increasingly 
untenable, so the focus is shifting to the cost of mitigation measures, which are 
described as wasteful and unnecessary. With a few exceptions, skeptics have not 
been able to formulate consistent hypotheses, as demanded by orthodox science.51 
For their part, climate scientists refute the charge that skeptics have not been given a 
chance to be heard, pointing out that a number of scientists with varying degrees of 
                                                 
45 See FRANK BIERMANN, SCIENCE AS POWER IN INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS: GLOBAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENTS BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH 2-3 (ENRP Discussion Paper 2000-
17, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2000). 
46 NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 44, at 41. 
47 A well-documented attack on the IPCC is the criticism by Frederick Seitz, in 1996, of the peer 
review process relating to the Second Assessment Report. See above note 26. Other prominent 
skeptics include S. Fred Singer an engineer and physicist with distinguished background in academic 
and government service, who in 1997 published a book entitled HOT TALK, COLD SCIENCE: GLOBAL 
WARMING'S UNFINISHED DEBATE; Patrick Michaels, frequent commentator and author of 
MELTDOWN: THE PREDICTABLE DISTORTION OF GLOBAL WARMING BY SCIENTISTS, POLITICIANS 
AND THE MEDIA (2004) and THE SATANIC GASES (2000).  
48 BOEHMER CHRISTIANSEN & KELLOW, supra note 10, at 149-175.  
49 For details of the relationships between skeptics and industry-funded lobby groups, see ROSS 
GELBSPAN, THE HEAT IS ON (1998) and JEREMY K. LEGGETT, THE CARBON WAR: GLOBAL WARM 
ING THE THE END OF THE OIL ERA (2001). 
50 Naomi Oreskes, Beyond the Ivory Tower: The Scientific Consensus on Climate Change, 306 (5702) SCIENCE 
1686 (2004). 
51 Richard Lindzen, a professor at MIT and a member of the National Academy of Sciences, is one 
prominent critic. He has argues that water vapor causes negative rather than positive feedbacks, 
resulting in reduced warming. His theories are regarded as difficult to prove and flawed by most other 
climate scientists. See Daniel Grossman, Researchers: Lindzen’s Work is Flawed, Dissent in the Maelstrom, 
SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, November 2001. 
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skepticism have served, and continue to serve, on the panels of the IPCC. 52 
Furthermore, although some skeptics have distinguished scientific pedigrees, most 
do not possess backgrounds in disciplines commonly regarded as falling within the 
climate sciences.53  
With each successive IPCC report there is less room to attack the broad 
conclusions concerning anthropogenic climate change. Perhaps in response, skeptics 
seem to have turned to criticizing particular conclusions, with a recent example being 
the controversy around the so-called “hockey-stick” graph by Mann et al in the Third 
Assessment Report.54 Based on “proxy” data (tree-rings, corals) from the past 
thousand years, together with the more recent instrumental record, the graph 
showed the rapid rise in temperature in the 20 th century compared to the preceding 
thousand years. Such skirmishing, while making a media impact and finding support 
in political circles, does not really affect the broad consensus on the causes of climate 
change.55 
 
2.3.2 Methodological shortcomings? 
Future climate change depends largely on human activity, in particular 
population growth, socio-economic development, and technological change.56 For 
climate modeling purposes, such driving forces are captured using scenarios. In 2000 
the IPCC released its Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES), which contains 
40 scenarios depicting plausible different futures up to 2100. These scenarios serve 
as the “inputs” for modeling exercises used by the IPCC projections, including the 
2007 Fourth Assessment Report. An aspect of the methodology used in the 
scenarios has come under attack on economic and statistical grounds.57 The essence 
of the argument advanced is that the team preparing the SRES erred in the method it 
used compare to compare gross domestic product (GDP) values across different 
                                                 
52 E.g. Lindzen has served on the IPCC for the Third Assessment Report. Yuri Israel, the long-serving 
vice -Chair of WG I, is known to question the point of the Kyoto Protocol and has expressed 
skepticism about the link between human activities and warming. See Mark MacKinnon, Russian cools 
on Kyoto, science is questioned, GLOBE & MAIL, October 3, 2003.  
53 For example Frederick Seitz, a physicist and past president of the National Academy of Sciences, 
has been a longstanding skeptic of theory of human-induced greenhouse warming.  
54 Michael Mann et al, Global-Scale Temperature Patterns and Climate Forcing Over the Past Six Centuries, 392 
NATURE, 779-787 (1998). For criticism, see Stephen McIntyre & Ross McKitrick, Corrections to the Mann 
et al (1998) Proxy Data Base and Northern Hemisphere Average Temperature Series, 14(6) ENERGY AND 
ENVIRONMENT 751-772 (2003). The controversy has resulted in Congressionl hearings, defenses and 
rebuttals in the media and an ongoing debate on various weblogs. At the request of Congress, the 
National Research Council produced a report, which appears to side with Dr. Mann. See COMMITTEE 
ON SURFACE TEMPERATURE RECONSTRUCTIONS FOR THE LAST 2,000 YEARS, NATIONAL RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, SURFACE TEMPERATURE RECONSTRUCTIONS FOR THE LAST 2,000 YEARS (2006) 
55 A well known exampled of extreme public skepticism is Senator James M. Inhofe, who in a speech 
on the Senate floor declared “global warming the greatest hoax every perpetrated on the American 
people”. Congressional Record – Senate, S10022, July 28, 2003. 
56 IPCC, SPECIAL REPORT ON EMISSIONS SCENARIOS 3 (2000) 
57 See Ian Castles & David Henderson, The IPCC Emission Scenarios: An Economic-Statistical Critique, 14 
(2-3) ENERGY & ENVIRONMENT 159 (2003); Ian Castles and David Henderson, Economics, Emissions 
Scenarios and the Work of the IPCC, 14 (4) ENERGY & ENVIRONMENT, 415 (2003). The critique by 
Castles and Henderson garnered mainstream coverage. See  article, Hot Potato, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 
13, 2003. 
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countries.58 It was argued that the method adopted exaggerates the difference in 
income between developed and developing countries. That, coupled with the 
assumption – generally accepted as valid by economists - that income levels between 
developed and developing countries will converge over the next century, results in 
the scenarios projecting unrealistic gains in income by developing countries. This in 
turn would lead to unrealistically high GHG emission increases, suggesting that the 
IPCC warming projections are also too high. Members of the IPCC team have 
publicly defended the methodology used for the SRES59 And while it appears that on 
strict methodological grounds there may be something to the critique, it does not 
follow that using a different method would have any significant effect on the average 
warming temperature projected by the IPCC.60 In its latest report, the IPCC makes 
use of both exchange rate measures for Gross Domestic Product (GDP), stating that 
“[a]vailable studies indicate that the choice of exchange rate for GDP (MER or PPP) 
does not appreciably affect the projected emissions, when used consistently.”61 
Although the dispute related to narrow and technical issue - assumptions 
concerning the calculation of future economic growth – it nonetheless underscores 
that peer review may not guard against errors when “peers are all drawn from the 
same restricted professional milieu”.62 This is especially the case where modeling 
exercises rely on assumptions that require validation from disciplines – such as 
economics and economic statistics – that lie outside the orbit of climatology or 
energy and climate modeling. This may present a larger challenge to the IPCC, 
especially as increasingly assesses the adaptative capacity of social and economic 
systems. This episode reinforces the commitment to an open process and a healthy 
regard for the limits of peer review. 
 
2.3.3 Science – but not without politics 
True to its mandate, the IPCC provides policy relevant assessments, not 
policy advice as such. Its assessments have enormous influence, and are accepted by 
                                                 
58 The IPCC converted GDP figures into 1990 US dollars using exchange rates. The method 
advocated by Castles and Henderson is purchasing power parity (PPP) approach, which is an indexing 
method widely used for income comparison over time. Using international exchange rates can 
exaggerate real income differences by a factor of 5. 
59 N. Nakicenovic et al, IPCC SRES revisited: a response, 14 (2-3) ENERGY & ENVIRONMENT 187 
(2003). 
60 Some recalculations have apparently yielded only a 0.5 degree difference, see Alan Manne & Richard 
Richels, Market Exchange Rates or Purchasing Power Parity: Does the Choice Make a Difference to the Climate 
Debate? (Unpublished paper, 2003, copy on file with author). See also along similar lines, RICHARD S.J. 
TOL, EXCHANGE RATES AND CLIMATE CHANGE: AN APPLICATION OF FUND (Working Paper FNU-
45, 2004), available at http://www.uni-hamburg.de/Wiss/FB/15/Sustainability/pppmerwp.pdf. 
Because GDP growth has been overestimated, so have the potential improvements in efficiency from 
lowering the energy intensity (economic output per unit of energy). The two effects - lower than 
expected emissions (due to less economic output) and fewer efficiency gains (less improvements in 
energy intensity) – cancel each other out. See Bjart J. Holtsmark & Knut H. Alfsen, PPP-correction of the 
IPCC emission scenarios - does it matter? 68 (1-2) CLIMATIC CHANGE 11 (2005). 
61 IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: M ITIGATION, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP III TO THE 
FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 8 (Bert 
Metz et al eds., 2007). 8 (2007), footnote omitted. 
62 David Henderson, Text used in making a presentation to the IPCC TGCIA Expert Meeting , Amsterdam, 
10 January 2003, available at http://www.economist.com/media/text/efhpdoc2.pdf. 
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most scientists and governments as authoritative. However, its conclusions have 
been disputed and its working methods attacked by a small group of skeptics, as well 
as interest groups linked to the fossil fuel industry.63 In this politicized atmosphere, it 
is not surprising that a former Executive Secretary of the Secretariat of the UNFCCC 
has stated that: “The science has driven the politics…if the science is to continue 
guiding the politics, it is essential to keep the politics out of the science”.64 It is easy 
to sympathize with this plea. However, one must ask whether an institution - more 
precisely an intergovernmental panel with membership includes countries with such 
divergent interests with respect to climate change as Antigua and Barbuda, China, the 
European Union, Saudi Arabia and the United States – can realistically steer clear of 
politics. Its summary reports are subject to line-by-line negotiations by government 
lawyers. Government representatives elect the Chair of the Panel, as well as the 
scientists who head up the Working Groups. Quite simply, the IPCC operates in 
political environment. 
There is a general conception of science as neutral territory apart from 
politics, which is consistent with a model of decision-making that characterizes 
science as a source of objective knowledge for informing and rationalizing policy 
choices.65 A more recent strand of research on science and technology conceives of 
them as being “socially embedded” – that is, science and technology are social 
institutions, influenced by context.66 Such conceptions are particularly relevant for 
understanding and analysing the IPCC. Although the IPCC is engaged in producing 
assessments and not prescriptions, it is situated at the interface between science and 
politics. The fact that governments elect the membership of the Working Groups 
makes this almost inevitable.67 Some scholars of science, skeptical of a clear divide 
between the production of scientific knowledge on the one hand, and policy on the 
other, have referred to the “coproduction” to explain the mutual evolution of 
science and politics.68 The terms refers to the ways in which knowledge, including 
scientific knowledge, is “framed, collected, and disseminated through social 
interaction” and how such knowledge in turn also impacts on social change.69 
Importantly, acknowledging the social influence on science does not entail an 
inevitable a descent into relativism and devaluation of the basic precepts of the 
natural sciences. 
                                                 
63 See also supra text accompanying notes 47 to 55. 
64 Michael Zammit Cutajar, quoted in TIM FORSYTH, CRITICAL POLITICAL ECOLOGY: THE  POLITICS 
OF ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE 1 (2003). 
65 Jasanoff, supra note 39, at 64. 
66 Id. at 65. 
67 Witness the controversy in 2002, when Dr. Rajendra K. Pachauri was elected as Chairman, 
replacing Dr. Robert T. Watson, when it was implied that the incoming Bush administration opposed 
the re-election of Watson, an American, and favored Pachauri, an Indian, in the belief that the latter 
was more pro-industry. See Andrew C. Revkin, Dispute Arises Over a Push to Change Climate Panel, N.Y. 
TIMES, April 2, 2002. 
68 Sheila Jasanoff, Beyond Epistemology: Relativism and Engagement in the Politics of Science, 26(2) SOCIAL 
STUDIES OF SCIENCE 393, 397 (1996). See also SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE 
ADVISERS AS POLICYMAKERS (1990). 
69 FORSYTH, supra note 64, at 104. 
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The IPCC has been characterized as a “hybrid science-policy” body.70 One 
implication is that framing of issues and questions and the standards of inclusion and 
legitimization of knowledge are not undertaken exclusively along scientific lines. As 
noted earlier, the setting of the work programme for assessment reports is subject to 
government approval, with a number of opportunities to influence the topics 
selected.71 The IPCC also fits the description of a boundary organization. Boundary 
organizations can be defined as: “social organizations or collectives that sit in two 
different worlds such as science and policy, and can be accessed equally by members 
of each world without losing identity.”72 Among the characteristics of boundary 
organizations are that they involve participation of actors from both sides of the 
boundary, the produce “boundary objects” (items or material that can be used by 
both sides without losing its identity, such as assessment reports can be and are put 
to different uses by scientists and policymakers), and they operate on the border 
between science and politics, but are accountable to both.73 A successful boundary 
organization may be able to achieve the objectives of two quite different 
constituencies and at the same time remain organizationally stable while continually 
being engaged in negotiating the boundary between the two constituencies.74  
As an institution it has managed to maintain credibility in relation to two very 
different constituencies: the scientists making up its core membership and the global 
policy community.75 Independent self-governance, more specifically peer review, has 
proved critical in maintaining the credibility of the IPCC. Thus the IPCC has 
managed to dynamically straddle the junction between science and politics. One the 
one hand producing syntheses of the latest science that are a balanced reflected of 
the latest scientific knowledge, and on the other producing summaries for 
policymakers (SPMs) that satisfy divergent views of member governments and 
remain consistent with the science. There is little doubt that this process does entail 
comprises; however, the very involvement and final imprimatur of governments 
gives the IPCC reports credibility among governments. 
 
2.4. Links with the UNFCCC – the role and function of the SBSTA 
The IPCC is mandated to perform periodic assessments of the state of scientific 
knowledge of climate change. It pre-dates the UNFCC and its Kyoto Protocol, and it 
and does not function as a dedicated scientific assessment body for either of these 
legal instruments. Nonetheless, linkages with the treaty regime have developed, one 
example being the production of Special Reports at the request of the Conference of 
the Parties. The objective of this section is to briefly examine the institutional links 
between the IPCC and the climate change regime in the form of the Subsidiary Body 
for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA).  
                                                 
70 Edwards & Schneider, supra note 26, at 225. 
71 The structure of the reports has achieved a degree of stability, which may itself influences to some 
degree not only the presentation but also selection of material. 
72 FORSYTH, supra note 64, at 141. 
73 Id. at 141. 
74 David Guston, Boundary organizations in environmental policy and science: an introduction, 26(4) SCIENCE, 
TECHNOLOGY AND HUMAN VALUES 339, 400-401 (2001). 
75 Edwards & Schneider, supra note 26, at 225. 
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The SBSTA, and its sister body, the Subsidiary Body for Implementation 
(SBI), are established under the UNFCCC. The role of the SBSTA, set out in Article 
9, is to provide scientific and technological input into the decision-making process of 
the Conference of the Parties to the Convention (COP). It is mandated to assess the 
state of scientific knowledge with regard to climate change, the effects of measures 
to implement the Convention, and respond to scientific, technological, and 
methodological questions that the COP may put to it. Participation is open to all 
parties to the UNFCCC and observers from other States, international organizations 
and non-governmental organizations. For its part, the SBI has an advisory role in 
connection with the review of national communications from the parties, the effect 
of measures agreed by the parties, technology transfer and the adequacy of 
commitments.76 In general, discussions in this body tend to be less technical and 
more focused on issues relating to implementation. 
Article 9 of the UNFCCC does not explicitly mention the IPCC, simply 
stating that the SBSTA will carry out its work “drawing upon existing competent 
international bodies”.77 At the time of the negotiation of the Convention, developing 
countries rejected efforts by the European Union countries and the United States to 
bring the IPCC into its structure, with the SBSTA being a compromise to manage 
the perceived need for expertise and relations with “competent international 
bodies”.78 In contrast, the text of the Kyoto Protocol sets out more explicitly the link 
with the IPCC and also assigns a number of tasks to the SBSTA. Among other 
things, the SBSTA is mandated to: provide advice to supreme body of the Protocol, 
the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties (COP/MOP), on 
modalities, rules and guidelines governing the inclusion of sinks in the parties 
inventories (Article 3.4); provide advice to the COP/MOP on the revision of 
methodologies and adjustments for estimating anthropogenic emissions of 
greenhouse gases (GHGs), based on the work of the IPCC (Article 5.2); and to 
provide advice to the COP/MOP on the revision of global warming potentials of 
GHGs (Article 5.3).  
The first Conference of the Parties to the Convention, characterized the role 
of the SBSTA as “the link between the scientific, technical and technological 
assessments and the information provided by the competent international bodies, 
and the policy-oriented needs of the Conference of the Parties”.79 The COP re-
stated, in more detail, the mandate of the SBSTA as provided under Article 9 of the 
Convention.80 With regard to scientific assessments the SBSTA is requested to make 
                                                 
76 Bodansky, supra note 4, at 536-537; SEBASTIAN OBERTHUR & HERMANN E. OTT, THE KYOTO 
PROTOCOL: INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE POLICY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 250 (1999). 
77 UNFCCC, art. 9(2). The only reference to the IPCC in the Convention is found in art. 21(2), which 
provides that the interim secretariat will cooperate closely with the Panel to ensure that it can respond 
to the need for objective scientific and technical advice. The reservations of developing countries 
concerning the IPCC were apparently responsible for the lack of more extensive references to the 
Panel.  
78 Clark A. Miller, Challenges in the Application of Science to Global Affairs: Contingency, Trust, and Moral 
Order, in CHANGING THE ATMOSPHERE: EXPERT KNOWLEDGE AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
GOVERNANCE 255-256 (Clark A. Miller and Paul N. Edwards, eds., 2001). 
79 Decision 6/CP.1, in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its First Session, Addendum, Part II: Action 
taken by the parties, prmbl. para. 4, FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add.1 (1996). 
80 Id. decision 6/CP.1, at paras. 1-5. 
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use of information provided by “competent bodies”, including the IPCC. The COP 
“invite[ed] relevant international organizations and bodies, including the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, to contribute to the work of the 
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice, especially on the scientific 
aspects of methodologies, particularly those relating to inventories of anthropogenic 
emissions by sources and removals by sinks of all greenhouse gases not controlled by 
the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, global warming 
potentials of those greenhouse gases, vulnerability assessment and adaptation, 
projections of emissions by sources and removals by sinks, the evaluation of the 
effects of measures undertaken pursuant to the provisions of the Convention and 
the allocation and control of emissions from international bunker fuels.”81 Based on 
the decisions of the COP, the SBSTA developed a list of items on which the IPCC 
could provide advice and requested it to carry out activities in this regard.82 The 
SBSTA has also requested the preparation of Technical Papers – reports prepared at 
relatively short notice – from by the IPCC.83 Beginning with its 1995 Second 
Assessment Report, the IPCC has submitted its assessment reports to the SBSTA, 
where they are discussed.84 Cooperation between the bodies exists also under Joint 
Working Group of Officers of the Convention and the IPCC, which brings together 
the members of the Bureaux of the SBSTA and IPCC, as well as the secretariat of 
the IPCC, and UNFCC and deals with the working arrangements between the two 
bodies.85 
The questions of methodologies for the accounting of GHG emissions and 
sinks have remained a key area of focus for the SBSTA, where it has worked closely 
with the IPCC. As regards accounting for emissions from bunker fuels for 
international air travel and maritime travel, which are not currently covered under the 
Kyoto Protocol, the SBSTA has cooperated with the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO). In the 
area of technical advice on technology transfer, a subject of major concern to 
developing countries, the SBSTA has carried out its activities fairly independently of 
the IPCC.86  Following initial discussion, the role of the IPCC as the provider of 
scientific assessments on climate change to the UNFCCC has not been challenged. 
An early attempt to establish Technical Advisory Panels (TAPs) under the SBTSA 
                                                 
81 Decision 4/CP.1, in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its First Session, Addendum, Part II: Action 
taken by the parties, para. 2, FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add.1 (1996). Close cooperation with the IPCC is 
also foreseen in relation to the development and improvement of comparable methodologies for, 
among others, national inventories of emissions and removals of greenhouse gases. See decision 
6/CP.1, supra note 79, at para. 5(a) 
82 A preliminary list of items is contained in Report of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological 
Advice on the Work of its First Session , annex, UN Doc. FCCC/SBSTA/1995/3. At its second meeting 
the SBSTA requested the IPCC to carry out a detailed list of activities, see Report of the Subsidiary Body for 
Scientific and Technological Advice on the Work of its Second Session, annex III, FCCC/SBSTA/1996/8. 
83 See for example IPCC, IMPLICATIONS OF PROPOSED CO2 EMISSIONS LIMITATIONS, IPCC 
TECHNICAL PAPER (John T. Houghton et al eds., 1997). The practice in such cases is for the IPCC to 
consider a request from the SBSTA, or relevant body of another convention.   
84 Report of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice on the Work of its Second Session, supra note 
82 at paras. 27-31. 
85 See Miller, supra note 78, at 260; id. at paras. 39 and 44.  
86 Miller, supra note 78, at 260. 
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foundered on lack of consensus regarding the precise mandate and composition of 
the panels.87  
 
2.4.1 Assessment of the SBSTA 
A scholar of science and policy has stated that: “Although its formal function 
within the [climate change] regime was initially uncertain, the SBSTA has 
subsequently emerged as the principal forum in which regime participants have 
articulated and negotiated among competing models of the institutional design for 
providing expert advice about climate change.”88 The SBSTA can be regarded as a 
liaison and interface between the science-driven process of the IPCC and the more 
political COP.89 Its success must be judged on this basis, bearing in mind that, as 
described above, the IPCC process is not without politics of its own.  
The SBSTA is therefore perhaps more of a policy than a science body. For 
one thing, it is generally the same representatives who sit in the SBSTA as follow the 
other aspects of the climate negotiations and these, outside the large delegations 
fielded by some developed countries, are generally not scientists or technical 
experts.90 It may thus be more accurate view the SBSTA as a body where aspects of 
climate change science – methodologies for greenhouse gas inventories, for instance 
– are discussed and integrated into the negotiating process, specifically through the 
preparation of draft decisions for the Conferences of the Parties (COPs). This role 
can be further illustrated with reference to the above-mentioned methodologies. 
Under Article 7(d) of the Convention the COP is charged with the development and 
periodic refinement of methodologies for the preparation of inventories of 
greenhouse gas emissions by sources and removals by sinks. In practice, the IPCC 
has developed these methodologies, which the COP has then approved for use by 
parties for reporting under the UNFCCC.91 Since the Convention states that parties 
should use “comparable” – not identical – methodologies, it is open to parties to 
                                                 
87 Id. at 257. See also Report of the First Meeting of the Subsidiary Bodies of the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change: 28 August – 1 September 1995, 12(23) EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULLETIN, available at 
www.iisd.ca. Decision 6/CP.1, supra note 79, at para. 3, authorized the SBSTA to establish two 
technical advisory panels. 
88 Miller, supra note 78, at 251. 
89 Bodansky, supra note 4, at 536. For a detailed and interesting study of the SBSTA in the context of 
international environmental governance and the nexus between science and policy-making, see Miller, 
supra note 78 and Clark A. Miller, Hybrid Management: Boundary Organizations, Science Policy, and 
Environmental Governance in the Climate Regime, 26(4) SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND HUMAN VALUES, 478 
(2001). 
90 Personal communication from Mohammed Reza Salamat, former climate negotiator for the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, on file with the author. 
91 See decision 4/CP.1, in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its First Session, Addendum, Part II: 
Action taken by the parties, para. 1(a) and (b), FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add.1 (1996), providing, 
respectively, that Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories and Technical  Guidelines for 
Assessing Climate Change Impacts and Adaptations adopted by the IPCC should be used by Annex 1 
parties for preparing their national communications. In addition, Guidelines or the simplified default 
methodologies developed by the IPCC should be used, as appropriate and to the extent possible, by 
non-Annex 1 parties in meeting their obligations under the Convention. See also decisions 9/CP.9 and 
10/CP.10, in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Ninth Session, Addendum, Part II: Action taken by 
the parties, FCCC/CP/2003/6/Add.1 (2004),  providing, respectively, for revised reporting guidelines 
for Annex 1 parties, and for the guidelines for the submission of initial communications by non-
Annex 1 parties. 
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select alternatives. This is recognized in the decisions of the COP, which state that 
parties “should” use the methodologies developed by the IPCC, but that it is open to 
parties to use their own, provided that they are sufficiently substantiated.92 The 
“intermediary” role of the SBSTA is illustrated in is decision recommending when 
and how parties should adopt the revised IPCC methodology guidelines for 
greenhouse gas inventories. In that case, it was decided that the guidelines should be 
phased in for Annex 1 parties, while non-Annex 1 countries were “encouraged” to 
apply them.93  
Another example of the SBSTA’s function as an intermediary between the 
UNFCCC and the IPCC relates to the estimation of emissions of a new class of 
greenhouse gases - the so-called fluorinated gases - which find important uses as 
alternatives to ozone-depleting substances.94 In this case the IPCC provided two 
methodologies for reporting emissions of these gases,95 each having different 
implications in terms of data requirements and accuracy over time. The SBSTA 
decided to encourage countries to use the method that although more accurate on a 
year-to-year basis, could also be regarded as masking the full impact on greenhouse 
gas concentrations of the continued use of these substances.96 This methodological 
                                                 
92 See decision 4/CP.1, in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its First Session, Addendum, Part II: 
Action taken by the parties, para. 1, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add.1 (1996). 
93 Report of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice on the Work of its Fourth Session , para. 30, 
FCCC/SBSTA/1996/20. 
94 HFCs and PFCs are alternatives to ozone-depleting substances and are not controlled under the 
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. Their use is expected to grow in the 
future, with applications in refrigeration and air-conditioning, fire suppression, aerosol sprays, solvent 
cleaning and foam blowing. The chemicals have high global warming potentials (hundreds and even 
thousands of times more powerful than carbon dioxide). Some have long atmospheric residence 
times. Another substance, SF6, is used in gas insulation switchgear, circuit-breakers, fire suppression 
and other applications. 
95 The REVISED 1996 GUIDELINES indicate that emissions of HFCs, PFCs and SF6 can be estimated 
using either of two approaches, namely, a potential emission approach or an actual emission approach. 
See REVISED 1996 IPCC GUIDELINES FOR NATIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INVENTORIES, VOL. 3, 
GREENHOUSE GAS INVENTORY REFERENCE MANUAL 46 (John T. Houghton et al eds., 1996). 
Accessible at http://www.ipcc-nggip.iges.or.jp/public/gl/invs1.htm , last checked 28 May 2007. The 
potential approach uses annual data on production, exports, imports and destruction, which are 
generally available to most countries. The emission estimates so derived tend to be high because they 
do not take into consideration storage in equipment and the slow release of the chemicals over time. 
Over a period of 15-30 years, as products are retired and gases escape into the atmosphere, actual 
emissions come into line with the estimates. This approach to reporting has been adopted under the 
Montreal Protocol. The actual approach attempts to take into account the time lag between 
consumption and emissions. The time lag occurs because chemicals used in new equipment tend to 
leak out over time, more specifically during manufacturing, operation and disposal. This approach 
provides low estimates in the early years. It tends to mask the possible long-term implications of 
chemicals accumulating in equipment and products. The SBTSA encouraged countries to adopt the 
actual approach , while also requiring them to provide estimates of potential emissions for purposes of 
comparability. See UN Doc. FCCC/SBSTA/1996/20. 
96 Report of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice on the Work of its Fourth Session, supra 
note 93, at para. 31 and endorsed in decision 2/CP.3, in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Third 
Session, Addendum, Part II: Action taken by the parties, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1 (1998). 
The reason for the “actual” method masking the cumulative impact of emissions is that it estimated 
annual emissions from the products concerned, such as foams and refrigerants, occurring over a 
period of 15-20 years. 
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choice was not a purely scientific and technological one, but rather akin to that faced 
by a regulator faced with the need weigh up factors such as effectiveness and 
available resources. This is typical of the role that the SBSTA is able to play as the 
link between the scientific assessment process of the SBSTA and the 
implementation-focussed activities of the Convention and Kyoto mechanisms.  
Other methodology issues that the SBSTA has dealt with include 
methodologies to account for emissions from bunker fuels for international maritime 
and air travel, as well as harvested wood products. In these instances the choice and 
application of a particular methodology depends essentially on a political decision. 
With respect to bunker fuels, the issue concerns the attribution of emissions where 
these do not take place on the territory of any party. In the case of harvested wood 
products, in other words furniture and so forth, the question is the attribution of the 
emissions from products, either by decomposition or combustion, where this occurs 
in a country other than that where the wood was harvested.97 Both have been 
discussed in the SBTSTA, so far without conclusive resolution. 
The SBTSA has served as a venue where scientific outcomes have been vetted 
and agreement sought among the various interest groups. Progress has been slow, 
reflecting the lack of consensus on many of the issues, but also hampered by the rule 
of consensus that applies to the deliberations.. Although the early attempt to set up 
technological advisory panels soon foundered, SBSTA did decide that it would draw 
on experts from a roster for specific issues, an example being technology transfer, 
that are of particular concern to developing countries. During negotiating sessions 
the practice of convening small “contact groups” has facilitated agreement on 
sensitive as well as highly technical matters, bearing with it, however, the danger that 
small delegations lacking technical expertise may be left out of the process. 
 
2.4.2 Other science assessment bodies under MEAs 
Scientific assessment and technological advice is an important component of 
many multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). Science has been instrumental 
in identifying the environmental problems that the agreements were created to 
address. Furthermore, the implementation of treaty obligations frequently requires 
that scientific questions be authoritatively settled within the framework of the 
agreement. This chapter has analyzed the role played by the IPCC and the SBSTA in 
the climate regime. The purpose of this part is to briefly examine science-policy 
bodies connected with, or operating under, a handful of other MEAs. Science advice 
in conventions has followed two broad models. Agreements such as Convention on 
the International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna (CITES)98 
and the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands99 have made use of small experts groups 
for scientific and technological advice, with selection on the basis of geographical 
representation.100 Appointed panels, as further discussed below, also provide advice 
to the parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. 
                                                 
97 Miller, supra note 78, at 262. 
98 Convention on international trade in endangered species of wild fauna and flora, March 2, 1973, 
993 U.N.T.S. 244. 
99 Convention on wetlands of international importance especially as waterfowl habitat, February 2, 
1971, 996 U.N.T.S. 246. 
100 NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 44, at 39. 
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On other hand, the UNFCCC, the United Nations Convention to Combat 
Desertification101 (UNCCD) and the Convention on Biological Diversity102 (CBD) all 
rely on subsidiary bodies whose membership is open to all parties. As with the 
SBSTA under the UNFCCC, these advisory bodies operate in practice by appointing 
working groups or groups of experts to provide input on specific scientific and 
technological issues. 
Scientific assessment played a key role in the adoption of the Montreal 
Protocol, as well as its subsequent amendments.103 Article 6 of the Montreal Protocol 
provides that every four years the Parties shall assess the control measures under the 
Protocol on the basis of the available scientific, environmental, technical, and 
economic information, with panels being convened to cover the respective fields. 
Since 1990 the panels have been organized as follows: the Technological and 
Economic Panel (TEAP), the Scientific Assessment Panel (SAP), and the 
Environmental Effects Assessment Panel (EEAP). The latter two panels essentially 
evolved from the WMO/NASA ozone assessments and follow the model of 
selecting government and academic members, with strict reliance on publications 
from peer-reviewed journals.104  
The organization of the membership of the Technical Panel is different, 
drawing heavily on respected and capable experts from industry, which reflects the 
fact that the latest technology developments are not to be found in the peer-reviewed 
literature. The SAP and EEAP are organized along chapter committees to cover 
particular topics, while the TEAP has Technical Option Committees (TOCs) on 
different sectors. While the parties to the Protocol make recommendations, the 
chairs of the panels have had considerable freedom to select the most qualified and 
suitable candidates for the technical committees that draft the reports.105 At the same 
time, an effort was made to involve experts from developing countries, with about a 
third of the membership of the committees being from these countries. A factor in 
the success of the panels under the Montreal Protocol has been their continuity. 
Although Article 6 originally envisaged the convening of ad hoc panels, they have in 
fact become standing panels and have gone beyond only assessing control measures 
to have a positive influence on the implementation of the Protocol.  106 The standing 
nature of the panels built a community of scientists and technologists resulted in a 
sharing of knowledge and expertise that positively influenced the political 
discussions. The TEAP, in particular, has been singled out for assembling a tight-knit 
network of experts who’s work in translating scientific findings and technological 
                                                 
101 United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in those Countries Experiencing Serious 
Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa, October 14, 1994, 1954 U.N.T.S. 3, 33 I.L.M. 
1238. 
102 Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79.  
103 BENEDICK, supra note 41; STEPHEN O. ANDERSEN ET AL, PROTECTING THE OZONE LAYER: THE 
UNITED NATIONS HISTORY 258-260 (2002). 
104 ANDERSEN ET AL, supra note 103, at 439. 
105 ANDERSEN ET AL, supra note 103, at 360. 
106 Id. at 360. 
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breakthroughs into real, practical suggestions played a major role in the adoption of 
more stringent policies.107 
Article 25 of the Convention on Biological Diversity establishes an 
intergovernmental scientific advisory body known as the Subsidiary Body on 
Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice (SBSTTA). SBSTTA, which consists 
of government experts, is a subsidiary body of the Conference of the Parties (COP), 
to which it reports. Its functions include: providing assessments of the status of 
biological diversity; assessments of the effect of measures taken in accordance with 
the provisions of the Convention; and responding to scientific, technical, 
technological and methodological questions put to it by the COP and its subsidiary 
bodies. The COP may further elaborate the function, terms of reference and 
organization of the SBSTTA.108 A large part of SBSTTA’s work consists of preparing 
recommendations for the COP, which are either endorsed by the COP in whole or 
in part, or taken up in another form. A decision by the COP sets out the modus 
operandi for the SBSTTA, providing for the formation of ad hoc technical expert 
group meetings on specific priority issues on its program of work.109 Guidelines have 
been put in place for the operation of the expert groups, including components such 
as the roster of experts.110 Discussion of the “identity crisis” of the SBSTTA – the 
divergence between its scientific advisory and political roles – was a feature during its 
early meetings.111 It was noted that the delegates serving on the SBSTTA were 
frequently the same as those in the COP, and many did not have a background in 
science. Recently, it seems that finding the appropriate balance between science and 
politics has continued to be a challenge underlying the SBSTTA’s work.112 
One study concluded that while the Convention on Biodiversity has 
continued to strive to improve its science advice system, the existing structure has 
not allowed for a balance between scientific credibility and policy involvement.113 A 
higher premium has been placed on policy involvement rather than on the need to 
improve the scientific credibility of the reports underpinning the policy advice. 
Political concerns may have hampered the establishment of large assessments on key 
areas such as marine and coastal biodiversity, which could have been undertaken by a 
                                                 
107 PENELOPE CANAN & NANCY REICHMAN, OZONE CONNECTIONS: EXPERT NETWORKS IN 
ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE, 30-32 (2002). 
108 Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 102, art. 25(3). 
109 See Decision IV/16, Modus Operandi of the Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice, 
annex 1, available at http://www.biodiv.org. The experts serving on the ad hoc groups are selected 
from a roster by the Executive Secretary of the CBD Secretariat in consultation with the Bureau of 
the SBSTTA. The duration and terms of reference for the groups are recommended by the SBSTTA 
for approval by the COP. Interestingly, as a general rule reports of expert groups should be submitted 
for peer review. 
110 See Terms of Reference for the Ad Hoc Technical Expert Groups, Note by the Executive Secretary, Doc. 
UNEP/CBD/SBSTTA/4/5; Ad Hoc Technical Expert Groups: Terms of Reference, and Roster of Experts and 
Uniform Proposal for Their Use, Note by the Executive Secretary, UNEP/CBD/SBSTTA/5/15 
111 Summary of the Second Session of the Subsidiary Body Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity 2-6 September 1996, 9(54) EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULLETIN (1996), 
available at http://www.iisd.ca/vol09/0954000e.html . 
112 Summary of the Ninth Meeting the Subsidiary Body Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice of the UN 
Convention on Biological Diversity 10-14 November 2003, 9(262) EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULLETIN (2003), 
available at http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb09262e.pdf.  
113 NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 44, at 43. 
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more independent body like the IPCC. Overall, however, it appears that the 
SBSTTA has been less constrained by disagreements between member states than its 
UNFCCC counterpart, the SBSTA. 
 
2.5 Conclusions 
As the only intergovernmental institution charged with conducting 
assessments of the science of climate change, the IPCC finds its conclusions and 
processes subjected to intense scrutiny. The IPCC has institutionalized processes for 
validating authoritative statements of the state of knowledge with respect to the 
biophysical, economic and social aspects of climate change.  
Despite dire warnings and mounting evidence, scientific findings and 
conclusions have, however, largely proven incapable of catalyzing policy responses 
commensurate with the threat. This suggests that a more complex model of the 
interaction between climate science and policy needs to be developed. At times it 
may appear that different scientific disciplines – natural and social – give conflicting 
messages. Climate scientists emphasize new findings and provide projections on 
risks, which often seem to call for urgent action. On the other hand, economists, 
concerned with aggregate welfare and efficiency, tend to counsel against precipitate 
action. Others champion technology as the solution, potentially making unrealistic 
assumptions about its adoption, barriers to entry, and intended consequences. 
A well-developed scientific understanding is a necessary, but far from 
sufficient condition for responding to the global problem of climate change. In this 
respect, there can be little doubt that the IPCC has served the climate regime well.  
The involvement of governments in work of the IPCC, leading to charges of 
“politicization” from critics, contributes to the Panel’s impact: having publicly 
endorses its key findings, governments are less likely to deny them in the negotiation 
rooms or to their publics.  
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Chapter 3 – Development of the international climate change regime 
 
3.1 Introduction: Framework Convention on Climate Change 
By the end of the 1980s the threat of climate change had entered the policy 
arena. The basic scientific conclusions about the causes and dimensions of the 
potential human impact on the climate were sufficient to bring pressure to bear to 
take action at the international level.1 Momentum had begun to build with the release 
of the first report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the 
holding of the Second World Climate Conference in Geneva in November 1990. In 
December of that year the United Nations General Assembly established the 
Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC), tasked with negotiating the 
Convention. The INC met in five formal sessions, working within a tight deadline to 
complete a text for adoption before the United Nations Conference on Environment 
and Development (UNCED), commonly known as the Earth Summit. The text of 
what was called the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) was adopted on 9 May 1992 and opened for signature a month later at 
the Summit.2 
According to the author of the leading commentary, the Convention proved 
disappointing to many.3 Efforts to include binding stabilization targets, not to 
mention reductions, were watered down, leaving the Convention only with vague 
commitments with respect to stabilization. Other shortcomings identified include 
failure to include an insurance fund and technology transfer mechanism (sought by 
the developing countries), the absence of market mechanisms such as emissions 
credits, and the limited obligations imposed on developing countries. Nonetheless, 
given the diverging interests of the parties concerned, the Convention was a 
remarkable achievement. It unambiguously recognizes climate change as a threat and 
sets the long-term objective to stabilize GHG emissions at “at a level that would 
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system”.4 The 
process of convening regular conferences of the parties (COPs) is one of the 
Convention’s key features, as it has lead to improvements in the collection of 
information concerning emissions, the reduction of uncertainties and the work 
towards international standards. Similarly, it was soon recognized that the 
Convention needed to be fleshed out, leading to the negotiation of the Kyoto 
Protocol, under the auspices of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention, 
which in effect served as a preparatory committee for the Protocol. All the same, it is 
sobering to reflect that the same arguments made then against binding stabilization 
or reduction targets – namely, that scientific uncertainty and the potential impact on 
                                                 
1 The evolving scientific understanding and early policy responses are covered in chapter 1. The 
developments prior to the Convention are comprehensively covered Daniel Bodansky, The United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A Commentary 18 YALE J. INT. L. 451, 458-471 (1993) 
[hereinafter Bodansky, Commentary ]. See also Daniel Bodansky, Prologue to the Climate Change Convention, 
in NEGOTIATING CLIMATE CHANGE: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE RIO CONVENTION 45, 46-60 
(Irving L. Minzer & J Amber Leonard eds., 1994) [hereinafter Bodansky, Prologue]. This and the 
following section draw on these two sources.  
2 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, adopted on May 9, 1992, art. 3(1), 1771 
U.N.T.S 164, 31 I.L.M. 851 [hereinafter UNFCCC]. 
3 See Bodansky, Commentary, supra note 1, at 454. 
4 See UNFCCC, art. 2. 
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economic growth mean that it would be unwise to take action – still are holding back 
more aggressive mitigation measures today.5  
This chapter will provide a brief account of the genesis of the Convention 
and an overview of its key provisions. The second part will trace the development of 
the Kyoto Protocol and briefly outline some of its key provisions. 
 
3.1.1 Genesis of the Convention - Negotiating history 
The international scientific effort to study climate change was taken up at the 
intergovernmental level with the formation of the IPCC in 1988, under the auspices 
of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP).6 And while the discussions on an international 
policy response to the emerging threat of climate change were at an early stage, the 
United Nations General Assembly resolution endorsing the establishment of the 
IPCC made reference to “the identification and possible strengthening of relevant 
existing international legal instruments having a bearing on climate…[and] elements 
for inclusion in a possible future international convention on climate.”7 Yet this was 
far from a definitive call to action. The year 1989 saw support for a convention 
mount, with a large group of industrialized countries calling for negotiations, in the 
process increasing pressure on United States to change course and support such an 
initiative.8 When the United States changed its position, it was not long afterwards 
that the UNEP Governing Council adopted a resolution mandating UNEP to 
commence preparations for the negotiations. However, as momentum for a treaty 
grew, so too did the view that such negotiations should take place under the broader 
umbrella of the General Assembly, rather than the technical strictures of UNEP and 
the WMO, in recognition that climate change had implications beyond the 
environment.9 Developing countries had raised concerns that the IPCC process was 
dominated by the developed countries, whose experts were in the majority on the 
Panel.10  
Discussions also took place on the form a convention might take, with some 
favoring a general framework agreement modeled on the United Nations Law of the 
Sea Convention, supplemented by separate protocols covering particular 
atmospheric issues, such as climate change and ozone depletion.11 Even before the 
                                                 
5 See Richard A. Kerr, U.S. Bites Greenhouse Bullet and Gags, 251 SCIENCE, 868 (1991) and Rose Gutfeld, 
Climate Change Pact is Reached by 143 Nations – Treaty Begins Initial Attack on Global Warming, Wall St. J., 
May 11, 1991, at A7. See more recently, Letter to Members of the Senate on the Kyoto Protocol on 
Climate Change, 37 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. DOC. 444 (Feb. 13, 2001), in which President Bush sets 
out the Administration’s position, stating that the Protocol “would cause serious harm to the U.S. 
economy” and referring to “the incomplete state of scientific knowledge of the causes of, and 
solutions to, global climate change”. 
6 See chapter 2. 
7 G.A. Res. 53, U.N. GAOR, 43rd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/43/53 (1988).  
8 See Bodansky, Prologue, supra note 1,, at 54. 
9 Delphine Borione & Jean Ripert, Exercising Common but Differentiated Responsibility, in NEGOTIATING 
CLIMATE CHANGE: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE RIO CONVENTION, 71, 81-82 (Irving L. Minzer & J 
Amber Leonard eds., 1994) 
10 See G.A. Res. 207, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., UN. Doc. A/RES/44/207 (1989), at prmbl. para. 9 and 
op. para. 9.  
11 See Bodansky, Prologue, supra note 1, at 53.  
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onset of formal discussions, however, the alternative approach of a dedicated 
framework convention climate change emerged as the preferred option.  
In a resolution adopted in December 1989, the United Nations General 
Assembly expressed support for the initiative to begin preparations for negotiations 
on a framework convention on climate and called on States to “prepare, as a matter 
of urgency, a framework convention on climate and associated protocols containing 
concrete commitments in the light of priorities that may be authoritatively identified 
on the basis of sound scientific knowledge, and taking into account the specific 
development needs of developing countries”.12 This resolution also foreshadowed 
some of the themes that would feature in the subsequent negotiation of the 
Convention and beyond, including the historical responsibility of industrialized 
countries for anthropogenic climate change and developing countries’ need for 
financial support, as well access to, and transfer of, environmentally sound 
technologies.13  
General Assembly Resolution 45/212, of 21 December 1990, established the 
Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) and mandated it to pursue “a 
single intergovernmental negotiating process under the auspices of the General 
Assembly” tasked with negotiating a convention incorporating “appropriate 
commitments”.14 The INC conducted its work on five sessions, of which the first 
three were largely dominated by the staking out of positions and procedural 
discussions.15 This prelude did allow the parties to sound each other out and served 
to more clearly delineate the positions of the various groups. The INC struggled to 
develop a negotiating text - the bread and butter of intergovernmental negotiations – 
and its penultimate meeting concluded with a text littered with hundreds of brackets, 
indicating the diverging positions of the parties. In a decision widely credited with 
facilitating the adoption of the Convention, the Chairman of the INC presented his 
clean draft negotiating text for consideration at the final meeting.16  
A number of determining positions stood out and were instrumental in 
shaping the Convention. First, throughout the negotiations the United States 
remained firmly opposed to binding targets for emission stabilization and reduction, 
which in various forms were advocated by the states of the European Community 
(EC). Although it favored a pared-down treaty along the lines of the Vienna 
Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, the United States came to accept 
a more detailed Climate Convention. The question of targets and timetables 
bedeviled the process until before the very last session of the INC, just prior to 
which it was resolved by means of a compromise crafted by the United Kingdom 
and the United States, giving rise to what is now Article 4(2) of the Convention.17 
Targets and timetables where replaced with language according to which 
industrialized countries would report regularly on policies and measures to reduce 
                                                 
12 Supra note 10, at op. para. 12. 
13 See id. prmbl. para. 7 and op. paras. 14-15. 
14 G.A. Res. 212, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., UN. Doc. A/RES/45/212 (1990). 
15 See Bodansky, Prologue, supra note 1, at 61. 
16 See Bodansky, Commentary, supra at 491; Ahmed Djoghlaf, The Beginnings of an International Climate Law, 
in NEGOTIATING CLIMATE CHANGE: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE RIO CONVENTION, supra note 9, at 
102. 
17 See Bodansky, Commentary, supra note 1, at 491 
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emissions, with the aim of returning emissions to their 1990 levels.18 Second, an issue 
pressed by the developing countries was that of access to financial resources and 
technology. These countries generally assigned less importance to climate change 
mitigation, given the more immediate needs demanding the attention of their 
governments and argued that they should receive additional financial assistance for 
mitigation and adaptation.  
By and large the industrialized countries, quite possibly aware of the cost that 
mitigation efforts would exact from their economies, were unwilling to agree to 
either specific mitigation targets for themselves or new and additional resource flows 
to developing countries. Discussion centred around the role of the Global 
Environment Facility (GEF), with industrialized countries insisting on designating it 
as the funding mechanism, while developing countries argued for the creation of a 
dedicated financial mechanism for the Convention. As a final compromise the GEF 
was designated as the financial mechanism on an interim basis.19 Third, among the 
developing countries, who underscored the industrialized countries’ historical 
responsibility for emissions, there was generally little support for strong 
commitments or mechanisms for implementation, with the exception of island and 
small low-lying states, which banded together under the umbrella of the Alliance of 
Small Island States (AOSIS). Given their particular and immediate concern with the 
effects of climate change, this group of states advocated positions considerably more 
stringent than those of most other developing countries. In fact, the G-7720 had 
some difficulty maintaining a common negotiating position and stopped meeting as a 
group at the fourth session of the INC. This came as a result of the diverging 
interests of the states making up this group, encompassing states with very different 
interests such as AOSIS and the OPEC countries, some of whom made common 
cause with the United States in drawing attention to scientific uncertainties and the 
undesirability of targets and timetables.  
While CO2 is the most important greenhouse gas, making up around 77 per 
cent of anthropogenic emissions, the other greenhouse gases, such as methane, 
nitrous oxide and some of the hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) and perfluorocarbons 
(PFCs), from a range of industrial and consumer uses, are also important. While they 
may be emitted only in relatively small quantities, because of their high global 
warming potentials their abatement offers significant CO2-equivalent emission 
reductions. This was one reason why countries, led by the United States, argued that 
the Convention should adopt a “comprehensive approach” that considered all 
greenhouse gases and removals by sinks. The Convention refers only to “carbon 
dioxide and other greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol”, which 
deals with ozone depleting substances, without endorsing the comprehensive 
                                                 
18 UNFCCC, art. 4(2)(b). 
19 See Elizabeth Dowdeswell & Richard J. Kinley, Constructive Damage to the Status Quo in, 
NEGOTIATING CLIMATE CHANGE: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE RIO CONVENTION, supra note 9, at 
113, 124-125. A later decision confirmed the status of the GEF as the financial mechanism of the 
Convention. 
20 The Group of 77 and China, so-called for its original number of members, but today a group 
representing 132 developing countries in various United Nations fora, including the climate change 
negotiations. The chairmanship of the G-77 rotates on a six-monthly basis. For a selection of recent 
statements made on behalf of G-77, see http://www.g77.org/.  
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approach. However, under the Kyoto Protocol a basket of gases count towards the 
emission limitation and reduction targets.  
 
3.1.2 Key provisions of the UNFCCC 
The following section will outline some of the key provisions of the 
Convention. The objective is not to be comprehensive, but rather to select 
provisions that are of relevance to the issues raised in this thesis. 
Bodansky concludes that the Convention falls somewhere between a 
framework and substantive convention, establishing more comprehensive obligations 
than the bare-bones form of a treaty such as the Vienna Convention on the 
Depletion of the Ozone Layer, yet falling short of the detailed commitments 
contained in the Montreal Protocol to the Vienna Convention.21 Functionally, the 
provisions of the Convention can be roughly grouped under four headings: 
introductory provisions, commitments and associated provisions, institutions 
established by the Convention, and final or “boilerplate” provisions relating to 
amendments, entry into force and the like. Thus, the introductory part consists of 
the preamble, definitions, the objective of the Convention (Article 2), and principles 
guiding the implementation of the Convention (Article 3). Principles listed include 
the principle of the protection of the climate system for the benefit of present and 
future generations of humankind, the principle of equity, the principle of common 
but differentiated responsibilities, and the precautionary principle. With respect to 
the latter, it is evident how carefully the provision is balanced – it affirms that lack of 
full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason to postponing mitigation 
measures; at the same time such measures must be cost-effective to ensure global 
benefits at the lowest possible cost. The principle of the right to sustainable 
development is included. The linkage between climate change and sustainable 
development is an important one, underpinning as it does so many debates between 
North and South on the conceptualization of global problems, including climate 
change. Considered overall, the phrasing of the principles reveals several, sometimes 
opposing, strands. For example, phrases emphasizing environmental integrity are 
linked with a reference to cost-effectiveness of measures. Similarly, mitigation 
measures should not come at the cost of development for the developing countries, 
and mitigation measures should not constitute an unjustifiable restriction on 
international trade.22 The legal status of the principles is difficult to define with 
certainty.  Nonetheless, and despite efforts to dilute their legal implications, the 
principles stand clearly as interpretive aids to the Convention. 23 
The ultimate “objective” of the Convention is clearly stated in Article 2 as 
“the stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations at a level that would prevent 
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.” This level “should 
be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to 
climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable 
economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.” The recognition of the 
                                                 
21 See Bodansky, Commentary, supra note 1, at 496. 
22 See in relation to trade, UNFCCC, art. 3(5). 
23 See Bodansky, Commentary, supra note 1, at 501 (noting that the United States inserted the word 
“guide” and replaced the word “States” with “Parties” to undercut the argument that the principles 
were part of customary international law binding on all parties). 
  47 
 
need to stabilize greenhouse gas emissions underlines the serious nature of the 
climate change. The exact legal status of the objective is, however, not entirely 
clear.24 While the objective is not phrased as an obligation, it can convincingly be 
argued that it is akin to a collective commitment, as it encapsulates the rationale of 
the Convention as a whole. Various stabilization targets have been proposed, based 
on the avoidance of major, irreversible events, and at the same time considering what 
is technologically and economically feasible. The objective cannot be understood as 
an obligation to meet any such specific target, but rather as a commitment to strive, 
in good faith, to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations, including through the 
implementation of the Convention and subsequent protocols. In the final analysis, 
although the objective is explicit, it retains a Delphic quality. Who is to say precisely 
what constitutes “dangerous” interference with the climate system and for whom?25  
The principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” finds its most 
explicit expression in the Convention.26 The principle is not a new one in 
international law, finding expression in, among others, provisions of the General 
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) and the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).27 In the context of the negotiations, the principle 
served to bridge the positions of the developed countries, which, with the exception 
of the United States sought some form of targets for stabilization and reduction, and 
the developing countries, which generally contended that it would be unfair to them 
to assume such commitments. 
In the Convention, the principle finds expression in the differentiation in 
commitments between Annex 1, or developed country parties, and non-Annex 1 
parties. Differentiation exists with respect to: Annex 1 parties’ non-binding goal to 
return their emissions to 1990 levels by 2000; more stringent and frequent reporting 
obligations of Annex 1 parties; and provisions concerning the granting of assistance, 
which also fall within the ambit of differential treatment as articulated by the 
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities.28  The Convention provides 
that a sub-set of Annex 1 parties – essentially the members of the OECD in 1992, 
listed in Annex II to the Convention – have a special responsibility to assist 
developing countries meet their commitments. Thus Article 4(3) states that parties 
included in Annex II “shall provide new and additional financial resources to meet 
the agreed full costs incurred by developing country Parties” in complying with their 
reporting obligations. Parties included in Annex II are, among other things, also 
required (“shall”) to take all practicable measures to promote and finance the transfer 
of environmentally sound technologies, particularly to developing countries.29 
                                                 
24 See Bodansky, Commentary, supra note 1, at 500. 
25 For a recent scientific contribution addressing this issue, see AVOIDING DANGEROUS CLIMATE 
CHANGE (Hans Joachim Schellnhuber et al eds., 2006). 
26 See UNFCCC, art. 3(1) and art. 4(1). The principle is further analyzed in chapter 5. For a detailed 
analysis of the principle in the climate change regime, see LAVANYA RAJAMANI,  DIFFERENTIAL 
TREATMENT IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 176-249 (2006). 
27 Yoshiro Matsui, Some Aspects of the Principle of “Common but Differentiated Responsibilities”, 2 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: POLITICS, LAW AND ECONOMICS, 151, 151-152 
(2002). 
28 RAJAMANI, supra note 26, at 191. 
29 UNFCCC, art. 4(5). 
  48 
 
The commitments contained in Article 4 form the core of the Convention, 
setting out obligations common to all parties, as well as those applicable only to 
industrialized or Annex 1 parties. In terms of Article 4(1), all parties must prepare 
national inventories of anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks, as 
well as implementing programs containing measures to mitigate climate change, as 
well as measures facilitate adaptation. The parties are also required to promote 
sustainable management, conservation and enhancement of sinks and reservoirs of 
greenhouse gases, including forests and oceans. Under Article 4(2), the Annex 1 
parties commit themselves to adopt national policies and take corresponding 
measures on the mitigation of climate change, by limiting anthropogenic emissions 
of greenhouse gases and protecting sinks. The Annex 1 parties also are required to 
report periodically on the above policies undertaken by them, “with the aim of 
returning individually or jointly to their 1990 levels these anthropogenic emissions of 
carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases”.30 To the extent that this is a binding 
legal obligation, it is a rather weak and diluted one.31 As the record shows, where this 
obligation was met it was by and large due to economic factors and unrelated to 
mitigation measures.32  
Article 12 on reporting (“communication of information”) of inventories and 
applicable methodologies reinforces, and is closely linked to, Article 4. While all 
parties must communicate their inventories and describe steps taken to implement 
the Convention, Annex 1 countries must also include in their communications 
detailed descriptions of policies and measures to mitigate climate change. However, 
the reporting obligation is differentiated for developing countries, which shall submit 
their first national communication within three years of the entry into force of the 
Convention or of the availability of financial resources in accordance with Article 
4(1). Least developed countries (LDCs), a sub-set of developing countries classified 
by the United Nations largely on the basis of very low per capita GDP, can submit 
national communications at their discretion.33 The provision relating to reporting 
forms a fundamental part of the Convention as the reporting and monitoring is vital 
measuring progress. It also facilitates the development of common standards and 
builds trust among the Parties. Reporting and monitoring is a mainstay of multilateral 
environmental agreements, as is true of treaties in other spheres, such as human 
rights. And, while the Convention does not explicitly empower any of its institutions 
to review compliance with its provisions, the Conference of the Parties has 
elaborated a process of in-depth expert reviews of Annex 1 parties’ national 
communications.34 Finally, as they serve to facilitate reporting, the provisions 
                                                 
30 UNFCCC, art. 4(2)(b). 
31 See Bodansky, Commentary, supra note 1, at 516 (expressing doubt as to whether they legally binding 
and calling them a “quasi-target and quasi-timetable”). 
32 Primarily the economic collapse in states of the former Soviet Union and shuttering of inefficient 
industries in Central and Eastern Europe and the reunified Germany.  
33 UNFCCC, art. 12(5). 
34 See Jacob Werksman, Compliance and the Kyoto Protocol: Building a Backbone into a Flexible Regime  9 
YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 48, 65-66 (Jutta Brunnée & Ellen Hay eds., 
1999). 
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covering cooperation on research and observation and education and training should 
also be mentioned here.35 
A third key part of the Convention consists of the Articles relating to the 
institutional arrangements, namely the Conference of the Parties (COP) and its 
subsidiary organs for scientific and technological advice and implementation, as well 
as the financial mechanism. The Conference of the Parties, as the supreme body of 
the Convention, is empowered to make decisions to promote the effective 
implementation of the Convention, including to “[e]xercise such other functions as 
are required for the achievement of the objective of the Convention”.36 Thus, aside 
from the enumerated functions, the COP is entrusted with such open-ended powers 
necessary to implement the Convention. It is also provided that the COP shall agree 
upon and adopt by consensus rules of procedure.37 This stipulation had the result 
that parties who did not support the objectives of the Convention could block 
consensus on the adoption of the rules of procedure, which was the case at the first 
Conference of the Parties, with the result that the rules of procedure have at every 
meeting been “applied”, without ever having been formally been adopted. The 
provisions on voting, however, have never been applied.38 Exponents of delay and 
obfuscation were thus handed a veto, because - in the absence of voting rules - the 
rule of consensus applies. Creative accommodation and skilful chairmanship have 
thus proved key to overcoming this impediment. Unfortunately, the Convention’s 
unhappy status quo concerning the rules of procedure was also imported into the 
Kyoto Protocol.39  
Lastly, the Convention has the standard provisions covering the settlement 
of disputes, amendments to the Convention, and adoption of protocols. 
 
3.2 The Kyoto Protocol 
A significant new chapter in the field of environment and energy was opened 
with the decision in 2004 of the Russian Federation to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. 
Adopted in 1997, the Protocol had existed in a state of limbo. With Russia’s 
ratification, the Protocol cleared its final hurdle, entering into force on 16 February 
2005.40. It builds on the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
by setting binding emission targets for Annex 1 countries to limit or reduce their 
                                                 
35 See UNFCCC, art. 5 and art. 6. 
36 See UNFCCC, art 7(2)(m). 
37 UNFCCC, art. 7(2)(k). 
38 Sebastian Oberthür & Hermann E. Ott, THE KYOTO PROTOCOL: INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE 
POLICY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 40, 46 (1999). Art. 17 concerning protocols to the Convention does 
not specify procedures for the adoption of such instruments, which meant that parties were referred 
back to the rules of procedure “applied” but not “adopted”. This effectively extended the veto to the 
decision on the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol. For the text of the draft rules of procedure, see 
Organizational matters, Adoption of the rules of procedure, Note by the secretariat , FCCC/CP/1996/2 (1996). 
39 UNFCCC, art. 13(5) states that “[t]he rules of procedure of the Conference of the Parties…shall be 
applied mutatis mutandis under this Protocol, except as may be otherwise decided by consensus…” 
40 UNFCCC, art. 25(1) stipulates that entry into force is conditional on ratification of 55 countries and 
representing at least 55 per cent of CO2 emissions in 1990, the base year for the treaty. As at 10 
January 2007, 176 states had ratified or acceded to the Protocol. After Australia’s deposited its 
instrument of accession at the Thirteenth Conference of the Parties (COP-13) in Bali in 2007, the 
United States became the sole industrialized country not to have ratified the Protocol. 
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greenhouse gas emissions. Overall, the Annex 1 countries that have ratified the 
Protocol are required to reduce their emissions by 5.2 per cent relative to 1990 
emissions. Parties must meet their targets at the end of the commitment period, 
from 2008 to 2012.  
The Protocol contains a number of innovations. It breaks new ground at the 
international level by assigning a key role to three “flexibility mechanisms”. In terms 
of institutional design, the mechanism for monitoring and enforcing compliance is 
unique among multilateral environmental agreements. To a significant degree, the 
Protocol itself consists of an outline, so that considerable time and effort was 
required to finalize the “rulebook” necessary to implement its provisions. That 
process is essentially complete. Under provisions for a “prompt start”, key aspects of 
the Protocol, such as the clean development mechanism (CDM), began to operate 
before its entry into force.  
As indicated, a key innovation of the Protocol is the establishment of the so-
called “flexibility mechanisms”, which consist of emissions trading between Annex 1 
countries, joint implementation between developed countries, and the clean 
development mechanism (CDM), which links carbon reduction efforts with 
developing countries by making it possible to earn credits for projects implemented 
in developing countries. Importantly, the CDM is not designed solely to accomplish 
carbon reductions, but is also intended to help developing countries achieve 
sustainable development. The market in credits from CDM projects is gaining 
momentum, and indications are that it could be a significant source of capital 
investment, perhaps in the order of 12 billion dollars by 2012.41 The value of credits 
traded under the CDM in 2006 totalled an estimated US$ 5 billion.42 Linking the 
CDM to regional emission trading systems, as has been done with the European 
Emissions Trading Scheme, will also serve to bolster the CDM market. The 
international carbon market is still in an early stage of development, but is growing 
rapidly – and is expected to increase dramatically in coming years. The driving force 
behind such flexibility mechanisms is the disparity of emission control costs in 
different parts of the world.  Based on current analyses, for example, the marginal 
costs of control for greenhouse gases within developing countries is approximately 
half that found within OECD.  Studies demonstrate that developed countries could 
significantly reduce the cost of meeting their greenhouse gas reduction goals by 
making use of the flexibility mechanisms.43 In the case of the CDM, developing 
                                                 
41 This figure assumes a price per ton of CO2 of around US$ 10 and CDM credit volumes of about 
1.2 billion certified emission reductions (CERs). See United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change Secretariat, Press Release, Annual green investment flow of some 100 billion dollars possible as 
part of fight against global warming, 19 September 2006, 
http://unfccc.int/files/press/news_room/press_releases_and_advisories/application/pdf/20060919
_riyadh_press_release_vs5.pdf. For analysis of CDM volumes, INTERNATIONAL EMISSIONS TRADING 
ASSOCIATION, 2006 STATE OF THE CDM: IETA POSITION ON THE CDM FOR COP-12/MOP-2, 43-
44 (2006). 
42 KARAN CAPOOR & PHILIPPE AMBROSI, WORLD BANK, STATE AND TRENDS OF THE CARBON 
MARKET 2007 3 (2007). 
43 Economic modeling strongly suggests that marginal abatement costs are significantly lower if global 
trading is instituted. See a comparison of the results of two dozen models by Urs Springer, The market 
for tradable GHG permits under the Kyoto Protocol: a survey of model studies, 25(3) ENERGY ECONOMICS 527 
(2003). 
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countries should also benefit from increased investment and clean energy 
technologies. 
Reducing greenhouse gases will require the implementation of effective 
policies and the diffusion of climate-friendly technologies. Emissions from the 
industrialized countries, which stabilized in the 1990s, are once again rising.44 At the 
same time, emissions from developing countries, especially emerging economies, are 
rising very rapidly. This underlines the need to fully implement the Kyoto Protocol – 
a first step in the collective effort to combat climate change – while also elaborating a 
more stringent and inclusive successor agreement. The next part of this chapter 
consists of a brief account of the Protocol’s negotiating history. 
 
3.2.1 Negotiating history 
The Protocol is the result of more than two years of preparatory 
negotiations, culminating in a down-to-the-wire final negotiating session.45 The seeds 
for the Protocol were sown by the Convention. Thus Convention Article 4(2) 
provides that the Conference of the Parties shall at its first meeting review the 
adequacy of the “aim” to return greenhouse gases to 1990 levels by the year 2000 
and to consider next steps. Projections indicated that it was very unlikely that Annex 
1 parties were going to meet that goal.46 It was also evident that commitments with a 
horizon of 2000 were not sufficient to combat climate change in a meaningful 
manner. Given the work of the IPCC, policymakers were also cognizant that a 
stabilization of emissions at 1990 levels would be insufficient to stabilize greenhouse 
gas concentrations. Thus when the first Conference of the Parties (COP-1) met in 
Berlin in April 1995, there was a realization that further commitments would be 
required, a conclusion that was strongly opposed by oil producing exporting 
countries and some powerful interest groups, such as US industrial lobby.47 
Nonetheless, at COP-1 parties reached an agreement coined the Berlin Mandate, 
which set in motion a process to reinforce the Convention’s commitments by means 
of a protocol or other instrument, with objective of elaborating policies and 
measures and setting quantified limitation and reduction objectives (“targets”) within 
specified post-2000 timeframes.48  
Developing countries contended that, in accordance with the principle of 
common but differentiated responsibilities the process leading to a new instrument 
should not introduce any fresh commitments for them. Industrialized countries’ 
(reluctant) acceptance of this position was an important factor in reaching agreement 
and in shaping the instrument that emerged from the negotiations. (In the explicit 
                                                 
44 Compilation and Synthesis of Third National Communications, U.N. Doc. UNFCCC/SBI/7/Add.1 (2003).  
45 Two well-known books on the Kyoto Protocol are: Sebastian Oberthür & Hermann E. Ott, THE 
KYOTO PROTOCOL: INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE POLICY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (1999) [hereinafter 
Oberthür & Ott, INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE POLICY]; Michael Grubb et al, THE KYOTO PROTOCOL: 
A GUIDE AND ASSESSMENT (1999) [hereinafter Grubb et al, GUIDE AND ASSESSMENT]. 
46 First Review of Information Communicated by Each Party Included in Annex 1 to the Convention, U.N. Doc. 
A/AC.237/81, (1994). 
47 See Grubb et al, GUIDE AND ASSESSMENT, supra note 45, at 46. 
48 Decision 1/CP.1, in Report of the Parties to the Convention on its First Session , Addendum, Part II: Action 
taken by the parties, FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add.1 (1995). For details on the Berlin Mandate and the 
AGBM, see Grubb et al, GUIDE AND ASSESSMENT, supra note 45, at 43-60; Oberthür & Ott, 
INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE POLICY, supra note 45, at 43-54. 
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exclusion of commitments for developing countries lay seeds of the fateful US 
Senates’ Byrd-Hagel resolution, which by a vote of 97-0 rejected Senate ratification 
of any agreement not contemplating commitments for developing countries.) It was 
also decided that should be completed in 1997 with a view to adopting the results at 
the third session of the Conference of the Parties. Following the Berlin meeting, a 
negotiating body, known as the Ad hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate (AGBM), was 
established to oversee the negotiation of the new instrument. The AGBM met eight 
times between 1995 and 1997 and produced a compilation text in time for the third 
Conference of the Parties (COP-3) in Kyoto. 
Countries participate in the climate change negotiations as members of one 
or other grouping. 49 The largest, and the oldest, is the Group of 77 or G-77, which 
today counts 132 developing countries as members.50 China is an associate member 
and works closely with the Group, so that statements are usually made “on behalf of 
the G-77 and China”. It is active throughout the United Nations system, and the 
country holding the six-month presidency of the Group usually appoints individuals 
as spokespersons on a particular issue, or for certain negotiating sessions. Given the 
diverse interests housed within the Group - encompassing OPEC oil exporting 
countries and small island states - coordinating a common position often proves 
difficult. Accordingly, sometimes certain developing countries will pursue their 
interests through smaller groups, such as the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), 
a grouping of 43 low-lying and island countries and the group of Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs). AOSIS was formed during the negotiations on the Framework 
Convention. The member states of the European Union (EU) negotiate as a bloc, led 
by the country holding the rotating six-month presidency. The Umbrella Group is a 
loosely organized and brings together non-EU industrialized countries, usually 
Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Russian Federation, 
Ukraine and the United States. The Umbrella Group evolved out of the 
JUSSCANNZ coalition (Japan, United States, Switzerland, Canada, Australia, 
Norway and New Zealand), which became active during the Kyoto Protocol 
negotiations at COP-3. The Umbrella Group countries share an interest in 
advocating for cost-effectiveness and flexibility in the development and 
implementation of the climate regime. A fairly new grouping is the Environmental 
Integrity Group, consisting of Mexico, the Republic of Korea, and Switzerland. 
The key issues in the negotiating process – the Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin 
Mandate - that would culminate in the Kyoto Protocol can be grouped under three 
broad headings: (i) specific policies and measures that might be included; (ii) targets, 
or “quantified emissions limitations and reduction objectives” (QELROs), in the 
negotiating jargon; and (iii) developing country concerns relating to financial support 
and technology transfer.51 At the instigation of the European Union, the Berlin 
                                                 
49 The UNFCCC secretariat has a useful note on the various groupings on its website at: 
http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/parties/negotiating_groups/items/2714.php. More details 
on the party groups and their negotiating positions and influence can be found in FARHANA YAMIN & 
JOANNA DEPLEDGE, THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE REGIME: A GUIDE TO RULES, INSTITUTIONS 
AND PROCEDURES, 34-46 (2005). 
50 At its founding in 1964, in the context of the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), the Group had a membership of 77 countries. Membership grew in the 
following decades as more countries attained  independence and joined the United Nations. 
51 See Grubb et al, GUIDE AND ASSESSMENT, supra note 45, at 62. 
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Mandate committed the parties to elaborate policies and measures for mitigating 
climate change, ranging from energy efficiency appliance labeling through to carbon 
taxes. After internal wrangling, the EU submitted a list of policies and measures, 
some of which were intended to be mandatory, but this “command and control” 
regulatory approach was rejected by the United States, which preferred to retain 
flexibility with respect to choice of mitigation mechanisms.52 The EU proposals did 
not garner much support, with the OPEC states especially emphatic to exclude 
carbon taxes. A turning point came at the second Conference of the Parties (COP-2), 
when the United States spoke out in favor of binding emission reductions, taking the 
wind out of the sails of EU’s arguments for mandatory policies and measures. The 
watered-down version of the EU proposals – contained in Protocol Article 2 – in no 
way reflects time expended on this item during the earlier phase of the negotiations. 
A few years later, in an audacious policy about-face, the EU embraced binding 
targets and market mechanisms, establishing a EU-wide emissions trading scheme in 
2005, while the US retreated from the mechanisms that it had once championed. 
COP-2 was held in Geneva in early July 1996. The IPCC’s Second 
Assessment Report (SAR), officially published in June, concluded: “The balance of 
evidence suggests that there is a discernible human influence on global climate.” The 
Geneva Ministerial Declaration endorsed the SAR and stated that is should provide a 
scientific basis for strengthening action, particularly action by Annex I Parties to limit 
and reduce emissions of greenhouse gases. The Declaration also noted several 
findings of the SAR, including that achieving a stabilization of atmospheric GHG 
concentrations at twice pre-industrial levels would eventually require global 
emissions to fall below half of 1995 levels. The Geneva Conference also saw an 
about-turn by the United States, which changed the dynamic of the negotiations 
when it announced support for legally binding commitments. With this it became 
clear that despite some lingering objections, binding commitments would be a 
feature of whatever instrument eventually was adopted.53 From the perspective of 
the present, it is somewhat surprising that, until well into the AGBM process, it was 
uncertain whether the emission targets would be legally binding or framed as “soft” 
target similar to those in the Convention.54  
The next part provides an overview of the key provisions of the Protocol. 
For practical purposes, the section focuses on analyzing the most relevant 
provisions, providing details of the negotiations where relevant.  
  
3.2.2 Key provisions 
The basic structure of the Protocol may be summarized briefly as follows.55 The 
substantive obligations of industrialized (Annex 1) countries are set out in Article 2 
(policies and measures), Article 3 (emission target and timetable), Article 4 (joint 
fulfillment by a group of Parties), Article 5 (inventories and methodologies), and 
Article 7 (reporting). Article 10 largely restates the Convention provisions on 
                                                 
52 For more details, see Oberthür & Ott, INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE POLICY, supra note 45, at 103-106. 
53 See Grubb et al, GUIDE AND ASSESSMENT, supra note 45, 53-55. 
54 See Oberthür & Ott, INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE POLICY, supra note 45, at 49. 
55 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, December 11, 
1997, 37 I.L.M. 22, text available from the website of the UNFCCC secretariat, 
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php [hereinafter Protocol]. 
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cooperation and national communications. Article 11 essentially repeats Convention 
Articles 4(3) and 11, providing guidance to Annex II Parties on financing for 
developing countries to carry out their inventory and reporting obligations. The 
institutional role of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention, the Secretariat, 
the subsidiary bodies and related matters are dealt with in Articles 9, 13, 14, 15 and 
16. The market-based mechanisms designed to assist Annex 1 parties in meeting 
their obligations to reduce greenhouse gas emissions are covered in Article 6, Article 
12, and Article 17. Article 18 requires the development of compliance procedures 
and mechanisms. Article 19 makes the dispute resolution provisions of the 
Convention applicable to the Protocol. The legal boilerplate relating to matters such 
as amendment, entry into force and so forth is covered in Articles 20-28.  
The preamble and definitions sections of the Protocol are short, drawing on 
what is contained in the Convention. The definition of “parties present and voting” 
as a Party present and casting an affirmative or negative vote – typically found in the 
rules of procedure – was included as a result of an anomalous situation under the 
Protocol. The parties to the Convention have never formally adopted the Rules of 
Procedure and the provision on voting is not applied.56 Article 13(5) provides that 
the same rules applied under the Convention will be applicable to the Protocol until 
such time as otherwise decided by consensus. As indicated this effectively 
incorporates the unsatisfactory state of affairs existing under the Convention, 
meaning that decisions under the Protocol are subject to consensus. 57  
Article 2(1) sets out a menu of polices and measures to be adopted by Annex 
1 countries, which are phrased in non-binding terms, qualified (“in accordance with 
its national circumstances”). The policies covered include enhancement of energy 
efficiency, protection and enhancement of sinks and reservoirs, development of 
renewable forms of energy, and reduction or phasing out of market imperfections 
and subsidies that run counter to the objectives of the Convention.58  
Article 2(2) calls on Annex 1 Parties to pursue the limitation or reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions from aviation and marine bunker fuels, working through 
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO), which are the international organizations that deal with these 
sectors. International bunker fuel emissions were not included in Annex 1 parties 
Kyoto targets, largely because no agreement could be reached on how to ascribe 
responsibility for such emissions.59 Accordingly, while parties must tally these 
emissions, they are excluded from national totals and are reported separately. The 
issue continues to be on the agenda of the SBSTA, which has discussed matters 
related to improving the monitoring and accuracy of emissions international bunker 
                                                 
56 The reason is that the impasse on the rules of procedure, and the consequent absence of a 
provision on voting, means that decisions have to be taken by consensus, a state of affairs that gives 
objectors a veto. In practice, at crucial times, chairmen have managed to carry majority decisions over 
the objections of a few States. 
57 See Oberthür & Ott, INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE POLICY, supra note 45, at 100. 
58 See UNFCCC, art. 2(1)(a). 
59 See Oberthür & Ott, INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE POLICY, supra note 45, 107-108. 
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fuels, as well as liaising with ICAO and IMO.60 For their part, these organizations 
have been studying the issue, but have not moved towards control measures.61 
Driven by growth in air travel and international trade rapid, both aviation and 
maritime emissions are rising rapidly, so that regulation under future international 
climate policy will be important.62 Emissions from CO2 rose about 68 per cent 
between 1990 and 2000.63 In addition, various factors amplify the effect of emissions 
from air travel: a special report of the IPCC on aviation noted that while aviation was 
responsible for about 2 per cent of CO2 emissions from human activities, it 
accounted for an estimated 3.5 per cent of climate change.64 Given the lack of 
substitutes for aviation and marine bunkers, efficiency improvements are the focus in 
both transport sectors. With respect to aviation, the IPCC has estimated that fuel 
burn could be reduced by 6-18 percent with better operating measures, particularly 
air traffic control. 
The agreement on binding quantified emissions targets and a timetable for 
their achievement represent the heart of the Kyoto Protocol. Under Article 3 Annex 
1 Parties as a group committed themselves to individual and differentiated emission 
targets, which they would have to meet with a view to reducing their overall 
emissions of the applicable greenhouse gases by at least 5 per cent below 1990 levels. 
The individual targets, relative to the 1990 baseline, are inscribed in Annex B to the 
Protocol. During the negotiations various targets where proposed, some for specific 
gases, but the introduction of differentiated targets helped to bridge the existing 
differences. While the EU advocated an early date for meeting targets should be met 
– 2005 was proposed - the United States insisted on 2010. The rump of the EU 
proposal is to be found in Article 3(2), which provides that each Annex 1 Party 
should by 2005 have made “demonstrable progress in achieving its commitments”.  
                                                 
60 See Methodological issues relating to emissions from international aviation and maritime transport, Note by the 
Secretariat , FCCC/SBSTA/2004/INF.5 (2004). 
61 The 36th ICAO Assembly established a group to develop a program of action on climate change 
and international aviation, but parties could not agree on a proposal to endorse emissions trading. The 
resolution adopted provides that emissions trading schemes should only be implemented with mutual 
consent of the States co ncerned. See Consolidated statement of continuing ICAO policies and practices related to 
environmental protection , Ass. Res. A36-22 (2007), appendixes K and L, compiled in Resolutions adopted at the 
36th Assembly, Provisional Edition (Sept. 2007). At the regional level the European Commission has 
proposed bringing aviation, including flights into and out of the European Union, under EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme. See Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Directive 
of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to include 
aviation activities in the scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the 
Community, COM(2006) 818, 20 December 2006. Despite opposition for airlines, it seems that the 
EU Governments will adopt an amended version of the proposal, see James Kanter, Plan on Emissions 
Hints at U.S.-Europe Rift, N.Y. TIMES, December 21, 2007. 
62 MICHEL DEN ELZEN ET AL, AN ANALYSIS OF OPTIONS FOR INCLUDING INTERNATIONAL AVIATION 
AND MARINE EMISSIONS IN A POST-2012 CLIMATE MITIGATION REGIME 13 (Netherlands 
Environment Agency Report, MNP Report 500114007/2007, 2007). 
63 IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: M ITIGATION, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP III TO THE 
FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 330 
(Bert Metz et al eds., 2007). 
64 IPCC SPECIAL REPORT, AVIATION AND THE GLOBAL ATMOSPHERE, 6, 8 (Joyce E. Penne, et al, 
eds., 1999). 
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The genesis of the targets and timetables can usefully be analyzed by 
examining how the emission targets are defined, the level of the commitments, and 
the flexibility mechanisms designed to aid in achieving them.65 Given the prospect of 
allocation of the mitigation burden under a post-2012 climate regime, it is interesting 
to note that apparently it was never questioned that targets would be formulated with 
reference to, and largely on the basis of, historical emissions. Alternatives, such as 
indices calculating emissions relative to population or GDP did not make it further 
than academic journals.66 Other key issues concerned which sources (gases) would be 
covered and how to account for sinks (forests). With respect to sources, negotiators 
opted for a so-called “basket of gases” or comprehensive approach that, in addition 
to the three greenhouse gases – carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide - includes 
three trace gases that have very powerful warming effect and whose emission levels 
have been rising rapidly.  
The Protocol defined and put into practice the comprehensive approach to 
greenhouse gases previous adopted in the Convention. The basket of gases approach 
introduces a degree of “what” flexibility, because Parties can select the gas or gases 
on which to concentrate their mitigation activities, enabling them to choose the most 
cost-effective options. To make reductions of the various gases comparable, 
negotiators turned to the global warming potentials (GWPs) that the IPCC had 
developed for the various greenhouse gases. The GWP expresses the greenhouse 
forcing effect of a gas relative to CO2. Using the GWPs, collective emissions of the 
applicable greenhouse gases can be calculated as CO2 equivalent emissions, which is 
the term used in Article 3 of the Protocol.67 Table 3.1 illustrates the respective GWPs 
of the greenhouse gases controlled under the Kyoto Protocol, as well as their main 
sources. 
                                                 
65 See Grubb et al, GUIDE AND ASSESSMENT, supra note 45, at 62 and following. The next section 
draws heavily on his work. 
66 See id. at 77. 
67 Although the GWPs are a convenient tool, questions have been raised concerning their scientific 
soundness and accuracy. See Grubb et al, GUIDE AND ASSESSMENT, supra note 45, at 74 (referring to 
academic criticisms that GWPs are “uncertain and logically imperfect”). 
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Table 3.1: Greenhouse gases in Kyoto Protocol 
Gas Sources Emission 
trends 1990-
2000 
Lifetime (years) GWP-100 
years 
% GHG 
Annex 1, 
2000  
Carbon Dioxide 
(CO2) 
Fossil fuel 
burning, 
cement 
Small decrease 
(<1%), mainly 
due to 
reduction in 
EIT countries, 
significant 
increases in 
some EU and 
OECD 
Variable, 
depending on 
uptake by sinks, 
but dominant 
component up  to 
100 
1 82 % 
Methane (CH4) Rice, cattle, 
biomass 
burning, land 
conversion, 
fossil fuel 
production 
21 % decline, 
increases in a 
few countries  
8.4/12 23 10 % 
Nitrous Oxide 
(N2O) 
Fertilizers, 
fossil fuel 
burning, land 
conversion for 
agriculture 
5% decrease 
due to sharp 
drop in EITs 
120/114 296 6 % 
Perfluoro-
carbons (PFCs) 
Industry, 
aluminum, 
electronic and 
electrical 
industries, fire 
fighting, 
solvents  
Decreased 10000 to >50000 5700 
(CF4); 
11900 
(C2F6) 
0.30 % 
Hydrofluoro-
carbons (HFCs) 
Industry, 
refrigerants 
Sharp increase 
due to 
substitution for 
ODS 
controlled by 
Montreal 
Protocol 
1.40 to 260 120 
(HFC-
152a); 
1200 
(HFC-23) 
1.23 % 
Sulphur 
hexafluoride 
(SF6) 
Electronic and 
electrical 
industries, 
insulation 
Decreased 3200 22000 0.38 % 
Source: Adapted from IPCC, Climate Change 2001: Working Group 1: The Scientific Basis , Table 4.1(a) and 
Compilation and Synthesis of Third National Communications, U.N. Doc. UNFCCC/SBI/7/Add.1 (2003)  
 
The technically very complicated issue of sinks came to prominence quite 
late in the negotiations.68 Up to half of the carbon emitted from human sources is 
quite rapidly absorbed by terrestrial sources (plants) and the oceans through the 
                                                 
68 See Oberthür & Ott, INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE POLICY, supra note 45, at 130. 
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operation of the natural carbon cycle.69 Countries with significant forests stood to 
gain if absorption by sinks were to be counted against CO 2 emissions (the so-called 
“net” approach emissions approach). The subject became controversial, not least 
because counting sinks (forests) appeared to be postponing actual cuts in emissions 
and seemed to favor some countries over others. While it was agreed that parties 
should not be able to count natural sinks (existing forests) this begged the question 
of what constituted an anthropogenic sink.70 The approach eventually adopted 
counts “[t]he net changes in greenhouse gas emissions by sources and removals by 
sinks resulting from direct human-induced land-use change and forestry activities, 
limited to afforestation, reforestation and deforestation since 1990” (own 
emphasis).71 This definition left a number of questions open and the adoption of 
detailed implementation rules proved difficult and time-consuming.72  
The Protocol contains several “flexibility mechanisms” to help Parties meet 
their obligations at lowest cost. Legally, support for such flexibility can be found in 
the Convention. Article 3(3) states that policies and measures “should be cost-
effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost” and “be 
comprehensive, cover all relevant sources… and comprise all economic sectors.” It 
also provides that efforts to address climate change may be carried out cooperatively 
by interested Parties. Article 4(2)(a) states that Annex 1 Parties may implement 
policies and measures jointly with other Parties and cooperate to achieve the 
objective of the Convention, and Article 4(2)(d) provides that the Conference of the 
Parties shall decide on criteria for joint implementation.  
Foremost of the measures allowing for flexibility are the market-based 
mechanisms elaborated in Articles 6 (joint implementation), Article 12 (clean 
development mechanism), and Article 17 (international emissions trading). Before 
discussing these mechanisms in greater detail, it is worth considering their common 
features and the context in which they operate. Regulated parties are subject to a 
                                                 
69 The storage capacity on land and in the oceans is clearly not unlimited. While considerable 
uncertainties remain, indications are that the oceans absorb about half of anthropogenic carbon. As 
warming increases, the physical uptake of this carbon is expected to decrease. See Christopher L. 
Sabine et al., The Oceanic Sink for Anthropogenic CO2 305 (5682) SCIENCE 367 (2004). In addition, higher 
levels of CO2 have also been linked with acidification of the oceans, with yet uncertain consequences 
for organisms and ecosystems, but it is thought that corals and components of phytoplankton may be 
affected. See THE ROYAL SOCIETY, POLICY DOC. 12/05, OCEAN ACIDIFICATION DUE TO INCREASING 
ATMOSPHERIC CARBON DIOXIDE (2005). 
70 It is frequently pointed out that since natural forests are carbon sinks, there ought to be a way to 
link their protection and preservation to the generation of carbon offset credits. In general, one 
problem with carbon offsets for avoided deforestation is that alternative land uses, commonly logging 
or soybean farming, are currently economically more attractive. Within the climate regime, countries 
with large areas of tropical rainforest that are experiencing significant deforestation (and resultant 
emissions), have traditionally resisted discussions of any measures or policies relating to preserving 
forests as natural sinks. This has changed, however, in the past few years with Indonesia, for instance, 
joining other smaller tropical rainforest countries expressing interest in market incentives for reduced 
deforestation. Costa Rica has pioneered the concept of ecosystem services. Forestry Law No. 7575 
adopted in 1996, recognizes four services provided by Costa Rica’s forests: carbon sequestration, 
hydrological services, biodiversity protection, and scenic beauty.  
71 Protocol, art. 3(3).  
72 Decision 19/CP.9, in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Ninth Session, addendum, Part II: action 
taken by the parties, vol. 2, FCCC/CP/2003/6/Add.2 (2004). See section 3.3 below, summarizing the 
outcomes of COP-9. 
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limitation on their emissions (the “cap”) over a given period of time. (Under the 
Protocol this is the 2008-2012 commitment period.). The potential for emissions 
reductions varies from country to country and industry to industry. That is to say, 
the marginal cost of abatement varies. Setting a cap on emissions puts a price on 
carbon. Depending on the carbon price, firms may engage in mitigation activities– 
installing more efficient machinery or switching from coal to natural gas for power 
generation. Other - facing relatively high abatement costs – may find it cheaper to 
purchase emissions allowances. The carbon price acts as an incentive for firms to 
seek out the least-cost mitigation opportunities, with the result that the overall 
mitigation effort takes place in the most efficient manner. For this reason, 
economists prefer “market-based” instruments over “command-and-control” 
regulatory policies, such as design or performance standards, which it is argued result 
in economic losses.73 The experience in the United States with the 1990 amendments 
to the Clean Air Act,74 resulted in reductions of sulfur dioxide at much lower cost 
than had been predicted, providing a major boost to the proponents of trading 
mechanisms.75 A larger and more diverse market – with more mitigation 
opportunities – leads to lower aggregate mitigation costs, so that on economic 
efficiency grounds larger emission trading markets (national or international) are 
preferable to small ones.76  
Theoretically, taxes can achieve the same results as a trading scheme, with the 
same or lower aggregate costs.77 In fact, economic theory suggests that taxes are 
                                                 
73 Robert N. Stavins, What Can We Learn from the Grand Policy Experiment? Lessons from SO2 Allowance 
Trading, 12(3) THE JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES, 69, 69 (1998). Interestingly, Stavins also 
summarizes reasons why legislators, regulators and industry favored a command-and-control 
approach. 
74 Clean Air Act of 1970 42 U.S.C. S § 761b (2003). 
75 The savings are generally estimated to have been about $1 billion (in 1996 dollars) per year. 
However, the calculation of savings is sensitive to assumptions about alternative regulatory options. 
See CURTIS CARLSON ET AL, SULFUR DIOXIDE CONTROL BY ELECTRIC UTILITIES: WHAT ARE THE 
GAINS FROM TRADE? 3-5 (Resources for the Future, Discussion Paper 98-44-REV, 2000). According 
to Office of Management and Budget calculations, for the period 1992 to 1995 the benefits of the 
Title IV SO2 trading provisions exceeded the costs 40:1. See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, 
DRAFT 2003 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS, 68 
Fed. Reg. 5492, 5500. 
76 Economic studies confirm that global trading, as opposed to domestic action, lowers the cost of 
meeting commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. See John P. Weyant & Jennifer Hill, Introduction and 
Overview, THE COSTS OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL: A MULTI-MODEL EVALUATION, SPECIAL ISSUE OF 
THE ENERGY JOURNAL vii, (John P. Weyant ed., 1999). This is one reason why the private sector may 
prefer a federal cap-and-trade system in the United States, as opposed to a number of overlapping but 
separate state schemes, for instance the planned California initiative.  
77 Economic analysis suggests that price (tax) measures are more suited than permit or trading 
(quantity) approaches to certain environmental problems. In particular, price measures are more 
efficient in situations where harmful consequences of the pollution (externality) are a function of a 
much larger stock accumulating in the environment, rather than an annual flow. The lack of a definite, 
short-term threshold for severe damage also favors a tax approach. This is the case for ozone 
depleting substances, groundwater pollution and the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the 
atmosphere. In the case of climate change, because the problem is caused by the total concentration 
of GHGs, the marginal benefit of reducing a unit of emissions is rather low. In the terminology of 
economics, the marginal benefits curve is flat relative to the marginal cost of abatement, and hence 
prices are preferred on efficiency grounds. See RICHARD G. NEWELL & WILLIAM A. PIZER, 
REGULATING STOCK EXTERNALITIES UNDER UNCERTAINTY, 1-2 (Resources for the Future 
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more appropriate for addressing climate change, where what counts is not achieving 
a particular level of pollutants year-to-year – as in the case of air pollution - but 
ensuring a change in the long-term trend. In practice, however, carbon taxes have, 
with the exception of a few European countries, proved politically unpalatable.  
For their part, regulated industries may prefer emissions trading, in part 
because such a scheme creates a tradable asset, as opposed to a tax that extracts 
revenue.78 If emissions allowances or permits are allocated at no cost – that is, 
“grandfathered” as opposed to auctioned – some firms will extract a benefit or 
economic “rent”. In the case of a tax, revenue is channeled to the government, 
which in theory can recycle it by adjusting other taxes to address distortions in the 
tax system and fund other desirable activities like worker re-training in emissions 
intensive industries research on clean energy technologies 79 Functioning emissions 
trading markets require careful design and a sophisticated regulatory framework, as 
demonstrated by the performance of the European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU 
ETS) in 2006, when information showing that many firms had benefited from an 
over allocation of allowances, which resulted in a dramatic drop in prices.80 
Availability of full information – actual historical emissions, monitoring of emissions, 
and realistic calculations of expected growth - are critical for the regulator. Given 
weak regulatory frameworks, as well as uncertainty about emissions growth 
projections, cap-and-trade schemes are generally not regarded as a good policy 
option for any but the most sophisticated developing countries. 
Market-based mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol introduce flexibility in 
several respects. First, and very importantly, three trading mechanism - CDM, JI and 
international emissions trading - provide flexibility regarding the location where 
emissions reductions can be undertaken.81 Second, the comprehensive approach, 
discussed above, introduces flexibility as to which greenhouse gases count. Third, the 
provision of a five-year commitment period (2008-2012) allows some leeway 
regarding when the commitment must be met. In addition, countries with economies 
in transition, in other words the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
                                                                                                                                     
Discussion Paper 99–10–REV, 2000). The classic analysis on the merits of prices versus quantities is 
M.L. Weitzman, Prices vs. Quantities 41(4) REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 477–491 (1974). 
78 See Grubb et al, GUIDE AND ASSESSMENT, supra note 45, at 90. The “political economy” of trading 
schemes is covered by Stavins, supra note 73, at 74-76 (1998). Since permits are almost always freely 
allocated (grandfathered) regulated industries are able to extract an economic rent. In addition, free 
initial allocation serves as a barrier to entry for new firms, who would have to purchase permits. For 
legislators, a permit scheme with a free allocation has the advantage of masking the cost of regulation, 
unlike a tax. For more on this, see Nathaniel O. Keohane et al, The Choice of Regulatory Instruments in 
Environmental Policy, 22 HARVARD ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW 313-367 (1998). 
79 See for instance the “ecological tax” reforms in Germany that aim to reduce the tax burden on labor 
and shift a portion of it to environmental consumption. E.g, Mineral Oil Tax Law of 21 December 
1992, as amended (Mineralölsteuergesetz  vom 21 Dezember 1992). 
80 After it became known in April 2006 that firms in several member states held considerably more 
allowances than actual emissions of the covered installations, the price of EU allowances (EUAs) 
almost halved in price. While regulated entities may have an interest to inflate their emissions 
projections, the integrity of a trading scheme demands that the regulator have access to real emissions 
data. 
81 See for discussion of various types of flexibility, Jim Skea, Flexibility, Emissions Trading and the Kyoto 
Protocol, in POLLUTION FOR SALE; EMISSIONS TRADING AND JOINT IMPLEMENTATION (Steve Sorrell 
& Jim Skea, eds., 1999). 
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Union, were granted flexibility in choosing their baselines.82 Lastly, Article 4 of the 
Protocol allows groups of countries members of a regional integration organization 
to fulfill their obligations jointly under a “bubble arrangement”.83 The European 
Union assumed an overall reduction commitment of 8 per cent below 1990 levels, 
which was then divided into individual targets for the 15 member states that jointly 
ratified the Protocol.84 The arrangement permitted the EU as a whole to advocate 
for, and assume, a fairly aggressive target, while also providing the flexibility to take 
account of differences in member state’s economic development, generation mix and 
so on.85  
The Protocol does not establish a set of full-fledged institutions.86 Although 
not stated explicitly, the supreme governing body is the Conference of the Parties to 
Convention serving as the Meeting of the Parties, or the COP/MOP as it is known.87 
The COP/MOP is assigned the responsibility of keeping under review the 
implementation of the Protocol, and it is empowered to make “…the decisions 
necessary to promote its effective implementation”.88 This is consistent with practice 
in international environmental law of bestowing quite wide legislative (or quasi-
legislative) and administrative powers on conferences of the parties.89 The 
                                                 
82 Since allowances were effectively grandfathered, being able to select a year when the economy was 
robust and emissions at a historical high point was potentially of considerable benefit. Among the 
countries different base years are Bulgaria (1989) and Poland (1988). 
83 If the group of countries fails to meet its collective target, each of the countries, and the regional 
integration organization that is a party to the Protocol, will be held liable according to its individual 
targets under the burden-sharing agreement. See art. 4(6). 
84 See Jürgen Lefevere, The EU Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading Scheme, in CLIMATE CHANGE 
AND CARBON MARKETS: A HANDBOOK OF EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS MECHANISMS 75, 77-88 
(Farhana Yamin, ed., 2005).  Internally, the burden-sharing agreement was made binding on the 15 
member states of the EU. See Council Decision 2002/358/EC of 25 April 2002, art. 2, 2002 O.J. (L 
130) 1, 2. Because article 4 of the Protocol does not permit amendments to burden-sharing 
agreements, the accession of 10 members to the Union in 2004 and a further two in 2007 has not 
altered the EU burden-sharing agreement.  
85 For example, the EU’s economically less-developed countries could increase their emissions over 
the 1990 baseline (Greece +30 per cent, Ireland +15 per cent and Portugal +40 per cent) while other 
countries accepted deeper cuts to compensate (Austria –25 per cent, Denmark –25 per cent and 
Germany –25 per cent). 
86 See Oberthür & Ott, INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE POLICY, supra  note 45, at 240-241, detailing why a 
majority of the Parties to the Convention preferred not create new institutions for reasons of 
economy as well out of a desire to retain authority in the subsidiary bodies of the Convention. 
87 See id.at 242-243. That the COP/MOP is a separate entity from the COP appears from art.13(2)-(3) 
providing that in COP/MOP meetings non-Parties may participate as observers, but that decisions 
under the Protocol may be taken only by Parties to the Protocol. Similarly, when the COP/MOP 
meets, Bureau members who are not Parties to the Protocol shall be replaced by additional members 
who are Parties. (The Bureau consists of representatives elected in accordance with the regional 
groups of the United Nations and tasked with chairing and coordinating the COP and its various 
bodies.) See also Report of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation on its Eighteenth Session , para. 44,  
FCCC/SBI/2003/8 (2003), “The SBI recognized that the COP and the COP/MOP are legally 
distinct with separate agendas.”  
88 Protocol, art. 13(4). 
89 See Oberthür & Ott, INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE POLICY, supra  note 45, at 243, noting that the 
elaboration of the compliance regime under art. 18 may add quasi-judicial powers to the list. See for 
developments with respect to MEAs generally, Jutta Brunnée, COPing with Consent: Law-Making under 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements 15, LEIDEN J. OF INT. LAW 1 (2002). 
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enumerated tasks of the COP/MOP include assessing the implementation of the 
Protocol and the extent to which progress towards the objective of the Convention 
is being achieved,90 periodically examining the obligations of the Parties under the 
Protocol, considering and adopting reports on its implementation,91 and carrying out 
the development and periodic refinement of methodologies for the effective 
implementation of the Protocol.92 With respect to subsidiary organs, article 15 
provides that the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) 
and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) established under the Convention 
shall also serve, respectively, as the SBSTA and SBI for the Protocol. As with the 
COP/MOP, non-Parties to the Protocol may participate as observers, but not in 
decisions concerning the Protocol.93 Although the functions of the subsidiary organs 
are not specifically enumerated in the same manner as in the Convention, the 
Protocol in various places assigns tasks to the subsidiary organs, such as mandating 
the SBSTA to provide advice in relation to sinks and methodologies.94 
 
3.2.2.1 Joint implementation (JI) 
JI and CDM involve the generation of credits from individual projects that 
result in emissions reductions relative to baseline emissions. Joint implementation 
(JI) is a project-based mechanism where emission reductions are achieved in 
accordance with projects implemented in an Annex 1 country by investors from 
another Annex 1 country. The investor/investing country can then claim the 
resulting emission reduction to sell on the market or credit it against the country’s 
target.  
The term joint implementation has a somewhat tangled history, but under 
the Protocol its meaning and ambit are clear and uncontroversial.95 JI has its roots in 
Articles 4(2)(a) and (d) of the Convention, under which the Conference of Parties 
established a pilot phase for activities implemented jointly (AIJ). Under AIJ 
industrialized (Annex I parties) could implement projects reducing emissions of 
greenhouse gases or enhancing their removals through sinks in other countries, both 
industrialized and developing.96 Participation in the AIJ is voluntary, and no credits 
are granted for any reductions achieved under the program.97 However, the eligibility 
requirements for AIJ projects closely tracked those that were later made applicable to 
JI and the CDM, including that activities should result in real and measurable 
environmental benefits that would not have occurred in the absence of the project.98 
                                                 
90 Protocol, art. 13(4)(a). 
91 See id. art. 13(4)(b). 
92 See id. art. 13(4)(3) and art. 5. 
93 See id. Art. 15(2). Items of the agenda of the SBSTA and SBI will be clearly identified so that is clear 
in which capacity the bodies are acting, in other words under the Convention or Protocol.  
94 See id. art. 3(4) and art. 5(2). 
95 See Grubb et al, GUIDE AND ASSESSMENT, supra note 45, at 87-89. 
96 Decision 5/CP.1, in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Seventh Session, addendum, Part II: 
Action taken by the parties, FCCC/1995/7/Add.1,  
97 The pilot phase of the AIJ continues, with 157 projects in 42 countries. See Activities Implemented 
Jointly under the pilot phase: Seventh progress report , UNFCCC/SBSTA/2006/8 (2006). 
98 Decision 5/CP.1, in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Seventh Session, addendum, Part II: 
Action taken by the parties, para. 1(d), FCCC/1995/Add.1 See Charlotte Streck, Joint Implementation: 
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AIJ enabled countries to gain experience with a project-based mechanism, including 
an approximation of emissions reduction potential, costs, and likely barriers.99 
Although there are many similarities, it is important to distinguish JI from its 
close conceptual cousin, the CDM. JI projects take place between Annex 1 countries, 
and the mechanism is intended to assist Annex 1 parties comply with their emission 
reduction obligations under Article 3 of the Protocol. The CDM has a dual purpose: 
assist Annex 1 countries in meeting their emissions limitation and reduction 
obligations and promote sustainable development in host developing countries, for 
instance by promoting transfer of clean technology. An second important difference 
between the two mechanisms flows from the fact that JI projects can only be 
implemented in fellow Annex 1 countries, each of which is entitled to a set number 
of allowances, known as assigned amount units (AAUs), corresponding to its target 
under the Protocol. Emissions reductions generated by a JI project are known as 
emission reduction units (ERUs). The quantity of ERUs generated by a particular 
project is subtracted from the host countries’ total number of AAUs. This means 
that JI projects do not introduce additional allowances into the system; the overall 
amount of emissions under the “cap” does not increase. Environmental integrity is 
safeguarded by the requirement that JI host country is required to maintain an 
appropriate inventory of GHG sources and sinks, as well as an accounting system 
for additions and subtractions from its allocation of AAUs. In contrast, CDM 
projects, which are not backed by the conversion of existing allowances, give rise to 
additional credits and thus raise the cap. In order to maintain the environmental 
integrity of the CDM – that is, avoid the issuing of credits not based on real 
reductions – the verification, monitoring and certification requirements for the CDM 
are more onerous than the equivalent JI provisions.100  
The basic eligibility requirements for JI projects are set out in Article 6(1), 
namely that projects require the approval of both countries involved (host and 
investor), that any reduction in emissions by sources or removal by sinks must be 
additional to any that would otherwise occur, and that countries maintain proper 
inventories and comply with the Protocol’s reporting obligations. Article 6(3) 
provides that private sector entities may, subject to the authorization of the country 
concerned, participate in JI projects. During the negotiations, it was envisaged that 
the private sector would have a key role to play as investor in, and developer of, JI 
projects. However, since JI projects result in a subtraction from a host country’s 
allocation of AAUs, with potential consequences for compliance with its emission 
reduction commitments, government supervision is important. Hence the proviso 
                                                                                                                                     
History, Requirements, and Challenges, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF IMPLEMENTING THE KYOTO PROTOCOL 
MECHANISMS: MAKING KYOTO WORK 108-109 (David Freestone & Charlotte Streck, eds., 2005). 
99 See e.g. a study prepared for the Government of the Netherlands, which analyzed AIJ projects to 
estimate the potential market for credits under the CDM, including prices. NETHERLANDS ENERGY 
RESEARCH FOUNDATION (ECN) ET AL, POTENTIAL AND COST OF THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT, 
OPTIONS IN THE ENERGY SECTOR: INVENTORY OF OPTIONS IN NON-ANNEX I COUNTRIES TO 
REDUCE GHG EMISSIONS (1999). Jason Anderson & Rob Bradley, Joint Implementation and Emissions 
Trading in CEE, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND CARBON MARKETS: A HANDBOOK OF EMISSIONS 
REDUCTIONS MECHANISMS, supra note 84, at 211-213. 
100 Streck, supra note 98, at 112. The requirements for CDM projects are discussed in greater detail in 
the next section. 
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that private sector participation is subject to authorization and the requirement that 
both the host and the purchasing countries must approve the project.   
As noted above, developers of JI projects must demonstrate “additionality”, 
in other words make the case that project emissions will be lower than a credible 
baseline, which would have applied but for the project. The Protocol does not 
address the process for verifying additionality and other requirements for JI projects, 
simply stating that the parties “may…further elaborate guidelines for the 
implementation of this Article, including for verification and reporting.”101 The rules 
developed to implement JI provide for two variants. The first, known as “tack one 
JI”, is available to host countries that that have demonstrated certain reporting and 
accounting requirements. These countries may themselves – without additional 
oversight - verify that emissions reductions achieved by the project are in fact 
additional.102 Such self-verification does not jeopardize environmental integrity 
because, as noted earlier, reported project reductions, even if nominally inflated, are 
subtracted from the host country’s allocation of AAUs.103 A second option, involving 
more oversight, is available for Annex 1 countries that do not meet the requirements 
for track one JI. In this case, an independent body, the Joint Implementation 
Supervisory Committee, carried out the tasks of ensuring that project design meets JI 
requirements, verifying emission reductions, and the issuance of ERUs.  
For Annex 1 countries that are not on track to meet their Kyoto 
commitments from action alone, the attraction of JI stems from lower mitigation 
costs in the countries of Eastern Europe, as compared with costs in the more 
advanced industrialized economies.104 In the process of transition to market 
economies most of these countries moved away from their earlier reliance on energy 
intensive and inefficient heavy industries. With emissions well below their 1990 
baselines, several of the economies in transition will have a surplus of AAUs 
available in the first Kyoto commitment period from 2008-2012.105 For host 
countries the advantages of JI over pure emissions trading lie in the transfer of clean 
energy technology, enhanced energy efficiency, and of course greater long-term 
reductions in GHG emissions. From the perspective of investors JI projects present 
fewer regulatory and related risks. This is particularly true for track one JI projects 
where risks associated with baselines, additionality and verification can be mitigated 
in a manner not feasible under the CDM.106 At the same time, unclear institutional 
responsibilities in host countries, coupled with a lack of transparent approval 
procedures, and political uncertainties in some hosts, mean that the JI market has 
                                                 
101 Protocol, art. 6(2). 
102 16/CP.7, in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Seventh Session, addendum, Part II: Action taken 
by the Conference of the Parties, annex, para. 21, 23, FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.2 (2003). See Jari 
Väyrynen & Franck Lecoq, Track One JI and ‘Greening of AAUs’: How Could it Work?, in LEGAL 
ASPECTS OF IMPLEMENTING THE KYOTO PROTOCOL MECHANISMS: MAKING KYOTO WORK supra 
note 98, at 156. 
103 The line separating international emissions trading of AAUs under Article 17 and Track One JI can 
become rather blurred. The implications are further explored by Väyrynen & Lecoq,  supra note 102. 
104 The Japanese economy is already very energy efficient and has a low carbon intensity. Therefore 
domestic abatement costs are high, and Japan is an active participant in the market to acquire JI and 
CDM credits.  
105 Anderson & Bradley, supra note 99, at 203-205. 
106 Streck, supra note 98, at 125. 
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been slow to reach its full potential.107 The value of JI market stood at US$ 141 
million in 2006, more than double that of the previous year.108 
The expansion in membership of the European Union in 2004 and again in 
2007 has diminished the attractiveness of several Eastern European states as JI hosts. 
Upon joining the EU, these countries become subject to the Emissions Trading 
Scheme of the EU (EU ETS). The ETS covers some 12,000 installations accounting 
for almost 45 per cent of CO2 emissions of the 25 European member states.109 The 
ETS applies to a range of installations, including in the power generation, iron and 
steel, glass, and cement sectors. The first phase of the EU ETS covered the period 
2005-2007, while the second phase will coincide with the Kyoto Protocol’s first 
commitment period, from 2008 to 2012. The ETS is intended to assist the EU meet 
its Kyoto commitment of an 8 per cent reduction below 1990 levels.  
The EU amended the legislation establishing the ETS so that certified 
emission reductions (CERs) from CDM projects and ERUs from JI projects could to 
be traded in the ETS.110 Subject to some limitations, the so-called “Linking 
Directive” makes it possible to convert project-based credits that meet the Kyoto 
standards into EU allowances.111 Firms subject to the ETS can thus draw on CDM 
and JI credits in meeting their targets under the scheme. Interaction of the EU ETS 
with CDM and JI gives rise to the rather technical issue of “double counting”, which 
“refers to a situation in which CERs or ERUs are issued as a result of reductions that 
also lead to a reduction from emissions from an installation covered by the 
[Emissions Trading] Directive.”112 In order to prevent double counting under the EU 
                                                 
107 John O’Brien, Optimism amid uncertainty? in KYOTO AND THE CARBON MARKETS: FINANCING 
CLIMATE POLICY TO 2012 AND BEYOND, A SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT to ENVIRONMENTAL FINANCE & 
CARBON FINANCE, November 2006, S38. 
108 KARAN CAPOOR & PHILIPPE AMBROSI, WORLD BANK, STATE AND TRENDS OF THE CARBON 
MARKET 2007 3 (2007). 
109 See Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003, 
Establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and 
amending Council Directive 96/61/EC, 2003 O.J. (L 275) 32. 
110 See Directive 2004/101/EC of 27 October 2004, Amending Directive 2003/87/EC establishing a 
scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community, in respect of the 
Kyoto Protocol’s project mechanisms, 2004 O.J. (L 338) 18.  For details on the “Linking Directive” 
see Lefevere, supra note 84, at 126-138. 
111 ). The Directive does not cap the number of CERs and ERUs that member states may introduce 
into the ETS, but provides that inclusion of an amount greater than 6 per cent of a member state’s 
EU allowances will trigger a review process. CERs and ERUs from forestry-related projects are 
excluded. 
112 Lefevere, supra note 84, at 138. For instance, double counting would arise where a JI project is 
implemented at an installation subject to the ETS. The project will give rise to JI credits – which can 
be traded in the EU ETS – as well as freeing up EU allowances assigned to the particular installation. 
In order to prevent double counting, the operator of the installation is required to cancel a EU 
allowance for every JI credit (ERU) that is issued. For a more detailed discussion of double counting 
under the EU ETS and JI, see Streck, supra note 98, at 123-125. The provisions of the Linking 
Directive relating to double counting are regarded as having made JI projects in EU countries less 
attractive, leading to criticism from Japan which felt it was being denied access credits needed to meet 
its Kyoto obligations. Linking the EU ETS to other cap-and-trade schemes has been mooted from 
time to time and, if and when such arrangements come into being, double counting will also be an 
issue. 
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ETS and the Protocol, installations covered by the EU ETS are not eligible to 
generate ERUs under JI.  
 
3.2.2.2 Clean development mechanism 
The third flexibility mechanism is the clean development mechanism (CDM), 
which is established by Article 12 to serve the twin goals of assisting developing 
countries achieve sustainable development and to aid Annex 1 parties in meeting 
their emission limitation and reduction commitments.113 The CDM has its roots in a 
proposal for a Clean Development Fund advanced by Brazil, to be financed from 
fines levied on Annex 1 parties for non-compliance.114 As elaborated by the United 
States in the final Kyoto negotiations, the proposal was transformed into what is 
now the CDM, which incorporates the underlying principle of joint 
implementation.115 
Like JI, the CDM is a project-based mechanism, but in this case credits may be 
earned for projects executed in developing countries. Every certified emission 
reduction (CER) is equivalent to a tonne of CO2. For each CER purchased, an 
Annex 1 party is in effect increases its “cap”. Unlike under JI projects, the CERs 
generated by CDM projects are not backed by a subtraction from an Annex 1 
parties’ assigned basket of allowances. Thus ensuring the environmental integrity of 
CDM projects is all the more important.116 Resulting greenhouse gas reductions must 
be real and measurable and “additional to any that would occur in the absence of the 
certified project activity”.117 Thus developers of CDM projects must demonstrate 
that a project’s reduction in GHG emissions goes beyond business as usual (BAU), 
which involves showing that emission reductions generated by the project are in 
addition to any that would have occurred in the project’s absence (the so-called 
‘additionality’ criterion).118 CDM projects are also required to contribute to 
sustainable development, but the determination whether this criterion has been met 
rests with the host country. In order to ensure the environmental integrity of the 
CDM and its proper administration, the COP has developed detailed rules covering 
project validation, registration with the Executive Board, and the verification, 
certification and issuing of credits from CDM activities.119  
                                                 
113 Mark Kenber, The Clean Development Mechanism: a tool for promoting long -term climate protection and 
sustainable development? in CLIMATE CHANGE AND CARBON MARKETS: A HANDBOOK OF EMISSIONS 
REDUCTIONS MECHANISMS, supra note 84, at 263. 
114 See Oberthür & Ott, INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE POLICY, supra note 45, at 165-166; 
FCCC/AGBM/1997/MISC.1/Add.3. 
115 Naoki Matsuo, CDM in the Kyoto negotiations: How CDM has Worked as a Bridge between Developed and 
Developing Worlds? 8 M ITIGATION AND ADAPTATION STRATEGIES FOR GLOBAL CHANGE 191, 197 
(2003). 
116 Ernestine Meijer & Jacob Werksman, Keeping it Clean – Safeguarding the Environmental Integrity of the 
Clean Development Mechanism, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF IMPLEMENTING THE KYOTO PROTOCOL 
MECHANISMS: MAKING KYOTO WORK, supra note 98, at 191  
117 Protocol, art. 12(5). 
118 For detailed discussion of baselines and additionality see Axel Michaelowa, Determination of baselines 
and additionality for the CDM: a crucial element of the credibility of the climate regime, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND 
CARBON MARKETS: A HANDBOOK OF EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS MECHANISMS,  supra note 84, at 287. 
119 For a summary of the CDM project cycle, see Farhana Yamin, The international rules of the Kyoto 
Mechanisms, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND CARBON MARKETS: A HANDBOOK OF EMISSIONS 
REDUCTIONS MECHANISMS, supra note 84, at 29-52; Maria Netto & Kai-Uwe Barani Schmidt, CDM 
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The implementation of the CDM is overseen by the CDM Executive Board 
(EB), which is composed of 20 members (ten full-time members and ten alternates) 
drawn from among Annex 1 and non-Annex 1 (developing countries).120 The EB 
elaborates the rules and modalities governing the CDM, approves and registers CDM 
projects, issues CERs, and carries out other functions relating to the CDM.121 The 
EB is subject to the “guidance” of the Conference of Parties serving as the Meeting 
of the Parties (COP/MOP), which is the supreme body of the Protocol. The 
COP/MOP fulfils this function only in relation to a number of enumerated issues – 
for instance the rules of procedure of the EB and the geographical distribution of 
CDM projects – but it does not serve as a general avenue of appeal for decisions 
taken by the Board.122  
The EB has established several panels and working groups to assist it in 
carrying out its functions. The Methodology Panel, tasked with developing project 
methodologies, has attracted the most attention and scrutiny. Project developers and 
investors in the carbon market have criticized the Executive Board for supposedly 
overly stringent application of project approval criteria, lack of transparency, and 
insufficient resources and capacity leading to inability to cope with its workload.123 
While there have been some difficulties, a more charitable view is that the Board, as 
a key part of a unique governance structure, has done a reasonably good job in 
establishing the necessary rules for the operation of the CDM. Overall, the 
registration of projects is accelerating and the funding shortfalls that have plagued 
EB, due to its reliance on voluntary funding, will recede as it begins to benefit from 
the collection of administrative fees levied on CDM projects. 
An analysis by United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) reveals 
that the geographic distribution of CDM projects is very uneven, with Asia and Latin 
America accounting for the lion’s share (96 percent of projects).124 Together they are 
expected to generate around 95 percent of CERs flow through 2012; Africa is 
expected to garner only 3 per cent of CERs by that date. Moreover, the report notes 
that while some 80 per cent of projects employ technologies that have the potential 
to promote sustainable development in the host country, for instance energy 
                                                                                                                                     
Project Cycle and the Role of the UNFCCC,  in LEGAL ASPECTS OF IMPLEMENTING THE KYOTO 
PROTOCOL MECHANISMS: MAKING KYOTO WORK, supra note 98, at 175. 
120 See Decision 17/CP.7, in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Seventh Session, addendum, Part II: 
Action taken by the Conference of the Parties, Vol. II, annex, Modalities and procedures for a clean 
development mechanism, FCCC/CP./2001/13/Add.2 (2002). Members of the Executive Board serve in 
their personal capacity, are required to take a written oath of service, and may not have a pecuniary or 
financial interest in any aspect of a CDM project activity. See supra, decision 17/CP.7, respectively 
para. 8 (c), (e) and (f), Modalities and procedures for a clean development mechanism. As a body established 
under public international law the decisions of the Executive Board are probably not subject to review 
under domestic law. The EB is solely subject to the political and legal control of the COP/MOP. 
121 Maria Netto & Kai-Uwe Barani Schmidt, CDM Project Cycle and the Role of the UNFCCC Secretariat , in 
LEGAL ASPECTS OF IMPLEMENTING THE KYOTO PROTOCOL MECHANISMS: MAKING KYOTO WORK, 
supra note supra note 98, at 177-180. 
122 Decision 17/CP.7, in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Seventh Session, supra note 120, Annex, 
paras. 2-4. Farhana Yamin, The international rules of the Kyoto Mechanisms, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND 
CARBON MARKETS: A HANDBOOK OF EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS MECHANISMS,  supra, note 84, at 34. 
123 For an expression of such views, see INTERNATION EMISSIONS TRADING ASSOCIATION, 2006 STATE 
OF THE CDM: IETA POSITION ON THE CDM FOR COP-12/MOP-2, 11-20 (2006). 
124 UNDP, THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM: AN ASSESSMENT OF PROGRESS, 11-12 (2006). 
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efficiency, a total of 21 projects abating emissions of industrial gases are expected to 
be responsible for almost half of all CERs through 2012. A fairly conservative 
estimate of CERs generated by 2012 would see the CDM supplying 15-25 per cent 
of the expected demand for Kyoto emission reductions, thus contributing to meeting 
the expected shortfall of Annex 1 countries at a relatively low abatement cost.125 
However, the report notes that it remains to be seen whether the CDM can deliver 
broader sustainable development benefits for host countries, for instance with 
respect to the transfer of clean technology.126 A separate of analysis of the 
“development dividend” – the social, economic and environmental benefits – for 
CDM host countries found that projects giving rise to the highest number of CERs 
received very low scores.127 The overall contribution to mitigation is decidedly 
modest.128 Looking ahead, the study concludes that: “[u]ncertainty concerning the 
post-2012 climate framework and its implications for the continued existence of a 
broad-based international carbon market is the single most important factor 
influencing the out look for CDM growth and evolution over the next 5 years.”129 
The CDM is at the intersection of international and domestic law: established 
under a treaty, the Kyoto Protocol, overseen by an international body exercising 
administrative functions, the Executive Board, in accordance with rules adopted by 
the Conference of the Parties. Project developers and investors – the key private 
entities in the system – are subject to both the provisions of Protocol and the 
international rules adopted by COP, decisions of the Executive Board, and domestic 
rules of the host country, for instance with respect to environmental impact 
assessments and taxation. While some have criticized this governance structure as 
unwieldy and bureaucratic, a more balanced perspective view might hold that 
progress in establishing an innovative and unusual set of institutions has been quite 
successful thus far. 
 
3.2.2.3 International emissions trading 
Under Article 17 Annex 1 parties to the Protocol may engage in emissions 
trading for the purposes of fulfilling their commitments. The Protocol provides that 
each Annex 1 party has a number of Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) corresponding 
to its individual emission allowance inscribed in Annex B of the Protocol.130 The 
emission targets in Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol are expressed as a percentage 
                                                 
125 See id. at 13-14. 
126 See HELEEN C. DE CONINCK ET AL, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT 
MECHANISM, (ECN – Energy Research Centre of the Netherlands, ECN-E-07-009, 2007); Katrin 
Millock, Technology transfers in the Clean Development Mechanism: an incentives issue 7 ENVIRONMENT AND 
DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 449 (2002). 
127 AARON COSBEY, MAKING DEVELOPMENT WORK IN THE CDM: PHASE 2 OF THE DEVELOPMENT 
DIVIDEND REPORT, IISD (2007), http://www.iisd.org/climate/global/dividend.asp.  
128 It is estimated that by 2012 total CO2 equivalent emissions (CO2e) abated under the CDM will 
amount to upwards of 1 billion tonnes. According to the IPCC, from 2000-2005 annual world-wide 
emissions of CO2 from fossil fuels and land-use are estimated to have been about 32 gigatonnes.  The 
total reductions achieved under the CDM are thus equivalent to approximately 3.125 per cent of 
annual CO2 emissions.  
129 UNDP, supra note 124, at 14-15. 
130 Protocol, art. 3(7). 
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relative to 1990 emissions; the AAUs simply express this as units of CO2 equivalent 
emissions.  
The concept of international emissions trading was introduced in the 
negotiations by the United States, winning the support of the other members of the 
JUSCANZ coalition (Japan, United States, Switzerland, Canada, Australia, Norway 
and New Zealand), but opposed initially by the EU and rejected by developing 
countries. In the knowledge that significant domestic emissions cuts would be 
politically difficult to obtain, the United States regarded trading as critical to meeting 
any target it might assume. With respect to the Russian Federation and other 
countries with economies in transition (EITs), the United States stressed that, as a 
consequence of their excess AAUs, they would stand to gain considerably under 
trading. The EU, skeptical at first, came to accept the concept, but argued that is 
should remain supplementary to domestic action. The most serious opposition came 
from the developing countries, who argued that trading would allow the United 
States, the largest emitter of GHGs, to avoid meaningful domestic action.131 This in 
turn threatened the position of countries such as China and India, which at times 
advocated the position that over time the per capita emissions of industrialized 
countries should contract, eventually converging at an equal per capita level with 
those of developing countries. Finally, developing countries were aware that under 
trading the Russian Federation potentially stood to gain from trading with its large 
number of surplus AAUs, with an attendant transfer of wealth.132 Flooding the 
market with AAUs would also have the effect of depressing the price of CERs 
generated by CDM projects in developing countries. 
 
3.2.2.4 Compliance mechanism  
An important provision of the Protocol that remains to be covered is Article 
18. It requires the COP to “approve appropriate and effective procedures and 
mechanisms to determine and to address cases of non-compliance with the 
Provisions of the Protocol”. This rather basic provision, while specifying that the 
procedure should include an “indicative list of consequences”, left a great deal to be 
fleshed out in the post-Kyoto negotiations in the COP.133 Objections to the proposal 
for binding penalties were overcome with the insertion of the final sentence of the 
Article, providing that “[a]ny procedures or mechanisms…entailing binding 
consequences shall be adopted by means of an amendment”.134 The compliance 
mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol has been hailed as unique to international law.135 
                                                 
131 See Grubb et al, GUIDE AND ASSESSMENT, supra note 45, at 94-95. 
132 With the withdrawal of the United States from the Kyoto Protocol, the market for credits from 
Russia and other EITs is much smaller. In any event, it is thought that buyers will be reluctant to 
purchase “hot air” or windfall allowances. Various options are being explored to “green” such 
allowances. See Jari Väyrynen & Franck Lecoq, Track One JI and ‘Greening of AAUs: How Could It Work, 
in LEGAL ASPECTS OF IMPLEMENTING THE KYOTO PROTOCOL MECHANISMS: MAKING KYOTO 
WORK, supra note 98, at 155. 
133 For details, see Werksman, supra note 34; Jacob Werksman, The Negotiation of a Kyoto Compliance 
System, in IMPLEMENTING THE CLIMATE REGIME: INTERATIONAL COMPLIANCE, 17 (Olaf Schramm 
Stokke et al, eds., 2005).  
134 See Oberthür & Ott, INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE POLICY, supra note 45, at 216-218. 
135 Jacob Werksman, The Negotiation of a Kyoto Compliance System, in IMPLEMENTING THE CLIMATE 
REGIME: INTERNATIONAL COMPLIANCE, 17, 19 (Olaf Schramm Stokke et al, eds., 2005). 
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Together with the market-based flexibility mechanisms it comprises the innovative 
features of the Protocol. This section starts with a brief outline of approaches to 
compliance in international environmental law. This scene-setting part is followed by 
a description of the compliance mechanism itself.136 
Classically, breach of an obligation under international law entitles the 
wronged party to reparation or compensation – such as in the seminal Trail Smelter 
arbitration137 – with the parties arguing their case before an independent third party. 
In truth, this third-party dispute resolution is quite uncommon in international law, 
and even more so in international environmental law.138 For one thing, states tend to 
avoid the confrontational (and unpredictable) approach entailed by formal dispute 
settlement, generally preferring negotiations. More importantly, traditional dispute 
settlement - akin to domestic tort action - is simply not appropriate for harms 
involving a range of actors, diffuse causation, and long time-scales.139 In such 
circumstances, a process resting on monitoring, supervision and management is a 
better means of achieving the objectives of the instrument concerned. Accordingly 
some scholars view non-compliance procedures, whether formal or informal, as a 
natural extension of existing information-gathering, monitoring and supervision 
activities that are normally carried out by the conferences of the parties of many 
treaties.140 This view is strongly represented by the so-called managerial school, 
which holds that although many international regimes invest little in explicit 
enforcement, the degree of compliance is quite good.141 This position is supported by 
a number of empirical studies.142 A conclusion drawn from this line of thought is that 
compliance does not derive predominantly from deterrent effects or consequences. 
Another group of scholars, however, regard enforcement and the calculations 
underlying compliance and participation as central to the design of effective 
international regimes.143 Faced with evidence of relatively widespread compliance, 
advocates of this position ask whether states choose to participate only in treaties 
where compliance imposes little or no cost. Finally, it has also been noted that the 
                                                 
136 See also on the compliance mechanism Geir Ulfstein & Jacob Werksman, The Kyoto Compliance 
System: Towards Hard Enforcement , in IMPLEMENTING THE CLIMATE REGIME: INTERATIONAL 
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perceived legitimacy144 and fairness145 of a particular rule will influence parties’ 
compliance with its terms. 
The process of drawing up the rules for a compliance mechanism began at 
the first conference after the adoption of the Protocol. The Buenos Aires 
Programme of Work, adopted at COP-4 in 1998, established the Joint Working 
Group on compliance, which was mandated to articulated procedures by which 
“compliance with the obligations under the Kyoto Protocol should be addressed”.146 
At the resumed sixth Conference Bonn, agreement was reached, among other things, 
on the objectives of the mechanism, the consequences of enforcement, the scope of 
the enforcement, and the conditions for lodging appeals.147 At COP-7 in Marrakech 
parties agreed that the compliance mechanism would consists of a Compliance 
Committee, with two functioning branches, a Facilitative Branch and an 
Enforcement Branch. 148 The Committee consists of twenty members, with ten 
elected to serve in each respective branch. Members, who serve in their individual 
capacities, and must have recognized “competence relating to climate change and in 
relevant fields such as the scientific, technical, socio-economic or legal fields.”149 
Membership in each branch is composed as follows: one member from each of the 
five regional groups of the United Nations;150 one member from the small island 
developing states; two members from Parties included in Annex 1; and two members 
from non-Annex 1 parties. This means that developing countries have a majority 
representation on both branches. The Committee is required to make “every effort 
to reach agreement on any decision by consensus.”151 Where this fails, decisions shall 
be adopted by a majority of three-fourths of the members present and voting. 
However, as Annex 1 parties were unwilling to permit developing country members 
have the final say in the Enforcement Branch, a double majority provision applies – 
decisions also require a three-fourths majority of members of Annex 1 parties.   
Expert review teams (ERTs) are responsible for reviewing Annex 1 parties’ 
performance of their technical reporting requirements, for example with respect to 
inventories of GHG sources. ERTs form a crucial part of the compliance system. As 
independent and technical experts they are not meant to make judgments on 
compliance, but instead to raise “questions of implementation”. ERTs are drawn up 
by the Secretariat of the Convention, from a list nominated by the parties. Action by 
the Committee can be triggered in the following ways: questions of implementation 
raised in reports submitted by the ERTs; by a party with respect itself; or by party 
                                                 
144 THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990). 
145 THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1995). 
146 Decision 8/CP.4, in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Fourth Session, addendum, Part II: 
Action taken by the Conference of the Parties, annex 2, FCCC/CP/1998/16/Add.1 (1999). 
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149 See id. at annex, section II. 
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151 Decision 24/CP.7, in Report of the Conference of the Parties, supra note 148, at annex, section II. 
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with respect to another party.152 After allocation to one or other branch by the 
bureau of the Committee, the relevant branch carries out an initial screening, 
including weeding out de minimis submissions. 
The mandate of the Facilitative Branch consists of providing advice and 
facilitation to the parties in implementing the Protocol, and promoting compliance 
by parties with their obligations, “taking into account the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capacities”.153 With respect to matters 
falling outside the mandate of the Enforcement Branch, the Facilitative Branch is 
responsible for addressing “questions of implementation” – the technical term for 
matters brought before the Committee – concerning steps taken by industrialized 
countries to minimize the adverse effects of climate change response measures on 
developing countries, and information provided by Annex 1 countries on the extent 
to which use of the flexibility mechanisms is supplementary to domestic mitigation 
efforts.154  In addition, as a means of “providing for early warning of potential non-
compliance” the Facilitative Branch is responsible providing parties with advice and 
facilitation on a number of issues, prior to the first commitment period. These 
provisions appear designed to allow one party to involve the Facilitative Branch in a 
question whether another party has, before the commitment period, established the 
requisite national monitoring and reporting systems. 
The consequences that Facilitative Branch is competent to apply, taking into 
account the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, encompass, 
among other things, the facilitation of financial and technical assistance, including 
technology transfer and capacity building from sources other than climate funds 
established under the Convention and Protocol, and the formulation of 
recommendations to the Party concerned, taking into account Article 4(7) of the 
Convention, which states that effective implementation by developing countries of 
their commitments will depend on industrialized countries meeting their 
commitments to make available financial resources and technology.155 It is clear from 
this outline of consequences, as well as the contrasting language relating to the 
Enforcement Branch, that decisions of the Facilitative Branch decisions are not 
intended to be binding.  While the Facilitative Branch “shall decide” on the 
application of consequences, its enforcement counterpart “determine[s] that a Party 
is not in compliance”.156 
The Enforcement Branch is responsible for determining whether an Annex 1 
party is not in compliance with its emissions limitation and reduction target under 
the Protocol; the methodological requirements for estimating emissions by sources 
and removals by sources and the reporting requirements; and the eligibility 
requirements for participation in Joint Implementation (JI), the clean development 
mechanism (CDM), and international emissions trading.157 At a more technical level, 
the Enforcement Branch is also empowered to make adjustments and corrections in 
the event of disagreements between a party and an expert review team regarding, 
                                                 
152 See id. at annex, section VI. 
153 See id. at annex, section IV. 
154 See id. at annex, section IV. 
155 See id. at annex, section XIV. 
156 See id. at annex, section XIV and XV. 
157 See id. at annex, section V. 
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respectively, inventories under Article 5(2) and databases for the accounting of 
assigned amount units.  
If the Enforcement Branch determines that a party is not in compliance with 
the Protocol’s requirements concerning the GHG monitoring and accounting 
systems, that party is obliged to submit to the Enforcement Branch for review and 
assessment a plan analyzing the causes of non-compliance, measures to remedy the 
non-compliance and a timetable for doing so.158 Where the Enforcement Branch 
determines that an Annex 1 party does not meet eligibility requirements for JI, CDM 
or international emissions trading, “it shall suspend the eligibility of that Party”.159 
Provision is made for reinstatement. Finally, revealing the teeth of the compliance 
system, where the Branch determines that a party has exceeded its assigned amount, 
a deduction equal to the excess plus 30 per cent (excess times 1.3) will be made from 
the assigned amount for the second commitment period. In addition, a non-
compliant party is required to draw up a compliance action plan and is suspended 
from making transfers under international emissions trading, pending 
reinstatement.160 
If a party believes it has been denied due process by a final decision of the 
Enforcement Branch, it may lodge an appeal with the COP/MOP, which may, by a 
three-fourths majority of parties present and voting, override a Enforcement Branch 
decision.161 Aside from the appeals procedure, the relationship of the COP/MOP 
with respect to the Committee is explicitly limited to matters such “providing general 
policy guidance”, considering the reports of the Committee, and adopting decisions 
on administrative and budgetary matters. This indicates that those countries who 
wished to insulate the Committee from more politicized COP/MOP deliberations 
succeeded, at least on paper, in doing so. Equally, the potential grounds for appeal 
appear fairly narrow, subject of course to the interpretation adopted by the 
Enforcement Branch. Certainly, the end result is closer to a process with fairly 
predictable consequences and limited discretion, as advocated by the United States, 
rather than a case-by-case review, preferred by the EU.162 Since decisions by the 
Enforcement Branch will presumably be based largely on technical questions – either 
submitted by the expert review team or another party – the scope for arguing denial 
of due process appears limited.  Moreover, the Enforcement Branch is likely to 
evaluate all information carefully. The material on which the Branch bases its 
determinations would in practice consist of the report of the ERT or the party 
having raised the question. Outside organizations, such as NGOs, are permitted to 
make submissions. The Enforcement Branch is empowered to appoint experts to 
assist it. Some deference by the Enforcement Branch to factual contentions by the 
party before it, as is found in the practice of judicial and quasi-judicial bodies with 
respect to findings of fact, would not be surprising.   
The generally positive assessment of the compliance regime must be 
balanced against the critical views of some scholars. Barrett, for instance, singles the 
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compliance regime out as one of the Protocol’s grave defects.163 Barrett points out 
that there is little to prevent a party determined to have exceeded its emissions quota 
from simply carrying its “penalty” from one commitment period to the next. In 
addition, a party found to be non-compliant, will bargain for a generous allocation in 
a succeeding commitment period. In short, he argues that the consequences 
contemplated in the non-compliance procedure are simply not enforceable. 
Another observer of the compliance system notes that in the course of its 
negotiation the parties gradually moved away from the “soft” managerial compliance 
regime, exemplified by the Montreal Protocol, towards “hard” compliance.164 In 
essence, it appears that the parties came to believe that it was appropriate that 
tougher compliance provisions should back binding emissions limitation and 
reduction commitments. The Kyoto compliance system is also distinguished from its 
Montreal Protocol counterpart in that the tools of the managerial approach – 
technical and financial assistance – are of less relevance to the exclusively 
industrialized group of countries subject to binding targets under the Protocol.  
  
3.3 Finalizing the Protocol - Consolidation and change – the long road to 
entry into force 
Having lingered on life support for a number of years, its imminent demise 
certified by critics,165 the Protocol finally entered into force on 16 February 2005.166 
The legal instrument adopted in 1997 set targets and timetables, but the technical 
details to bring the overall framework into operation remained to be worked out. 
This task, in what came to be known as the “Kyoto process”, fell to the Conference 
of the Parties to Convention, which, in the period before the Protocol came into 
force, was requested to carry out a range of tasks to ensure its prompt start.167 This 
process of filling in the gaps is covered in greater detail in this part. 
Like the Convention, the Protocol is also in many respects a framework 
instrument, with the drafters having left many details to subsequent negotiation. In 
particular, the rules for the market-based flexibility mechanisms remained to be 
elaborated. The same was true for other basic operational details relating to reporting 
and accounting for emissions, financial assistance for developing countries and the 
compliance mechanism. After protracted negotiations, most of these issues were 
resolved at the seventh Conference of the Parties in Marrakech in 2001, where the 
parties adopted the so-called “Marrakech Accords” containing the Protocol 
rulebook. This chapter traces the completion – and to an extent, evolution – of the 
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Protocol through the various Conferences of the Parties. It concludes with a short 
assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the climate regime. 
 
COP-4: Attending to unfinished business 
The Kyoto Protocol was adopted at the third Conference of the Parties in 
1997. COP-4, the first meeting of the parties after the adoption of the Kyoto 
Protocol, was an opportunity to deal with the “unfinished business” from those 
climactic negotiations.168 The parties adopted a number of decisions - the Buenos 
Aires Plan of Action – that established a negotiating agenda for the coming into 
operation of the Protocol.169 which essentially. The Plan covered a number of issues, 
including: the financial mechanism; the development and transfer of technology; the 
implementation of Convention and Protocol Articles concerning adverse effects of 
climate change on developing countries; and the Kyoto mechanisms.  
With respect to the financial mechanism, the Parties agreed that the 
restructured Global Environment Facility (GEF) would serve as an entity entrusted 
with the operation of the financial mechanism referred to in Article 11 of the 
Convention and that the COP would review the performance of the GEF every four 
years, in accordance with guidelines agreed at the meeting.170 Among other things, it 
was also agreed that the GEF should fund the full cost of initial and subsequent 
reports by developing countries on emissions and measures taken to implement the 
Convention (known as national communications).171 Demonstrating the early 
concern of developing countries regarding adaptation and vulnerability, the GEF was 
also asked to implement adaptation response measures in particularly vulnerable 
countries, such as preparations for adaptation activities and related capacity 
building.172 The decision on the adverse impacts of climate change launched work 
program to examine the issue, including identification and consideration of measures 
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such as technology transfer and insurance.173  The decision on the Kyoto (flexibility) 
mechanisms set a deadline of COP-6 in 2002 for the Parties to take decisions on the 
rules to flesh out the details necessary to make these mechanisms operational.174 
The Conference highlighted once again the persistent fault-line between 
industrialized and developing countries, which came to fore with the proposal by 
Argentina, tacitly supported by the United States, to place the issue of voluntary 
commitments for developing countries on the agenda.175 The proposal faced 
immediate and fierce resistance from G-77 and China, representing the developing 
countries. After the predictable rejection of the proposal, Argentine President 
Menem pledged that his country would assume a voluntary target at the next 
Conference of the Parties.176 (At recent Conferences, for instance the twelfth 
Conference of the Parties in Nairobi in 2006, the Russian Federation has persistently 
advocated the amendment of the Protocol to allow for voluntary commitments by 
developing countries.177) In legal terms – and consistent with the principle of 
common but differentiated responsibilities – the Protocol does not provide for the 
negotiation or assumption of voluntary commitments. Discussion of such 
commitments engenders enormous suspicion among developing countries who 
regard them as a “slippery slope” to binding commitments, as well as undermining of 
the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. 
A second example of the fault-line evident at COP-4, one that continues to 
be manifested in the negotiations, related to the review of the adequacy of 
commitments under the Convention.178 While there was agreement on the 
inadequacy of commitments, Parties could not reach agree on the reasons, with 
developing countries criticizing insufficient mitigation by the industrialized countries, 
some of who in turn drew attention to the former’s lack of emissions reduction 
obligations. Similarly, at the 12th Conference of the Parties in 2006, great difficulty 
was experienced in reaching agreement on the mandated review of the Kyoto 
Protocol.179 The interests, arguments and chief protagonists remained largely 
unchanged. 
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  77 
 
COP-5:  Pause and prelude 
Hailed as a modest success, COP-5 was in truth largely a prelude to the more 
substantive decisions scheduled for COP-6.180 The meeting adopted a number of 
important decisions on technical issues such as guidelines for reporting of annual 
inventories by Annex 1 countries181 and guidelines for expert review of inventories 
submitted by Annex 1 countries.182 These decisions contributed to the transparency, 
integrity and comparability of emissions data – all critical qualities in the negotiations 
on climate change. The modalities and procedures for the flexibility mechanisms, 
particularly the CDM, and the design of the compliance mechanism were key topics 
discussed. In both cases the COP adopted decisions requesting the relevant 
subsidiary bodies working on the two topics to continue their work with a view to 
adopting decisions by the COP at its 6th Session. With respect to the CDM, non-
governmental organizations were vocal in rejecting the eligibility of nuclear energy as 
an option. 
 
COP-6: Things fall apart 
The 6th Conference of the Parties convened in The Hague with the aim of 
completing the negotiations on the topics under the Buenos Aires Programme of 
Action. Despite vigorous attempts to rescue the meeting,183 it ended in failure with 
the parties unable to reach agreement on a number of issues.184 Among the issues 
that derailed the negotiations were disagreements to what extent CDM and JI should 
be “supplemental” to domestic action by Annex 1 countries;185 how much credit 
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the flexibility mechanisms would allow Annex 1 countries to avoid taking domestic action to reduce 
emissions. The exact meaning of the “supplemental” and “part of” provisions has remained 
contested. 
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countries should get for the carbon dioxide absorbed by forests and grasslands;186 
and the compliance mechanism.187 The COP suspended its sessions and requested 
the President “to seek advice on the desirability of resuming that session in 
May/June 2001 in order to complete work”.188 Overall, aside from the divergence 
regarding specific issues, observers identified the sheer scale of the agenda and the 
lack of trust and understanding among parties as reasons for failure.189 
 
COP-6bis: Compromise and concessions 
After the meltdown at The Hague, the resumed 6th Session of the Conference 
of the Parties, COP-6 (Part II), ended with negotiators managing to reach agreement 
on most of the critical political issues relating to the implementation of the Kyoto 
Protocol. This was despite – or perhaps partly because of – unfavorable 
developments in the United States. Responding to a letter from a group of Senators 
requesting clarification of his stance on the Protocol, President Bush, stated his 
opposition to the Protocol on the basis that it exempted major emitters and would 
harm the U.S. economy.190 In June, the President Bush confirmed the United States’ 
rejection of the Kyoto Protocol and unveiled the Administration’s climate change 
program, with a focus on research and technology.191 The U.S opposition to the 
Protocol opened a rift in transatlantic relations.192 At the same time, the supporters 
of the Protocol, in the first place the European Union, were aware that if they could 
not clinch a deal on the key outstanding issues, there would probably not be another 
opportunity to resuscitate the treaty. 
Progress was made in Bonn regarding four main areas: the rules for 
emissions trading and the flexibility mechanisms; the eligibility of forestry projects 
                                                 
186 The technical term of art is land-use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF). Under Article 3(3) 
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under the CDM and rules on the counting of forestry management; funding and 
capacity building for developing countries to combat climate change; and key aspects 
of the compliance mechanism. At the beginning of the second week of negotiations 
the Parties agreed to adopt a political statement – the Bonn Agreement - proposed 
by the President, which encapsulated agreement on the outstanding issues, with the 
understanding that negotiations would continue on individual decisions.193 The Bonn 
Agreement settled certain issues that had bedeviled COP-6 in The Hague, among 
them that the flexibility mechanisms “shall be supplemental to domestic action, and 
that domestic action shall thus constitute a significant element” of the effort made by 
Annex 1 parties to meet their emission reduction commitments. 194 It also states that 
Annex 1 parties “are to refrain from” using JI and CDM credits from nuclear 
facilities to meet their commitments, thus effectively ensuring that nuclear energy 
projects would not be eligible under these mechanisms.195 The parties also agreed 
that forestry projects could be included in the CDM but that these would be limited 
to: (a) afforestation and reforestation in the first commitment period, with the 
detailed technical procedures and methodologies governing such projects to be 
drawn up by one of the subsidiary bodies; and (b) that credits from such forestry 
projects could constitute no more than one per cent of a Parties’ assigned amount in 
the first commitment period.196 With respect to forestry management and other 
additional land-use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) activities under Article 
3.4, the contribution of these sinks was subject to individual country caps, set out in 
an appendix.197 Agreement was reached on many aspects of the compliance system, 
including such contentious issues as membership,198 decision-making procedures,199 
and consequences of non-compliance.200 Consensus could not be achieved, however, 
on whether the consequences of non-compliance should be binding.201 
                                                 
193 See Report of the Conference of the Parties on the Second Part of its Sixth Session, Part I: Proceedings, paras. 
34-38, 45-50, FCCC/CP/2001/5. See also Summary of the Resumed Sixth Session of the Conference of the 
Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, 16-27 July 2001 12 (176) EARTH 
NEGOTIATIONS BULLETIN 4 (2001). 
194 Report of the Conference of the Parties on the Second Part of its Sixth Session, supra note 193, at 41. 
195 See id. at 43. 
196 Id. at 43. 
197 Id. at 46-47. For instance, the Canada is permitted to count removals of 12 million tonnes of CO2 
(Mt/CO2) per year in the commitment period, Japan 12 Mt/CO2, and the Russian Federation 17.63 
Mt/CO2. Some observers maintain that these allowances undermined the environmental integrity of 
the Protocol. It is interesting to that a footnote at 46 states that: “Consideration was also given to 
national circumstances (including the degree of effort needed to meet Kyoto commitments and the 
forest management measures implemented).” 
198 A total of 10 members, with the selection formula resulting in six representatives from non-Annex 
1 countries and four from Annex 1. Report of the Conference of the Parties on the Second Part of its Sixth 
Session, supra note 193, at 49. 
199 See id. at 49. Decisions are to be taken by consensus, failing which a three-quarters majority 
prevails. For the enforcement branch, Annex 1 parties insisted on double majority voting procedure, 
so as to avoid the possibility of non-Annex 1 countries colluding against them. 
200 See id. at 48. The consequences include subtraction of excess emissions times 1.3 from the assigned 
amount of first commitment period, added to the assigned amount in the next commitment period.  
201 See Summary of the Resumed Sixth Session of the Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, 16-27 July 2001 12 (176) EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULLETIN 8(2001). 
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The issues on which the parties reached detailed agreement essentially related 
to developing country concerns.202 Most importantly, the parties created three new 
funds, two under the Convention – the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF) and 
the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF)203 – and one, the Adaptation Fund,204 
under the Kyoto Protocol. In something of an innovation, parties decided that the 
Adaptation Fund would be financed from a two per cent share of proceeds from 
CDM projects. In a victory for developing countries, agreement was also reached on 
the creation of an Expert Group on Technology Transfer.205 A decision under 
Protocol Article 3.14, strongly supported by OPEC countries, requested Annex I 
Parties to report annually on the steps taken to minimize the adverse effects of their 
response measures on developing countries.206 
 
COP-7: The “Marrakech Accords” – Hard bargaining 
The Seventh Conference of the Parties (COP-7) in Marrakech succeeded in 
the task of translating the political Bonn Agreement into a legal text.207 Decisions 
were prepared with respect to: “nuts and bolts” issues such as the rules and 
procedures applicable to systems and inventories relating to GHG emissions and 
removals by sinks;208 the compliance regime;209 guidelines and procedures for the 
implementation of the flexibility mechanisms;210 and land-use and forestry as sinks 
for the removal of GHGs.211 The more than two hundred pages of text comprising 
the Marrakech Accords are also known as the “Kyoto rule-book”. 
After Marrakech, the Protocol might perhaps have been compared to a new 
house that – while still requiring a few touch-ups here and there – was essentially 
                                                 
202 At COP-6bis the parties converted the political Bonn Agreement into one set of decisions 
forwarded to COP-7 for adoption and another requiring further elaboration and completion. See 
Report of the Conference of the Parties on the Second Part of its Sixth Session, respectively, addendum, Part III: 
Decisions on which the Conference of the Parties noted that negotiations were completed and 
consensus reached at the Second Part of the Sixth Session and which the Conference decided to 
forward to its Seventh Session for adoption, FCCC/CP/2001/5/Add.1 (2002), and addendum, Part 
IV: Draft decisions on which progress was noted by the Conference of the Parties at the second part 
of its Sixth Session and which the Conference of the Parties decided to forward to its Seventh Session 
for elaboration, completion and adoption, FCCC/CP/2001/5/Add.2 (2002). 
203 See Report of the Conference of the Parties on the Second Part of its Sixth Session, addendum Part III, supra 
note 202, at 44-45. 
204 See id. at 54. 
205 See id. at 21. 
206 See id. at 50. Countries with economies dependent oil exports, particularly some OPEC members, 
are concerned that mitigation measures under the Protocol may harm their markets. 
207 For a summary and overview see Summary of the Seventh Conference of the Parties to the UN Convention on 
Climate Change, 29 October to 10 November 2001, 12 (189) EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULLETIN (2001) 
208 Decisions 20/CP.7, 21/CP.7, 22/CP.7 and 23/CP.7, in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its 
Seventh Session, addendum, Part II: Action taken by the Conferen ce of the Parties, Vol. III, 
FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.3 (2002). 
209 Decision 24/CP.7, in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Seventh Session, supra note 208. 
210 See decisions 15/CP.7, 16/CP.7, 17/CP.7, 18/COP.7, 19/CP.7, in Report of the Conference of the 
Parties on its Seventh Session, addendum, Part II: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties, Vol. II, 
FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.2 (2002).  
211 See decisions 11/CP.7 and 12/CP.7, in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Seventh Session, 
addendum, Part II: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties, FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1 (2002). 
  81 
 
ready to be occupied. The cost in environmental integrity of “getting the job done” 
in Bonn and Marrakech could be judged as too high.212 The main count in this 
indictment relates to role played by sinks, particularly the fact that the verification of 
GHGs through forestry management and other land-use measures is very loose.213 
With the United States having pulled out, another group of countries  – Canada, 
Japan, and the Russian Federation – assumed a degree of veto power with respect to 
the final details of the Marrakech negotiations, and they were able to extract a 
number of concessions from the EU.214  
The combination of fungibility215 of allowances and credits under the 
Protocol and “banking”216 has the potential of watering down the environmental 
integrity of the Protocol.217 (Parties with surplus allowances and credits in the first 
commitment period may “bank” them for subsequent commitment periods.) 
Particularly problematic may the units derived from sinks projects in Annex 1 
countries under Protocol Article 3(3)-(4). Although these removals units (RMUs) 
cannot themselves be banked or carried over, their interchangeability or fungibility 
with other Kyoto units means that an Annex 1 party could simply surrender RMUs 
for compliance purposes in the first commitment period, retaining surplus assigned 
amount units (AAUs), certified emission reductions (CERs), and emission reduction 
units (ERUs) to carry over into the next commitment period.218  
Careless engagement in international emissions trading, and to a lesser extent 
JI projects, raised the possibility that Annex 1 parties could find themselves short of 
allowances at the end of the commitment period. In order to mitigate the risk of 
                                                 
212 See analysis of “Kyoto loopholes” by BILL HARE & MALTE MEINSHAUSEN, GREENPEACE 
INTERNATIONAL, BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON POTENTIAL LOOPHOLES IN THE KYOTO 
PROTOCOL, UPDATE FOR COP-6 (PART TWO), BONN, (2001). 
213 For instance, while parties must demonstrate that removals from cropland management, forestry 
management and similar activities are human induced, there is no requirement for the submission of 
annual inventories, as there is for sources of GHG emissions and removals by sinks in the case of 
afforestation and deforestation. This undermines the rigor and environmental integrity of the exercise. 
See decision 11/CP.7, annex, para. 8. And while sinks from forestry management are capped by 
country, no such limit applies to the other land-use measures mentioned above. With respect to 
rewards of hard bargaining, the concession obtained by the Russian Federation is particularly striking 
– it was able to double the amount of removals from forestry management it could count towards its 
target, up from 17 Mt/CO2 to 33 Mt/CO2 per year times five. 
214 See Summary of the Seventh Conference of the Parties to the UN Convention on Climate Change, 29 October to 10 
November 2001, 12 (189) EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULLETIN 15-16 (2001). See also DESSAI, supra note 
184, at 14-17. 
215 See decision 18/CP.7, in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Seventh Session, supra note 210,  
annex, paras. 11-12. 
216 Banking refers to the possibility of retaining unused AAUs from one commitment period for use 
in a subsequent commitment period. See id. annex, paras. 15-16. 
217 There is no limit on the number of AAUs that may be banked or carried over. For CERs and 
ERUs, respectively, a party may not bank an amount greater than 2.5 per cent of its initial assigned 
amount under Article 3(7)-(8) of the Protocol. 
218 In theory banking introduces flexibility and improves the economic efficiency of a cap-and-trade 
mechanism, helping to overcome the limitations of fixed and rather short commitment periods. 
However, with the potential of large numbers of forestry and land-use RMUs entering the system, 
allowing Annex 1 countries to bank AAUs, it is possible that new comers in a second commitment 
period will be disadvantaged. Under a tighter cap, new entrants will not have the buffer of easily 
acquired, banked credits of some Annex 1 parties. 
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overselling by Annex 1 parties, it was decided that they would be required to 
maintain a commitment period reserve (CPR), which is an amount equal to 90 per 
cent of its initial assigned amount or five times its most recently reviewed emissions 
inventory, whichever is lowest.219  
 
COP-8: Focus on Adaptation in New Delhi 
With the technical details of the Kyoto flexibility mechanism in place, the 
Eighth Conference of the Parties (COP-8), held in New Delhi, saw the concerns of 
developing countries take center stage.220 Prominent among them was adaptation – 
of immediate concern to developing countries - but an issue that has generally played 
second fiddle to mitigation in the climate negotiations.221  The parties adopted the 
Delhi Declaration on Climate Change and Sustainable Development, which reaffirms 
that development and poverty eradication are the overwhelming priorities of 
developing countries.222 It emphasizes that climate change should be addressed while 
meeting the requirements of sustainable development, as well as the need to integrate 
measures to combat climate change into national development programs. It stresses 
the importance of adaptation to the impacts of climate change for all countries, 
noting that developing countries are particularly vulnerable, and calls on 
industrialized countries to further implement their commitments relating to 
financing, capacity building and technology transfer. With COP-8 taking place little 
more than a month after the World Summit on Sustainable Development, it is 
unsurprising that the Declaration borrows language from the Plan of 
Implementation calling for diversifying energy supplies, as well as actions to 
substantially increase the global share of renewable energy sources.223  
 
COP-9: Milan 
The uncertain fate of the Kyoto Protocol hung over the discussions at the 
Ninth Conference of the Parties (COP-9), held in Milan in December 2003.224 Entry 
into force was conditional on the ratification of the Russian Federation, which sent 
mixed but largely negative signals on this point.225 Nevertheless, the parties adopted 
                                                 
219 See decision 18/CP.7, in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Seventh Session, supra note 210,  
annex, para. 6. 
220 For an account of the negotiations, see Summary of the Eighth Conference of the Parties to the UN 
Convention on Climate Change, 23 October to 1 November 2002, 12 (209) EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULLETIN 
(2002). 
221 Andrew C. Revkin, Climate Talks Shift Focus to How to Deal With Changes, N.Y. TIMES, November 3, 
2002. 
222 Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Eighth Session, addendum, Part II: Action taken by the 
Conference of the Parties, 3, FCCC/CP/2002/7/Add.1 (2002). 
223 See Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, para. 20(e), Report 
of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, U.N. Doc. A/Conf./199/20. The Plan of 
Implementation is accessible at 
http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/docs_key_conferences.htm.  
224 For an account of the negotiations see Summary of the Ninth Conference of the Parties to the UN 
Convention on Climate Change, 1 to 12 December  2003, 12 (233) EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULLETIN (2003). 
See also SURAJE DESSAI ET AL, CHALLENGES AND OUTCOMES AT COP-9 (Tyndall Centre Briefing 
Note No. 11, 2004). 
225 Steven Lee Myers & Andrew C. Revkin, Russia to Reject Pact on Climate Putin Aide Says, N.Y. TIMES, 
December 3, 2003. 
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an important decision operationalizing the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF). 
The decision provides that that adaptation will enjoy priority in allocation of 
resources, and that technology transfer and associated capacity building will also be 
covered.226 Supported adaptation activities will fall in a range of areas such as water 
resources management, agriculture, integrated coastal zone management, monitoring 
of vector-borne diseases and coping with disasters caused by extreme weather 
events. A sticking point in the negotiations was how funds under the SCCF would be 
used to support the economic diversification of countries with economies dependent 
on oil exports,227 which was an issue because the initial decision establishing the 
Fund provided that diversification activities would be covered.228 Supported by 
provisions in the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol referring to the adverse impact 
of response (mitigation) measures, oil producing developing countries have 
advocated for assistance to enable their economies to diversify beyond hydrocarbon 
exports.229 In this context, oil-producing countries allege the adverse impacts 
resulting from carbon taxes and similar mitigation measures aimed at fossil fuels. 
The parties also adopted guidelines for the operation of the LDC Fund, 
which is designed to provide assistance to least developed countries.230 In the first 
instance, the Fund would be tapped to support the preparation of national 
adaptation programmes of action (NAPAs), identifying immediate and urgent 
adaptation needs. Finally, in adopting the technical rules for afforestation and 
deforestation projects under the CDM, the Milan meeting completed the last item on 
the Buenos Aires Plan of Action.231 
 
COP-10: Buenos Aires 
The Russian Federation’s decision to ratify the Protocol,232 taken shortly 
before the Tenth Conference of the Parties (COP-10), reinvigorated the negotiations. 
A major outcome of this meeting was the adoption of the Buenos Aires Programme 
of Work on Adaptation and Response Measures. It covers the following areas: 
adverse effects of climate change; impact of the implementation of response 
                                                 
226 Decision 5/CP.9, in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Ninth Session, addendum, Part II: Action 
taken by the Conference of the Parties, Vol. I, 11-12, FCCC/CP/2003/6/Add.1 (2004). 
227 EU countries argued that the inclusion of diversification for oil exporters would preclude them 
making substantial contributions to the Fund. The issue was deferred for further consideration at 
COP-10, following inputs by the parties. See DESSAI ET AL, supra note 224. 
228 See decision 7/CP.7, in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Seventh Session, addendum, Part II: 
Action taken by the Conference of the Parties, Vol. I, para. 2(d), FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1 (2002). 
This provision represented a considerable victory for the OPEC countries, building on Protocol 
Article 4(8)(h) that situates the potential negative economic impacts of mitigation measures with the 
adverse impacts of climate change on developing countries. 
229 See UNFCCC, art. 4(8)(h) and Protocol art. 2(3) and art 3(14). 
230 Decision 6/CP.9, in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Ninth Session, Part two: Action taken by the  
Conference of the Parties at its Ninth Session, supra note 226, at 13. 
231 Decision 19/CP.9, in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Ninth Session, addendum, Part II: 
Action taken by the Conference of the Parties, Vol. II, 13. FCCC/CP/2003/6/Add.2 (2004). The 
decision addresses complex issues relating to the permanence of sinks by providing for two types of 
CERs: a temporary CER (tCER), which expires five years after its issue and a long-term CER (lCER), 
which expires at the end of the crediting period of the project activity.  
232 Seth Mydans & Andrew C. Revkin, With Russia’s Nod, Treaty in Emissions Clears Last Hurdle, N.Y. 
TIMES, October 1, 2004. 
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measures; and a request to the Subsidiary Body for Technological and Scientific 
Advice (SBSTA) to develop a structured five-year program of work on the scientific, 
technical and socio-economic aspects of impacts, vulnerability and adaptation to 
climate change.233  
The discussions on support for adaptation activities were again complicated 
by the coupling of impacts from climate change with the impacts of response 
measures, because under this agenda item certain oil producing States, argued that 
assistance under the GEF should be made available for activities such as economic 
diversification.234 Donor countries resisted this linkage and equivalence. The EU 
announced that donors had pledged over US$ 30 million for the Special Climate 
Change Fund (SCCF).235 During discussions on additional guidelines for the SCCF 
and the LDC Fund developing countries reiterated their complaints concerning the 
difficulty in accessing funds under the GEF, which had been designated as the entity 
to manage both these funds.  
Other decisions taken by the parties concerned the adoption of simplified 
modalities and procedures for small-scale afforestation and reforestation CDM 
projects,236 seen as facilitating community-level CDM projects in developing 
countries,237 as well as further guidelines for quality assurance of the international 
transactions log (ITL), the software and technical backbone of international 
emissions trading under the Protocol.238 The ITL is designed to verify that 
transactions involving allowances and other units are consistent with rules agreed 
under the Kyoto Protocol. 
With the Protocol’s entry into force assured, negotiators also turned some of 
their attention to the issue of the future direction of the climate regime, bearing in 
mind the expiry in 2012 of the first commitment period under the Protocol. A rather 
unthreatening proposal by the EU to hold two seminars was rebuffed, and it was 
only at the last minute agreement was reached on one seminar.239  
 
COP-11: Breakthrough in Montreal 
Since the Protocol had entered into force in February 2006, the eleventh 
Conference of the Parties (COP-11) was held together with the first Conference of 
                                                 
233 Decision 1/CP.10, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Tenth Session, addendum, Part II: Action 
taken by the Conference of the Parties, Vol. I, FCCC/CP/2004/10/Add.1 (2005). 
234 Hermann E. Ott et al, It Takes Two to Tango – Climate Policy at COP 10 in Buenos Aires and Beyond, J. 
FOR EUROP. ENV. & PLANNING L.84, 86 (2005). 
235 Summary of the Tenth Conference of the Parties to the UN Convention on Climate Change, 6 -18 December  
2004, 12 (260) EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULLETIN 9 (2004). 
236 Decision 3/CP.10, in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Tenth Session, addendum, Part II: 
Action taken by the Conference of the Parties, Vol. II, FCCC/CP/2004/10/Add.2 (2005). 
237 E.g. the BioCarbon Fund of the World Bank, 
http://carbonfinance.org/Router.cfm?Page=BioCF&ItemID=9708&FID=9708 . 
238 Decision 16/CP.10, in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Tenth Session, supra note 236. 
239 As expected this discussions proved difficult and the results were meager, with the parties only able 
to agree on a seminar for an informal exchange of views, subject to the express condition that it 
would not “open any negotiations leading to new commitments”. See Report of the Conference of the Parties 
on its Tenth Session, Part I: Proceedings, 37, FCCC/CP/2004/10 (2005). Strong opposition came from 
the United States. See Larry Rohter, U.S. Waters Down Global Commitment to Curb Greenhouse Gases, N.Y. 
TIMES, December 19, 2004. For analysis, see also Ott et al, supra note 234, at 85. 
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the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties (COP/MOP-1) to the Kyoto 
Protocol.240 The Montreal meeting was historic on several counts. The first meeting 
of the supreme body of the Kyoto Protocol, the COP/MOP, formally adopted the 
draft decisions that constituted the rulebook agreed on in the Marrakech Accords 
and subsequent COPs.241 The meeting also launched two parallel processes or 
“tracks” addressing the future next stage in the climate regime. Under the Protocol, 
parties initiated the mandated review of the commitments of Annex 1 parties by 
establishing the Ad Hoc Working Group (AWG) to negotiate industrialized parties’ 
commitments for the post-2012 period. Under the Convention, parties agreed to 
establish a non-negotiating “dialogue on long-term cooperative action” to address 
climate change.  
The review of Annex 1 commitments was triggered by Article 3.9 of the 
Protocol, which requires that the COP/MOP shall initiate the consideration of 
Annex 1 commitments at least seven years before the end of the first commitment 
period, in other words by 2005. The mandate of this review covered only 
industrialized (Annex 1) parties. Developing countries proposed that negotiations on 
the second commitment period should conclude in 2008, and argued that it was 
incumbent on industrialized countries to demonstrate leadership on mitigation. For 
their part, Annex 1 parties – now excluding the United States, which as a non-party 
was relegated to an observer role – resisted the establishment of a timeline. 
Eventually parties settled on less specific language stating that the negotiations in the 
Ad Hoc Working Group (AWG) on Annex 1 commitments should be completed in 
time to ensure that there is no gap between the first and second commitment 
periods.242 Some industrialized country parties attempted to link the above process 
with the broader review of the Protocol provided for under Article 9.243 This review 
of the adequacy of the Protocol would also apply to developing countries. Article 9 
states that the parties “shall periodically review this Protocol in the light of the best 
scientific information and assessments on climate change and its impacts”, with the 
first review required at COP-12/MOP-2 in 2006. As a negotiating tactic, establishing 
a linkage between the two processes presented an opportunity to bring pressure to 
bear on certain developing countries; however, in legal terms the Article 9 review is 
intended to be a separate process, based on a thorough review of the latest science, 
as well as technical and economic information.  
As noted above, the second “track” begun in Montreal consisted of a 
dialogue under the Convention. What it lacked in ambition, it partially compensated 
for in terms of inclusiveness, both in relation to the issues (adaptation and 
mitigation) and with respect to parties. For those taking the longer view, the dialogue 
could be regarded as the first tenuous toehold in a process leading towards greater 
                                                 
240 For an analysis of the meeting, see Hermann E. Ott et al, The Montreal Climate Summit: Starting the 
Kyoto Business and Preparing for post -2012, J. FOR EUROP. ENV. & PLANNING L. 90 (2006). 
241 At total of nineteen draft decisions were recommended for adoption by the COP/MOP at its first 
session, as contained in the reports of COP 7, COP 8, COP 9 and COP 10. See Compendium of draft 
decisions forwarded for adoption by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol at its first session, Note by the Secretariat, para. 2, FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/3. 
242 Given the time required to complete the requisite ratifications, an agreement probably needs to be 
reached by 2009. 
243 Ott et al, supra note 240, at 91. 
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involvement of developing countries and those outside the Kyoto process, Australia 
and the United States. However, the latter was adamant that any new process – in 
fact carefully labeled as a “dialogue – should in no way lead to new commitments.244 
Thus the parties explicitly resolved that the dialogue would consist of an “open and 
non-binding exchange of views” and would “not open any negotiations leading to 
new commitments”.245 
Among other things, the decision on the dialogue on long-term cooperative 
action to address climate change reaffirms that development and poverty eradication 
are the first and overriding priorities of developing country parties, recognizes the 
diversity of approaches to address climate change, and emphasizes the essential role 
of technology in addressing climate change.246 The parties agreed that the dialogue 
would be structured as four workshops covering the following topics: advancing 
development goals in a sustainable way; addressing action on adaptation; realizing 
the full potential of technology; and realizing the full potential of market-based 
opportunities.  
The adoption of the decision on the compliance mechanism gave rise to 
considerable discussion.247 Article 18 of the Protocol states that “[a]ny procedures 
and mechanisms under this Article entailing binding consequences shall be adopted 
by means of an amendment to this Protocol”. In the Marrakech Accords, the legal 
status of the compliance mechanism as well as its consequences was left open, and 
referred to COP/MOP in the following terms: “it is the prerogative of the 
Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol to decide on the legal form of the procedures and mechanisms relating to 
compliance”.248 At the risk of some uncertainty about its exact legal status, both 
developing and industrialized countries preferred adopting the compliance regime in 
the form249 of a decision of the COP/MOP. An amendment to the Protocol, as 
proposed by Saudi Arabia,250 raised the possibility of two categories of parties to the 
Protocol, namely those who had ratified the amendment and those who had not, 
with associated legal uncertainty.251  
While the climate negotiations have, from their inception, attracted attention 
from the business community and environmental negotiations, the Montreal 
conference will be remembered for manner in which one part of the business lobby 
pressed for a clear signal on the future of the climate regime. The representatives of 
the carbon finance industry – consultants, investors, lawyers, project developers – 
                                                 
244 See id. at 92. See also Summary of the Eleventh Conference of the Parties to the UN Convention on Climate 
Change, 28 November – 10 December 2005, 12 (291) EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULLETIN 14 (2005). 
245 FCCC/CP/2005/5/Add.1, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its eleventh session, Part Two: Action 
taken by the Conference of the Parties at its eleventh session, 3 (2006). 
246 Report of the Conference of the Parties on its eleventh session, addendum, Part II: Action taken by the 
Conference of the Parties, 3-4, FCCC/CP/2005/5/Add.1 (2006). 
247 Ott et al, supra note 240, at 94. 
248 Decision 24/CP.7, in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Seventh Session, addendum, Part II: 
Action taken by the Conference of the Parties, Vol. III, FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.3 (2002). 
249 The implications are analyzed by Ulfstein & Werksman, supra note 136, at 58-58. 
250 Proposal from Saudi Arabia to amend the Protocol, Note by the secretariat, FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/2 (2005). 
251 Summary of the Eleventh Conference of the Parties to the UN Convention on Climate Change, 28 November – 10 
December 2005, 12 (291) EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULLETIN 14 (2005). 
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now have a great deal at stake in the continuation of the Kyoto flexibility 
mechanisms. It is clear that this interest group will represent a significant new private 
sector voice in the evolution and development of the climate regime. 
 
COP-12 – Nairobi: The African Adaptation COP 
This part summarizes the discussions and main outcomes of twelfth 
Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change and the second Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the 
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (COP/MOP-2).252 As the first COP to be held in sub-
Saharan Africa, the Nairobi Conference was naturally expected to advance the 
adaptation agenda. As it turned out, progress was made on the establishment of the 
Adaptation Fund and the work program of the Subsidiary Body on Scientific and 
Technological Advice (SBSTA) on impacts, vulnerability and adaptation.  
The Ad Hoc Working Group (AWG) on Annex 1 commitments held its 
second session at COP-12, agreeing that future work would proceed under three 
headings: analysis of mitigation potential and ranges of emission reduction 
objectives; analysis of possible means to achieve mitigation objectives; and 
consideration of further commitments. The first review of the Protocol, mandated 
by Article 9(2), proved to be a contentious issue that kept negotiators occupied quite 
late into the final days of the meeting. Developing countries, particularly the African 
group and China advocated concluding the review “at” the meeting – while the EU 
wanted to launch a review process. Developing countries also supported scheduling 
the second review in four to five years.253 Not coincidentally perhaps the second 
review would then take place safely after the date – generally assumed to be 2009 - 
by when targets for the second Kyoto commitment period would have had to be 
agreed. In the end, developing countries obtained language that the review would not 
lead to new commitments, while in return industrialized countries prevailed on the 
timing of the second review, which was set for COP-14 in 2008.254 The Russian 
proposal to amend the Protocol to allow for voluntary commitments by non-Annex 
1 again kept negotiators busy until the final hours of the conference.255 The proposal 
as its stands is not readily compatible with the structure of the Protocol. It would, for 
instance, enable those developing countries assuming “voluntary commitments” to 
participate in all the Protocol’s flexibility mechanisms, including international 
emissions trading, the latter of course being predicated emission limitation and 
reduction targets. In short, the mechanisms designed to assist Annex 1 parties meet 
their binding targets would be extended to other parties assuming “voluntary 
                                                 
252 The author attended the second week of the meeting (15-17 November 2006) in an observer 
capacity. For an account of discussions and decisions at the Nairobi conference, see Summary of the 
Twelfth Conference of the Parties to the UN Convention on Climate Change and Second Meeting of the Parties to the 
Kyoto Protocol, 6-17 November, 12 (318) EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULLETIN (2006). 
253 See id. at 7. 
254 Decision 7/CMP.2, in Report of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties on it s Second 
Session, addendum, Part II: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the 
Parties, FCCC/KP/CMP/2006/10/Add.1 (2007). 
255 As a compromise, parties requested the President of the COP to hold a workshop in May 2007 to 
explore the scope and implications of the proposal. See Report of the Conference of the Parties serving as the 
meeting of the Parties on its Second Session, Part I: Proceedings, paras. 134-136, FCCC/KP/CMP/2006/10 
(2007). 
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commitments”.256 Finally, under the Convention track, the second workshop of the 
Convention dialogue on long-term cooperative action addressed the topics of 
advancing development goals in a sustainable way and realizing the full potential of 
market-based opportunities.257 
The COP/MOP took an important step forward by defining the principles 
and modalities governing the administration of the Adaptation Fund.258 Notably, the 
governing body will have a majority of members from developing countries (non-
Annex 1) and follow a one-country-one vote rule, differentiating it from the “double 
majority” of the other funds under the GEF voting system.259 The Adaptation Fund 
(AF) is unique in a number of respects. First, unlike the other funds it is solely the 
creature of the parties to the Protocol, outside the direct influence of United States, 
with negotiations led by the EU.260 Second, unlike the other funds - which are 
financed from voluntary contributions and hence dependent on solidarity – revenue 
for the AF will be derived from a two per cent levy on emissions credits under the 
CDM.261 The levy is projected to generate between $160 and $950 million for the 
Fund, dwarfing the $170 million that has been deposited or pledged for the LDC and 
the Special Climate Change Funds.262 Third, the parties also decided that the AF 
"should operate under the authority and guidance of and be accountable” to 
COP/MOP, which will decide on its overall policies. It is legally and politically 
significant that the AF will operate not only under the guidance of the COP/MOP, 
but also under its authority. The reason is that with respect to the other climate 
change funds operated by the GEF, the COP provides “guidance”; effective 
authority rests with the GEF council, in practice dominated by donor countries. For 
developing countries, many of which have chafed under what they view as the 
excessively bureaucratic and onerous procedures of the GEF, the decision on the 
Adaptation Fund, particularly the voting procedure, was rightly hailed as major 
victory.  
The Subsidiary Body on Scientific and Technological and Advice (SBSTA) 
adopted decisions concerning its “Five year program of work on impacts, 
vulnerability and adaptation to climate change”, which consists of activities 
                                                 
256 Report of the President on consultat ions concerning the proposal of the Russian Federation to develop appropriate 
procedures for the approval of voluntary commitments, Submission from a Party, 9 
FCCC/KP/CMP/2006/MISC.4 (2006). 
257 Copies of presentations are available on the UNFCCC secretariat website at 
http://unfccc.int/meetings/dialogue/items/3759.php . 
258 Decision 5/CMP.2, in Report of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties on its Second 
Session, supra note 254. 
259 There are legal questions how the voting procedure for the Fund will operate within the GEF’s 
governance system. The GEF maintained that the hybrid formula of the GEF was flexible enough to 
accommodate the unique features of the Fund, including the fact that CERs, which will finance the 
Fund, originate from projects in developing countries. Additionally, a legal opinion from the World 
Bank, which is the trustee of the GEF funds, indicated that the unique aspects of the Adaptation 
Fund would be compatible with GEF procedures. See GEF, GOVERNANCE OF THE GLOBAL CLIMATE 
CHANGE FUNDS, GEF/C.29/5, para. 11 (2006). 
260 BENITO MUËLLER, OXFORD INSTITUTE FOR ENERGY STUDIES, NAIROBI 2006: TRUST AND THE 
FUTURE OF ADAPTATION FUNDING, 3 (2007), available at http://www.oxfordenergy.org/. 
261 Decision 17/CP.7, in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Seventh Session, supra note 120, at para. 
15(a)-(b). CDM projects in least developed countries are exempt from the levy.  
262 MUËLLER, supra note 260, at 3. 
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(workshops, technical papers, submissions, etc) to help countries make informed 
decisions on practical actions and measures.263 As could be expected, the G-77 and 
China focused on a learning-by-doing approach and actual projects, while United 
States led the argument for an approach based on assessment and research.264 The 
adoption of the work program marked the achievement of one concrete goal 
established in the Buenos Aires program of work on adaptation, adopted in 2004 at 
COP-10. A range of other decisions addressed guidance to the GEF for the 
operation of the Special Climate Change Fund under the Convention;265 guidance to 
the Executive Board of the CDM, where disagreement surfaced among the parties 
with respect to the eligibility of carbon dioxide capture and storage projects;266 and 
adopted the rules of procedure for the body responsible for supervising certain Joint 
Implementation (JI) projects.267 On the issue of emissions from deforestation, Brazil 
submitted a proposal for an international fund to finance activities to reduce the rate 
of deforestation in developing countries.268 This came after Papua New Guinea, 
supported by other tropical rainforest nations, had placed the issue of incentives for 
avoided deforestation on the Convention agenda at COP-11 in Montreal.269 
In sum, COP-12 did not deliver any breakthroughs, but nor was it expected 
to do so. This was not necessarily the view taken by the media, which perhaps found 
it difficult to reconcile the self-contained negotiating process - its set timelines and 
stylized group positions – with the greater urgency of climate change in the public 
debate.  
 
COP-13 – Down to the wire in Bali 
In the year leading up the Bali conference, a number of meetings contributed 
to setting a tone of urgency with respect to climate change. In April, the Security 
Council, under the rotating presidency of the United Kingdom, convened its first 
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short of embracing the concept of avoided deforestation as such. Rather, the proposal is aimed at the 
reduction of emissions from deforestation.  
269 See Reducing emissions from deforestation in developing countries: approaches to stimulate action, Subm issions 
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ever debate on climate change.270 In June, under the German presidency, the G-8 
countries adopted a summit document pledging to “seriously consider” deep cuts in 
emissions in their developing countries, but only after prolonged opposition by the 
U.S.271 At the United Nations, the General Assembly convened a thematic debate on 
climate change, which saw an almost exhaustive speakers list of countries address the 
topic.272 At this meeting, as before, the E.U reiterated its position of a 20 per cent cut 
by 2020, to be deepened to 30 per cent, if other major actors committed to serious 
mitigation action. Likewise, the statements of certain developing countries, such as 
Brazil and South Africa, hinted that they would approach Bali with a mandate to 
begin negotiations. In early September, the Asia Pacific Cooperation Summit 
(APEC), hosted by Australia, countries adopted a final declaration pledging to work 
constructively towards a successful meeting in Bali, and they also agreed to “work to 
achieve a common understanding on a long-term aspirational global emissions 
reduction goal to pave the way for an effective post-2012 international 
arrangement.”273 
On 24 September, the United Nations Secretary-General convened a one-day 
high-level event on climate change, which was organized around the four themes of 
adaptation, mitigation, technology and finance, and which drew the participation of 
almost 80 heads of state or government.274 Although a forum for discussion, not 
negotiation, the meeting did generate momentum going forward to Bali, with 
participants highlighting the need for action on climate change.275 Later that same 
week, the U.S. convened a its first meeting in a planned series of meetings of major 
economies on energy security and climate change, which brought together eighteen 
major economies, as well as the EU and the United Nations.276 The stated aim of this 
initiative, quickly dubbed the “major emitters” meeting, is to arrive at a long-term 
(non-binding) goal among the major economies and establish nationally defined 
goals and programs for improving energy security and reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions. The emphasis on voluntary action, as opposed to binding targets, seems 
to have dampened participants’ enthusiasm for the meeting.277 
The Bali Conference – formally the Thirteenth Session of the Conference of 
the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP-13) and the 
Third Session of the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (COP/MOP-3) – 
saw governments make progress on several important agenda items, but the 
dominant issue was the expectation that the meeting would launch negotiations on a 
                                                 
270 See Reuters, U.N. Council Hits Impasse Over Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES, April 17, 2007. U.N. S.C., 
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future agreement. The release of the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report strengthened 
the scientific case for action, and media and public interest in climate change reached 
a new level with the joint award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Albert Gore and the 
IPCC. A full day after the scheduled close, and after high-profile pleas for flexibility 
from the United Nations Secretary-General and the President of Indonesia, the Bali 
conference concluded with agreement on launching negotiations on future actions to 
mitigate greenhouse gases emissions.278 At the heart of the “Bali roadmap” – in fact a 
collection of decisions – is the much-expected and politically crucial agreement to 
launch a new process for negotiations on “long-term cooperative action” beyond 
2012. 
As noted above, at the Montreal conference in 2005, parties launched two 
parallel processes – or “tracks” – to begin addressing the post-2012 action. The first, 
the Ad hoc Working Group (AWG), was established under article 3.9 of the 
Protocol, with the aim of elaborating for Annex 1 countries only, for the second, 
post-2012 commitment period. The second track, the Dialogue on long-term 
cooperative action - explicitly not a forum for negotiations - concluded with its last 
workshop in August 2007. In their report to the Bali conference, the co-facilitators 
of the Dialogue outlined four options for the future, ranging from an extension of 
the Dialogue to a fully integrated negotiating process under both the UNFCCC and 
Protocol. The key outcome was the Bali Action Plan launching a negotiating process, 
the Ad Hoc Group on Long-term Cooperative Action, which will proceed in parallel 
with the Kyoto negotiations, with the expectation that the two tracks will converge, 
resulting in a comprehensive post-2012 agreement in 2009.   
The two critical issues in the negotiations on the Bali Action Plan were 
whether to reference an IPCC scenario under which developed country emissions 
would fall 20-40 per cent below 1990 levels by 2020, and degree to which the 
paragraphs on developed and developing countries resembled each other in terms of 
level of implied mitigation effort.279 The figures, especially cuts proposed by 2020, 
were strongly opposed by the U.S., which argued that settling on numbers at the 
outset of the meeting amounted to prejudging the outcome of the process.280  The 
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paragraphs of the mandate relating to developed and developing countries are worth 
quoting in full, in order to illustrate the nuances:281 
“(b) Enhanced national/international action on mitigation of climate change, 
including, inter alia, consideration of: 
(i) Measurable, reportable and verifiable nationally appropriate mitigation 
commitments or actions, including quantified emission limitation and reduction 
objectives, by all developed country Parties, while ensuring the comparability of 
efforts among them, taking into account differences in their national circumstances; 
(ii) Nationally appropriate mitigation actions by developing country Parties in the 
context of sustainable development, supported and enabled by technology, financing 
and capacity-building, in a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner;” 
 
The mandate retains, but softens, the differentiation between developed 
(“mitigation commitments or actions”) and developing countries (“actions”), and for 
this reason marks an important step forward. (Without some willingness to introduce 
consideration of mitigation in developing countries, the Bali outcome – and any 
eventual agreement – would certainly have faced rejection by the U.S.) In contrast, 
the Berlin Mandate, which in 1995 launched the negotiations leading to the Kyoto 
Protocol, explicitly ruled out any commitments for developing countries. Even a 
cursory reading, however, reveals that the negotiators, led by the U.S., managed to 
introduce considerable leeway and flexibility. To begin, the chapeau calls for 
enhanced “national/international” action – satisfying the interests of parties, like the 
U.S., that prefer national actions over internationally mandated targets. Second, the 
chapeau calls for “consideration”, not negotiation, of the commitments and actions 
referenced in paragraphs (b)(i) and (b)(ii).   
It is worth noting that the developed country paragraph  - para. (b)(i) - lists 
actions as an alternative to commitments, and emission targets are referred as 
“objectives”, rather than “commitments”, as in an earlier draft. 282  Further scope for 
differentiation is introduced by the words “nationally appropriate” as a qualifier for 
“actions and commitments”. As regards the developing country paragraph, the 
phrase “in a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner” qualifies both mitigation 
actions and the reference to technological and financial assistance. The result of a 
last-minute amendment proposed by India, it enables developing countries to insist 
on the contingency of mitigation action on support, financial and technological, from 
developed countries.  
A final point worth mentioning is that the Bali Action Plan eschews the usual 
Annex 1 and non-Annex 1 language – categories codified in the Convention - in 
favor of “developed” and “developing” countries. This opens possibility of the 
negotiations introducing some differentiation with respect to mitigation effort 
among developing countries, recognizing the reality that this category contains 
economically ascendant emerging economies, as well as far less developed nations. 
In Bali the parties also agreed on the scope of the second article 9 review of 
the Protocol, which provides that the parties are required to periodically review the 
Protocol in light of the best available scientific information. To satisfy the terms of 
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the Protocol, a perfunctory first review took place at COP-12, and it was agreed that 
a more far-reaching effort would be carried out at in 2008. The review is contentious 
because industrialized countries, pointing to scientific findings on the future global 
mitigation effort, tend to argue that effectiveness demands that developing countries 
also shoulder some of the responsibility for reducing GHGs. The parties agreed that 
the second review would focus on issues such as the scope and effectiveness of the 
Kyoto protocol’s flexibility mechanisms and progress by developed countries in 
meeting their commitments on finance and technology for developing countries.283 It 
was reiterated that the second review would not lead to new commitments for any 
Party. 
In a long-awaited decision, the parties agreed on the governance structure of 
the Adaptation Fund, paving the way for this institution to become operational. As 
noted above, the issue dividing the developed and developed countries centered 
around who should manage and operate the Fund – the GEF, an institution 
dominated by donor countries, or another body, with greater decision-making 
powers for developing countries. In Nairobi developing countries had won 
agreement on the point that decision-making should be according to majority rule. In 
Bali, the parties agreed to establish the Adaptation Fund Board as the operating 
entity to “supervise and manage the Adaptation Fund, under the authority and 
guidance of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the 
Kyoto Protocol”.284 Unlike the other climate change funds, therefore, the Adaptation 
Fund is not subject to the Council of the GEF,  rather it is Adaptation Fund Board 
that will assume the function of drawing up operational guidelines policies and 
guidelines, as well as making decisions on projects and the allocation of funds. The 
decision provides that the Board will be composed of 16 members representing 
parties to the Protocol, with two representatives from each of the five UN regional 
groups, one from SIDS, one from the LDCs, two non-Annex I parties, and two 
Annex I parties. Decision-making is on the basis of consensus, failing which, by two-
thirds majority. Since the developed countries have six representatives and 
developing countries ten, the latter have a majority.   
The decision designated the GEF as the fund’s secretariat, and the World 
Bank as its trustee, on an interim basis, with a review schedule to be held in three 
years. Overall, the decision means that developing countries have secured a key 
objective – control over the Fund – and at the same time benefiting from the 
experience and technical resources of the GEF as the secretariat implementing the 
Fund on a day-to-day basis. It remains to be seen whether the Board will be in a 
position to exercise real supervision and management, or whether the secretariat will 
exert effective control, and in this respect the interim nature of the arrangement 
almost certainly intended to have a moderating influence. Finally, although the 
available resources are a welcome increase over the trickle thus far made available for 
adaptation, they come nowhere near matching the need, so that allocation and 
priority setting are destined to be difficult and contentious.  
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Despite the fact that deforestation in developing countries accounts for an 
estimated 20 per cent of global carbon dioxide emissions, projects designed to avoid 
deforestation – as opposed to reforestation - are not eligible for credits under the 
CDM.285 At Bali, progress was made in recognizing efforts aimed what has become 
known as reduced emissions from deforestation and degradation (REDD) in 
developing countries. Papua New Guinea, as the head of a coalition of 15 rainforest 
counties, placed the issue of crediting efforts to avoid deforestation on the agenda at 
COP-11 in Montreal. At COP-12, Brazil, which had thus far steadfastly resisted 
discussions of avoided deforestation, unveiled a competing proposal under which 
countries reducing their deforestation rates would be eligible for payments from an 
international fund established by donors, as opposed to emission credits under a 
market mechanism.   
Moving in the direction of recognizing REDD efforts, the parties adopted a 
decision that, in carefully chosen language, encourages developing countries to 
explore a range of actions, including demonstration activities, to address 
deforestation and forest degradation.286 The decision also encourages work on 
methodological issues, such as the critical question of baselines against which 
reductions can be measured. In this respect, the decisions states that countries may 
have recourse to the “indicative guidance” provided in an annex to the decision, as 
an aid in undertaking and evaluating demonstration activities. Not addressed in the 
decision is whether the incentives to reduce deforestation would flow from a market-
based mechanism or donors. The issue of “[p]olicy approaches for and incentives” 
for REDD is singled out in the Bali Action Plan as one of the items for discussion 
by the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action.  
The issue of incentives for reducing deforestation is methodologically 
complex, because deforestation is the result of diverse social and economic factors. 
Extending credits for REDD would be a boon to countries that have so far been left 
out of the CDM market; however, the beneficiaries under the current CDM 
arrangements are way of a flood of cheap REDD credits.  Nonetheless, the issue has 
gained momentum, with the World Bank announcing a $300 million Forest Carbon 
Partnership Facility with the dual aim of building capacity to undertake projects and 
demonstrating the methodologies that could be scaled up for full-scale market.287 
In the climate negotiations, when industrialized countries exert pressure on 
developing countries with respect to mitigation action, the latter push back with 
demands for access to clean technology and greater financial support. In the opening 
days of the Bali conference developing countries tried very hard to turn the attention 
to technology transfer and, what the argued, were the unfulfilled commitments made 
by industrialized countries.288 Their emphasis on technology transfer reflected a 
concern that the emphasis on new mitigation commitments, including for possibly 
                                                 
285 WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, NAVIGATING THE NUMBERS 92 (2005). 
286 Decision, Reducing emissions from deforestation in developing countries: approaches to stimulate 
action, FCCC/SBSTA/2007/L.23/Add.1/Rev.1, advance unedited version, 
http://unfccc.int/meetings/cop_13/items/4049.php.  
287 Forest Carbon Partnership Facility Takes Aim at Deforestation, World Bank, December 11, 2007, 
http://go.worldbank.org/1ELJCN2F60.   
288 COP-13 and COP/MOP-3 Highlights: Tuesday, December 4, 12 (345) EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULLETIN 
(2007), http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb12345e.pdf.  
  95 
 
for developing countries, should not come at the expense of agenda items reflecting 
their interests. In the end, the parties agreed on a decision requesting the Global 
Environment Facility (GEF) to establish a strategic program to scale up technology 
transfer.289 This request had its roots in a more ambitious proposal by the G-
77/China to establish a fund under the Convention dedicated to technology 
transfer.290 At the institutional level, the parties decided to re-constitute the Expert 
Group on Technology Transfer (EGTT) for a period of five years, with a number of 
tasks, including the development of a set of performance indicators, for use by the 
Subsidiary Body on Implementation to evaluate technology transfer activities.291 
Politically, an undoubted coup for the G77/China is the language of the Bali Action 
Plan, which very tightly links “mitigation action by developing countries” with 
technology and financing “in a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner”.292 
Opening the door to “mitigation actions” is significant, but the decision now spells 
out that one of conditions for progress – increased financial support and access to 
technology for developing countries. 
In assessing the Bali conference, it is fair to ask whether negotiators 
succeeded in “defining success down”. With evidence and risk of climate change 
growing apace, it is sobering to realize compare the lack of ambition in the Bali road 
map with the conclusions of scientists and the instructive economic and technical 
assessments setting out how the problem can be tackled. A clear-eyed view of Bali 
would characterize it as “talks about talks” – and no negotiator worth his or her salt 
gives any more ground than necessary in the first round. Attempts by industrialized 
countries to defect from the more stringent targets-and-timetables approach of the 
Kyoto track to the Convention process could fatally undermine the willingness of 
developing countries define their mitigation actions. The negotiating process must 
thus balance commitments and actions under the Kyoto and Convention tracks. 
Given the variety of mitigation approaches likely to be considered, it will be 
important to convincingly demonstrate comparability of effort across different policy 
options.  
 
International developments outside the Convention process 
Climate change was one of the key topics addressed at Gleneagles G-8 
Summit, held under the presidency of the United Kingdom. In the summit 
communiqué countries agreed to launch a Dialogue on Climate Change, Clean 
Energy and Sustainable Development and asked the International Energy Agency 
(IEA) and World Bank, respectively, to develop alternative, clean energy scenarios 
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and a new framework for clean energy financing and investment.293 Forming part of 
the communiqué was short Plan of Action setting out specific actions taken and 
planned with respect to climate change. A number of Dialogue meetings were 
convened under the G8 plus 5 format,294 and the size and composition (outside the 
environment portfolio) having the potential to turn them into forums for meaningful 
discussion. Given the generally private nature of these discussions, not much is 
known of the conclusions reached, but from what has emerged, the G8 dialogue 
does not appear to have significantly contributed to progress in the international 
climate change negotiations.  For their part, both the IEA and World Bank prepared 
a number of studies and reports pursuant to their Gleneagles mandates, with the 
Bank’s work being especially useful in putting some hard numbers to the financing 
challenge for clean energy and adaptation to the adverse effects of climate change.295 
Governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the business 
community have joined together in partnerships at local, national, regional and 
international levels. A few examples provide an indication of the scope and variety of 
partnerships and cooperative ventures that have arisen, some with international 
political and legal significance, others not. In January 2006 the U.S. and Australia - 
the two industrialized countries that had rejected the Kyoto Protocol and its 
approach of binding targets – launched the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean 
Development and Climate, dubbed APP.296 Other founding members – all Kyoto 
parties – are China, India, Japan, and the Republic of Korea, with Canada joining in 
2007. The Partnership aims to accelerate the deployment of clean energy 
technologies through focused cooperation between member countries, working 
closely with industry. The APP established a policy and implantation committee to 
guide its work and oversee the activities of the eight public-private tasks forces 
addressing eight focal areas ranging from energy intensive sectors (aluminum) to 
renewable energy. In ambition and institutional structure the APP stands head and 
shoulders above other partnerships in the energy and climate field; continued 
engagement of key members and the commitment of financial resources are likely to 
determine whether it makes a real contribution with respect to clean technology, or 
as many skeptics suspected, merely served as a diversion by countries opposed to the 
Kyoto Protocol. Certainly, the deployment of clean energy technology has been 
insufficiently addressed under the current climate regime, and an initiative such as 
the APP - perhaps expanded to include membership from the EU and with closer 
links to the UNFCCC – could go some way towards remedying this deficiency.  
                                                 
293 The Gleneagles Communiqué, 
http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/PostG8_Gleneagles_CCChapeau.pdf.  
294 The five are: Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa. 
295 See THE WORLD BANK, CLEAN ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT: TOWARDS AN INVESTMENT 
FRAMEWORK, April 2006; CLEAN ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT: A PROGRESS REPORT, (2006); and 
CLEAN ENERGY FOR DEVELOPMENT: THE WORLD BANK ACTION PLAN, (2007). Available at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTENERGY/0,,menuPK:336812~
pagePK:149018~piPK:149093~theSitePK:336806,00.html. 
296 See http://www.asiapacificpartnership.org/. For a perhaps the only legal analysis of the Asia-
Pacific Partnership, see Christoph Holtwisch, Asiatisch-pazifische Partnerschaft für umweltverträgliche 
Entwicklung und Klima – Blockade oder Antrieb für das internationale Klimaregime?, unpublished Masters 
thesis, June 2007, copy on file with the author. 
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The Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum (CLSF) is an example of a 
technology partnership with participation, including the U.S., Germany, Japan, China 
and India. The aim of the CLSF is to develop and make available cost-effective 
technologies for carbon dioxide capture and storage.297 Methane is powerful 
greenhouse gas emitted from landfills, mines and oil and gas installations. Bringing 
together twenty governments and well over one hundred corporations, the Methane 
to Markets Partnership is an international initiative aimed at advancing cost-effective, 
near-term methane recovery and use as a clean energy source.298 Other partnerships 
have been formed in specific industry sectors, for instance the cement industry, 
which is responsible for about 5 per cent of global carbon dioxide emissions from 
human activities. An example of practical cooperative action address emissions from 
this vital economic sector is the Cement Sustainability Initiative, formed by leading 
cement producers under the umbrella of the World Business Council on Sustainable 
Development (WBCSD).299 
 
3.4 Conclusion and the road ahead 
Drawing together the material covered in this chapter, this part briefly 
assesses climate change regime to date. Challenges for the way forward are also 
outlined. As outlined in this chapter, states have steadily (albeit slowly) built climate 
regime through successive Conferences of the Parties. Beginning with the historic 
Framework Convention, which established the goal of preventing dangerous 
interference with the climate system, states have established an impressive and 
intricate multilateral regime. While management and further development by 
Conferences of the Parties is now regarded as a feature of modern MEAs, the 
Convention and the Protocol have set a new mark for the development of rules by 
such treaty bodies. The multifaceted nature and technical complexity of many of the 
issues dealt with is quite staggering. At the same time, deep policy differences and 
weighty economic interests underlie many supposedly “technical” issues. This is true 
for instance of the somewhat arcane rules relating to emissions credits for land-use 
change and forestry. The political dimension stems from a number of sources. First, 
nominally the Convention and the Protocol are environmental treaties; in reality they 
have profound social and economic implications. The future division of the 
mitigation burden between industrialized and developing countries cuts to the core 
of disagreements on global development and fairness in the relations between states. 
This chapter has touched on how industrialized countries have attempted to extend 
binding commitments to developing countries, who in turn have invoked the 
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, underlining the historical 
responsibility of developed countries. This aspect is explored in greater depth 
elsewhere in this thesis.300 Second, and more narrowly, the binding nature of Annex 1 
parties’ targets under the Kyoto Protocol endows otherwise technical matters, for 
instance guidelines and standards for reporting and maintenance of emissions 
inventories, with greater significance. Failure to maintain adequate accounting 
                                                 
297 See http://www.cslforum.org/about.htm .  
298 See http://www.methanetomarkets.org/.  
299 See http://www.wbcsdcement.org/.  
300 See chapter 4. 
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standards for GHG emissions and removals can lead to suspension of eligibility to 
use the emissions trading mechanisms.  
The process of regular Conferences of the Parties, backed by preparatory 
work of the subsidiary bodies, has proved capable of sustaining and further 
developing the climate regime. In drafting the Convention, the parties went as far as 
they could at that time in addressing climate change; some, like the states of the 
European Union, would have preferred going further. (In fairness, it should be 
recalled that the IPCC’s first assessment report, issued in 1990, concluded that the 
evidence as to whether warming was attributable to human or natural causes was 
evenly balanced.301) The need to supplement the Convention with an instrument 
containing emission limitation and reduction targets was quickly recognized, leading 
to the launch of the negotiations for the Protocol.  
The Convention and Protocol have established a number of important 
institutions and mechanisms. The Protocol’s compliance system, while borrowing 
from experience of the Montreal Protocol, is in the view of many observers the most 
sophisticated mechanism of its kind in any MEA. The three flexibility mechanisms, 
particularly the CDM, exist at the intersection of public international law and 
domestic laws. The Protocol has established an international carbon market that will 
become fully operative in 2008, the first year of its commitment period. It has also 
helped to create a private sector constituency with a direct pecuniary interest in the 
continuation of emission controls (as opposed to the rather less direct interests of 
insurance companies or the professed  “enlightened self-interest” of some oil 
companies).  
An international body, the CDM Executive Board, guided in its work by the 
Conference of the Parties, regulates the activities of private sector entities involved 
with project activities in host countries. Host countries, in turn, set the criteria for 
approving projects and apply domestic laws as they would to any other investment 
activity. Putting this edifice in place has been the painstaking task of the parties in 
the years after the adoption of the Protocol in 1997 and the agreement on the 
Marrakesh Accords in 2001. The next few years were spent tying up remaining loose 
ends. The Protocol also became caught in a debilitating waiting game concerning its 
entry into force. Only with the 11 th Conference of the Parties in Montreal in 2005 did 
negotiators turn to the next phase, that is, what would come after 2012 when the 
first Kyoto Commitment period expires.  
It is perhaps not entirely unfair to say that the climate change regime has 
been a victim of its own success. After all, few other environmental regimes would 
be criticized for the level of productivity and range of issues considered under the 
Convention and Protocol. However, like a runner who thinks she has run a short 
distance race, only to be told to tackle a marathon, the process under Convention 
and Protocol recently suffered something of a loss of confidence. One reason was 
that “success” is increasingly defined within the parameter of climate negotiations 
themselves, so that it means incremental (and admittedly necessary) advances, but no 
“breakthrough” on the central issues dividing industrialized and developing 
countries. The result was that even insiders have expressed the view that fresh 
                                                 
301 IPCC, SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT OF CLIMATE CHANGE – REPORT OF WORKING GROUP 1 (John 
Houghton et al, eds., 1990) 
  99 
 
impetus from outside was needed.302 The outcome of the Bali meeting has, however, 
succeeded in injecting renewed sense of purpose into the process. 
As summarized in this chapter, and posited by scholars,303 regular and 
institutionalized procedures - such as those typified by Conferences of the Parties -
contribute to a situation where states with diverse interests can nonetheless agree on, 
and steadily develop, institutions and rules to respond to a complex global problem. 
In short, the existence of a regular forum for discussion and generating agreement 
and coordination on core issues such monitoring and reporting of emissions has 
value, which is admitted by those who believe a decentralized approach is more 
practicable.304 Nevertheless, it possible that the facilitating embrace of the rules and 
institutions of the climate regime may have become a straitjacket, insulating the 
process from new ideas and permitting elaboration and refinement to substitute for 
action and innovation. These ideas will be further explored in the final chapter. 
The climate regime as summarized in this chapter demonstrates a number of 
other disadvantages and weaknesses. First, the approach taken in the Protocol 
emphasized binding targets to be met over a relatively short time frame (2008-2012). 
Assuming full compliance by all countries, the cuts under the Protocol would have 
had a largely symbolic effect on global emissions and negligible impact on climate 
change; nonetheless, several countries are having difficulty meeting their individual 
targets. The combination of negligible environmental impact and the fact that many 
Annex 1 parties are not on track to meet their targets may appear to give credence to 
critics’ arguments.  This situation, coupled with uncertainties about compliance costs, 
naturally increased the incentive to exploit available loopholes. The overview of 
COP-6 (Part II) and COP-7 showed how the rules concerning the counting of sinks 
(forestry) were (re-)defined. This leads some scholars to conclude that agreements 
like the Kyoto Protocol are essentially unenforceable, because some parties will 
always find and exploit loopholes, and enforcement with real teeth is a non-starter in 
an international system based on voluntary agreement.305  
Second, the sheer size of the annual COPs (drawing anywhere from 6,000-
10,000 people) and the number of interests groups represented (environmental 
NGOs, business NGOs of various stripes) lends them an overwhelming quality. The 
sheer number of issues and their complexity elevated the transaction costs of 
effective participation in the negotiations. Only large and well-resourced delegations 
can participate meaningfully as national actors. Recent COPs seem to show that 
these mega -meetings do not lend themselves to creative solutions among the key 
players in developed and developing countries. Third, while groups have always been 
                                                 
302 UN official proposes global summit on climate change to plan next steps, UN News Centre, 16 January 2007. 
The report states that: “The head of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) today proposed the convening of a global summit backed by the UN to plan a future 
course of action for tackling the cross-cutting problem.” 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=21244&Cr=climate&Cr1=change  
303 Stephen D. Krasner, Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variables 36(2) 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 185 (1982). 
304 David Victor, Fragmented carbon markets and reluctant nations: implications for the design of effective 
architectures, in ARCHITECTURES FOR AGREEMENT : ADDRESSING GLOBAL CLIMATE ON THE POST-
KYOTO WORLD 133 (Joseph E. Aldy & Robert N. Stavins, eds., 2007). 
305 Scott Barrett, A multitrack climate treaty system, in ARCHITECTURES FOR AGREEMENT: ADDRESSING 
GLOBAL CLIMATE ON THE POST-KYOTO WORLD, supra note 304, at 237. 
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a feature of the climate negotiations, negotiations are frequently caught in stylized 
and predictable group politics and positions. At times, well-placed single-issue 
“blockers” can effectively make use of groups to advance their interests, which are 
often antithetical to those of other members of the group.306 In addition, negotiating 
time and resources are at times consumed by controversies, such as the Russian 
Proposal for voluntary commitments for developing countries. 307  
Fourth, while the multilateral process has almost universal participation,308 
the reality is that a relatively small group of some 15 large emitters are responsible 
for over three-quarters of global emissions.309 By and large, they will also be 
responsible for much of the emissions growth in the coming decades. Theory 
suggests that a meaningful agreement among members of this group could have a 
major impact on global emissions. In practice, both initiatives that have tried 
something of this nature, the G8 plus 5 process and the US Administration’s Major 
Economies Meeting, do not appear to have gained much traction. (In fairness, at the 
time of writing in early 2008, it is too early to pass a conclusive judgment on then 
Major Economies Meeting initiative. All the same, the lesson seems to be that, for all 
its faults, the Convention process is imbued with a legitimacy not easily acquired by 
“start-ups”, especially where questions linger about the real motives.) Overall, if the 
Convention and Protocol multilateral negotiations do not deliver on the mandate 
agreed at Bali at the end of 2007, key parties may well consider that more is to be 
gained outside the existing process. 
At the time of writing in early 2008, there is a sense that confidence has been 
restored in the multilateral climate negotiations. Effective disengagement of the US 
from discussions on a future climate regime has been replaced with a willingness to 
negotiate, albeit on narrowly circumscribed grounds. The Bali Action Plan makes it 
plain that developing countries regard mitigation actions on their part as contingent 
on access to technology and financial support from industrialized countries. Thus far 
the climate regime has, despite promises embedded in the text of the Convention, 
delivered little in the way of credible incentives for developing countries.  
It is in the nature of negotiations for parties not to tip their hands and 
instead to wait for the “endgame”. Given the complicated nature of the climate 
change regime, and the widely diverging interests of parties, it may be optimistic to 
assume that one down-to-the-wire negotiation will resolve all the outstanding issues. 
Certainly, the widely appreciated need to begin implementing some adaptation and 
mitigation policies now, militates against a “Kyoto 2”, where years are spent fleshing 
out the rules, without initiating actual policy changes. There is increasing 
understanding that future commitments should establish a stable long-term 
framework, providing certainty for the carbon market and incentives for 
                                                 
306 For example the divergence in views on the urgency of mitigation measures between OPEC 
members and countries with membership in the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS).  
307 See supra text accompanying notes 240 to 269. 
308 As of the August 22, the Convention had 192 members. See List of Signatories & Ratification of 
the Convention, 
http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/status_of_ratification/items/2631.php.  As of 
December 12, 2007, the Protocol had 177 parties, including one regional integration organization (the 
EEC). See Status of Ratification, 
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/background/status_of_ratification/items/2613.php. 
309 WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, supra note 285. 
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technological innovation. A graduated phasing in of policies would ensure that 
economic costs are minimized, thereby avoiding the premature retirement of 
expensive infrastructure. Targets would be tightened over time 
Pressure is building in the US for domestic action on climate change. If 
regulation appears inevitable, some business interests will prefer federal policy to the 
uncertainty and higher transaction costs associated with a patchwork system of state 
regulation. Statements and actions in 2007 by US industry leaders indicate that they 
have concluded that domestic GHG regulation is inevitable. US domestic action is 
significant, because experience (e.g. ozone depleting substances under the Montreal 
Protocol) suggests that US international engagement/action is strongly correlated 
with commitment at the domestic level.  
The conclusion has drawn out a number of challenges facing the next phase 
of the climate regime. At this point, the direction and shape of that next phase 
remain to be determined. A later chapter examines and evaluates a selection of 
proposals in this regard. 
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Chapter 4 - Theoretical aspects of equity and fairness 
 
As you know, I oppose the Kyoto Protocol because it exempts 80 percent of the world, including 
major population centers such as China and India, from compliance, and would cause serious harm 
to the U.S. economy. The Senate's vote, 95-0, shows that there is a clear consensus that the Kyoto 
Protocol is an unfair and ineffective means of addressing global climate change concerns.1 
 
Those of us who live on small specks of land,…in the Caribbean, have not agreed to be sacrificial 
lambs on the altar of success of industrial civilization.2 
 
The economy is a wholly owned subsidiary of the environment, not the other way around.3 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Climate change is forcing difficult choices on decision-makers at national and 
international levels. In the face of competing demands and interests, countries are 
faced with committing significant resources in order to avoid consequences that, 
while beginning to be felt now, will only manifest themselves decades and in some 
case centuries from now. Decisions will need to be taken under conditions of 
considerable uncertainty as to the exact scope and timing of harm.  Moreover, the 
adverse impacts of climate change will be unevenly distributed, with the countries 
least responsible for the historical build-up of greenhouse gases (GHGs) bearing the 
brunt. Under such conditions values and principles carry added weight in decision-
making. Science provides information on the status of the climate system and 
projections of future changes. Economics attempts to present the costs and benefits 
of alternative courses of action. Yet observation of the global effort to combat 
climate change reveals that a key part of the discussion revolves around the 
contested concept of fairness. It is proposed that a juridical analysis of options to 
combat climate change can benefit from a critical engagement with the principle of 
fairness, as articulated in the discussions in the climate change regime.  
Fairness and equity claims and discourse are a major part of the climate 
change regime. The Framework Convention, which is the multilateral basis for action 
to combat climate change, itself assigns a prominent place to equity. Equity and 
fairness are deep-rooted concepts in human relations, and it is not surprising to find 
them invoked in a setting where decisions with far-reaching social, economic and 
environmental consequences are made. Therefore it is desirable to improve our 
understanding of the dimensions and application of equity and fairness concepts in 
the climate negotiations. Understanding equity and fairness in climate change is all 
the more important as negotiators, policy-makers, and advocates turn to consider 
deepening and broadening the climate change regime after the end of the first 
                                                 
1 President G.W. Bush, Text of letter to Senators Helms, Craig, Hagel, and Roberts, March 13, 2001, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/03/20010314.html  
2 Statement by Ambassador Lionel Hurst of Antigua and Barbuda, at the International Red Cross 
Conference on Climate Change and Natural Disasters, The Hague, June 28, 2002, quoted in, BENITO 
MUELLER, OXFORD INSTITUTE OF ENERGY STUDIES, EQUITY IN CLIMATE CHANGE: THE GREAT 
DIVIDE 45 (2002). 
3 GAYLORD NELSON, BEYOND EARTH DAY: FULFILLING THE PROMISE (2002). 
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commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol in 2012.4 As the science points out, the 
emission reductions that will result from the Protocol are a very modest first step in 
the face of the much more extensive (60-80 per cent) reductions that will be required 
in the coming decades. And equity and fairness will come to the fore even more, 
because the future stages of the international effort to combat climate change will see 
require some form of GHG controls for all countries, only the group of 
industrialized countries covered under the Kyoto Protocol. 
 
4.2 Why fairness? 
One straightforward reason for considering fairness and equity is that the 
language of the Framework Convention demands it. The Convention enjoins Parties 
“…to protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of 
humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.”5 Another principle states 
that the special needs and circumstances of those countries particularly vulnerable to 
the adverse impacts of climate change should be given full consideration.6 It also 
states that in taking action in circumstances of scientific uncertainty, account should 
be taken of the need to ensure that measures and policies are cost-effective and 
achieve global benefits at the lowest possible cost.7 The guiding principles of the 
Convention refer explicitly to an equitable and fair approach to the protection of the 
climate system, with a circumscribed mention of cost-effectiveness and none relating 
to efficiency. A plain reading of the Convention’s guiding principles, which are quite 
evenly balanced, points the reader in the direction of equity and fairness principles 
for burden-sharing. Taking the language of the Convention seriously gives meaning 
and purpose to an effort to explore and de-limit the meaning of equity and fairness 
in the climate change context. Since equity is not defined in the Convention it makes 
sense have recourse to background moral or ethical notions of fairness, as would the 
case in a domestic legal system when giving substance to concepts such as “equality” 
and “due process”.8 
A substantial body of scholarship and policy advocacy has developed that 
discusses equity and fairness in the climate change context.9 References to fairness 
                                                 
4 Joseph E. Aldy et al, Addressing Costs: The Political Economy of Climate Change, in BEYOND KYOTO: 
ADVANCING THE INTERNATIONAL EFFORT AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE, PEW CENTER ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE (2003). 
5 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, adopted on May 9, 1992, art. 3(1), 1771 
U.N.T.S 164 Article 3(1) [hereinafter UNFCCC]. 
6 UNFCCC, art. 3(2). 
7 UNFCCC, art. 3(3).  
8 Roger Shiner, Law and Morality, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 
436, 438 (Dennis Patterson , ed., 1996). 
9 ANIL AGARWAL & SUNITA NARAIN, CENTRE FOR SCIENCE AND ENVIRONMENT, GLOBAL 
WARMING IN AN UNEQUAL WORLD: A CASE OF ENVIRONMENTAL COLONIALISM (1991); Henry 
Shue, The Unavoidability of Justice, in THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT: ACTORS, 
INTERESTS, AND INSTITUTIONS (Andrew Hurrell & Benedict Kingsbury, eds., 1992); Henry Shue, 
Subsistence Emissions and Luxury Emissions, 15 LAW & POLICY 40 (1993); Henry Shue, After You: May 
Action by the Rich Be Contingent upon action by the Poor? 1 INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 
343 (1994); Adam Rose, Equity Considerations of Tradeable Carbon Emission Entitlements, in COMBATING 
GLOBAL WARMING: STUDY ON A GLOBAL SYSTEM OF TRADEABLE CARBON EMISSION 
ENTITLEMENTS 55 (UNCTAD, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/RDP/DFP/1, 1992); Michael Grubb, Seeking 
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and equity also abound in intergovernmental forums dealing with climate change. 
The two quotations above–taken from opposite sides of the climate change divide, 
one from the world’s largest emitter of GHGs, the other from a small island state 
with negligible emissions–illustrate how fairness is implicitly or explicitly invoked. 
From one perspective fairness requires that in addressing a problem all major 
contributors should play their part, regardless of their historical contribution to the 
problem. The other view sees a group of countries as the victims of another group of 
countries’ unwillingness to take responsibility for the consequence of their actions. 
The first statement raises the issue of costs (“would cause serious harm to the U.S. 
economy”), but it is evident that cost per se is not the crux of the objection – even if 
the named developing countries participated in the mitigation effort, the U.S. would 
still have to incur potentially substantial costs. Presumably, therefore, some 
arrangement that did not entirely “exempt” some countries would be perceived as 
fair. Burden-sharing is thus the issue. Opposite sides in the debate evidently believe 
that they derive advantage by articulating their position in terms of fairness. Unless 
one believes that statements such as those above mean nothing at all, it is worthwhile 
examining the language countries use and the context in which they do so.  
Another strong reason for analyzing fairness is that parties are more likely to 
adhere to, and faithfully implement, an agreement that is considered fair and 
equitable. This is a straightforward notion, clearly applicable in the conduct between 
persons, and scholars have argued that it also applies to agreements between States.10  
Global environmental problems bring to the fore the need to arrive at some 
degree of consensus about the meaning of fairness. A primary reason is that, unlike 
in other cases such as international trade, developed countries cannot rely on their 
unequal power and influence to essentially impose a solution, but rather require the 
voluntary cooperation of the poor countries. This opens the possibility for 
developed countries to deal on fair and equitable terms with developing countries, 
taking into account the imperative of poor countries to pursue economic and social 
development, while at the same time maintaining the stability of the climate system.11 
                                                                                                                                     
Fair Weather: Ethics and the International Debate on Climate Change 71 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 463-96 
(1995); Tariq Banuri et al, Equity and Social Considerations, in CLIMATE CHANGE 1995: ECONOMIC AND 
SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP III TO THE 
SECOND ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE,  83–
124 ( James P. Bruce et al eds., 1996); Mathew Paterson, International Justice and Global Warming, in THE 
ETHICAL DIMENSIONS OF GLOBAL CHANGE (Barry Holden, ed., 1996); Matthew Paterson, Principles of 
Justice in the Context of Global Climate Change, in INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND GLOBAL CLIMATE 
CHANGE 119 (Urs Luterbacher & Detlef F. Sprinz, eds., 2001); GLOBAL COMMONS INSTITUTE, 
CONTRACTION AND CONVERGENCE: A GLOBAL SOLUTION TO A GLOBAL PROBLEM (1997); Adam 
Rose et al, International Equity and Differentiation in Global Warming Policy: An Application to Tradeable 
Emission Permits 12(1) ENVIRONMENTAL AND RESOURCE ECONOMICS 25 (1998);  FAIR WEATHER? 
EQUITY CONCERNS IN CLIMATE CHANGE 193 (Ferenc L. Tóth, ed., 1999), which contains 
contributions from the fields of economics, social science, and law; MARINA CAZORLA & MICHAEL 
TOMAN, INTERNATIONAL EQUITY AND CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY (Resources for the Future, 
Climate Issue Brief No. 27, December 2000). 
10 THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1995). 
11 Henry Shue, Global Environment and International Inequality 75(3) INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 531 
(1999). 
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4.3 International political context of fairness 
This section examines how fairness is reflected in the political process of the 
climate change regime. Overall, it may be that in international environmental 
negotiations developing countries have more often cast their arguments in terms of 
justice and fairness.12 There are several possible reasons for this. First, arguments 
framed in terms of fairness or justice appear more binding and forceful than those 
appealing to charity.13 Second, arguments appealing to moral and, if applicable legal, 
obligations have a universal character. A violation of a right to refrain from conduct 
that injures another, or responsibility to provide compensation for consequent 
damages, applies objectively to all who fall within the scope of the rule or principle. 
For example, while a policy arguments relating to economic efficiency in combating 
climate change may not have much to offer for a representative of Antigua and 
Barbuda, claiming the violation of a right by those responsible for GHG emissions 
has more traction.  
Developing countries tend to view climate change in the context of their 
economic and social development.14 Imposing limits on their growth is regarded as 
unfair, given that they have not yet attained the level of development of 
industrialized countries. While not ruling out “cleaner” forms of development, they 
do not wish to bear any additional cost, particularly when the developed countries 
achieved their status with few if any environmental constraints.15 Developing 
countries do not want to be held responsible for remedying a problem not of their 
making. Accordingly, they emphasize industrialized countries’ dominant share of 
cumulative carbon dioxide emissions (76 per cent), and the fact their emissions 
account for less than half of current emissions.16 By some estimates the developing 
country carbon dioxide emissions will exceed those of industrialized countries by 
2012.17 It also bears recalling, however, that some 140 countries, including small 
islands and least developed countries, are responsible for only 10 per cent of annual 
emissions.18 Developing countries also point out the difference in per capita 
emissions: some industrialized countries (Australia, Canada, United States) have per 
capita emissions more than six times those of China, and 13 times those of India.19  
The argument from historical responsibility has obvious attractions in the 
international climate change discourse. At face value, basic notions of fairness seem 
                                                 
12 Mark A. Drumbl, Poverty, Wealth, and Obligation in International Law, 76 TULANE LAW REVIEW 843, 
898 (2002). 
13 Drumbl, supra note 12, at 897 citing ANDREW DOBSON, JUSTICE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: 
CONCEPTIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY AND THEORIES OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 95 
(1995). 
14 MUELLER, supra note 2, at 45. The following draws on the points made by Mueller. 
15 See Delhi Ministerial Declaration on Climate Change and Sustainable Development, decision 
1/CP.8 U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2002/7/Add.1. (“Reaffirming that economic and social development 
and poverty eradication are the first and overriding priorities of developing country Parties”, 
preambular para. 3; Recognizing that climate change could endanger future well-being, ecosystems 
and economic progress in all regions, preambular para. 6.) 
16 WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, NAVIGATING THE NUMBERS 32 (2005). 
17 INT. ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2006 81 (2006). 
18 WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, supra note 16, at 11. 
19 WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, supra note 16, at 21. 
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to suggest that the main contributors to a problem should the ones carrying out 
abatement.20 In this context, Brazil in 1997 put forward a proposal that would assign 
relative responsibilities to individual industrialized countries in accordance with their 
respective contributions to climate change, as measured by the induced change in 
temperature, based on historical emissions.21 According to recent research the 
average contributions to the global mean surface temperature increase in 2000 are 
around 40 per cent from OECD group of industrialized countries, 14 per cent from 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, 24 per cent from Asia, and 22 per cent 
from Africa and Latin America.22  
Arriving at accurate numbers for historical emissions is complicated by lack 
of available data, particularly for emissions from non-fuel sources, in particular land-
use change and deforestation, as well non-CO2 gases. The inclusion of emissions 
from deforestation can in some some cases–notably Brazil and Indonesia–
significantly increase countries’ estimated historical share of cumulative emissions. 
The historical share of emissions is also sensitive to the selection of the time periods 
considered. Thus, analyzing the relative shares of industrialized and developing 
countries will yield markedly different results depending on whether the period of 
analysis ends, for instance, in 1990–at the beginning of rapid economic growth in 
major developing countries–or 2005. Based on the premise that each generation has 
an entitlement to an equal share of the atmosphere, it could be argued that some 
countries owe current and future generations in developing countries a “climate 
debt”. Attempts have been made to quantify this debt.23 
An important dimension of the fairness in the international political context 
relates to adaptation to the adverse impacts of climate change. Adaptation is 
increasingly being regarded as a twin priority with mitigation. Practically, this stems 
from the realization that the current concentration of GHGs already commits the 
planet to further warming, even if emissions were frozen at current levels.24 (This is 
                                                 
20 A country’s historical emissions can be presented in at least three ways: on the basis of simple 
cumulative emissions, contribution to current concentrations of greenhouse gases, or the contribution 
to increase in global average temperature. See WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, supra note 16, at 32 for 
a succinct explanation. The cumulative approach simply counts all emissions since a particular start 
date. In assessing a country’s contributions to atmospheric concentrations, the second approach takes 
into account the decay of GHGs over time to give a country’s share of emissions presently in the 
atmosphere. 
21 U.N. Doc. FCCC /AGBM/1997/MISC.1/Add.3, 3. Although not adopted, the Brazilian remains 
on the agenda of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention whose Subsidiary Body for 
Technological and Scientific Advice (SBSTA) has sponsored continued research into contributions to 
climate change. See U.N. Doc. FCCC/SBSTA/2002/INF.14 for a summary of the research efforts 
carried out by various institutions, while up-to-date information is available at http://www.match -
info.net/  
22 Michel den Elzen et al, Analysing countries’ contributions to climate change: scientific and policy-related choices, 8 
(6) ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE & POLICY, 614 (2005). 
23 V. Bhaskar, Distributive justice and the control of global warming, in THE NORTH THE SOUTH AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT: ECOLOGICAL CONSTRAINTS AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 115-116 (V. Bhaskar & 
Andrew Glyn, eds., 1995); K. Smith, Allocating responsibility for global warming: The natural debt index, 20 
AMBIO 95-96 (1991). 
24 IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING 
GROUP I TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE 23 (Susan Solomon et al eds., 2007). 
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primarily due to the thermal inertia of the oceans, which have absorbed vast amounts 
of heat, which will be slowly released into the atmosphere.) Given their 
vulnerabilities – a combination of geographical location, reliance on sectors 
vulnerable to climate shocks (agriculture) and low level of technology and capital 
accumulation – developing countries are much less able to cope with the impacts of 
climate change and climate variability. A drought in the US may harm the prospects 
of farmers (many of whom will be cushioned by insurance) but loss of life is unlikely. 
For a country in a persistently drought-wracked region, such as Niger, where 
subsistence agriculture supports a large proportion of the population, the situation is 
quite different. A recent World Bank study concludes that progress in fighting 
poverty is under threat from increasingly severe weather events and climate 
variability.25 The report goes on to note that 20 to 40 per cent of official 
development assistance (ODA) and public concessional finance (i.e. US$20 – US$40 
billion per year) is subject to climate risk, and that very little ODA takes this risk into 
account.26  There is a risk that climate change could impede the achievement of the 
United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), including those on 
poverty eradication, child mortality, combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and other 
diseases, and environmental sustainability.27 
Industrialized countries, particularly those of Europe, approach climate 
change from the perspective of correcting or managing an environmental imbalance. 
A change of lifestyle may be necessary, but by and large the adverse impacts of 
climate change will be less severe than in the sub-tropical countries, and the capacity 
to adapt is more developed than in poor countries.28 It is suggested that framing the 
problem on these terms is contributes the climate regime’s focus on mitigating GHG 
emissions, epitomized in the emission limitations and reductions required by the 
Kyoto Protocol. Adaptation to the adverse effects of climate change – sea-level rise, 
potentially greater frequency and intensity of extreme weather events, and the spread 
of insect-borne diseases – has only comparatively recently assumed importance.29 
Even so, funding for adaptation falls well short of what is needed, while progress on 
the issue in the climate talks was bogged down for a number of years.30 From an 
environmental management perspective, informed by the scientific evidence of 
GHG and public concern, the primacy of mitigation on the agenda of the 
international climate change regime made sense. The Convention addresses issues of 
                                                 
25 VICE PRESIDENCY FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, THE WORLD BANK, AN INVESTMENT 
FRAMEWORK FOR CLEAN ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT: A PROGRESS REPORT (2006). 
26 Id. at 38. 
27 THE WORLD BANK GROUP, MANAGING CLIMATE RISK: INTEGRATING ADAPTATION INTO 
WORLD BANK GROUP OPERATIONS 5 (2006). The Millennium Development Goals and related 
documents are available at http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/ . 
28 But cf. the 2004 heat wave in Europe which was responsible for some 30,000 deaths. Again, 
remedial measures, such as air conditioning and improved preparedness, can be taken relatively easily. 
Compare this with the impact of drought on countries in the Sahel or populations in low-lying areas 
such as Bangladesh or the Nile Delta. 
29 While the UNFCCC did deal with the question of funding for adaptation at the first Conference of 
the Parties in 1995 (decision 11/CP.1), it was only with the adoption of the Marrakesh Accords in 
2001 that adaptation was addressed as a key area of action.  
30 See slow progress on articulating the Buenos Aires Programme of Action on Adaptation, adopted at 
10th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP-10) in 2004. 
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equity and solidarity, providing that vulnerable countries, particularly small island 
developing states and least developed countries (LDCs), should be assisted in 
adapting to the adverse effects of climate change.31 From the perspective of 
developing countries the promise of these provisions has not been fulfilled.32  
Some countries are more vulnerable and less able to take adaptive measures 
than others. The United Nations currently classifies fifty countries as least-developed 
countries (LDCs). These countries are generally those lowest on the development 
rung – one criteria is an annual per capita gross national income (GNI) of less than 
US$750.33 The individual and total GHG emissions of this group of countries are 
almost negligible. Due to their vulnerability to climate impacts, over the long term 
LDCs stand to gain from stringent emission limitations by major emitters. In the 
short- to medium term, however, they have less to gain from a climate change 
agenda dominated by mitigation concerns, including haggling among industrialized 
and emerging countries over the allocation of emission reductions. For small island 
states, the issue is even more pressing, and they have been the most vocal in calling 
for strict emission limitations. Their equity claims are directly founded on the 
existential threat posed by climate change. 
 
4.3.1 The role of interests 
An examination of the role fairness and equity must also acknowledge the 
role of interests in negotiations and formation of agreements. A discussion of equity 
and fairness needs to bear the importance of national interest in the positions taken 
by states in the climate arena. Even if cogent grounds of equity and fairness support 
a given outcome, few countries would accept it if it goes against the national interest, 
for instance by imposing economic costs on important domestic constituencies 
without tangible (political) benefits. In negotiations and the articulation of policy 
positions, the parties will naturally attempt to cast their position in the most 
favorable and persuasive light. Sometimes references to equity may therefore simply 
be disguised arguments concerning interests.  
Realists focus on the primacy of interests in determining the conduct of 
states.34 In analyzing a possible treaty outcome, a realist analysis might focus on the 
willingness to pay of the various actors, rather than conceptions of equity or 
fairness.35 Realism developed as a reaction against Wilsonian liberal internationalism, 
and the “political realists” of the period after World War II articulated a theory of 
                                                 
31 See Convention, art. 4(8)-(9). 
32 As further detailed in chapter 5, several funds have been established to address the adaptation and 
technology needs of developing countries. The Least Developed Country Fund and the Special 
Climate Change Fund, both of which are voluntary funds, have supported studies, capacity building 
and planning, but actual adaptation projects. The Adaptation Fund, which was finally operationalized 
in 2007, should have greater resources at its disposal.. 
33 The other two criteria related to human resource weakness and economic vulnerability. See 
explanation on the website of the UN Representative for Least Developed Countries, Landlocked 
Countries  and Small Island Developing States: http://www.un.org/special-
rep/ohrlls/ldc/ldc%20criteria.htm  
34 See, for the classic exposition, HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE 
STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE (4th ed. 1967). 
35 See David Victor, The Regulation of Greenhouse Gases: Does Fairness Matter?, in FAIR WEATHER? EQUITY 
CONCERNS IN CLIMATE CHANGE, 193 (Ferenc L. Tóth, ed., 1999). 
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relations between states based on their respective national interests.36 Politics was 
struggle for power with no place for law as a constraining force.37 Over time the 
political realism of the post-war period was redefined into what came to be known as 
neo-realism.38 A full description of neo-realism is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
However, it holds as a key tenet that the basic “laws” of the international system 
flow from the relative distribution of capabilities (power) across the system.39 Under 
neo-realism’s structural conception of international politics there is almost no role 
for international law. A basic assumption of realism is that states are rational actors, 
which, against the background of an anarchic international system, seek to further 
their interests with ultimately little regard for international law. Realists are skeptical 
of the idea that states can cooperate in international institutions to advance their 
common interests.  
The second broad school of international relations is neo-liberal 
institutionalism or regime theory.40 This school places less emphasis on power 
differentials between states, drawing attention instead to the role of international 
regimes and institutions in assisting states to realize their common interests. Neo-
liberal institutionalism shares realism’s commitment to a theory of rational, self-
interested actors, but it argues that regimes and institutions help states coordinate 
their behavior and achieve mutually beneficial outcomes.41 The standard definition of 
regimes is from Krasner: “Regimes are sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, 
rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge 
in a given area of international relations.”42 The neo-liberal institutionalist approach, 
in recognizing of the role that regimes and institutions can play in empowering 
states, rather than acting as constraints, is at least conceives a facilitative role for 
international law.43 
                                                 
36 See MORGENTHAU, supra note 34;  GEORGE KENNAN, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1900-1950 (1951) 
37 Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 
AM. J. INT’L L 205, 207-209 (1993). 
38 See Slaughter Burley, supra note 37, at 214-217. The architect of this development in international 
relations theory was Kenneth Waltz and the classic exposition of his “systemic” theory is KENNETH 
N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1979). According to Waltz it is structural factors, 
particularly the relative distribution of power in the international system, that determine world 
politics. He differs from political realism in that power is regarded not as an end, but as a means to 
secure survival or security.  
39 KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 66 (1979).  
40 A key text is ROBERT KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE 
WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY (1984). 
41 ANDREAS HASENCLEVER ET AL THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 23-24 (1997) 
42 Stephen D. Krasner  Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables 36(2) 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 185 (1982). International institutions are regarded as having a 
potentially positive effect on compliance with the rules, because they expand or shrink the options 
available to rational state actors, which are constantly attempting to maximise their respective self-
interest. It is important to note that in general neo-liberal institutionalism assumes, in common with 
realism, that states interests tend to be fairly stable over time and that interests shape interaction or 
cooperation and not vice versa. See also HASENCLEVER ET AL, supra note 41 at 23-24. 
43 Slaughter Burley, supra note 37, at 219-220. She concludes that institutionalism has led to a 
convergence between international relations and international law, with the former arriving at a new 
appreciation of the latter. 
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An analysis based on a hard-nosed calculation of interests may appear more 
rigorous and useful than engagement with the more amorphous concepts of equity 
and fairness. It is, however, worth considering realism in more detail. First, in 
complex climate negotiations actually determining the national interest on a particular 
issue is far less obvious than a casual consideration of realism suggests. Does the 
national interest lie in minimizing short-term costs, at the risk of a flawed outcome, 
leading to the probability of more severe climate impacts in the future? At a time 
when climate change is seen as potentially contributing to population migrations and 
conflicts over natural resources, there may be some degree of convergence with 
traditional national security interests. In sum, one can rightly question whether the 
national interest is readily definable and not highly dependent on context. Second, 
the interests of a state, and its willingness to pay for outcomes, are hardly monolithic 
– positions can and do change over time. If the interests of states are neither 
monolithic nor static, then how exactly do they change and why? It is suggested that 
there exists a dynamic interplay between interests and concepts such as fairness and 
equity. Confronted by the strongly held views of allies concerning the fairness and 
equity of a certain issue, a state may decide it is in its interests after all to concede the 
point (and bear the cost). While realist analysis appears to provide a sharp, rigorous 
counterpoint to the fuzzier normative analysis that is advocated here, realism 
generally takes interests (or willingness to pay) as given and cannot account 
adequately for their formation and change over time. In short, it is suggested that in 
understanding climate change policy realist interests-based approaches and 
normative investigations of equity and fairness both have a place. 
 
4.4 Philosophical roots 
This section briefly considers the main philosophical underpinning of equity 
and fairness. The intention is to provide a compact analysis shedding light on key 
aspects of these concepts.  
According to Hart, fairness is primarily of relevance in two situations – in the 
distribution of a burden or benefit among a class of persons and where 
compensation or redress is claimed for an injury or wrong. 44 The idea of fairness is 
captured in the injunction to “treat like cases alike”. Equity is closely linked to 
fairness and is often used synonymously.45 Thus it has been observed that in 
common usage equity means “the quality of being fair or impartial” or something 
that is fair and just”.46 In a famous passage, Aristotle, who provided an early 
distinction between distributive and corrective justice, describes equity as mitigating 
the excesses implied by law’s absoluteness.47 For him its essence is to be found in the 
adaptation of the law to the concrete case.  In this view equity serves as a corrective 
to the harshness or injustice that may result from the inflexible application of a rule. 
                                                 
44 HLA HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 154 (1961). 
45 Henry Shue, Global Environment and International Inequality 75(3) INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 531 
(1999), (“What diplomats and lawyers call equity incorporates important aspects of what ordinary 
people everywhere call fairness.”). 
46 Banuri et al, supra note 9, at 85. 
47 ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS Book 5, Ch. 10 (W.D. Ross trans., Clarendon Press 1908, 
digital text, http://www.ilt.columbia.edu/publications/artistotle.html).  
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This sense is reflected in expressions such as “equitable principles”. Equity prevents 
or ameliorates injustice – it promotes fairness. 
Issues of fairness generally relate to at least one of two dimensions: either 
fairness of general background conditions or fairness specific to the problem at 
hand.48 The former leads to the question: Under what conditions are sufficient for 
the parties to be considered in a position to bargain for a “fair” outcome? If the 
parties in grossly unequal positions this undercuts the legitimacy of the process and 
the eventual outcome. For instance, it could be argued that relations between states 
are not structured in a neutral fashion, and there does exist a “global basic structure” 
of economic and political rules and relationships, which has distributional effects on 
states inter se, as well as on individuals within states.49 Some would argue that this 
structure is revealed in the unequal relations between states, with key aspects of the 
international system “skewed” in favor of affluent and powerful states.50 In general, 
the approach to fairness adopted here will focus on the narrower question of 
principles guiding allocation of responsibility for combating climate change, rather 
than analyzing the deeper inequalities of the international system. Nonetheless, in 
pursuing the former, it is necessary to bear in mind the implications of broader 
context in which parties make fairness claims.  
The next section briefly examines two broad - and opposing – approaches to 
justice, which are relevant to understanding the character of fairness claims in the 
climate change context. Thereafter the analysis considers specific instances of 
fairness – procedural and distributive. It is determined that distributive fairness is 
applicable to the question of allocating responsibility for combating climate change 
and specific fairness and equity principles are analyzed in greater detail. The 
remainder of the section considers the intersection between economic analysis of 
climate change and fairness claims and presents selected examples of equity and 
fairness in international environmental law. 
 
4.4.1 Utilitarianism 
At its most basic utilitarianism holds that the morally right act or policy is the 
one that leads to the greatest happiness or utility for members of society.51 Thus the 
attraction of utilitarianism is that it evaluates the merits of an action not according to 
an abstract standard of right or wrong – religious text or other system of morals – 
but in terms of its consequences.52 It stands in contrast to moral theories based on 
rules or rights, which require the conformity with the relevant standards, without 
giving primacy to consequences.53 Variants of utilitarianism are widespread, and 
utilitarian thinking is an aspect of everyday common sense reasoning.  
                                                 
48 Henry Shue, Environmental Change and Varieties of Justice , in EARTHLY GOODS: ENVIRONMENTAL 
CHANGE AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 9, 13 (Fen Osler Hampson & Judith Reppy, eds., 1996). 
49 Allen Buchanan, Rawls’s Law of Peoples: Rules for a Vanished Westphalian World, 110 (4) ETHICS 697 
705-706 (2000); John Tasioulas, International Law and the Limits of Fairness, 13 EUR. J. INT. L. 993, 1009 
(2003). 
50 Tasioulas, supra note 49, at 1006, quoting Thomas Pogge, Priorities of Global Justice, 32 
METAPHILOSOPHY 9, 16-17 (2001). 
51 WILL KYMLICKA, CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: AN INTRODUCTION 10 (2002). 
52 Id. at 11. 
53 Moral theories based on rules are generally known as deontological theories. 
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Because of the way utilitarianism calculates overall utility – by adding individual 
preferences – it has been criticized for not accommodating the notion of just or fair 
shares.54 For example, if in a community where all possess an equal (fair) share of 
land, the majority nonetheless prefer to use part of my land as a public park, that 
would be an acceptable outcome under utilitarianism, because it maximizes the utility 
of the community.55 Policies based on utilitarianism are tend thus not to be sensitive 
to the distribution of burdens and benefits across individuals or countries. 
With respect to the climate change, we see utilitarianism underpinning 
debates on the costs and benefits of various proposals to combat global warming. 
Utilitarian thinking is reflected in economic and policy analysis, an idea that is further 
explored below. Other aspects of the climate change issue, however, appeal not to 
utilitarianism but to its opposite, namely moral theories based on rules and rights. 
Thus inhabitants of small, low-lying island nations appeal for the equal consideration 
of their claim to continue their way of life; conservationists argue for the protection 
of species and eco-systems independent of their economic value; and right of future 
generations to enjoy the Earth in a comparable state as present generations.56 Like 
the example above, such appeals generally fall on barren ground under utilitarian 
theories of justice. 
 
4.4.2 Rule-based theories of justice 
Although it may be easy to see the importance of fairness – whether at the 
level of inter-personal relationships or in the conduct of States – it is difficult to 
agree on a common, accepted understanding of what fairness means in practice. 
Society is simply too pluralistic for a settled consensus to exist with regards to 
fairness or similar contested concepts. Because of the difficulty in defining fairness 
from first principles, theories of fairness or justice have therefore shifted towards 
process-based models. Thus one enormously influential theory of justice has been 
that of John Rawls, who famously posited a “veil of ignorance”, so that people 
would not know what place they would occupy in society. Ignorant of their race, sex, 
class, health, economic status and so forth, what kind of framework would they 
choose for their society?57 According to Rawls they would select two basic principles 
of justice.  They are the following: 1. Every individual in a just society has an equal 
right to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties consistent with a similar 
scheme for everyone. Social and economic inequalities must satisfy two conditions: 
first, such inequalities must be attached to offices and positions open to all under 
conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they must be to the greatest 
benefit of the least advantaged members of society.58  
                                                 
54 KYMLICKA, supra note 51, at 41-45. For defenses of utilitarianism, see DAVID LYONS, FORMS AND 
LIMITS OF UTILITARIANISM (1965) and R.M. HARE MORAL THINKING (1981). For an attempt to 
apply utilitarianism to a range of global problems, including climate change, see PETER SINGER, ONE 
WORLD: THE ETHICS OF GLOBALIZATION (2002). 
55 KYMLICKA, supra note 51, at 41. 
56 EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS (1989). 
57 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). 
58 Maimon Schwarzschild, Constitutional Law and Equality, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 
AND LEGAL THEORY 156, 165 (1999, Dennis Patterson, ed.). 
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Rawls’s theory has been adapted and applied at the international level by 
Thomas Franck in Fairness in International Law and Institutions.59 Franck asserts that 
international law has entered a “post-ontological” age – it has entered an era in 
which it is no longer necessary to defend the status of international law as law, but 
where a vital task is to analyze its fairness.60 According to Franck fairness consists of 
two elements: “right process” or procedural fairness, and substantive fairness, or the 
fairness of outcomes.61 We have an intuitive understanding for what constitutes right 
process, which is the rules of the game, as reflected in concepts familiar to lawyers, 
such as the principles of natural justice.62 Franck ties right process to legitimacy – 
decisions or allocations are legitimate where they are the outcome of a fair process.63 
When it is said that a rule or its application is legitimate, this implies that the rule was 
made or applied in accordance with right process, and that as a consequence it is 
deserving of voluntary compliance.64 Franck goes on to state that “any analysis of 
fairness must include consideration of the consequential effects of a law: its 
distributive justice.”65 In theory and in practice it is the second aspect of fairness that 
proves particularly nettlesome, for how are we to settle on a common understanding 
of what is fair or just? Like the belief that a law is legitimate, the belief that it is 
distributively fair will promote voluntary compliance, “primarily because most people 
think it is right to act justly.”66  
Franck regards the “growing awareness of irrefutable interdependence” and 
its effects as mounting evidence of the emergence of global community, or as we 
                                                 
59 See Harold Koh, Review Essay: Why Do Nations Obey International Law?  106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997) 
(reviewing: The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements,  Abram 
Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes; Thomas M. Franck, Fairness in International Law and 
Institutions  1995); Phillip R. Trimble, Globalization, International Institutions, and the Erosion of National 
Sovereignty and Democracy, 95 M ICH. L. REV. 1944 (1996-1997), (Review of Thomas M. Franck, Fairness 
in International Law and Institutions 1995); Gerry J. Simpson, Is International Law Fair? 17 MICH. J. 
INT. L  615 (1996-1997) (review essay); Symposium on Thomas M. Franck’s Fairness in International Law and 
Institutions, 13 (4) EUR. J. INT L. 901-1030 (2002); Christopher Ward, Book Review, 48 INT. & COMP. 
L.Q. 237 (1999); Elisabeth Zoller, Book Review, 36 VA. J. INT. L. 1079 (1996). 
60 THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1995), 6 [hereinafter 
Fairness]. 
61 Fairness, supra note 60, at 7. The two elements of fairness are independent, in that a law viewed as 
substantively “unjust” can be applied in a procedurally fair manner – one n eed only think of ruling of 
the US Supreme Court on the “separate but equal” question in Plessy v. Ferguson 163 US 537 (1896). A 
well-known work taking the procedural element further to develop a procedural morality of law is 
LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964). Cf . criticism by Hart and others that an unjust law 
could meet the requirements of Fuller’s “inner morality”. In the same way, a rule that is considered 
just could be adopted or applied in a manner that violates the tenets of right process. Tension may 
arise between the two aspects of fairness because the one – substantive justice – privileges change, 
while the other – right process – tends towards stability and order 
62 Two principal rules of natural justice are expressed in the following Latin phrases:  audi alteram 
partem (“hear the other side”) and nemo judex in sua causa  (“no person can judge a case in which he or 
she is a party”). 
63 See THOMAS FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990). 
64 Fairness, supra note 60, at 26. 
65 Id. at 8. 
66 Id. (emphasis in original). 
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might term it the international community.67 Having set the stage, Franck turns to 
the question of common values or conceptions of justice in the international 
community. While a range of allocation formulas can be applied, such as “to each 
according to capacity” or “to each according to just desserts”, arriving at a shared 
perception of fairness is much more difficult.68 He concludes that there is no one 
conception of fairness, but rather that fairness “is a product of social context and 
history” that “captures in one word a process of discourse, reasoning and negotiation”.69 He 
this aligns himself with liberal thinking on justice, more particularly the very 
influential work of John Rawls.70 In order for the fairness discourse, Franck 
postulates two minimum assumptions that serve as prerequisites for participation in 
the discourse.71  
Since Franck has consciously adopted for an approach drawn from the liberal 
tradition, his conception of fairness attracts some familiar criticisms. Developed and 
developing countries disagree radically about the responsibility for climate change 
and the allocation of burdens to combat it. Against this backdrop, some have 
questioned whether Franck’s fairness discourse amounts to foisting one particular 
conception of fairness on the international community.72  Another criticism of 
Franck’s approach is that fairness is too narrow to serve as a standard for an ethical 
evaluation of international law.73 Values other than legitimacy and distributive justice 
that play a role in the international system, such as peace, compassion (exemplified in 
humanitarian law) prosperity, and species survival risk being excluded.74 The 
emphasis on distributive justice could result in the neglect of retributive and 
corrective justice, which are both strands firmly entwined in the discourse of justice 
                                                 
67 However, he states that global community should not be seen as an alternative to the state, which 
remains the basis unit, and he does not advocate abandoning the concept of state sovereignty. Id. at 
12-13. 
68 Id. at 13. 
69 Id. at 14 (emphasis in original). 
70 See RAWLS, supra note 57 and POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993). 
71 Fairness, supra note 60, at 18. Franck puts forward two such “gatekeepers”: the first is the “no 
trumping rule” and the second is the “maximin principle”. The former holds that no participant may 
raise a principle - whether religious, philosophical or ideological – that is non-negotiable. Instead, 
everything must be subject to discussion. The maximin principle holds that “unequal distribution is 
justifiable only if it narrows, or does not widen, the existing inequality of persons’ and/or states’ 
entitlements”. Franck provides the following example: A scheme that allocates $100 to every person 
who already has $100 but only $50 to persons with $10 proportionately narrows the gap between 
them and is therefore not axiomatically excluded from fairness discourse.  
72 This could be termed the “ethnocentric “ critique. See Tasioulas, supra note 49, at 994 (2003); 
Trimble, supra note 59, at 1952-1954. Because Franck relies on a process-based approach, buttressed 
by his two gatekeeper principles, this in theory should allay some of the fears regarding 
ethnocentrism. However, on closer examination his no trumping principle would effectively exclude 
parties holding strong core beliefs. These points parallel those who criticize liberal approaches to 
diversity and multi-culturalism for misunderstanding the nature of a deeply held worldviews or 
religious faith. 
73 Tasioulas, supra note 49, at 1000. He provides a more closely argued criticism of the primacy Franck 
assigns to the maximin principle, pointing out that in Rawls’ account it is subordinate to a first 
principle of the equal right to liberty.  
74 Id. at 1001. 
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in the international community.75 Lastly, Franck’s adoption of distributive justice as 
the primary value against which to evaluate environmental law supposedly 
“implicates him in an anthropocentric perspective that regards the natural world as 
simply made up of so many ‘resources’ that are to be apportioned among humans in 
order to realize their interests.”76 
Franck adopts and adapts concepts from legal theory and political 
philosophy and applies them to the international community. It is an open question 
whether these theories can validly be applied at the inter-state level.77 Franck’s 
conception of fairness draws heavily on the work of John Rawls, who himself saw 
his original work as applying only within a liberal democratic society, not between 
States.78  
The next section turns briefly to procedural justice before presenting a 
detailed analysis of distributive fairness in the context of climate change. 
 
4.5 Procedural fairness 
As noted earlier, fairness considerations can be applied to the general 
background conditions, that is the conditions under which distributions are made, as 
well as the fairness of the allocation itself. The former aspect concerns “procedural” 
fairness, and encompasses rules on participation, the exclusion of coercive tactics, 
and the general ability of parties to bargain on roughly equal terms. Basic and formal 
elements of procedural fairness flow from the sovereign equality of states, so that 
countries are entitled to participate equally in the intergovernmental negotiations. As 
                                                 
75 The former is reflected in the tribunals established for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia and the 
International Criminal Court, while the latter finds expression in the calls for assistance in adapting to 
the effects of climate change. 
76 Tasioulas, supra note 49, at 1002. 
77 The existence of a real and meaningful “global community” is open to question, or at the very least 
it is a nascent and fragile community. For an analysis of the notion of community in Franck’s 
FAIRNESS see, Dino Kritsiotis, Imagining The International Community , 13 EUR. J. INT. L. 961 (2002). 
Technological advances and greater interdependence may not necessarily lead to a convergence in 
values, but may in fact prove compatible with fragmentation and the spread of extremist ideologies of 
all stripes. For example, seen from the early 21st century, the vision triumph of liberal values 
articulated by Francis Fukuyama in THE END OF HISTORY (1992) appears somewhat premature. It 
can also be questioned whether principles, or process-oriented explanations developed against the 
backdrop of a (liberal) state can be employed in the realm of relations between states, which lacks the 
constitutional structure and order of domestic systems and is characterized to a greater extent by the 
exercise of power. The extreme view is that is that interests determine states’ behavior; reference to 
principles is a distraction. The competing approaches to international law, including the realist 
conception, are considered elsewhere and cannot be treated in greater detail here.  
78 See JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES’ (1999). In this later work he addresses the question of 
justice at the international level. Rawls dispenses with a distributive principle, substituting for it a 
much weaker principle to “assist other peoples living under unfavourable conditions that prevent their 
having a just or decent political and social regime.” Id. at 37. This principle of assistance is founded 
not on principles of distributive justice, but on humanitarian grounds, with the aim of helping 
societies that are not liberal or decent achieve this status. The reason Rawls opts not to extend the 
difference principle to the global level is revealed in the following passage: “I would conjecture that 
there is no society in anywhere in the world – except marginal cases – with resources so scarce that it 
could not, were it reasonably and rationally organized and governed, become well-ordered.” Id. at 108. 
Franck faults two elements that he identifies in this argument – that underdevelopment or being 
burdened is largely the result of societies’ value choices and that no distributive obligations exist in the 
absence of a meaningful global community. Fairness, 18-19 
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in other contexts, such formal equality is substantially reduced by the inequalities 
among states, reflected in developed countries’ generally superior ability to design 
and analyze policy proposals, availability of technical expertise, and negotiating 
experience. The negotiating structure and bargaining process can be structured to 
incorporate aspects of procedural justice, for instance by formulating a broad and 
inclusive agenda, clear and transparent rules, and giving all parties a say in selecting 
procedures.79 
Concerns exist that developed countries may compel developing countries to 
accept an unfavorable agreement.80 Fairness in the negotiating process will become 
more salient as developing prepare to take countries take on commitments, and in 
the process will be required to propose and analyze various proposals.81 Up to now, 
strength in numbers has permitted developing countries to achieve common aims – 
leadership on mitigation by industrialized countries, while blocking emission 
limitation commitments for developing countries – but the next phase of the 
negotiations will demand a more proactive stance, with the risks that it entails. 
Undoubtedly industrialized countries possess advantages in terms of resources – size 
of delegations, experts, and ability to design and evaluate technical proposals – which 
developing countries generally cannot match. In general developing country 
delegations are small, which makes it difficult to participate meaningfully in the 
negotiations, which quite often take place simultaneously in small groups. 
Maintaining continuity is also a challenge – the loss of institutional memory and 
familiarity with the issues is particularly acute for small delegations. However, the 
same is not necessarily true of larger, rapidly industrializing developing countries, 
such as India and China. To level the playing field, some observers have suggested 
increased capacity-building for developing country negotiators and technical 
experts.82 To some extent acceptance of negotiating process and outcomes will be 
affected by participants’ sense of “ownership” and mutual adherence to procedures. 
Violations of fairness in the process can also be expected to influence the stability of 
the agreement (compliance). 
 
4.6 Distributive justice – fairness of allocation 
Equity and fairness in climate change has been of prominent concern in the 
context of how to allocate the costs of mitigation among countries. Other important 
aspects of fairness international equity are procedural fairness and fairness in the 
context of adaptation to the adverse effects of climate change. Procedural justice 
within the climate negotiations has been briefly touched on above. Some of the 
ethical questions relating to adaptation are common the analysis pursued in this 
thesis, although mitigation, more than adaptation, is the focus of this enquiry.83 
                                                 
79 Cecilia Albin, Getting to Fairness: Negotiations over Global Public Goods, in PROVIDING GLOBAL PUBLIC 
GOODS: MANAGING GLOBALIZATION 263, 270-272 (Inge Kaul et al, eds., 2003) 
80 Rose, supra note 9, at 58.  
81 Pamela Chasek & Lavanya Rajamani, Steps toward Enhanced Parity: Negotiating Capacity and Strategies of 
Developing Countries, in PROVIDING GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS: MANAGING GLOBALIZATION 245 (Inge 
Kaul et al, eds., 2003); DEUTSCHE GESELLSCHAFT FÜR TECHNISCHE ZUSAMMENARBEIT, SOUTH-
NORTH DIALOGUE ON EQUITY IN THE GREENHOUSE: A PROPOSAL FOR AN ADEQUATE AND 
EQUITABLE CLIMATE CHANGE AGREEMENT 2 (2004),  http://www.wupperinst.org/en/home/ . 
82 Chasek & Rajamani, supra note 81. 
83 See FAIRNESS IN ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE (W. Neil Adger etal, eds., 2006). 
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Climate change also has important implications for the sharing of burdens and 
benefits within countries, but a consideration of the intra-national equity issues of 
falls outside the scope of this thesis.  
The philosopher Henry Shue has suggested that the questions relating to 
distributive justice in the case of climate change are at least the following:84 
1.       What is a fair allocation of the costs of preventing the global warming that is 
still avoidable? 
2. What is a fair allocation of the costs of coping with the social consequences 
of the global warming that will in fact not be avoided? 
3. What background allocation of wealth would allow international bargaining – 
about issues like (1) and (2) – to be a fair process? 
4. What is a fair allocation of emissions of greenhouse gases (a) over the long 
term and (b) during the transition to the long-term allocation? 
These questions usefully frame the discussion of distributive fairness in the 
context of climate change. The focus of what follows relates to point four above. A 
satisfactory definition of equity and fairness is destined to remain elusive. Therefore 
the chosen approach is to identify and briefly discuss a number, by no means all, 
equity principles. In particular, the objective of this section is to articulate a number 
of equity and fairness principles that could potentially constitute the basis for a 
rough, working ethical consensus in the climate change regime. The following 
representative fairness and equity principles have been selected and are analyzed in 
turn: egalitarian; responsibility or contribution; need; and capability based. Naturally, 
these various principles and interact and overlap in the climate change discourse. 
Egalitarian principles recognize the equal entitlement of persons to some 
good, condition (happiness), opportunity and so forth. In the context of climate 
change, egalitarian principles would hold that all humans have an equal right in the 
protective qualities of the atmosphere. More specifically, this translates to an equal 
allocation, between generations, of the total atmospheric capacity to safely absorb 
GHG emissions. Equality exerts a powerful pull in ethical as well as legal arguments, 
and it is often presumed to be the default standard for allocation, so that the burden 
of proof falls on those advocating differential treatment.85 The appeal of equality - 
with its strict application of simple standard - risks engendering injustice by not 
accounting for individual circumstance. For example, in order to be habitable, some 
regions of the world require space heating in winter, resulting in higher GHG 
emissions per capita than temperate regions.86 Is an equal allocation fair in these 
circumstances? Variants of equality that hold that differences are intrinsically wrong 
– that is, regardless of how they came about – can result in unacceptable outcomes 
when pushed to the limit. For example, strict adherence to intrinsic equality would 
hold in a situation where one group lives just above subsistence levels, and another at 
subsistence levels, the just outcome would be for both groups to be “equal” and live 
at the subsistence level. Thus adherence to equality as an overriding standard may 
                                                 
84 Shue, Subsistence Emissions, supra note 9, at 40. 
85 DONALD BROWN ET AL, WHITE PAPER ON THE ETHICAL DIMENSIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 21 
(undated), http://rockethics.psu.edu/climate/index.htm. 
86 Allowing trading between temperate and colder regions would result in an efficient allocation of 
emission entitlements (the Coase Theorem) but it this says nothing about the fairness or equity of the 
final distribution.  
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lead to what is termed the “leveling down” effect.87 Overall, egalitarian approaches 
would support stronger mitigation action in the present, so as to secure the interest 
of future generations, and at the same time a redistribution to equalize the position 
of states. Equality principles would favor both preventative and compensatory 
transfers, particularly as climate change is likely to exacerbate the inequality of 
developing countries. 
Another line of equity and fairness thinking emphasizes that a distribution of 
benefits and burdens should accord priority to the poorest or most at risk. If climate 
change were to impose very adverse impacts on future generations, this would justify 
expensive mitigation, at the expense of present generations. In contemporary terms, 
an approach would prioritize the achievement of the Millennium Development 
Goals, which cover basic global development objectives such as the eradication of 
extreme poverty and hunger.88 Proceeding on the basis that adaptation to climate 
change is a viable response, it has been argued that priority should be given to the 
poorest populations now, rather than devoting the bulk of scarce resources to 
expensive mitigation efforts.89 
Responsibility as an ethical principle has an intuitive appeal. In fact 
industrialized countries’ responsibility for the accumulated stock of GHGs is 
frequently cited in the climate negotiations. The ethical concept is also reflected in 
the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. However, despite its 
appeal, the contribution or responsibility principle is not as cogent as it appears on 
first consideration. A first problem relates to the notion of responsibility across 
generations. Among philosophers fairness with respect to future generations 
encounters several theoretical hurdles, among them the non-identity problem, which 
holds that policies or actions that are likely to diminish welfare in the future will 
harm few members of future generations because those very same policies are the 
necessary conditions for those people to come into existence.90 In the context of 
climate change, the statement of the problem holds that “[t]he emissions that 
contributed to the emergence of climate change as a global problem originated in 
acts and policies that have affected the size and composition of subsequent 
generations, such that very few members of the present generation can plausibly 
argue that they have been harmed, or made worse off, by the historical greenhouse 
gas emissions associated with industrialization.”91 Although the non-identity problem 
may seem fit to remain confined to the philosophy seminar room, the underpinning 
reasoning is in fact found in the discourse about responsibility for climate change. 
For instance, while it is admitted that current and future generations will be exposed 
to the impacts of climate change that was not of their making, it is argued that those 
generations also benefit from the technological advances and conveniences of 
modern society associated with those emissions. The effect of this line of argument 
                                                 
87 EDWARD A. PAGE, CLIMATE CHANGE, JUSTICE AND FUTURE GENERATIONS 80-81 (2006). 
88 For the eight Goals and related information, see http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/ . 
89 See Alan Manne & Robert Mendelsohn, Climate Change Alternative  Approaches, in GLOBAL CRISES, 
GLOBAL SOLUTIONS 44, 49 (Bjørn Lomborg, ed., 2004).  
90 PAGE, supra  note 87, at 132. On the problem in a context of ethics and philosophy, see DEREK 
PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 351-359 (1984). 
91 PAGE , supra  note 87, at 170. 
  119 
 
is to weaken intergenerational equity, particularly where it is founded on 
responsibility. 
The responsibility principle has a second weakness - arguments from 
responsibility are undermined if the conduct that caused the harm was not 
recognized as wrongful at the time that it occurred.92 It is questionable whether the 
bulk of past emissions can be considered unlawful under existing international law.93 
Under the prevailing view in international law an action must have been wrongful or 
unlawful in that it violated a duty of care or breached a rule of international law in 
order to establish responsibility.94 In law foreseeability is usually considered as a 
prerequisite for liability. Ignorance of the reality and consequences of climate change 
– at which point this ceased to be the case is open to debate – could mitigate 
wrongfulness of industrialized countries’ past emissions. And what of oil-producing 
countries, many of which have achieved a degree of welfare for their populations, 
but at the cost of higher than average emissions? Finally, it is argued that those 
responsible for much of the accumulated stock of GHGs are now dead, and that it 
would be unfair to shoulder the present generation with the burden of responsibility. 
Nonetheless, responsibility retains a strong appeal, reflected for instance in the 
“polluter pays” principle. 
Another strand of equity and fairness focuses on ability to pay or the 
capability of industrialized countries to take the lead in mitigation activities. A 
combination of need and capability provide the ethically relevant grounds on which 
to justify differential treatment.95 The need for leadership by developed countries is 
explicitly recognized in the Convention. At first glance, a capability approach seems 
to avoid some of the problems of the responsibility approach. However, ability alone 
seems an inadequate grounding for an affirmative duty, so that any action would 
resemble charity or altruism. Page asks us to consider a situation where climate 
change was an entirely natural phenomenon, but the distribution of impacts 
remained the same as under the current scenario.96 Would we feel that the duty to 
                                                 
92 Page explains that arguments from responsibility depend on what he terms “historical principles” 
which evaluate the distribution of benefits and burdens in terms of how they came about; if their 
origins involved no wrong-doing they are just, but if wrong-doing occurred then a redistribution is 
allowed to re-establish justice. Id. 169. This means answering the question whether the actions that led 
to the GHG emissions were wrongful. One of the most well known exponents of an approach tracing 
justice based on initial distributions is ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974). 
93 But cf . for a detailed attempt to construct a basis for liability, see RODA VERHEYEN, CLIMATE 
CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: PREVENTION DUTIES AND STATE RESPONSIBILITY (2005). See 
also Richard S. J. Tol & Roda Verheyen, State responsibility and compensation for climate change damages – a 
legal and economic analysis 32 ENERGY POLICY 1109 (2004). 
94 See the Draft Articles on State Responsibility prepared by the International Law Commission. Art. 1 
states, “Every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility of that 
State.” Art. 2 provides that “There is an internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct 
consisting of an action or omission: (a) Is attributable to the State under international law; and (b) 
Constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State” (own italics). Report of the of the International Law 
Commission on its 53rd session, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Suppl. No. 10, UN Doc. A/56/10.  The Draft 
Articles are available at: http://www.un.org/law/ilc/  . The approach taken in the  Draft Articles does 
not encompass strict or direct liability. For an overview of the Draft Articles, see VERHEYEN, 
CLIMATE CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 93, at 229-248.  
95 BROWN ET AL, supra note 85 at 21. 
96 PAGE , supra  note 87, at 172-173.  
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assist was as compelling under such circumstances? This suggests that even within an 
“ability to pay” framework there is a residual linkage with responsibility arguments. 
One reason may be that there is an implicit assumption that those who have the 
capability to address global environmental problems are also the ones that caused 
them. Importantly, capability is dynamic, so that ethical responsibilities are seen to 
change over time. 
 
Equity 
principle 
Content Implied burden-sharing 
Egalitarian Every individual has an equal right 
to pollute or to be protected from 
pollution 
Limit emissions in proportion to 
population 
-    equal per capita emissions 
Sovereignty Every country has an equal right 
pollute or be protected from 
pollution; current level of emissions 
constitutes a status quo right 
Limit emissions proportionally 
across all countries; effect is to 
maintain relative emissions 
between them 
- acquired rights / 
“grandfathering” 
- grandfathering  
Horizontal Countries with similar economic 
circumstances have similar emission 
rights and burden-sharing 
responsibilities  
Equalize net welfare change 
across countries (net cost of 
abatement as a proportion of 
GDP equal for all countries) 
Vertical The greater the ability to pay the 
greater the economic burden 
Net cost of abatement is 
inversely correlated with per 
capita GDP 
- progressive sharing of 
cost burden 
- corresponds to 
capability 
Priority Prioritize and maximize benefits for 
the poorest nations 
Least limitations on poorest 
countries; large proportion of 
entitlements for poorest 
countries 
- variety of vertical equity 
or priority 
- emphasis on needs 
Compensation Indemnify countries for undue costs 
and damages 
Transfers or allocations to ensure 
no country suffers a net loss of 
welfare 
Responsibility Economic burden is proportional 
emissions, thus polluter pays (can be 
extended to include historical 
emissions)  
 
Abatement costs shared across 
countries in proportion to 
emission levels 
- one measure is CO2 per 
capita 
Adapted from Ringius (1999) and Rose (1992) 
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The discussion above analyzed selected equity and fairness principles at a 
very abstract level. In order to explore the practical implications for climate policy, it 
is necessary to go one step further and identify particular burden-sharing rules 
implied by a given set of equity and fairness principles. The table above does this by 
drawing on equity principles that are fairly commonly noted in the literature.97 There 
are of course other equity and fairness principles, as well as different formulations. 
As noted before, the purpose is not to select a “winner”, but instead map out various 
principles that might contribute to a working consensus.  
The next section analyzes the intersection between the economics of climate 
change and equity and fairness.  
 
4.7 Economics 
Economic analysis plays an important role in the debate on climate change, 
and this section will briefly examine conflicts arising at the intersection of economics 
and principles of equity and fairness. The objective of welfare economics, which is 
fundamental to much analysis of public policy, is to work out policies that maximize 
overall social welfare, where welfare is understood as the consumption of goods and 
services by individuals.98 The ethical framework animating welfare economics is then 
consequentialism – what matters are the effects of an action, in this case welfare 
maximization.99 This standard approach does not incorporate ethical concerns 
related to procedures for decision-making nor a commitment to rights, fairness or 
freedom.100  
As noted earlier, developing countries, which have a lower economic and 
social resource base than industrialized countries, will be hardest hit by climate 
change. One effect of climate change will thus be to reinforce existing global 
inequalities in welfare. Recently there has been an acknowledgement that climate 
change poses difficult questions for standard economic approaches to policy analysis, 
and that there is consequently a need to refer to a broader range of ethical 
perspectives and frameworks than those underpinning the orthodox approach.101 
Putting a cost on the likely impacts of climate change has a number of 
potential ethical pitfalls, which may not be immediately apparent from the rational 
presentation of economic studies.102 First, it is not clear how one should aggregate 
and compare impacts on different countries to arrive at a measure of global welfare. 
In practice, economists express the aggregate measure of wellbeing in terms of real 
                                                 
97 See e.g. Rose, supra note 9; Lasse Ringius et al, Burden Sharing and Fairness Principles in International 
Climate Policy, 2(1) INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: POLITICS, LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 1 (2002). 
98 NICHOLAS STERN, CABINET OFFICE, HM TREASURY, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE, 
THE STERN REVIEW 28 (2006). 
99 STEVEN C. HACKETT, ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCE ECONOMICS: THEORY, POLICY 
AND THE SUSTAINABLE SOCIETY 24 (2001). 
100 STERN, supra note 98, at 29; Seth Baum, Beyond the Ramsey Model for climate change assessments, ETHICS 
IN SCIENCE & ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 15, 16 (2007). 
101 STERN, supra note 98, at28. 
102 Michael Grubb, Seeking Fair Weather: Ethics and the International Debate on Climate Change 71 
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 463, 470 (1995). The text accompanying notes 102 to 109 draws on the 
arguments articulated by Grubb. 
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income.103 This process of arriving at an overall welfare function by (notionally) 
summing the wellbeing of different people involves value judgments about how 
effect (utility) of consumption for these individuals. Thus these models have to 
account for the fact that the same increase in consumption means more to a poor 
person than it does to a rich one. There are doubts whether the models meaningfully 
capture the utility of consumption.104 Second, expressing wellbeing in terms of 
income raises the question of how to value impacts on the environment and health, 
especially human life.105 The problem arises because in order to make cost-benefit 
comparisons, a monetary value must be assigned to human life, which is usually 
arrived at in relation to per capita GDP, yielding the result that the life of a person in 
a developed country is usually “worth” more than that of a person living in a 
developing country. In itself it may not be objectionable to value life differently in 
different places – a poor country simply cannot afford to spend the same amount on 
medical care as a richer one and must take this fact into account when making policy.  
Ethical questions arise, however, because climate change involves the actions of 
some countries impacting on others. It seems unfair that developed countries, on 
aggregate responsible for the climate impacts on poor countries, should be able to 
dilute their responsibility on the basis of the assignment of a low “value of life” 
measure in poor countries.  
This points raises the more general problem concerning the valuation of 
non-market goods – how would one value the loss of coral reefs, cultural practices 
associated with a way of life on small islands.106 The available economic tools and 
methodologies give widely divergent answers and do not appear to be adequate to 
the challenge.107 At some level attempts to bring large-scale global non-market goods 
into the ambit of economic analysis may not be possible in any coherent way. This 
touches on the deeper question of how, if at all, the economic system can be ever be 
integrated with the natural system.108 Fairness, equity and other moral values are 
critical in adequately assessing of the impacts of climate change on non-market 
goods.  
A third important issue in relation economics and climate change concerns 
intergenerational equity. How much the current generations pay to save future 
generations from the impacts of climate change? Climate change will result in 
damages occurring in the future, but mitigation costs will be incurred from now into 
the future. It is therefore useful to have some method of comparing these near-term 
costs with the more distant benefits. In tackling this question, economics applies a 
                                                 
103 STERN, supra note 98, at 30. 
104 Baum, supra note 100, at 16-17. 
105 Grubb, supra note 102, at 470. 
106 BROWN ET AL, supra note 85, at 30-31. 
107 See Grubb, supra note 102, at 472. He points out that two methods for valuing non-market goods, 
willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness to accept (WTA) almost always result in different figures. A 
reason may be that while people are limited in what they can pay to avoid damage, there is no limit on 
what they could demand as compensation to accept a loss they consider irreplaceable. It should also 
be obvious then that at a systemic level the WTP criterion is biased against the poor – they may not 
be able to pay much, even to avoid the loss of their livelihood.  
108  For detailed consideration of how economics can be reconciled with its bio-physical foundations, 
see essays in VALUING THE EARTH: ECONOMICS, ECOLOGY, ETHICS (Herman E. Daly & Kenneth N. 
Townsend, eds., 1993). 
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discount rate to determine at what point it is socially more beneficial to spend money 
on, say education, rather than increasing the share of renewable energy in order to 
avoid emissions of carbon dioxide, and in therefore future damages from climate 
change. A low discount rate results in a higher net present value for future damages, 
justifying more mitigation action; a high discount rate favors allocating resources to 
other socially useful priorities over climate change mitigation.109 Far from a 
technicality, the selection of the discount rates has far-reaching implications for 
equity and the assessment of policy options.110 There has long been disagreement 
among economists on the choice of discount rate.111 Those advocating a high 
discount rate justify this choice with reference to actual market behavior, in other 
words long-term interest rates. From an ethical perspective, it is questionable why 
tradeoffs made by people living now with respect to their present and future benefits, 
should be extended to trading off future benefits to others. An influential study 
recent study of the economics climate change, which opted for a low discount rate 
on equity grounds, has served to re-open the debate.112 Decisions about what we owe 
future generations – or what they may rightly expect from us - clearly concerns 
fairness and equity. The same is true for the policy and economic analysis that 
influence and shape decision-making on this question. 
Economic analyses of climate change policies assist decision-makers in 
understanding the cost-effectiveness of policies and their overall economic impact, 
including trade-offs against other goals. However, the application of cost-benefit 
analysis of climate change policy options may give rise to ethical concerns, as has 
been recognized in recent economic studies. Acknowledging the relevance of ethical 
concerns in policy analysis could strengthen analytical outcomes and enhance the 
acceptance of policy recommendations. 
 
4.8 Equity and fairness in international law 
Discussions and appeals can take place in many forums. The wider discourse 
is constituted by the arguments advanced as justification in the negotiations, 
scientific studies and reports that are marshaled in support of parties’ positions, the 
stands taken by interest groups and non-governmental organizations, debates in the 
                                                 
109 Damages of $1 million 100 years in the future have a present value of  $52,000 at an annual 
discount rate of 3 per cent, but only $455 at a discount rate of 8 per cent. Using the latter rate, it 
would be worth spending only a maximum of $455 in the present to avoid those damages. 
110 STERN, supra note 98, at 31; UNDP, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007/2008, FIGHTING 
CLIMATE CHANGE: HUMAN SOLIDARITY IN A DIVIDED WORLD 62-63 (2007). The HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT REPORT  provides an excellent and accessible overview of the issues. 
111 See Kenneth Arrow et al, Decision-making frameworks for addressing climate change, in 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 1995: ECONOMIC AND 
SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE, CONTRIBUTION OF WG III (James P. Bruce et al, eds., 
1996), summarizing the two sides in the debate as those favoring a descriptive discount rate, which is 
based on observations of the financial system (in the range of 6 per cent), and those who take a 
prescriptive approach, preferring a lower discount rate in relation to environmental damages, 
including climate change. Due to the uncertainties related to climate change, there is support for lower 
discount rates. See RICHARD NEWELL & WILLIAM PIZER, DISCOUNTING THE BENEFITS OF CLIMATE 
CHANGE M ITIGATION: HOW MUCH DO UNCERTAIN RATES INCREASE VALUATIONS? (2001), Pew 
Center on Global Climate Change.  
112 Stern review, 31. But cf . William Nordhaus, A review of the Stern review of the economics of global warming, 
45 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC LITERATURE 686 (2007). 
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media, domestic political debates, and the arguments of encapsulated in the 
negotiations on proposed legal instruments or in the halls of international 
organizations or treaty secretariats. The following section briefly fairness in the 
context of international law. 
 
4.8.1 Sources of international law 
When identifying the sources of international law it is customary to refer to 
Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which sets out the 
sources of law to be applied by the Court. They are: international treaties 
(conventions) establishing rules expressly recognized by the parties; international 
custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; and as a supplementary 
source, “general principles of law recognized by civilized nations”.113  
 
4.8.1.1 General principles 
General principles constitute a secondary source of international used for 
developing the law in special circumstances.114 They make up a “reserve store of legal 
principles upon which international tribunals may draw when there are no treaty 
rules or customary law applicable.”115 Drawn from domestic legal systems, examples 
of general principles include principles of unjust enrichment,116 reparation for a 
breach of an undertaking,117 res judicata,118 estopped119, and nemo judex in sua causa.120  
Fairness as it is analyzed in this thesis must be differentiated from general 
principles of international law in the technical sense outlined above. Tied to the 
doctrine of sources, these principles are necessarily a narrow grouping, not 
susceptible to expansion in ordinary circumstances. By contrast, fairness may be 
reflected in the formation of new rules of customary international law, or as is more 
frequently the case, in international treaties and conventions.  
International lawyers have no ready definition of fairness or justice.121 
Instead, there is reference to equity under the heading of general principles of law, 
discussed above as one of the supplementary sources of international law and 
referred to above. The understanding is likewise of equity in the sense fairness and 
reasonableness to supplement to the more settled rules of law, in order to permit 
their sensible application.122 Akehurst in his article on equity and general principles of 
law distinguishes three ways in which an international judge might apply equity: 
                                                 
113 See THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, THIRD, FOREIGN RELATIONS 
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1987), §102; IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL 
LAW, (4th ed. 1990) 3-17. Judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of 
the various nations are considered a subsidiary source for the determination of rules of law. 
114 RESTATEMENT, supra note 113, at §102. 
115 JOHN DUGARD, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A SOUTH AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE 36 (2nd ed. 2000).  
116 Diversion of Water from the Meuse (Netherlands v. Belgium)  (1937) PCIJ, Series A/B, no. 70. 
117 Chorzow Factory (Merits) (1928) PCIJ, Series A, no. 17, 29. 
118 Effect of Awards of Compensation made by the UN Administrative Tribunal 1954 ICJ Reports 47 at 53 
119 Temple of Preah Vihear 1962 ICJ Reports 6, at 23, 31-32. 
120 Mosul Boundary Case (1925) PCIJ, Series B, no. 12, 32. 
121 Frank Biermann, Justice in the Greenhouse: Perspectives from International Law, in FAIR WEATHER? 
EQUITY CONCERNS IN CLIMATE CHANGE 160 (Ferenc L. Tóth, ed., 1999). 
122 BROWNLIE, supra note 113, at 26. 
  125 
 
equity within the law (infra legem), equity as a gap filler (praeter legem) and equity against 
the law.123 While the former application of equity, as a rule of interpretation is not 
controversial, the other two applications are much more controversial. Thus in the 
Continental Shelf case the ICJ held that in those cases where the court can choose 
between two possible interpretations, it is bound to opt for the interpretation that 
appears “to be closest to the requirements of justice”.124 Equity and equitable 
principles have found their primary application in the continental shelf delimitation 
cases.125 The principles of good unjust enrichment, estoppel (good faith) and 
acquiescence may also incorporate equity.126 
 
4.8.1.2 Customary international law 
Treaty law largely consists of obligations based on consent of sovereign 
states. However, the creation of new rights and obligations by treaty can serve as 
evidence of emerging customary norms and, it is suggested, evidence of emerging 
principles of fairness. In contrast to treaty obligations, customary law allows for the 
emergence of binding norms without requiring explicit consent.127 Consequently 
determination of customary international law has vexed generations of international 
lawyers.128 There have also been attempts to identify structural principles relevant to 
the formation of customary international law.129  
Where a principle of environmental law, such as the precautionary principle, 
is codified in treaty law it assumes a different legal character as compared to ethical, 
moral or prudential principles. Yet principles have a slippery and contradictory 
quality – on the one hand presuming to guide action, yet on the other hand it is 
unclear in what circumstances they ought to be applied. Ronald Dworkin has put 
forward a strongly argued case for principles “trumping” policies emanating from 
utilitarian considerations.130 His theory is anchored in the context of adjudication, 
specifically constitutional adjudication, and its practical application to international 
law is open to question.  
There are many principles of environmental law that have not been securely 
anchored in treaty law. Such principles could also be considered part of international 
law if they are judged to have acquired the status of customary international law. The 
identification and validation of legal rules is quintessentially a lawyerly task, 
complicated in the case of custom by the complicated and decentralized structure of 
the international system. According to the orthodox account, “customary 
                                                 
123 M. Akehurst, Equity and General Principles of Law, 25 INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW 
QUARTERLY 801 (1976). 
124 Continental Shelf  case (Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (Judgment) 1982 ICJ Rep. 60 (para. 71). 
125 North Sea Continental Shelf Case (ICJ Rep (1969). See also Franck’s extensive comment on this case, 
Fairness, supra note 60, at 61-65.  
126 Fairness, supra note 60, at 50-54. 
127 RESTATEMENT, supra note 113, at §102; BROWNLIE, supra note 113, at 7-11. 
128 See Martti Koskenniemi, Hierarchy in International Law: A Sketch, 8(4) EUROP. J. INT’L. L. 566 (1997).  
129 Michael Byers, Custom, Power, and the Power of Rules: Customary International Law from an Interdisciplinary 
Perspective, 17 M ICH. J. INT’L L. 109 (1995). Byers considers how the principles of jurisdiction, 
personality, reciprocity and legitimate expectation qualify the application of state power in the process 
of customary international law. 
130 See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977) and LAW’S EMPIRE (1986).  
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international law results from a general and consistent practice of states followed by 
them from a sense of legal obligation.”131 The degree of generality and consistency in 
practice – significant regularity or uniformity – as well as demonstrating the internal 
element (opinion juris) pose problems in their application.  
Scholars hewing to a restrictive approach emphasize consent and the 
necessity of demonstrating actual state practice, from which custom appears by 
means of an inductive approach.132 Another approach proceeds in a more deductive 
manner, isolating customary norms primarily by reference to statements, or opinio 
juris, such as multilateral treaties and statements in international forums such as the 
United Nations General Assembly.133 In short, the manner in which norms attain the 
status of customary international law is a messy and contested question. Accordingly, 
Bodansky has asked whether it is really worth the effort to continue arguing whether 
an environmental norm is part of international law.134 He notes that much of what is 
called customary international law in truth fails to meet the traditional test, and that 
in his view few principles of international environmental law qualify as customary 
law in this strict sense.135 Rather than representing the actual state behavior, 
international environmental legal views reflect the “evaluative standards used by 
states to justify their actions and to criticize the actions of others.”136 They constitute 
the language of the inter-state discourse on environmental law.137  
In the course of the above conclusion, Bodansky makes another important 
point, namely that most scholars writing on customary international law (and indeed, 
many text books) implicitly operate from the premise that international 
environmental disputes are likely to be the subject of judicial dispute resolution.138 
The arguments are generally framed to persuade judges, who play a still negligible 
role in international environmental dispute resolution.139 (In general the scholarship 
on compliance has taken a turn away from judicial modes of resolution and 
enforcement.140) Bodansky locates the primary effect of international environmental 
                                                 
131 RESTATEMENT, supra note 113, at §102. 
132 For a forceful statement of this position, see J. Shand Wilson, State Consent and the Sources of 
International Law, 86 AM. SOC’Y INT.  L. PROC. 108 (1992).  
133 See Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A 
Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT. L. 757, 758 (2001). 
134 Daniel Bodansky, Symposium: Customary (and not so Customary) International Environmental Law, 3 IND. J. 
GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 105, 106. (1995). 
135 Id. at 109-113. 
136 Id. at 115. 
137 For an analysis of factors leading international actors select different legal forms to solve problems, 
see Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54(3) 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 421 (2000). On the topic of “soft law”, see COMMITMENT AND 
COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM (Dinah 
Shelton, ed., 2000). 
138 Id. at 117-118. 
139 But cf . Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Dam Case  (Hungary v. Slovakia) ICJ Rep. (1997) and the International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS): MOX Plant Case (Ireland v. United Kingdom) — Order Related to 
Request for Provisional Measures, No. 10 (December 3, 2001). However, compared to international 
criminal law, or trade law, environmental law lacks jurisprudence.  
140 See Abram Chayes & Antonia Chayes, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH 
INTERNATIONAL REGUGULATORY AGREEMENTS. (1997); Jake Werksman, The Negotiation of a Kyoto 
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norms in the context of negotiations:141 “In this second-party control process, 
international environmental norms can play a significant role by setting the terms for 
the debate, providing evaluative standards, serving as a basis to criticize other states’ 
actions, and establishing a framework of principles within which negotiations may 
take place to develop more specific norms, usually in treaties.” He concludes that the 
above functions of international environmental norms are independent of their strict 
legal status. 
 
4.8.2 Equity and fairness principles in international environmental law 
This section provides an overview of equity and fairness principles in 
selected areas of international environmental law. 
 
4.8.2.1 Stockholm, UNCED, JPOI, CSD process  
The political processes of the United Nations in the area of environment and 
sustainable development have made a lasting impact with respect to the introduction 
of fairness principles into the global debate. The Stockholm Conference on the 
Human Environment (UNHCE) heightened awareness of global environmental 
concerns, underlining the fundamental principle of regulating the use of the planet’s 
resources, while maintaining developmental opportunities.142 Principle 12 of the 
Stockholm Declaration provides for capacity-building and financial assistance for 
developing countries.  
Twenty years later at the United Nations Conference and Environment and 
Development (UNCED), the concept of sustainable development, earlier advanced 
in the Brundtland report, came to prominence as the core principle for reconciling 
protection of the natural environment and economic and social development.143 
Overall, the UNCED marked a clear turn toward concerns about development. The 
meaning of sustainable development is difficult to pin down, which may be one 
reason for its wide acceptance. It has been suggested that sustainable development 
emphasizes “the fundamental importance of equity within the economic system.”144  
This interpretation is supported by Principles 3 to 9 of the Rio Declaration, where 
Principle 3, for instance, states that “[t]he right to development must be fulfilled so 
as to equitably meet developmental and environmental needs of present and future 
generations.”145  
Agenda 21 contains the program of action to promote the implementation of 
sustainable development. The follow-up and review of the implementation of 
Agenda 21 was entrusted to the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD), 
which is a functional commission of the U.N. Economic and Social Commission. 
                                                                                                                                     
Compliance System, in IMPLEMENTING THE CLIMATE CHANGE REGIME: INTERNATIONAL COMPLIANCE 
17 (O. Stokke et al eds., 2005). 
141 BODANSKY, supra note 134, at 119. 
142 ALAN BIRNIE & PATRICIA BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 38 (2001, 2nd 
ed.). 
143 Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future U.N. Doc. 
A/42/427, annex. 
144 Id. at 45. 
145 Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Annex 1, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.151/26 of 12 August 1992. 
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Institutionally the CSD disappointed those who hoped for a stronger review 
mechanism. In practice, its reviews have not been very searching or probing, largely 
because its members – governments – prefer not to be scrutinized or criticized. 
However, unfavorable comparisons with the former U.N. Human Rights 
Commission,146 are unfair, particularly given the widespread criticism of that 
Commission.147 In fact, the CSD is more active and innovative than many of the 
other functional committees, especially with respect to securing meaningful 
participation from governments and to giving civil society a voice. It has also 
provided a platform for discussing issues in an integrated manner. An awareness of 
its limitations should not preclude one recognizing that it has made a normative 
contribution, particularly in the area of energy and environment.148.  
 
4.8.2.2 International Water Law 
The principles relating to international watercourses have been codified in 
the UN Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses.149 The Convention is the product of 20 years of work, and in the view 
of one its most authoritative commentators several of the Conventions key 
provisions reflect customary international law.150 McCaffrey writes that on the basis 
of state practice the following three general principles incorporated in the 
Convention correspond to customary norms: the obligation to use an international 
watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner, to use such a watercourse in a 
manner not to cause significant harm to other riparian states, and to notify 
potentially affected riparian states of planned measures on an international 
watercourse.151 States are enjoined to utilize an international watercourse in an 
equitable and reasonable manner on their own territories and states “shall participate 
in the use, development and protection of an international watercourse in an 
equitable and reasonable manner”, where such participation includes the right to 
utilize the watercourse and the duty to cooperate to protect and develop it.152 The 
Convention sets out a non-exhaustive list of factors and circumstances relevant to 
equitable and reasonable utilization of a river, including “[t]he social and economic 
needs of the watercourse States concerned” and  “[t]he effects of the use or uses of 
the watercourses in one watercourse State on other watercourse States”.153  
 
                                                 
146 See BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 142, at 52. 
147 The United Nations Human Rights Council replaced the Human Rights Commission in 2006. See 
G.A. Res. 251, March 15, 2006, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/251.  
148 Commission on Sustainable Development, Report of the on the 9th Session (2001), U.N. Doc. E/2001/29, 
E/CN.17/2001/19. 
149 See G.A. Res. 229, May 21, 1997, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/229; reprinted in 36 ILM 700 
(1997). 
150 Stephen McCaffrey, The Contribution of the UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigable Uses of 
International Watercourses, 1 INTERNATIONAL GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 250 (2001). 
151 Id. at 260. 
152 art. 5. 
153 art. 6 (b) and (d). 
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4.8.2.3 Law of the Sea 
Franck details how the Law of the Sea negotiations moved away from the 
principle of equidistance in maritime delimitations to embrace equity.154 Article 83(1) 
of UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) states:155 “The delimitation of 
the continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be 
effected by agreement on the basis of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of 
the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable 
solution.”  
UNCLOS provisions concerning transfer of technology156 to developing 
countries, access and freedom of transit for land-locked states,157 and those relating 
to the resources of the seabed158 also reflect equity and fairness principles. The 1995 
Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks requires that 
recognition be given to the special requirements of developing States in relation to 
conservation and management of fish stocks, inter alia, by ensuring that such 
measures do not result in a disproportionate burden of conservation action for 
developing countries and that developing States, in particular the least-developed 
among them and small island developing States, obtain assistance to enable them to 
participate in high seas fisheries.159  
 
4.8.3.4 Montreal Protocol 
In the course of the Montreal Protocol negotiations developing nations, 
pointing to the fact that industrialized countries had been responsible for the 
overwhelming share of ozone-depleting chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), took the 
position that they should not be subject to the same controls as wealthier 
countries.160 Consequently, Protocol makes specific provision for the circumstances 
of developing countries in the form of an exemption, technology of transfer and a 
fund to meet the incremental cost of switching to non-CFC substitutes.161 For 
                                                 
154 Fairness, supra note 60, at 66-68. See Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, April 29, 1958, 
art. 6, 499 U.N.T.S. 311, 315 defining principle of equidistance as follows: “Where the same 
continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two or more States whose coasts are opposite each 
other, the boundary of the continental shelf appertaining to such States shall be determined by 
agreement between them. In the absence of agreement, and unless another boundary line is justified 
by special circumstances, the boundary is the median line, every point of which is equidistant from the 
nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each State is 
measured.” 
155 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, December 10, 1982, 21 ILM 1261, 1286, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 3. 
156 arts. 266-278. 
157 arts. 124-132. 
158 arts. 133-149. 
159 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling 
Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, arts. 24-25, 2167 U.N.T.S. 3, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.164/37. 
160 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, MONTREAL VERSUS KYOTO: A TALE OF TWO PROTOCOLS 15 (AEI-Brookings 
Joint Cent. for Reg. Studies Working Paper No. 06-17, 2006). 
161 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, September 16, 1987, 26 ILM 
1541, 1522 U.N.T.S. 3. The text of Montreal Protocol as amended is available on the website of the 
Ozone Secretariat at http://www.unep.org/ozone/pdfs/Montreal-Protocol2000.pdf.  
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instance, under Article 5 developing parties are permitted to meet “basic domestic 
needs” by delaying the implementation of control measures. The Multilateral Fund 
established under the Protocol provides financial resources for the closure of closure 
or conversion of facilities producing ozone-depleting substances (ODS), technical 
assistance, information dissemination, and capacity building aimed at phasing out 
ODS use in a broad range of sectors.162 Over the period from 1991 to 2007 donors 
have pledged US$ 2.2 billion.163 These provisions contributed to a negotiated 
agreement in which fairness played an openly acknowledged part.164 
 
4.9 Conclusion 
Equity and fairness concerns are reflected in the Framework Convention 
itself. Equity is considered explicitly in many of the proposals for a post-Kyoto 
climate agreement.165 This chapter has examined how selected understandings of 
fairness and equity are relevant to the problem of climate change. This revealed that 
is not desirable to attempt to construct a universal theory applicable to all facets 
fairness. Rather, the aim was to identify principles that could form the basis for a 
working consensus relating relevant to allocating responsibility for combating climate 
change. The objective is to identify principles that can be applied in the evaluating, 
on fairness and equity grounds, actual proposals for a post-2012 climate agreement. 
The core principles identified and discussed were equality (egalitarian), responsibility, 
capability and need. 
The approach taken did not seek deny the role of perceived self-interests in 
determining the actions of states in international climate negotiations. Instead, it was 
argued that equity and fairness considerations can and do play a significant role in 
development of climate change law. Equity considerations are frequently mentioned 
in the literature, particularly with respect to mitigation arrangements. International 
law and the international community, are, at best, in an early, sometimes faltering, 
state. Nonetheless, international environmental law is predicated to a significant 
degree on common responsibility and a nascent sense of community. Furthermore, 
not only is there an overt fairness discourse in this area of law, but in fact various 
elements of fairness have been concretized in legal principles.166 The analysis of 
equity and fairness principles in the climate change regime is the subject of the next 
chapter. 
 
                                                 
162 art. 10 
163 See website of the Ozone Secretariat, 
http://www.multilateralfund.org/about_the_multilateral_fund.htm, last visited 2 February 2008. 
164 Fairness, supra note 60, at 386. 
165 Perhaps most prominently the Contraction and Convergence proposal, put forward by the Global 
Commons Institute, see http://www.gci.org.uk/contconv/cc.html  . 
166 Lasse Ringius, Asbjørn Torvanger & Arild Underdal, Burden Sharing and Fairness Principles in 
International Climate Policy, 2(1) INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: POLITICS, LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 1 (2002). 
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Chapter 5 - Equity and fairness in the climate change regime 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter consists of a closer analysis of the Convention and the Protocol, 
with a view to identifying provisions and aspects in these instruments that have a 
bearing on fairness and equity. The principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities is analyzed in the context of its development under international law. 
The chapter identifies the transfer of cleaner technology and financial assistance as 
examples of differentiation under international environmental law; in this respect, the 
implementation of the relevant provisions under the Convention and Protocol are 
detailed and analyzed. 
The preamble to the Convention stakes out the terrain to be covered. The 
language of the preamble is more expansive than the dryer terms of the Convention 
itself. If the Convention text has been pared down to a mutually acceptable 
minimum, then the preamble does give a taste of the bigger themes and issues lost in 
the process of drafting. In particular, the preamble is striking for the prominence it 
gives to issues of fairness and justice – in that sense it correctly signals their primary 
importance. The preamble states that: “Noting that the largest share of historical and 
current global emissions of greenhouse gases has originated in developed countries, 
that per capita emissions in developing countries are still relatively low and that the 
share of global emissions originating in developing countries will grow to meet their 
social and developmental needs”.1 Prominent reference is made to the principle of 
common but differentiated responsibilities.2 The special vulnerability to the impacts 
of climate change low-lying, small-island developing countries, and other developing 
countries is recognized.3 It is also recognized that in order to achieve sustainable 
social and economic development, the energy consumption of developing countries 
will have to grow.4  
The preamble is written in the hortatory language typical of such passages. 
As such it has no binding legal status, but it could be of assistance in interpreting the 
text. Under the provisions relating to the interpretation of treaties the preamble 
forms part of the context in which the terms of an instrument are interpreted.5 The 
preamble maps out the debate around fairness and equity – the recognition that 
climate change potentially threatens everyone – it s common concern of humankind 
– yet at the same time developing countries insist that historically they have 
                                                 
1 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, adopted on May 9, 1992, prmbl. para. 3, 
1771 U.N.T.S 164 Article 3(1) [UNFCCC]. 
2 Id.  prmbl. paras. 6, 23. 
3 Id.  prmbl. para. 24.Also mentioned, in paras. 25-26, is the vulnerability of countries “whose 
economies are particularly dependent on fossil fuel production”, that is the OPEC states. This a 
reflection of the negotiating dynamics and the kinds of compromise extracted in order to reach 
agreement. 
4 Id. prmbl. para. 27. 
5 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31, 1155 U.N.T.S., 331. It states: “1. 
A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the 
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.  2. The context for the 
purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble 
and annexes…” 
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contributed very little to the problem, and hence it is only fair and equitable that they 
be allowed to develop, allowing those with the greatest responsibility to bear the 
heaviest burden. As we have seen, theories and conceptions of ethics and justice 
abound. Applied to the issue of climate change they yield a variety of answers. These 
theoretical possibilities aside, the text of the Convention narrows the field of choices 
down very considerably. The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities 
is firmly entrenched in the Convention; it proved critical to launching the Berlin 
Mandate that culminated in the Protocol. At present there is no indication 
whatsoever that any major developing country is prepared to accept a binding cap on 
emissions in the near future– the need for development is simply too urgent. Per 
capita emissions in developing countries – including major emitters such as China 
and India – remain far lower than those of Annex 1 countries. For many small 
countries, the promise of assistance – for adaptation or technology transfer - under 
the Convention and Protocol has proved disappointing. At the same time, many of 
those countries vulnerable to the impacts of climate change – small island developing 
states, countries prone to drought and desertification – have found the changes 
occurring under the rubric of economic globalization to have brought them limited 
benefits, or even contributed to a further decline in their economic prospects.6 And 
after declining in the 1990s, levels of development assistance have begun to rise 
modestly in the past few years.7 The international community has also pledged to 
fulfill the Millennium Development Goals, which aim for the achievement of eight 
development-related goals by 2015, including halving the number of people whose 
daily income is less and $1 per day, achieving universal primary education and 
ensuring environmental sustainability.8 While progress has been notched up in Asia, 
it appears likely that sub-Saharan Africa will not be able to meet key goals relating 
poverty and the number of people suffering from hunger. 9 For instance, although 
over the period 1990 to 2000 the percentage of people in sub-Saharan Africa living 
in absolute poverty declined marginally, the absolute number of those in extreme 
poverty rose by 140 million.  
                                                 
6 For instance Africa’s declining share of world trade stands at only 1.5 per cent, and while recent 
years have seen economic growth, this has been driven by commodities (minerals, hydrocarbons) 
exports. For instance, oil and other fuels accounted for almost 60 per cent of Africa’s exports in 2005. 
See OECD, AFRICAN ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 2007 (2007). Changes in the world trading system, 
particularly the phasing out of market access preferences, are impacting negatively on a number of 
small island developing states that have achieved a degree of prosperity, e.g. Antigua and Barbuda 
(sugar industry) and Mauritius (textiles). 
7 According to the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD, its 22 member countries, the 
world's major donors, provided US$103.9 billion in aid in 2006, down by 5.1 per cent from 2005.  
This represents a significant increase over the low of recorded in 1997. Nonetheless, the DAC points 
out that aid to sub-Saharan Africa, excluding debt relief, was static in 2006, leaving a challenge to meet 
the Gleneagles G8 summit commitment to double aid to Africa by 2010. See OECD, FINAL AID 
FLOWS IN 2006, DCD/DAC/RD(2007)15/RD2 (2007), 
http://www.oecd.org/department/0,2688,en_2649_34447_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (last accessed 4 
February 2008). 
8 See http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/ (last accessed 17 May 2007). The MDGs were derived 
from the Millennium Declaration, adopted by the United Nations in G.A. Res. 2 of 8 September 
2000, U.N. Doc A/RES/55/2.  
9 See UNITED NATIONS, MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS REPORT 2007 4 (2007), 
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/pdf/mdg2007.pdf  (last accessed 4 February 2007). 
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The account of the negotiations provided in an earlier chapter also supports 
the argument that there are signs of a convergence towards what would be regarded 
as a fair and equitable approach to combating climate change. While no agreement 
on how to share the burden of combating climate change is apparent, some things 
are clear. Under the provisions of the Convention, developed countries must take 
the lead in combating climate change.  
This chapter will examine the “revealed” fairness and equity aspects present 
in the climate regime. As sketched out above, the argument is that although 
agreement on the future of the climate change instruments is presently lacking, an 
understanding and creative (re-)interpretation of the central provisions of the 
Convention points to the elements of a future agreement on international climate 
policy. It is therefore false to contend that there is no starting point for discussions 
on fairness and equity. The chapter begins with a brief overview of differentiation 
under international environmental law, in particular the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities as manifested in the Convention. The conceptual 
underpinning of the principle and its relationship with equity and fairness are 
examined.  The two sections that follow this theoretical discussion discuss 
differentiation in action in the climate change regime, namely the implementation of 
provisions of the Convention relating to the transfer of technology to developing 
countries and the provision of financial assistance to combat climate change.  
 
5.2 Differentiation – entry point for fairness and equity or instrument of 
expediency? 
Fairness or equity frequently concerns the division or sharing of something. 
Thus, international fairness or equity can be described as a fair or equitable sharing 
among countries of burdens and benefits.10 An earlier chapter analyzed three 
dimensions – equality, responsibility and capability – that inform and underpin the 
concepts of equity and fairness. The question of the division of burdens under global 
climate change is of course at the heart of fairness in this context.  
The emergence of differential treatment must be seen against a broader 
context in which differential treatment arose. A historical impetus for the 
development of differential treatment in international law was the expansion in 
membership of the state system with the process of decolonization after the Second 
World War.11 In parallel, the world has experienced a greater degree of 
interdependence through growth in trade, investment and changes in technology. 
The post-WWII state system also saw the rise of international institutions concerned 
with the economic interactions of states in the form of the Bretton Woods 
institutions, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The emergence 
of global environmental problems also created a demand for new norms intended to 
promote collective responses by states with widely diverging interest and capabilities. 
Early examples of differentiation in international law existed in the trade law,12 the 
                                                 
10 See PAUL G. HARRIS, WHAT’S FAIR? – INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE FROM AN ENVIRONMENTAL 
PERSPECTIVE (Working Paper, Columbia International Affairs Online, CAIO, 1999).  
11 Philippe Cullet, Differential Treatment in International Law: Towards a New Paradigm of Inter-state Relations, 
10 EJIL 549, 564 (1999). 
12 General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade, October 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 187. Part IV recognized 
the disadvantaged position of less developed countries, stating in art. XXXVI, sub-para. 8, that: “The 
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United Nations Law of the Sea Convention,13 and the movement to establish a New 
International Economic Order.14 
The 1972 Stockholm Declaration emphasized the need to consider "the 
applicability of standards which are valid for the most advanced countries but which 
may be inappropriate and of unwarranted social cost for the developing countries."15 
But it was the Rio Conference in 1992 that was conspicuous for its endorsement of 
the differentiated responsibilities between developed and developing countries.16 
Special concern for the needs of developing countries and the differentiation was 
articulated in Principles 6 and 7 of the Rio Declaration, which state that:17 
                                                                                                                                     
developed contracting parties do not expect reciprocity for commitments made by them in trade 
negotiations to reduce or remove tariffs and other barriers to the trade of less-developed contracting 
parties.” This provision was in essence more an exhortation to “good practice” and lacked binding 
force. See ALEXANDER KECK & PATRICK LOW, SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT IN THE 
WTO: WHY, WHEN AND HOW? 4 (WTO, Staff Working Paper ERSD-2004-03, May 2004), available 
at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd200403_e.htm . The Decision on Differential and More 
Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries, Decision of 28 November 
1979, (L/4903), provides for certain aspects of regional or global preferential agreements among 
developing countries, for special treatment for least-developed countries, and restates the principle of 
non-reciprocity (available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/prewto_legal_e.htm). The 
Doha Declaration calls for a review of all special and differentiation provisions “with a view to 
strengthening them and making them more precise, effective and operational”, para. 44. See Ministerial 
Declaration, adopted on 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm.  More specifically, the 
decision on implementation-relate issues and concerns calls for Members “to consider the legal and 
practical implications for developed and developing Members of converting special and differential 
treatment measures into mandatory provisions, to identify those that Members consider should be 
made mandatory”, para. 12(i). See Implementation-related issues and concerns, decision of 14 November 
2001, WT/MIN(01)/17, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_implementation_e.htm.  
However, little action has been taken advance Doha agenda in this respect. It is difficult to avoid the 
conclusion that under the GATT/WTO there has been a move toward the elimination of 
differentiation, with provision for procedural differentiation, such as longer time periods for the 
phasing in of rules, as well as technical assistance. Renewed efforts to secure special and treatment – 
exemplified by the Doha agenda – seem bogged down. 
13 See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, December 10, 1982, Part XI ,1833 U.N.T.S. 
3, 21 ILM 1261. But cf . Agreement relating to the implementation of Part XI of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December, G.A. Res. 263, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc., 
A/RES/48/263, Annex. The text of the Agreement is available at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_part_xi.htm. 
14 The New International Economic Order (NIEO) constituted an attempt by the developing 
countries to bring about changes in the international economic and legal system, with an emphasis on 
control of developing countries over their natural resources. See MOHAMMED BEDJAOUI, TOWARDS A 
NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (1979). The calls for the establishment of the NIEO faded 
away by the end of the 1980s. See Cullet, supra note 11, at 568. 
15 Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Conference on the Human 
Environment, 26th Sess., princ. 23, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14 (1972); 11 I.L.M. 1416, 142. 
16 Duncan French, Developing States and International Environmental Law: The Importance of Differentiated 
Responsibilities, 49 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 35 (2000). 
17 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, UN Doc. 
A/CONF.151/26(Vol.I),annex. 
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“The special situation and needs of developing countries, particularly the least 
developed and those most environmentally vulnerable, shall be given priority…” 
(Principle 6) 
“States shall cooperate in the spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect and 
restore the health and integrity of the Earth’s ecosystem. In the view of the different 
contributions to global environmental degradation, States have common but 
differentiated responsibilities. The developed countries acknowledge the 
responsibility that they bear in the international pursuit of sustainable development 
in view of the pressures their societies place on the global environment and of the 
technologies and financial resources they command.” (Principle 7) 
Following Rajamani, differential treatment in international environmental 
agreements can be divided into three broad categories as follows: (a) provisions that 
differentiate between developed and developing countries with respect to the central 
obligation of the instrument in question; (b) differentiation with respect to 
implementation, for instance phased-in compliance and delayed reporting schedules; 
and (c) the granting of assistance in the form of capacity building, financial resources, 
and transfer of technology.18  As regards provisions establishing differentiation 
concerning the central obligations, prime examples are the article 4(2) of the 
UNFCCC, which sets out the commitments of developed countries, and the Kyoto 
Protocol, which establishes emission limitation and reduction commitments for the 
countries contained in its Annex B.19 Provisions that differentiate between developed 
and developed countries with respect to implementation are far more common than 
those falling under the first category. For instance, the UNFCCC20, the Convention 
on Biological Diversity,21 the Desertification Convention,22 the 1994 International 
Tropical Timber Agreement (ITTA),23 the 1995 Agreement on Straddling Fish 
                                                 
18 LAVANYA RAJAMANI, DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, 93-
94 (2006). See also French, supra note 16, at 39-41, identifying two broad categories, namely applying a 
standard for developing countries that takes account of their special needs, as well as provisions 
relating to financial assistance and access to technology.  
19 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, December 11, 
1997, 37 I.L.M. 22, text available from the website of the UNFCCC secretariat, 
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php.  
20 See for example art. 3(1), “…the developed country parties should take the lead in combating 
climate change and the adverse effects thereof.” 
21 Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79. See prmbl. para. 16 
“[a]cknowledging further that special provision is required to meet the needs of developing 
countries”. In relation to research and training, article 12 provides that the contracting Parties shall 
take into account the “special needs of developing countries”. 
22 United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in those Countries Experiencing Serious 
Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa, October 14, 1994, 1954 U.N.T.S. 3, 33 I.L.M. 
1238. Compare prmbl. para. 4 asserting “…desertification and drought are problems of global 
dimension in that they affect all regions of the world and that joint action of the international 
community is needed to combat desertification” and prmbl. para. 5 noting the particular impact of 
drought and desertification on developing countries, particularly in Africa. See also references to needs 
of developing countries in arts. 3(d), 4(2)(b), 5, and 6.  Article 7 introduces further differentiation, 
stating that in implementing the Convention Parties shall give priority to African countries.  
23 International Tropical Timber Agreement, January 26, 1994, 1955 U.N.T.S. 81, 33 I.L.M. 1016. 
Under art. 34 on special measures, providing the developing country Parties can apply for 
“appropriate differential and remedial measures”. 
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Stocks24 provisions that recognize the special needs and circumstances of developing 
countries. The Montreal Protocol is a well-known example of delayed, or phased-in 
compliance with its requirement to cease the production and use of ozone depleting 
substances. Provisions relating to financial assistance in the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change,25 Convention on Biodiversity26 and the 
Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants27 are operationalized 
through the Global Environmental Facility. Examples of provisions concerning 
access to, or transfer of, technology on favorable terms are found in the UNFCCC 
and Convention to Combat Desertification.28 Statements endorsing differentiation 
are also found inn the non-binding documents adopted at the Rio Conference: 
Agenda 21,29 the Rio Declaration of Principles30, and the Statement on Forests.31  
 
5.2.1 Common but differentiated responsibilities in the UNFCCC 
The principles in Articles 3 of the Climate Change Convention consist of a 
particularly clear elaboration of the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities and the special needs of developing countries, particularly on account 
of their vulnerability to the adverse effects of climate change: 
“1. The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and 
future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their 
                                                 
24  Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling 
Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 2167 U.N.T.S. 3, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.164/37. See 
prmbl. para. 8, recognizing the need for specific assistance to developing countries to permit them to 
participate fully in the conservation, management and so forth of fish stocks. In particular the “special 
requirements of developing countries in relation to the conservation and management” of fish stocks, 
including “the need to ensure that such measures do not result in transferring, directly or indirectly, a 
disproportionate burden of conservation action onto developing States.” (art. 24(1) and 24(2)(c). Also 
art. 26 providing for special assistance to developing countries in the implementation of the 
Agreement. 
25 UNFCCC, art. 11. 
26 Supra note 21, art. 21. 
27 Stockholm Convention on persistent organic pollutants, May 22, 2001, art. 13, text available on the 
website of the secretariat, http://www.pops.int/.  
28 See arts. 4 and 18, respectively.  
29 UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26/(Vol.I), Annex 3, Agenda 21. See for instance chapter 9, Protection of 
the Atmosphere, stating that activities undertaken in pursuit of the objectives of the chapter should 
take into account “the legitimate priority needs of developing countries for the achievement of 
sustained economic growth and the eradication of poverty” (para. 9.3). A general reference to 
differentiation is found in para. 39.3(d), noting that in drawing up international standards States 
should “take into account the different situations and capabilities of countries”. 
30 Supra note 17. 
31 Non-Legally Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management, 
Conservation and Sustainable Development of all Types of Forests, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. III), 
Annex 3. Developed countries are to take the lead in greening and afforestation (principle 8(a)), 
efforts of by developing countries and countries with economies in transition to strengthen 
sustainable forest management should be supported (principle 9(a)). On 17 December 2007 the 
United Nations General Assembly adopted the Non-legally binding instrument on all types of forests, see G.A. 
Res. 89, 62nd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/98. The Instrument references the principle of common 
but differentiated responsibilities and makes calls attention to the need for financial and technical 
assistance for forest conservation and management in developing countries. 
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common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, 
the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and 
the adverse impacts thereof. 
2. The specific needs and special circumstances of developing country Parties, 
especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate 
change, and of those parties, especially developing country Parties, that would have 
to bear a disproportionate or abnormal burden under the Convention, should be 
given full consideration.” 
The close proximity of the provisions on the special needs of developed 
countries and the principle of differentiation points to the connection between them. 
The phrasing as a principle intended to guide the parties, as well as “should” rather 
than “shall”, indicates that it the obligation to protect the climate system should not 
be understood in binding legal terms. At the time of drafting, developed countries 
had argued that developing countries should assume the lead in combating climate 
change because they – through their high per capita energy consumption – 
historically bear the main responsibility for the rising concentrations of greenhouse 
gases.32 The attempt to include language to this effect was unsuccessful, and the 
reference to “respective capabilities” was inserted to underline that capabilities – 
rather than the differential contribution to global emissions – are the reason for 
developed countries taking the lead in combating climate change.33 (Language 
referencing the responsibility of developed countries is found in paragraph three of 
the preamble, which states “[t]hat the largest share of historical and current global 
emissions of greenhouse gases has originated in developed countries…”) The phrase 
“take the lead in combating climate change” now refers directly to “respective 
capabilities”, not the historically unequal share of greenhouse gas emissions, which 
serves to undermine the responsibility element.  
The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities finds concrete 
application in a number of the Convention’s provisions. Thus, the commitments 
enumerated under article 4 are qualified in that parties are to take into account “their 
common but differentiated responsibilities”. Further, under article 4(2) only the 
industrialized countries (Annex 1) committed themselves to the “aim of 
returning…to their 1990 levels” their emissions of greenhouse gases.34 Similarly, it is 
the Annex 1 countries who “shall adopt national policies and take corresponding 
measures on the mitigation of climate change, by limiting [their] anthropogenic 
emissions of greenhouse gases…”35 Reporting requirements are differentiated, with 
                                                 
32 Daniel Bodansky, The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A Commentary 18 YALE 
J. INT. L. 451, 498(1993). 
33 Id. at 503. He notes that developing countries wanted developed countries to take the lead because 
they bear the main responsibility for climate change. 
34 UNFCCC, supra note 1, art. 4(2)(b). 
35 Id., art. 4(2)(a). 
  138 
 
Annex 1 parties also required to report more frequently.36  Special consideration for 
the needs of developing countries recurs in a number of articles.37  
Another provision in assessing the embedding of the principle of common 
but differentiated responsibilities is article 4(7), which states that:  
“The extent to which developing country Parties will effectively implement their 
commitments under the Convention will depend on the effective implementation by 
developed country Parties of their commitments under the Convention related to 
financial resources and transfer of technology and will take fully into account that 
economic and social development and poverty eradication are the first and 
overriding priorities of the developing country Parties.” 
This provision represents an attempt to condition the fulfillment by 
developing countries of their obligations on financial and technology support by the 
developed countries.38 Since the part relating to the fulfillment by developing 
countries is stated in factual terms, the language in the Convention, watered down 
from earlier proposals, does not fully convey the originally intended meaning.  
The force of differentiation in action is seen in the Kyoto Protocol, which 
saw its genesis in the Berlin Mandate where developed countries eschewed targets 
for developing countries. Nothing less would have permitted the negotiations to 
move ahead. Since then, developing countries are careful to refer to this principle in 
all contexts where obligations, real or potential, are discussed. This is true also for 
non-binding instruments adopted under the auspices of organs of the United 
Nations.39 
                                                 
36 Under article 12, non-Annex 1 parties have three years to submit their initial communication, or 
upon the availability of financial resources, sufficient to cover the full cost of reporting, from 
developed country parties. Least developed country (LDC) parties may report at their discretion. 
Annex 1 parties are required to submit reports on a yearly basis. 
37 See article 4, sub-paras. 4 (assistance of developing countries particularly vulnerable to adverse 
effects of climate change); 8 (full consideration of actions necessary to meet the specific needs of 
developing countries); and 9 (specific needs and of least developed countries in relation to funding 
and technology transfer). 
38 See Mark A. Drumbl, Poverty, Wealth, and Obligation in International Law 76 TUL. L. REV. 843 (2002). 
He analyses this and similar provisions in terms of “shared compact” between developed and 
developing countries. Similar provisions exist in a number of MEAs, see for instance art. 20(4) of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, which replicates the language of art. 4(7) of the UNFCCC. 
39 Report of the Global Conference on the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States, chap. 2, 
Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States, UN Doc. 
A/CONF./167/9, 6 May 1994. Para. 14 refers to Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration in the context of 
addressing global environmental degradation. Report of the Ninth Session of the Commission on Sustainable 
Development, 1, Decision 9/1, Energy for Sustainable Development, at paras. 5, 7; at 15, Decision 9/2, 
Protection of the Atmosphere, para. 1. Report of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, UN Doc. 
A/Conf./199/20, chap. 1, 6, Johannesburg Plan of Implementation. For instance, the principle of 
common but differentiated responsibilities as set out in Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration is referred 
to in paras. 14 (production and consumption), 20 (energy for sustainable development), 38 (climate 
change), 39 (air pollution) 81 (implementation). Mauritius Strategy for the further Implementation of 
the Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States, Report 
of the International Meeting to Review the Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island 
Developing States, UN Doc. A/Conf./207/11, 14 January 2005, chapter 1, at 10. Para. 18(2)(b) where 
the Mauritius Strategy provides that the international community should “[c]ontinue to take, in 
accordance with the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol, as applicable, steps to address climate 
change, including through: adaptation and mitigation in accordance with the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities…” Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration is 
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5.2.2 Legal status of the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities 
The consensus on the legal status of the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities appears to be that it is an important principle of 
international environmental law, but that it has not attained the status of general 
customary international law.40 However, it would be difficult to deny the special 
status and importance of the principle in international environmental law, as 
evidenced by its presence in the UNFCCC41 and other agreements, as well as 
references in “soft law” instruments and decisions and resolutions of United Nations 
organs.42 The establishment of new obligations under international environmental 
law, or the deepening of existing ones, would prove difficult – and be perceived as 
inequitable – without taking into account the principle. Therein lies its real 
significance. 
 
5.2.3 Conceptual framework and philosophical roots of common but 
differentiated responsibilities 
The conceptual framework for differentiation in international environmental 
law has been approached from a number of angles. In general, differentiation can be 
regarded, at its most positive, as a manifestation of resolve to tackle common 
problems, motivated by partnership and cooperation.43 Differentiation of 
responsibilities is thus identified as one aspect of an emerging “shared compact” 
between developed and developing countries, with the latter conditioning their 
participation in global environmental agreements on assistance from the former.44 
Scholars argue that differentiation does the following in international law: first, 
promotes the achievement of substantive equality among states, by recognizing the 
                                                                                                                                     
referred to elsewhere in the text, at para. 3 (specific expression of principle required for Small Island 
Developing States) and 83 (implementation).  See Non-legally Binding Instrument on All Types of Forests, 
preambular para. 4, reaffirming commitment to Rio Principle 7, supra note  31. The principle has also 
been recalled in successive General Assembly resolutions in the context of climate change.  See for 
instance G.A. Res. 54/222 of 22 December 1999, UN Doc. A/RES/54/222, para. 2 and decision 
55/443 of 20 December 2000, GAOR., Supp. 49. See also G.A. Res. 55/443 of 56/199 of 21 
December 2001, UN Doc. 56/199, para. 2 (calling on “all States parties to continue to take effective 
steps to implement their commitments under the Convention, in accordance with the principle of 
common but differentiated responsibilities…”); 57/257 of 20 December 2002 UN Doc. 
A/RES/57/257, prmbl. para. 3;58/243 of 23 December 2003, UN Doc. A/RES/58/243, prmbl. 
para. 2; 59/234 of 22 December 2004, UN. Doc. A/RES/59/234, prmbl. para. 2. 
40 See Cullet supra note 11, at 578-579; Yoshiro Matsui, Some Aspects of the Principle of “Common but 
Differentiated Responsibilities”, 2 INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: POLITICS, LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 151, 167 (2002); RAJAMANI, supra note 18 at 158-160; Christopher D. Stone, Common but 
Differentiated Responsibilities in International Law, 98 A.J.I.L. 276, 300 (2004). 
41 The principle is also referred to in the decisions of Conference of the Parties (COP), including in 
the decisions to implement the Kyoto Protocol. See for instance decision 24/CP.7 (procedures and 
mechanisms relating to compliance), in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Seventh, Addendum, 
Part II: Action taken by the parties, vol. III, FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.3,. 
42 For a partial list of references to the principle in soft law instruments and United Nations General 
Assembly resolutions on climate change,  see supra  note 39. 
43 But cf . the analysis of Stone, supra note 40. 
44 See Drumbl, supra note 38. 
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different needs and circumstances of developing countries, second, fosters 
partnership and cooperation among states, and, third, promotes effective 
implementation of agreements.45 The above grounds for differentiation, it is 
contended, have gained in currency as compared to reasoning based on the historical 
responsibility of the developed world for the bulk of global environmental problems, 
as well as its capacity (in contrast to the developing nations) to remedy them.46 
Certainly in the climate change context it would be incorrect to maintain that 
ascriptions of responsibility based on past conduct have been superseded as a 
dominant strain of argument. Nonetheless, an approach based on partnership and 
cooperation was heralded in Agenda 21 and, in more hedged fashion, the major legal 
instruments adopted at the Rio Conference. The impasse around climate change 
signals that the earlier vision and optimism has frayed. The same authors who 
discern partnership and cooperation as one of the grounds for differentiation are 
also clear-eyed in noting that while differentiation arguably rests on concerns of 
fairness, it could also be characterized as expediency in ensuring that developing 
countries act on what are – for the time being – largely Northern concerns.47  
As appears from the formulation of Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration, the 
differentiated responsibility is ostensibly grounded in the different contributions to 
global environmental degradation on the one hand, and on the other greater financial 
resources and capacities of the developing nations.48 The two grounds for 
responsibility also neatly reflect the divide between the camps – developing countries 
favor the first, as it could conceivably give rise to legal obligations, developed 
countries naturally favor the second ground, perceived as weaker because resting on 
moral and political grounds, essentially akin to charity.49 A more positive perspective 
on the argument from relative capacities could hold that developing countries should 
be granted the opportunity to achieve economic and social development before 
assuming the full burden of environmental protection obligations in question.50 The 
                                                 
45 See Cullet supra note 11, at 550; French,  supra note 16, at 35, 46. 
46 French, supra note 16, at 35, 46. 
47 Id. at 35. Both French (supra note 16, at 57), Cullet (supra note 11, at 574) and Drumbl (supra note 
38, at 930-932) conclude that developed countries have been most accommodating to Southern 
demands for differentiation and financial support in areas where they perceive their interests to lie, for 
example climate change.  By contrast, the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, 
which covers an issue primarily of concern to developing countries, contains softer language on 
differentiation and has in general received less prominence than the UNFCCC and the CBD. See 
Drumbl, supra note 38, at 932-933. 
48 LAVANYA supra note 18, at 137-150. See also Matsui, supra note 40, at 155. As Matsui notes, this 
position is shared by most writers on the topic. See  for instance Cullet, supra note 11, at 577; French, 
supra note 16, at 46-52. See also Ileana M. Porras, The Rio Declaration: A New Basis for International 
Cooperation, in GREENING INTERNATIONAL LAW 25, 29 (Philippe Sands, ed., 1993).  
49 Illustrative of the perceived power of norms – even the soft-law variety – the United States issued 
an interpretative statement to the effect that Principle 7 merely acknowledged the “special leadership 
role of developed countries” due to their “wealth, technical expertise and capabilities” and that the 
principle does not “imply a recognition…of any international obligations…or any diminution in the 
responsibility of developing countries.” Cited by French, supra note 16, at 37. See UN Doc. 
A/CONF.151/26 (Vol.IV) (1992), 20. 
50 Cf. INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE SIXTY-SIXTH CONFERENCE 116 (1995), 
rejecting this ground and arguing for responsibility on the basis of “different contributions to global 
environmental degradation”.  
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relative wealth and historical contribution of States to the problem can be regarded 
as a salient reason to permit differential treatment. 
The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities gives effect to 
conceptions of equity and fairness in international environmental law and policy-
making. It does so first as a normative principle, for example as articulated in Rio 
Principle 7, and subsequently re-affirmed in documents such as the Johannesburg 
Plan of Implementation, adopted at the World Summit on Sustainable Development 
in 2002. Second, it gives effect to conceptions of fairness and equity when in 
concrete provisions, for instance in the differentiated emission limitation and 
reduction commitments of the Kyoto Protocol.  The philosophical roots of common 
but differentiated responsibilities have been traced to notions of equality and of 
restoring equality51, as well as the concept of intergenerational equity.52 Scholars have 
also identified the justifications for the principle, primarily the dichotomous 
responsibility and capacity/capability grounds,53 and extended to include taking into 
account the special needs and circumstances of developing countries and a “global 
partnership” featuring more equitable forms of cooperation.54  
It is suggested that this approach is correct, but does not go far enough. In 
fact, common but differentiated responsibilities can be better understood by going 
one step further to explicitly identify the notions of equity and fairness that underpin 
the principle. These are the inter-linked aspects of fairness and equity that have been 
discussed in an earlier chapter: equality, responsibility and capability. It is no 
coincidence that these aspects of fairness and equity also correspond to the various- 
at times competing - characterizations of common but differentiated responsibilities. 
In a very broad sense, quality demands that “like cases be treated alike”, but this begs 
the question what criteria determine similarity and dissimilarity in a given case. In this 
respect a more substantive and contextualized understanding of equality proves 
useful. As opposed to formal equality, which stresses neutrality, the promotion of 
substantive equality entails enquiring into which factors count in determining 
whether cases ought to be treated in a like manner.55 In the context of the climate 
change, equality in tackling the burden of combating climate change is contextualized 
and supported by the notion of responsibility. Equal sharing of the mitigation 
burden between developed and developing countries is unfair and inequitable when 
the respective responsibilities for atmospheric GHG concentrations are accounted 
for. Nonetheless, as noted in the analysis of the responsibility aspect of fairness, 
industrialized countries’ historical contribution to the “bad” of climate change 
should also be seen in the light of the global public goods, such as advances in 
                                                 
51 RAJAMANI, supra note 18, at 150-151, 154-155. 
52 Cullet, supra note 11, at 571. 
53 Stone, supra note 40, at 291-294. 
54 French, supra note 16, at 53, 55. 
55 Even in the environmental arena notions of formal equality have a strong hold. See Protocol to the 
1979 Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution on Long-term Financing of the Co-
operative Programme for Monitoring and Evaluation of the Long-range Transmission of Air 
Pollutants in Europe, September 24, 1984, 1491 U.N.T.S. 167, where a uniform reduction was 
accepted, even though it was much more burdensome for the former Soviet and Eastern European 
States. 
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science and technology that flowed from the process of industrialization.56 The 
principle’s different underpinnings – differential contributions to environmental 
degradation, greater capabilities on the part of the developed countries, and 
commitment to solidarity and partnership – are all consistent with a broad 
understanding of what is fair or equitable. Thus, it could be considered unfair if 
those who have contributed the most to the problem do not contribute more to the 
solution than those whose contribution is much smaller. Similarly, in the face of a 
problem demanding a collective solution, it would be unfair to expect those with the 
least resources to commit a higher share to the solution of the problem. 
As the above discussion has revealed, the terms, grounds and justifications 
put forward for differentiated responsibilities in favor of developing countries 
emanate from considerations of equity and fairness.57 The language of sharing 
responsibilities for collective problems, of taking account of the relative position and 
capacities of developing and developed countries in the establishment and 
implementation of international regimes is the idiom of fairness and equity in 
relations between states.  
The next two sections of this chapter examine how one dimension of 
common but differentiated responsibilities, namely technology transfer and financial 
assistance, are implemented in the Convention and Kyoto Protocol. 
 
5.3 Technology transfer 
The question of technology transfer relates in a number of ways to the 
international environmental law and the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities. First, it is clear that in order to manage the global environment, it is 
critical that developing countries are able to develop in a fashion that is less wasteful, 
resource intensive, and polluting than the path followed by the industrialized 
countries. In particular, in the context of climate change, anything like an 
equalization of per capita greenhouse gas emissions at current developing country 
levels would be disastrous for the global climate. Second, it would be profoundly 
unfair and inequitable if the peoples of the developing world were to be permanently 
consigned to a much lower level of economic activity than the rich. The economies – 
and the emissions – of developing countries will grow, as is fair and equitable. 
Sustainable development, by integrating social, economic and environmental 
concerns, ought to lead to a way out of this conundrum. A differentiated approach 
to obligations considers the relative capacities of the parties, as well as their 
contribution to the problem at hand, and guides the assumption of responsibilities 
for action on this basis. Technology transfer is intended to assist developing 
countries achieve the national imperatives of growth and poverty eradication, while 
                                                 
56 Stone, supra note 16, at 300, noting the difficulty holding current generations in industrialized 
countries responsible for the actions of their forebears, as well as the “ironic argument of adverse 
possession and prescription”. 
57 See Philippe Sands, The “Greening” of International Law: Emerg ing Principles and Rules, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL 
LEG. STUD. 293, 307 (1994), (differentiated responsibility results from the application of the broader 
principle of equity in general international law, as well as recognition that the special needs of 
developing countries must be taken into account in international environmental law); See also Matsui, 
supra note 40, at 155, citing Henry Shue, Global Environment and International Equity, 75 INTERNATIONAL 
AFFAIRS 533-540 (1999).  
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also assuming responsibility for combating global environmental degradation.58 
Success in combating climate change will require both technological innovation and 
the rapid and widespread transfer and implementation of environmentally sound 
technologies (ESTs) for mitigating the effects of greenhouse gas emissions and for 
adapting to climate change.59 
 
5.3.1 Technology transfer in MEAs 
Provisions relating to the transfer of environmentally sound technology are a 
staple of multilateral environmental agreements and other instruments. For instance, 
technology transfer is referred to in Principle 20 of the Stockholm Declaration, and 
Principle 9 of the Rio Declaration. Chapter 34 of Agenda 21 also pertains to 
technology transfer. The commitments are generally cast in terms of a commitment 
by developed countries to promote, facilitate or finance the transfer of 
environmentally sound technology to developing countries. 60 It appears that 
generally the commitments have not gone beyond the rhetorical to real transfer and 
uptake of technologies.61 Technology transfer was an element of the defunct quest to 
establish a New International Economic Order.62 The United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea of 1982 also contains far-reaching technology transfer 
provisions, which can be regarded as the high-water mark in this regard.63 Important 
provisions also are contained in the major MEAs adopted at Rio and afterwards.64 
The re-emergence of technology transfer in the context of MEAs has been traced to 
the recognition by developed countries that global environmental problems required 
a collective response, which could be facilitated by offering technology transfer to 
developing countries.65 With the London and Copenhagen Amendments to the 
Montreal Protocol, parties were required to take steps to ensure that the “best 
available, environmentally safe substitutes and related technologies are expeditiously 
transferred to” (article 10A) developing-country parties and that those transfers 
occur under fair and most favorable conditions. This was coupled with recourse to 
                                                 
58 Colin M. Alberts, Technology Transfer and Its Role in International Law: A Structural Dilemma, 6 HARV. J. 
L. & TECH. 63, 65 (1992) 
59 IPCC, SPECIAL REPORT, METHODOLOGICAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL ISSUES IN TECHNOLOGY 
TRANSFER (Bert Metz, et al, eds., 2000). 
60 Gaetan Verhoosel, Beyond the Unsustainable Rhetoric Sustainable Development: Transferring Environmentally 
Sound Technologies, 11 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 49 (1998). 
61 Id. at 49-51. 
62 On the NIEO, see supra note 14. 
63 Supra note 13. The Law of the Sea Convention provides for technology transfer in the context of 
the protection and preservation of the marine environment Part XII (articles 202-203) and the 
development and transfer of marine technology in Part XIV (articles 266-274). The objective of Part 
XIV is to enable developing countries to share in the exploration and exploitation of marine 
resources, particularly with respect to deep seabed mining. The Agreement on the Implementation of 
the Part XI of the Convention modified the scheme with respect to deep seabed mining so that 
technology transfer is on a commercial, not mandatory basis, and provides for the protection of 
intellectual property rights. Supra note 13. See also D. H. Anderson, Legal Implications of the Entry into 
Force of the U. N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, 44 INT’L COMP. L.Q. 313, 318 (1995). 
64 See e.g., Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 21, art. 16, UNFCCC, supra note 1, art 4(5), 
and Convention to Combat Desertification and Drought, supra note 22, arts.  6(e) and 18 
65 Verhoosel, supra note 60, at 53-54. See also Alberts, supra note 58, at 65. 
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the Multilateral Fund to meet the incremental costs of compliance in adopting 
substitutes to ozone depleting substances. 
 The Convention contains a number of provisions relating to technology 
transfer. Article 4(5) provides that: 
“The developed country Parties…shall take all practicable steps to promote, facilitate 
and finance, as appropriate, the transfer of, or access to, environmentally sound 
technologies and know-how to other parties, particularly developing country Parties, 
to enable them to implement the provisions of the Convention. In this process, the 
developed country parties shall support the development and enhancement of 
endogenous capacities and technologies of developing country parties.” 
 
A few points may be made in relation to this paragraph. First, it does not 
mandate the transfer of technology, but rather requires parties to take “all 
practicable” steps and the obligation may consist of facilitating access to EST – not 
necessarily a very strong or binding duty. Second, the provision applies to transfer 
from developed to developing countries (“vertical transfer”) as well as transfer 
between developed countries (“horizontal transfer”). Third, it recognizes the need to 
build capacity in (recipient) developing countries, since technology transfer is not 
limited to the installation of hardware, but includes also the “software” or knowledge 
and skills to employ the technology.66 
The commitment to technology transfer in article 4(5) of the Convention 
(echoed in article 10(c) of the Protocol) is cast in general terms and lacks procedures 
for its implementation. It is therefore not surprising that the Conference of the 
Parties (COP) to the Convention has taken a series of decisions on technology 
transfer.67 For instance, the COP has tasked the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and 
Technological Advice (SBSTA) with carrying out a “consultative process” on 
technology transfer with the aim of making recommendations to enhance the 
implementation of article 4(5).68 At the request of the COP the Secretariat of the 
Convention has carried out a number of activities to promote technology transfer, 
including the compilation and synthesis of information on financial resources and 
technology transfer activities and the development of a web-based technology 
information system (TT:CLEAR).69 At Marrakesh the COP also adopted a 
“framework for meaningful and effective actions to enhance the implementation of 
article 4(5)” and requested the GEF to provide funding to implement the 
                                                 
66 See Capacity-building in the Development and Transfer of Technologies, UNFCCC Technical Paper, para. 10, 
U.N. Doc. FCCC/TP/2003/1 (2003). See also E7 TECHNOLOGY DIFFUSION WORKING GROUP, 
RENEWABLE ENERGY DIFFUSION: FINAL REPORT, para. 2.4 (2003), available at 
http://www.e7.org/PDFs/e7_Renewable_Energy_Technology_Diffusion_Final_Report.pdf.  
67 See e.g. decision 11/CP.1, in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its First Session, Addendum, Part II: 
Action taken by the Conference of the Parties, FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add.1 (1995). 
68 Decision 4/CP.4, in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Fourth Session, Addendum, Part II: 
Action taken by the Conference of the Parties, FCCC/CP/1998/16/Add.1 (1999). 
69 Website of the UNFCCC Secretariat, 
http://unfccc.int/cooperation_and_support/technology/items/3031.php.  
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framework.70 The COP also decided to establish an expert group on technology 
transfer to analyze and report on means to facilitate technology transfer.71 
 
5.3.2 Technology transfer in action 
Technology transfer is best understood as a broad set of processes covering 
the flows of know-how, experience and equipment for mitigating and adapting to 
climate change amongst different stakeholders such as governments, private sector 
entities, financial institutions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and 
research/education institutions.72 The terms diffusion of technologies and 
technology cooperation are also sometimes used synonymously with transfer, and 
connote a “pull” model that is closer to reality than the “push” element associated 
with transfer as a concept.73 Importantly, the definition should extend to 
understanding, utilizing and even replicating the technology, including adapting it to 
local conditions and integrating it with indigenous technologies.74  
Practically, technology transfer encompasses all of the following: direct 
purchases, licensing, franchising, foreign direct investment, sale of turn-key plants, 
joint ventures, sub-contracting, cooperative research arrangements, exchange of 
scientific and technical personnel, science and technology conferences/trade 
shows/exhibits, open literature, information exchange mechanisms, and official 
development assistance (ODA).75  Successful technology transfer is generally viewed 
as requiring a number of steps, including agreement and establishment of 
partnerships between stakeholders; technology transfer needs assessment; 
implementation of technology transfer, including policy measures and capacity 
building to remove barriers); evaluation and refinement; and replication.76 
The debate over technology transfer has tended to be entangled in the 
opposing views of developed countries, which view it as a private sector matter, and 
developing countries which regard it as a matter of concessional government-to-
government exchange.77 There recently been a shift toward a position that recognizes 
that the greatest potential for technology transfer resides with multinational 
corporations (MNCs), resulting in more focus on how to create an “enabling 
                                                 
70 Decision 4/CP.7, in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Seventh Session, Addendum, Part II: 
Action taken by the Conference of the Parties, vol. I, FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1. 
71 Id. 
72 IPCC, supra note 59. 
73 Industry and the private sector are certainly more comfortable with a more decentralized, voluntary 
and market-based understanding of diffusion. See supra note 66. 
74 IPCC, supra note 59, at 1. 
75 The UNFCC Secretariat has established a web-based technology clearing house with the aim of 
improving the flow of, access to and quality of the information relating to the development and 
transfer of environmentally sound technologies. The site is available at 
http://ttclear.unfccc.int/ttclear/jsp/ . 
76 CLIMATE TECHNOLOGY INITIATIVE, METHODS FOR CLIMATE CHANGE TECHNOLOGY NEEDS 
ASSESSMENTS AND IMPLEMENTING ACTIVITIES: DEVELOPING AND TRANSITION COUNTRY 
APPROACHES AND EXPERIENCES 4 (2002) available at    
http://ttclear.unfccc.int/ttclear/pdf/TNA/CTI/Tech%20Transfer%20Guidelines-12%20_final_.pdf 
; Technical Paper on Terms of Technology Transfer and Know-how: Barrier and Opportunities related to the Transfer 
of Technology, FCCC/TP/1998/1 5 (1998). 
77 Verhoosel, supra note 60, at 66. 
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environment” for transfer by the private sector.78  Much, if not most en 
environmentally sound technology is owned by the private sector, which is also a 
major innovator, responsible for some 80 per cent of research and development 
spending79; in the eyes of developing countries intellectual property rights presents a 
barrier to technology transfer. In this respect, trade rules also have important 
implications for technology transfer. The Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) sets out the standards of protection for a 
comprehensive list of intellectual property rights, including patents and industrial 
designs. The TRIPS Agreement also includes several provisions on technology 
transfer, including an obligation on developed countries’ governments to provide 
incentives for their companies to transfer technology to least-developed countries 
(Article 66.2). Due to unhappiness on the part of least-developed countries with the 
implementation of this provision, it was agreed that a mechanism would be put on 
place to ensuring the monitoring and implementation of the obligation. 80 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) can serve to diffuse and transfer technology, 
as it not only introduces technologically advanced capital goods, but also 
“technology spillover” to national firms through the turnover of skilled personnel, 
imitation, and more rigorous standards for local suppliers.81  However, a recent 
WTO study that concluded that of the impact of trade on technology transfer is 
mixed, with some goods (machinery and equipment) associated with greater 
diffusions of technology.82 With fears that older, dirty technology could be 
“dumped” in developing countries, it is worth examining the effect of FDI on the 
environment. The analysis of the relationship between FDI and the environment 
breaks down into a number of strands, one focusing on the effect of competition for 
FDI (the “pollution haven” thesis) and the other investigating the effect on the 
environment of increased FDI flows.83 A recent review of the literature suggests that 
no general conclusion can be drawn concerning the effect of FDI on the 
environment – the answer is context dependent.84 A well-supported conclusion is 
that host country environmental policies are important in improving the 
                                                 
78 Id. at 66. See also Commission on Sustainable Development, Report of the Sixth Session, E/CN.17/1998/20, 
Chapter I, Decision 6/3, repeating the repeating the stalemate language of “access to and transfer of 
environmentally sound technologies…on favourable terms,including on concessional and preferential 
terms, as mutually agreed, taking into account the need to protect intellectual property rights…” at 
para. 2(g), but also that “Governments should try to facilitate the transfer of environmentally sound 
technologies by creating a policy environment that is conducive to technology-related private sector 
investments and long-term sustainable development objectives…”, para. 2(e)(i). 
79 U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., INVESTMENT AND TECHNOLOGY POLICIES FOR 
COMPETITIVENESS: REVIEW OF SUCCESSFUL COUNTRY EXPERIENCES at 10, 
UNCTAD/ITE/IPC/2003/2 (2003). 
80 Implementation-related Issues and Concerns, Ministerial Decision, WT/MIN(01)/17, para. 12.2, 
November 14, 2001.  
81 WTO SECRETARIAT, TRADE AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY, WT/WGTTT/W/1, at 16 
(Background note by the Secretariat) (2002); OECD, WORKING PARTY ON GLOBAL AND 
STRUCTURAL POLICIES, ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: A 
LITERATURE REVIEW, ENV/EPOC/GSP(2001)10/FINAL (2002). 
82 WTO Secretariat, supra note 81, at 13-14. 
83 OECD, supra note 81, at 6. 
84 Id. at 7. 
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environmental performance of FDI.85 In addition to the enforcement of national 
environmental standards, the spread of good practice at the firm level by MNCs may 
also lead to improved environmental performance at local affiliates, based on home 
country practices.86  
At present there appears to be a dearth of detailed data on the scale of 
technology transfer in relation to technologies relevant to ESTs in general, and 
climate change in particular.87 The extent of investment in climate relevant sectors 
and technology is poorly documented.88 Nonetheless, idea of the volume and trends 
can be gleaned from the financing provided by the World Bank, GEF and export 
credit agencies.  
 
5.3.2.1 International institutions and donors 
The activities of the World Bank Group (WBG)89 have been criticized for its 
support of extractive and greenhouse gas intensive industries, including loans for the 
development of oil and gas reserves. Although the total volumes of Bank 
commitments for oil and gas are relatively low, for instance totaling about US$ 480 
million in 2003, Bank investment often serves as a pre-condition for the participation 
of private sector lenders, with the result that Bank approval can be decisive for a 
project’s financial viability. The Extractive Industries Review - a multi-stakeholder, Bank -
initiated review of the on the World Bank Group’s activities in the mining, oil and 
gas sectors – issued a wide-ranging series of recommendations to improve the Bank’s 
performance with respect to sustainable development and human rights criteria.90 
Noting that the renewable energy made up only 6 per cent of the energy portfolio, 
the Review recommended that the WBG should phase out investments in oil 
production by 2008 and devote its resources to investments in renewable energy 
resource development, clean energy technology, and energy efficiency projects.91 
                                                 
85 JANE ELLIS ET AL, TAKING STOCK OF PROGRESS UNDER THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM 
(CDM), OECD, COM/ENV/EPOC/IEA/SLT(2004)4/FINAL, 17 (2004). 
86 See MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT ACROSS BORDERS: A STUDY OF TNC AFFILIATES’ 
ENVIRONMENTAL PRACTICES IN CHINA, MALAYSIA AND INDIA (Michael W. Hansen, ed., 2002). Key 
findings are summarized in U.N. CONF. TRADE & DEV., MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT ACROSS 
BORDERS, UNCTAD/ITE/IPC/MISC.12 ( 
87 Supra note 59. The IPCC’s study provides aggregate data for technology transfer by source, but not 
climate-specific data.  
88 Trends of Financial Flows and Terms and Conditions Employed by the Multilateral Lending Institutions, 
FCCC/TP/1997/1, 10 (1997).  
89 Consisting of the International Development Association (IDA), the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Association (MIGA). 
90 See EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES REVIEW, STRIKING A BETTER BALANCE – THE WORLD BANK 
GROUP AND EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES: STRIKING A BETTER BALANCE, Vol. 1, (2004), available at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTOGMC/0,,contentMDK:203066
86~menuPK:592071~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:336930,00.html. The official 
response from the World Bank, WORLD BANK MANAGEMENT RESPONSE TO THE EXTRACTIVE 
INDUSTRIES REVIEW, 17 September 2004, is available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTOGMC/Resources/finaleirmanagementresponse.pdf. The 
response suggests that the WBG agrees with a number of the recommendations. However, the WBG 
vowed to remain engaged in oil and coal, while agreeing to increase investment in “new” renewable 
(including hydro 10MW or smaller) energy by 20 per cent for 5 years. 
91 EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES REVIEW , supra note 90 at 65-66.  
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Although the Bank declined to implement the recommendation of the Review to 
phase out investment in the hydrocarbons sector, it pledged in 2004 to increase its 
commitments for energy efficiency and new renewable energy – defined as biomass, 
solar, wind, geothermal and hydro with a capacity of less than 10MW - by 20 per 
cent per year between 2005 and 2009.92 However, the baseline is quite low. During 
the period 1990-2005, total WBG commitments in the energy sector totaled $56 
billion, of which U$ 2.5 billion were for new renewables, US$ $4.3 billion for large 
hydropower and US$2.2 billion for energy efficiency.93 In other words, commitments 
for new renewables, that is excluding large hydropower, constituted about 4.5 per 
cent of energy sector commitments. Largely due to substantially increased 
commitments for energy efficiency, which rose from US$ 67 million in 2004 to US$ 
447 in 2006, the WBG has met its 20 per cent target. Over the same period support 
for new renewables remained relatively stagnant, increasing from US$ 192 to US$ 
221.94  
With respect to bilateral ODA targeting climate change-related activities, a 
survey of OECD countries put the amount committed at US$ 8.1 billion for the 
period 1998-2000, or 7.2 per cent of total bilateral ODA.95 Any discussion of 
international technology transfer would be incomplete without mention of the 
Global Environment Facility (GEF). Since its inception in 1991 until 2004, the GEF 
allocated US$ 1.74 billion to climate change projects and enabling activities, which 
leveraged an additional US$ 9.29 billion in co-financing from the World Bank, 
regional development banks, and bilateral funds.96 (A recent World Bank report gives 
an idea of the financing challenge – it estimated the cost of mitigating emissions in a 
range from less than US$ 10 billion to US$ 200 billion per year, depending on the 
stringency of the stabilization target and assumptions.97) Some 53 per cent has been 
allocated to renewable energy and 27 per cent to energy efficiency projects.98 The 
GEF climate change portfolio is organized into four areas: removing barriers to 
energy efficiency and energy conservation; promoting the adoption of renewable 
                                                 
92 See WORLD BANK, supra note 90. 
93 WORLD BANK, CLEAN ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT: TOWARDS AND INVESTMENT FRAMEWORK, 
110-111 (2006), available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEVCOMMINT/Documentation/20890696/DC2006-0002(E)-
CleanEnergy.pdf . 
94 WORLD BANK, IMPROVING LIVES: WORLD BANK GROUP PROGRESS ON RENEWABLE ENERGY 
AND ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN FISCAL YEAR 2006, Annex 2, table 1 (2006), available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTENERGY/Resources/336805-
1157034157861/Improving_Lives_Low_Res.pdf? . 
95 OECD, A ID TARGETING THE OBJECTIVES OF THE RIO CONVENTIONS: A CONTRIBUTION BY THE 
DAC SECRETARIAT FOR THE INFORMATION OF PARTICIPANTS AT THE WORLD SUMMIT FOR 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN JOHANNESBURG IN AUGUST 2002) (2002). The Development 
Cooperation Directorate (DAC) is a coordinating mechanism of the 23 OECD country donor 
agencies; twenty out of the 23 countries provided data for the survey.  An earlier, pilot report pegged 
the figure for 1998 at US$ 1.8 billion, see OECD, A ID TARGETING THE RIO CONVENTIONS: FIRST 
RESULTS OF A PILOT STUDY, A CONTRIBUTION BY THE DAC SECRETARIAT FOR THE INFORMATION 
OF PARTICIPANTS AT THE SESSION OF THE SUBSIDIARY BODY FOR SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL 
ADVICE (SBSTA), (2000).  
96 See GEF website at http://thegef.org/Projects/Focal_Areas/focal_areas.html#cc  
97 WORLD BANK, CLEAN ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 93. 
98 GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY, 2003 ANNUAL REPORT 13 (2003). 
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energy by removing barriers and reducing implementation costs; reducing the long-
term costs of low greenhouse gas emitting energy technologies; and supporting the 
development of sustainable transport. Given the limited funds at its disposal, the 
GEF approach to climate change is in large part devoted to technology diffusion – 
removing barriers to the adoption of energy efficiency and renewable energy 
technology, reducing implementation costs for renewable energy, and reducing long-
term technology costs by accelerating technological development and increasing the 
market share of low-greenhouse-gas-emitting technologies.99 
The export credit agencies of the OECD countries have on average provided 
around US$ 90 billion in loans, credit guarantees and investment insurance per year 
to developing countries.100 For instance, from 2000-2004 the percentage exposure 
(loan guarantees and loans) of the US Ex-Im bank has been around 10-14 per cent 
for power projects – largely made up of gas turbine equipment, with no wind, solar 
or other non-hydro renewables listed - and 10 per cent for oil and gas from 2000 to 
2004.101  
 
5.3.2.2 Clean Development Mechanism 
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) has been hailed as an innovative 
instrument to bring private capital into the technology transfer process.102 As stated 
in article 12(2) of the Kyoto Protocol, the twin purposes of the CDM are to “to 
assist Parties not included in Annex I in achieving sustainable development”, as well 
as to assist Annex 1 parties in achieving their emission limitation and reduction 
commitments. Technology transfer is a necessary ingredient for sustainable 
development, especially for developing countries where the accent is frequently on 
industrialization. With respect to the determination of what constitutes sustainable 
development, the Marrakech Accords provide that “it is the host Party's prerogative 
to confirm whether a Clean Development Mechanism project activity assists it in 
achieving sustainable development”.103 It is also possible that host countries could 
consider transfer of technology as a one criterion. Some countries have identified 
                                                 
99 ERIC MARTINOT & OMAR MCDOOM, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY, PROMOTING ENERGY 
EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABLE ENERGY: GEF CLIMATE CHANGE PROJECTS AND IMPACTS 5-6 
(2000). Martinot and McDoom, at 35, conclude that: “Overall, prospects for sustainability and 
replication of GEF climate change projects are still mixed and uncertain.” Nonetheless, there are 
some undoubted success stories of technology diffusion, for instance the more energy efficient 
refrigerator project (get reference). 
100 CÉDRIC PHILIBERT, OECD ENVIRONMENT DIRECTORATE/INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, 
INTERNATIONAL ENERGY TECHNOLOGY COLLABORATION AND CLIMATE CHANGE M ITIGATION, 
COM/ENV/EPOC/IEA/SLT(2004)1, 16 (2004). 
101 EXPORT-IMPORT BANK, 2004 FINANCIAL REPORT (2004). The financial reports for the years 2000-
2004 provide a breakdown of items covered by country, and show no listing for renewable energy, 
excluding hydro, which may have been reported under headings for generators. In its 2000 Financial 
Report the Bank stated that its environmental portfolio amounted to over US$2 billion, out of total of 
over US$61 billion. Similar breakdown is not presented in subsequent reports. Reports are available at 
http://www.exim.gov.  
102 Verhoosel, supra note 60, at 70. 
103 Decision 16/CP/7, in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Seventh Session, Addendum, Part II: 
Action taken by the Conference of the Parties, vol. II, FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.2 (2002). 
  150 
 
preferred areas for CDM projects in an attempt to promote investment in projects 
with multiple benefits.104 
A review of progress under the CDM found that funds available by 2004 
amounted to US $800m, rising to an estimated US $1 billion per year in the coming 
years.105 And since CDM finance makes up an estimated one-sixth to one-eighth of 
total project cost, the amount of investment stimulated by CDM could be between 
6-8 billion, which compares favorably with the GEF’s contribution.106 While the 
market for certified emission reductions (CERs) from CDM projects may indeed 
confound pessimists’ predictions, visions of a bonanza of clean energy projects have 
not materialized. There are a number of reasons for this. First, transaction costs for 
many renewable energy projects, such as solar photovoltaics, are so high that they 
render them unviable as commercial investments; nonetheless, donors or NGOs 
such as conservation groups may execute a proportion of such projects under the 
CDM.  
 
CDM Portfolio – Projected share of total CERs in 2012 by project type 
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Source: CDM Pipeline, Jørgen Fenhann, UNEP Risøe Centre 
 
Second, projects proving most profitable – such as methane capture from 
landfills or the destruction of HFC-23, an industrial waste gas – are outside the 
                                                 
104 For example the rules applicable to CDM projects provide that “priority areas for CDM projects in 
China are energy efficiency improvement, development and utilization of new and renewable energy, 
and methane recovery and utilization”. See art. 4, Measures for the Operation and Management of 
Clean Development Mechanism Projects in China, NRDC, 21 November 2005, available at 
http://cdm.ccchina.gov.cn/english/main.asp?ColumnId=27 . More concretely, the rules also provide 
for very different government shares of the proceeds of the credits– taxation – for different types of 
project. Thus, according to art. 24 of the rules the government share from HFC and PFC projects is 
65 per cent, while for projects falling into the preferred category it is only 2 per cent. 
105 Ellis et al, supra note 85, at 18. 
106 Id. at 18. 
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energy sector and do not offer significant benefits in terms of technology transfer.107 
HFC-23 is a waste gas created in the production of HCFC-22, a gas used in air-
conditioners and itself a potent ozone-depleting substance. This has given rise to a 
perverse incentive – a CDM project at a new HCFC plant offers potentially 
hundreds of millions of dollars in credits, but at the same time works at cross 
purposes with the effort to cut down on substances that deplete the ozone layer.108  
A detailed analysis by United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
reveals that the geographic distribution of CDM projects is very uneven, with Asia 
and Latin America accounting for the lion’s share (96 percent of projects).109 
Together they are expected to generate around 95 percent of CERs flow through 
2012; Africa is expected to garner only around 3 per cent of CERs by that date. 
Moreover, the report notes that while some 80 per cent of projects employ 
technologies that have the potential to promote sustainable development in the host 
country, for instance energy efficiency, a total of 21 projects abating emissions of 
industrial gases are expected to be responsible for almost half of all CERs through 
2012.  
Projected regional distribution of CERs in 2012 
North Africa & 
Middle East
1.9%
Sub-Saharan Africa
3.9%
Central Asia
0.3%
Latin America 16.6%
Asia & Pacific 
77.4%
 
Source: Adapted from CDM Pipeline, Jørgen Fenhann, UNEP Risøe Centre 
                                                 
107 These projects are profitable due to the very high greenhouse warming potential (GWP) of the 
gases involved, yielding very high carbon equivalent reductions for very low cost. For more details on 
GWP see chapter 1. N2O-reduction projects, related to adipic acid production, are also beginning to 
attract attention on the grounds of the high GWP of N2O and low costs. With the introduction of 
control technologies, nitrous oxide emissions from adipic acid production have fallen significantly in 
developed countries. See IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: MITIGATION, CONTRIBUTION OF WG III TO 
THE THIRD ASSESSMENT REPORT 213 (Ogunlade Davidson & Bert Metz, eds., 2001). 
108 The situation is made worse in that substitutes for HCFC, which is used in home air-conditioners, 
are not cheap. This comes at a time when sales of air-conditioners are soaring in China and other 
developing countries. See Keith Bradsher, Moving Faster on Refrigerants, NY TIMES, March 15, 2007. 
109 UNDP, THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM: AN ASSESSMENT OF PROGRESS, 11-12 (2006). 
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The impact of transaction costs, which are partially a function of the 
complicated approval process, is largely determined by the size of the project.110 For 
large projects, which generate many CERs, the ration of transaction costs to total 
costs will be small, and will thus not be a major determinant of project feasibility. 
However, for small, community-scale projects that may yield local sustainable 
development benefits, transaction costs constitute a more important barrier. Among 
the solutions to accommodate small-scale projects within the CDM framework are 
simplified rules, as well as “bundling” of smaller projects, which consists of 
aggregating several activities under one CDM project.111  Bundling is also permissible 
for large-scale projects, and “project activities under a programme of activities can be 
registered” as a single project.112  However, national or regional policies or standards 
do not qualify as a CDM projects.113 So for instance the adoption of air conditioner 
efficiency standard in developing country does not fall within the CDM.  
Every CDM project must be based on a project-specific baseline 
methodology approved by the Executive Board. A baseline is needed because the 
certified emissions reductions (CERs) generated by a project are calculated by 
comparing the emissions of the CDM project with the emissions under a business as 
usual scenario.114 In other words, for a wind farm project that feeds electricity to the 
grid, the emissions intensity of power supplied from the grid is the baseline against 
which credits for the project are calculated. Methodologies are quite specific, for 
example “landfill gas capture and electricity generation projects where landfill gas 
capture is not mandated by law”.115 A project developer wishing to establish a project 
under slightly different circumstances would need to draw up a new methodology, 
and submit it for approval to the Executive Board. This entails added expense, yet 
because once approved methodologies are publicly available, others can use them 
but without sharing in the cost of their development, which may act as a 
disincentive. Sequestration projects – afforestation and reforestation are permitted 
under the CDM - are among the limited opportunities available in Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs), which lack the industrial infrastructure for emission mitigation 
projects. Although such projects may yield a range of benefits, direct technology 
transfer is not among them.  
                                                 
110 AXEL MICHAELOWA & MARCUS STRONZIK, TRANSACTION COSTS OF THE KYOTO MECHANISMS 
175 (Hamburg Institute of International Economics, Discussion Paper, 2002). 
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an examination of what could fall under the “programmatic CDM”, see JANE ELLIS, OECD, ISSUES 
RELATING TO IMPLEMENTING “PROGRAMMATIC CDM”, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/42/31/36278652.pdf . 
113 Decision 7/CMP.1, supra note 112, at para. 20. 
114 Axel Michaelowa, Determination of baselines and additionality for the CDM: a crucial element of the credibility 
of the climate regime, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND CARBON MARKETS: A HANDBOOK OF EMISSIONS 
REDUCTIONS MECHANISMS 287, 290-292 (Farhana Yamin, ed., 2005). 
115 See “Approved Baseline Methodology AM0010”, available at 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/UserManagement/FileStorage/CDMWF_AM_675903718 . 
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The methodology applied to determine CDM eligibility narrowly 
circumscribes projects that can claim emissions credits, or certified emission 
reductions (CERs), as they are known. While the methodological rigor – project 
developers would say rigidity - reduces the number of projects that can claim CDM 
status, the it arguably improves the likelihood that projects that are approved will 
promote technology transfer. A strict methodology is necessary to safeguard the 
environmental integrity of the Protocol and so that the CDM does not become a 
backdoor for Annex 1 parties to circumvent their emissions “caps”. The Protocol 
therefore provides that a CDM project must result in GHG reductions that are 
“additional to any that would occur in the absence of the certified project activity”.116 
The interpretation of this requirement has given rise to some uncertainty,117 but the 
responsible subsidiary organ has recently issued a step-by-step guideline that makes 
clear that a rigorous approach to additionality will be applied.118 Pursuant to 
demonstrating additionality, a significant number of CDM project submitted for 
approval have referred to low penetration rates, or barriers to deployment, of the 
technology in question.119 Thus if a developer can show that the proposed 
technology has not previously been deployed in a similar market in similar 
circumstances, this can help the project clear the “additionality” hurdle. 
The methodology employed for the calculation of the baseline for CDM 
projects potentially also influences the potential for technology transfer. A baseline 
scenario, essentially business as usual, must be established so that the emission 
reduction potential of the project can be determined. This basically involves a 
counterfactual analysis to establish the situation that would have obtained in the 
absence of the project activity, for example if, instead of electricity from solar panels, 
grid electricity – generated from fossil fuels - had been provided. Establishing the 
appropriate baseline is important – if it assumes little or no technological advance, in 
other words is set too low, the project developer will reap an unjustified advantage. 
If the baseline standard is too stringent – mandating “best available technology” 
when the prevailing standard is less-advanced technology – this would hinder rather 
                                                 
116 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 19, art. 12(5)(c). See also decision 17/CP.7, Report of the Conference of 
the Parties on its Seventh Session , Addendum, Part II: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties, vol. 
II, annex, para. 43, FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.2, which provides that “[a] CDM project activity is 
additional if the anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases by sources are reduced below those 
that would have occurred in the absence of the…CDM project activity.” 
117 Under the stricter standard recommended by the Methodology Panel, the additionality assessment 
must show that the proposed CDM project would not have occurred in the absence of the CDM. See 
Report of the Sixth Meeting of the Methodologies Panel, 7-8 July, available at 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/Panels/meth/Report_06_rev.pdf. For a discussion of additionality and the 
work of the subsidiary organs Protocol, see JANE ELLIS, OECD, EVALUATING EXPERIENCE WITH 
ELECTRICITY-GENERATING GHG MITIGATION PROJECTS, COM/ENV/EPOC/IEA/SLT(2003)8, 
12-16 (2003). For critical view of the approach to additionality, see Editor’s Note, CDM: Birth or 
Abortion, in 9(2) JOINT IMPLEMENTATION QUARTERLY (JIQ), July 2003, available at 
http://jiq.wiwo.nl/2-2003.pdf.  
118 Report of the Sixteenth Meeting of the CDM Executive  Board, Annex 1, 21-22 October 2004, available at 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/EB/Meetings. One of the steps that may be used in demonstrating 
additionality is a barrier analysis, including whether the proposed p roject faces technological barriers 
or is a “first of its kind” in the host country.  
119 See ELLIS, EVALUATING EXPERIENCE WITH ELECTRICITY-GENERATING GHG MITIGATION 
PROJECTS, supra note 117, at 18-19, setting out projects and additionality assessments.  
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than promote the transfer of cleaner technology to developing countries.120 The three 
alternative approaches prescribed for establishing a baseline methodology are strict 
but not overly stringent.121 (As it is, criticism has been directed not at the baselines, 
but rather at the question of additionality.) Technology considerations are thus a 
central element in structure of the CDM.  
CDM investment holds considerable potential with respect the transfer of 
low- and no GHG-emitting technology, particularly to the extent that it can stimulate 
or augment private sector inflows.122 The analysis of the methodological aspects of 
the CDM has shown how technology considerations are central to its 
implementation. However, the very rigor of the methodologies has served to 
constrain – if for good reason – the application of the CDM. Being predicated on 
efficiency, it has also meant that investors have sought out those projects offering 
the highest volume of CERs at the lowest cost, but not necessarily providing broader 
sustainable development benefits. If these projects capture the market, the twin 
promise of the CDM – GHG mitigation at low cost and the sustainable development 
in the host countries – will have been only partially fulfilled. This has implications for 
questions of equity. In addition, the private sector orientation of the CDM has also 
meant that investment has flowed to those countries that are already beneficiaries of 
FDI and have in place the required “enabling environment”. For instance, in 2004 
Africa accounted for only 5 per cent of expected credits,123 figure that is not set to 
change the end of the Kyoto first commitment period in 2012. The CDM is, of 
course, concerned with mitigation, but it points to broader concern – the focus on 
mitigation technology, at the expense of adaptation technology. This also raises 
equity questions because the adaptive capacity of developing countries is generally 
much weaker than that of developed countries, yet they are projected to bear the 
brunt of climate change impacts. There exists a need to better understand adaptation 
technology and to promote transfer and access to it. 
 
5.4 Sharing the burden – the GEF and the climate change funds  
This section examines the assistance provided to developing countries by the 
Global Environment Facility (GEF) and the climate change funds established under 
the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol, namely the special climate change fund, the 
Least Developed Countries Fund and the Adaptation Fund. 
 
                                                 
120 Michael A. Toman, Establishing and Operating the Clean Development Mechanism, in CLIMATE CHANGE 
ECONOMICS AND POLICY: AN RFF ANTHOLOGY, 216, 220 (Michael A. Toman, ed., 2001). 
121 Decision 17/CP.7, supra note 116, annex, para. 48(c): “The average emissions of similar project 
activities undertaken in the previous five years, in social, economic, environmental and technological 
circumstances, and whose performance is among the top 20 per cent of their category.” See also 
elaboration in Report of the Eighth Meeting of the CDM Executive Board,  Annex 1 (clarifications on issues 
relating to baseline and monitoring methodologies), 19-20 March 2003, available at 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/EB/Meetings/008/repan1.pdf. Further guidance is provided in Report of the 
Tenth Meeting of the CDM Executive Board, Annex 1, (Further clarification on methodological issues), 
available at http://cdm.unfccc.int/EB/Meetings/010/eb10repan1.pdf.  
122 ELLIS ET AL, supra note 85 at 7. 
123 Id. 
  155 
 
5.4.1 The Global Environment Facility 
The GEF stands out as a unique experiment in the international 
environmental arena, not only as the only source of funding dedicated to global 
environmental problems, but also in its governance structure.124 It supports projects 
to achieve agreed global environmental benefits in the field of climate change, 
biodiversity, international waters, protection of ozone layer, land degradation, and 
persistent organic pollutants.125 Since its inception in 1991, the GEF has made US 
$4.5 billion in grants and generated US $14.5 billion in co-financing for projects in 
developing countries and countries with economies in transition.126 The GEF stands 
as a hybrid – combining in its structure and decision-making procedures elements 
typical of United Nations entities with those associated with the Bretton Woods 
institutions. Its serves to secure “global public goods” by seeking to protect those 
features of the planet in which there is a collective interest.127 It also forms a key link 
in the “bargain” between developed and developing countries relating to the 
combating of global environmental problems. Thus one chronicler of the GEF has 
stated that:128  
“The main purpose of the GEF from a developing country perspective is to 
provide the financial means to incorporate measures for the global environment as 
part of other plans and activities. It enables developing countries to go beyond being 
part of rule-making at the international level, to become active participants in 
multilateral efforts to protect the global environment. And in those global 
                                                 
124 A good overview of the establishment and key institutional features of the GEF can be found in 
LAURENCE BOISSON DE CHAZOURNES, THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY AS A PIONEERING 
INSTITUTION: LESSONS LEARNED AND LOOKING AHEAD (GEF Working Paper 19, October 2003). 
Rich and comprehensive accounts of establishment and restructuring of the GEF are contained in 
two working papers prepared by HELEN SJÖBERG RESTRUCTURING THE GEF (Working Paper 13, 
September 1999) [Hereinafter SJÖBERG, RESTRUCTURING] and FROM IDEA TO REALITY: THE 
CREATION OF THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY (Working Paper 10, October 1994) 
[Hereinafter SJÖBERG, CREATION], both of which are available on the GEF website. See also Jacob 
Werksman, Consolidating Governance of the Global Commons: Insights from the Global Environment Facility, 6 
YRBK. INT. ENV. L. 27-63 (1995); Alan S. Miller, The Global Environment Facility and the Search for 
Financial Strategies to Foster Sustainable Development, 24 VT. L. REV. 1229 (2000); and Andrew Jordan, 
Paying the Incremental Costs of Global Environmental Protection: The Evolving Role of GEF, ENVIRONMENT, 
Jul. 1994, at 12. 
125 Instrument for the Establishment of the Restructured Global Environment Facility, as amended by the Second 
GEF Assembly, Beijing 2002, art. 1(2) available at http://thegef.org/GEF_Instrument3.pdf.   
126 http://www.gefweb.org/What_is_the_GEF/what_is_the_gef.html. In the pilot phase the 
thematic areas were confined four – climate change, biodiversity, international waters, and ozone 
depletion. Calls to include desertification were resisted by the developed countries, which feared that 
this would introduce a broader agenda, to the detriment of the four thematic areas. See SJÖBERG, 
RESTRUCTURING, supra note 124, at 19-20. The compromise solution, reflected in the 1994 
restructuring, provided that the GEF would cover “The agreed incremental costs of activities 
concerning land degradation, primarily desertification and deforestation, as they relate to the four 
focal areas shall be eligible for funding.” Amendments adopted by the Second GEF Assembly in 2002 
extended land degradation and persistent organic pollutants. See Second Assembly of the GEF, 
Beijing, China, 16-18 October 2002, Proposed Amendments to the Instrument, GEF/A.2/9, available at 
http://www.thegef.org/participants/Assembly/2nd_Assembly/2nd_assembly.html. See also 
Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, May 22, 2001, art. 13(6), concerning the 
financial mechanism for the Convention.  
127 BOISSON DE CHAZOURNES, supra note 124, at 1; SJÖBERG, RESTRUCTURING, supra note 124, at 52. 
128 SJÖBERG, RESTRUCTURING, supra note 124, at 52. 
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environmental areas covered by a convention, GEF funding enables developing 
country signatories to fulfill their obligations.”  
The genesis for the GEF is usually traced back to a 1989 French proposal, 
backed by a substantial financial commitment, to establish a fund of voluntary grants 
dedicated to the global environment.129 In pilot phase, from 1991-1994, the GEF was 
characterized by a loose institutional structure, heavily influenced by the World Bank 
and the donor countries, with limited participation from developing countries.130 It 
has been noted that donor countries also saw in the GEF a means to forestall a 
proliferation of funds, as well as discussions on alternative funding in the run-up to 
UNCED.131 Some saw the pilot phase as the first step in the direction of a more 
ambitious institution while others where adamant that it should only be temporary, 
filling the gap until the World Bank integrated environmental matters into its 
activities.132 Observers have stressed that, whatever its shortcomings, the pilot phase 
saw the establishment of the GEF in record time, despite the different and 
conflicting views with respect to formal structure and future of the entity.133 During 
the pilot phase, and as it has continued to do, the Bank acted as trustee for the GEF 
and, with UNDP and UNEP, was also one of the implementing agencies responsible 
for drawing up proposals and implementing projects.  
With the preparations for UNCED, and then its outcome, the dynamics 
around the GEF changed considerably. From a loose, collaborative structure 
between the Bank, UNDP and UNEP, the GEF was tossed into thick of 
environmental politics between industrialized and developing countries, which 
wanted a greater say in how the Fund was run.  With disenchantment over the failure 
to match the lofty goals in Agenda 21 with new and additional resources, as well as 
the rejection by the donor countries of new funds for the Conventions then being 
negotiated, developing countries underlined that the GEF would have to be 
restructured.134 In particular, they stressed that if the GEF was to serve as the 
financial mechanism for the Framework Convention, it would be required to “have 
an equitable and balanced representation of all Parties within a transparent system of 
governance.135 
The arguments of the developing countries concerning balanced 
representation and accountability were designed to shift an institution characterized 
by the World Bank formula of one dollar, one vote towards the more universal 
decision-making process associated with the United Nations. Framed in political 
terms, developing countries wished to have an equal say and employed the language 
of accountability, transparency and equitable representation; donor nations naturally 
wished to retain control over the resources they provided and to this end fell back on 
                                                 
129 BOISSON DE CHAZOURNES, supra note 124, at 5. 
130 The GEF was legally established by World Bank resolution 91-5 of March 1991, and the Bank 
controlled the trust fund, which put it in a very strong position. See BOISSON DE CHAZOURNES, supra 
note 124, at 8. 
131 See SJÖBERG, RESTRUCTURING, supra note 124, at 7 and also Jordan, supra note 124, at 12, 19. 
132 See SJÖBERG, CREATION, supra note 124, at 28-29. See also BOISSON DE CHAZOURNES, supra note 
124, at 6 and SJÖBERG, RESTRUCTURING, supra note 124, at 7. 
133 BOISSON DE CHAZOURNES, supra note 124, at 6. 
134 Id. at 8. 
135 See UNFCCC, supra note 1, arts. 11(2) and 21(3). 
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arguments of efficiency and effectiveness. An example for more balanced 
representation already existed in the form of the Montreal Protocol Multilateral 
Fund, established in 1991, whose Executive Committee is evenly divided among 
developed and developing countries.136 After a two-year negotiating process, which 
concluded in March 1994, there was agreement on a restructured institution that 
retained elements of the pilot phase, yet moved decisively in the direction of 
universal participation but without adopting the UN model. Participation in the GEF 
is open to any State member of the United Nations or any of its specialized 
agencies.137 The incoming Chairman of the GEF, Mr. Mohamed T. El-Ashry 
concluded that: “The revised institutional framework represents a change from old-
style assistance to new-style cooperation.”138  
The restructured GEF was not established as an international organization 
under treaty, but on a special legal basis where the States concerned gave their 
political assent to the Instrument for the Establishment of the Restructured Global 
Environment Facility, which in turn was adopted by the governing bodies of the 
three implementing agencies, with the latter step serving to establish the new GEF. 139 
Of the bodies established by the Instrument, the most important is the Council, 
which serves as the main executive organ of the GEF.140 Its composition proved 
contentious, with donor countries and developing countries vying for control. The 
32 seats on the Council are split between developed countries (14) and developing 
countries (1) and countries with economies in transition (2), that is to say nations of 
Eastern and Central Europe and the Former Soviet Union.141 Decisions are to be 
made on the basis of consensus,142 failing which a formal vote may be held, in which 
case a double-weighted majority is necessary consisting of “an affirmative vote 
representing both a 60 percent majority of the total number of Participants and a 60 
percent majority of the total contributions.”143 The restructuring also saw the 
formalization of the legal relationship between the GEF and the Conferences of the 
Parties to the Framework Convention and Biodiversity Convention, provided for in 
the Conventions and the Instrument.144 
                                                 
136 Details of procedures and voting at http://www.multilateralfund.org/executive_committee.htm. 
See also  UNEP/OzL.Pro.2/3. 
137 See GEF Instrument, supra note 125, para. 7. 
138 Mohamed T. El-Ashry, Commentary, The New GEF, ENVIRONMENT, Jul. 1994, at 36. 
139 BOISSON DE CHAZOURNES, supra note 124, at 10. 
140 Provision is also made for: an Assembly, consisting of representatives of all participating States, 
which meets every four years with the broad mandate to review the general policies and operations of 
the GEF; a Scientific and Technical Advisory Panel (STAP); and a “functionally independent” 
Secretariat. This latter development saw the Secretariat remain housed in the World Bank for 
administrative purposes, but not controlled by it. See BOISSON DE CHAZOURNES, supra note 124, at 12. 
141 GEF Instrument, supra note 125, at para. 16. 
142 Id. at para. 25(b). 
143 Id. at para. 25(c)(i). 
144 See UNFCCC, supra note 1, art. 11(3), Convention on Biological Diversity,  supra note 21, art. 21(1), 
and GEF Instrument, supra note 125, at para. 20(g). For an overview process and legal issues involved 
in formalizing the relationship between the GEF and the COPs, see BOISSON DE CHAZOURNES, supra 
note 124, at 21. A legal opinion prepared by United Nations Legal Counsel, dated 23 August 1994, 
noted that the GEF’s parent institutions (the World Bank, UNDP and UNEP) had not bestowed on 
it the legal capacity of entering into legally binding arrangements or agreements, with the consequence 
that any such agreements approved by the GEF Council would have to be formalized by the World 
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Paragraph 9 of the GEF Instrument states that where the GEF serves as the 
financial mechanisms of, respectively the Framework Convention, the Biodiversity 
Convention and the Stockholm Convention “…the Council shall act in conformity 
with the policies, program priorities and eligibility criteria decided by the Conference 
of the Parties for the purposes of the convention concerned.”145  The Memorandum 
of Understanding between the COP and the Council of the GEF, which gives effect 
to the respective roles and responsibilities of the two bodies, provides that the COP 
decides on “the policies, programme priorities and eligibility criteria related to the 
Convention for the financial mechanism which shall function under the guidance of 
and be accountable to the COP.”146 It also states that “[t]he Council will ensure the 
effective operation of the GEF as a source of funding activities for the purposes of 
the Convention in conformity with the guidance of the COP” (emphasis added).147 In 
practice, the COP issues “guidance”, while the GEF establishes operational 
procedures and detailed project eligibility rules for resource allocation. Accountability 
of the GEF to the COP takes the form of regular reporting on activities and 
resource programming proposals. Overall, while developing countries may use their 
clout in the COPs to draw up fairly expansive guidance, in the GEF it is the donor 
countries that set the agenda in the interpretation of COP guidance and its 
translation into concrete policies. In particular, groups of countries such as small 
island and Africa states criticise the GEF for not adhering more closely to the COP 
guidance. In legal terms, it is clear that the GEF Instrument and the MOU envisage 
the GEF being subject to the guidance of the COP, but not to function under its 
authority. This is an important distinction, and the provision that the GEF must 
action “in conformity” with such guidance does not alter the relationship much. The 
word “guidance” connotes something of a broader and policy-oriented character, 
contrasting for instance with “decisions”, “conclusions”, or “resolutions”. 
The GEF exists to fund only the “incremental cost” of projects in order to 
achieve global environmental benefits.148 The incremental cost is understood as that 
portion of the costs of a project conferring global benefits but which would not 
normally be in the interest of the host country to fund.149 While relatively 
                                                                                                                                     
Bank. See UN Doc. A/AC.237/74, annex, paras. 19-19. See also Robin R. Churchill & Geir Ulfstein, 
Autonomous Institutional Arrangements in Multilateral Environmental Agreements: A Little -Noticed Phenomenon in 
International Law, 94 A.J.I.L. 623, 650-651 (2000). 
145 Similarly, para. 20(h) of the GEF Instrument, supra note 125, states that the Council shall “ensure 
that GEF-financed activities relating to the conventions…conform with the policies, program 
priorities and eligibility criteria decided by the Conference of the Parties for the purposes of the 
convention concerned”.  The same language is echoed in para. 26, which provides that the “[t]he 
Council shall ensure the effective operation of the GEF as a source of funding activities…The use of 
the GEF resources for purposes of such conventions shall be in conformity with the policies, 
program priorities and eligibility criteria decided by the Conference of the Parties of each of those 
conventions.” 
146 Decision 12/CP.2, in Report of the Conference of  the Parties on its Second Session , Addendum, Part II: 
Action taken by the Conference of the Parties, Memorandum of Understanding between the Conference of the 
Parties and the Council of the Global Environment Facility, para.2, FCCC/CP/1996/15/Add.1 (2002). 
147 Id. at para.4. 
148 GEF Instrument, supra note 125, art. 2. 
149 Incremental cost is defined as “a measure of the future economic burden on the country that 
would result from its choosing the GEF supported activity in preference to one that would have been 
sufficient in the national interest.” See GEF, INCREMENTAL COSTS, GEF/C.7/Inf.5 (Paper prepared 
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straightforward in the abstract, it is more difficult to apply the concept in practice, 
and has proved controversial. Arriving at a baseline, on the basis of which the 
incremental amount is assessed, may involve subjective judgments.150 For instance, 
how does one assess what is in a country’s national interest, or what course of action 
a country would have pursued? Critics have also questioned the feasibility, in physical 
and biological terms, of differentiating between national and global benefits.151 To 
this the response is “…that this is a conceptual distinction, or analytic tool, for the 
purpose of decisions on funding. It does not mean that in practice implementation 
of GEF projects is to be separate from other activities.”152 
The basic objective of the GEF – helping developing countries contribute to 
the achievement of global environmental benefits – is an expression of the principle 
of common but differentiated responsibilities. As such, it is linked with, and 
buttressed by, concerns of international fairness and equity. Yet to the extent that 
donors control the institution, it mirrors the traditional model of aid as charity or 
enlightened self-interest, rather than a partnership. With the advent of more 
equitable representation the institution gained greater legitimacy.  
 
5.4.2 Climate change funds 
The preceding part has set out the genesis and basic operation of the GEF, 
while aspects of its operations relating to disbursement of resources were covered 
under technology transfer. As outlined above, the GEF acts as the financial 
mechanism for the Convention, and it functions under of, and is accountable to, the 
COP. At COP-7 in 2001, the parties established three new, dedicated climate change 
funds, each with their own mandate but all managed by the GEF. Two funds, the 
Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF) and the Least Developed Countries Fund 
(LDCF), were established under the Convention.153 They are operated by the GEF, 
with the same relationship vis-à-vis the COP with respect to the existing institutional 
arrangements.154 The Adaptation Fund (AF), established under the Protocol,155 marks 
a break with these arrangements because the COP/MOP has decided that the Fund 
should “operate under the authority and guidance of and be accountable to” the 
COP/MOP (emphasis added).156 The lion’s share of the resources in all three funds 
will be dedicated to activities designed to assist countries adapt to climate change. In 
                                                                                                                                     
for the April 1996 Meeting of the GEF Council), available at 
http://www.gefweb.org/council/council7/c7inf5.htm.  
150 SJÖBERG, RESTRUCTURING, supra note 124, at 52.  
151 Jordan, supra note 124, at 31. 
152 SJÖBERG, RESTRUCTURING, supra note 124,at 51-52. 
153 Decision 7/CP.7, in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Seventh Session, Addendum, Part II: 
Action taken by the Conference of the Parties, vol. I, FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1 (2002) (establishing 
the Special Climate Change Fund and the  Least Developed Countries Fund). 
154 Id. Decision 7/CP.7 provides that two funds will be operated by the GEF “under the guidance of 
the COP”.  
155 Decision 10/CP.7, in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Seventh Session, Addendum, Part II: 
Action taken by the Conference of the Parties, vol. I, FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1 (2002). (establishing 
the Adaptation Fund). 
156 Decision 5/CMP.2, in Report of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol on its second session, Addendum, Part II: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties, para. 
1(e), FCCC/KP/CMP/2006/10/Add.1 (2007). 
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this respect, the GEF itself has also established a financing window for adaptation, 
known as the Special Priority on Adaptation, to pilot adaptation activities.  
 
Funding status – GEF and multilateral climate change funds 
Fund Amount US$ million 
GEF – Strategic 
Priority on Adaptation 
49.0 
LDC Fund 61.8 
SCCF 53.3 
Adaptation Fund (figure unknown) 
Total 164.1 
Source: Compiled from GEF documents 
 
The current and potential future funding from the climate change funds must 
be put into perspective against estimated adaptation financing needs. The costs of 
adaptation in developing countries remain highly uncertain, but an influential study 
on the economics if climate place estimated the costs required to adapt investments 
to climate risk at US$ 40 billion, with a range of US$ 10 – 100 billion.157 Another 
study, which analyzed the additional investments and financial flows for adaptation 
in 2030, concluded that an estimated US$ 28 – 67 billion could be required in 
developing countries.158 
 
5.4.2.1 Special Climate Change Fund 
The Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF) finances activities, complementary 
to regular GEF climate change programs, under the following four “windows” 
provided for in paragraph 2 of decision 7/CP.7: (a) adaptation; (b) transfer of 
technologies; (c) energy, transport, industry, agriculture, forestry and waste 
management; and (d) activities to assist oil-exporting developing countries in 
diversifying their economies.159 This last window is intended to give effect to article 
4(8)(h) of the Convention, which concerns the adverse impact of mitigation 
measures on developing countries whose economies rely on fossil fuel exports. At 
COP-9 in 2003, the parties decided to assign priority to adaptation activities, while 
also agreeing that technology transfer and related capacity building activities were 
also essential.160 That decision elaborates several adaptation activities that should be 
supported under the SCCF, including water resources management, infrastructure 
development, fragile ecosystems, improving the monitoring of disease vectors, 
supporting capacity-building for preventive measures, and strengthening national and 
regional canters and information networks for rapid response to extreme weather 
events.  
                                                 
157 NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE, THE STERN REVIEW, CABINET 
OFFICE, HM TREASURY 442 (2006). See also THE WORLD BANK, CLEAN ENERGY AND 
DEVELOPMENT: TOWARDS AN INVESTMENT FRAMEWORK (2006). 
158 UNFCCC, INVESTMENT AND FINANCIAL FLOWS TO ADDRESS CLIMATE CHANGE para. 26 (2007) 
159 Decision 7/CP.7, supra note 153, para. 2. 
160 Decision 5/CP.9, Report of the Meeting of the Parties on its Ninth Session , Addendum, Part II: Action 
taken by the Conference of the Parties, vol. I, para. 1(c) -(d), FCCC/CP/2003/6/Add.1 (2004). 
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Based on the guidance from the COP, the GEF developed proposal for 
programming under the SCCF, which provides that the fund “be available to finance 
the additional costs of achieving sustainable development imposed on vulnerable 
countries by the impacts of climate change.”161 Thus the SCCF is complementary to 
the GEF Trust Fund because it may support adaptation activities that generate 
primarily local benefits, as opposed to the latter, which may be used to support 
adaptation activities primarily linked to producing global environmental benefits, for 
instance in the area of bio-diversity. In order to expedite the processing of financing, 
the GEF also proposed the adoption of a presumptive co-financing sliding 
proportional scale, set out in the table below. The share of funds that can be 
accessed under SCCF depends on the overall scale of the project. Where projects fall 
within the ambit of the sliding scale they can be approved without project-by-project 
negotiations to determine the additional costs of adaptation.  
 
SCCF: Proposed sliding scale for co-financing 
Total project cost (US$) Share covered by Fund 
<$1 million up to 50% 
<$1.5 million up to 33% 
>$5 million  up to 25%  
Source: GEF 
 
The GEF programming document sought to address donor concerns about 
the open-ended nature of financing under windows (c) and (d) by addressing only 
adaptation and technology transfer, which were highlighted in decision 5/CP.9. 
Furthermore, the document provides that while there is one Fund, contributions will 
be pledged and contributed for a specific program – for example adaptation - and 
separate financial records and accounts will be maintained for each program.162 Thus, 
although the decision 7/CP.7 provides that the SCCF will support activities in all 
four areas, the establishment of distinct programs and dedicated administrative 
arrangements permits donors to fund only those parts of the COP decision that they 
wish to support.163 Donors have contributed US$ 10.6 million for the program on 
technology transfer and US$ 42.4 million for adaptation.164  Some US$ 25 million, 
roughly a quarter of the total cost, has been approved for eight projects.165 
Concerns were raised by some developing countries that the co-financing 
required under the sliding scale would effectively bar them from accessing the Fund, 
and that elements of the GEF programming document introduced new 
conditionalities that strayed into the mandate of the COP to set policies and 
                                                 
161 GEF, PROGRAMMING TO IMPLEMENT THE GUIDANCE FOR THE SPECIAL CLIMATE CHANGE 
FUND, GEF/C.24/12, para. 55 (2004). 
162 Id. at para. 37. 
163 See M.J. Mace, Funding for Adaptation to Climate Change: UNFCCC and GEF Developments since COP-7, 
14 (3) REVIEW OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 225, 237 
(2005). 
164 GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY, STATUS REPORT ON CLIMATE CHANGE FUNDS AS OF APRIL 
30, 2007 GEF/LDCF.SCCF.2/Inf.2,annex 2 (2007). 
165 GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY, LDCF AND SCCF PROGRAMMING UPDATE, 
GEF/LDCF.SCCF.2/INF.3, 7 (2007). 
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priorities.166 In decision 1/CP.12, adopted in 2006, the COP notes “the concerns 
expressed by most Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention with regard to 
the operational criteria and policies to be followed in financing activities under the 
Special Climate Change Fund during an initial five-year period” as set out in the 
programming document endorsed by the GEF Council.167 In that decision the COP 
decided that the SCCF will be used to fund activities under paragraphs 2(d) and (e) 
of decision 7/CP.7, that is mitigation projects in areas such energy efficiency, as well 
as assisting oil-exporting countries with economic diversification.168 
The most recent status report for the SCCF states that funds available stood 
at US$ 53.3 million.169 Both the rather modest funding available to date, as well as the 
need to avoid duplication of regular GEF climate change activities, militates for 
projects to be carefully selected.170 The Convention recognizes the specific needs and 
special situation of the LDCs with regard to funding and technology transfer.171  
 
5.4.2.2 Least Developed Countries Fund  
The LDC Fund (LDCF) is primarily charged with assisting least developed 
countries (LDCs) prepare and implement national adaptation programmes of action 
(NAPAs).172 These consist of a process designed to enable LDCs identify priority 
activities responding to their urgent and immediate adaptation needs.173 The category 
of LDCs consists of 50 countries with low capital and human resources, and which 
therefore have limited ability to adapt to the adverse effects of climate change. The 
most recent status report for the LDCF states that an amount of US$ 9.8 million had 
been disbursed for projects and assets stood at US$ 52 million.174  
Although managed by the GEF, modifications have been made so that 
certain of that institution’s normal procedures are not applicable to the LDCF. 175 
One of these is the concept of “incremental costs” – additional costs associated with 
transforming a project with national benefits into one with global environmental 
                                                 
166 Mace, supra note 163, at 238. 
167 Decision 1/CP.12, in Report of the Meeting of the Parties on its Twelfth Session , Addendum, Part II: 
Action taken by the Conference of the Parties, vol. I, FCCC/CP/2006/5/Add.1 (2007). 
168 Id. decision 1/CP.12, paras. 1and 2. 
169 GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY, STATUS REPORT ON CLIMATE CHANGE FUNDS, supra note 164,  
at 2 
170 The GEF is developing guidelines for activities under the SCCF, see Report of the GEF to the Tenth 
Session of the Conference of the Parties to United Nations Convention on Climate Change, 7 October 2004, annex 
d, contained in Report by the GEF to the Conference of the Parties, Note by the Secretariat , FCCC/CP/2004/6. 
171 UNFCC, supra note 1 art. 4(9). 
172 Decision 5/CP.7, in Report of the Meeting of the Parties on its Seventh Session, Addendum, Part II: Action 
taken by the Conference of the Parties, vol. I, para. 12, FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1 (2002). See also 
Mace, supra note 163, at 238-240. 
173. The COP has set out detailed guidelines for the preparation of national adaptation programmes of 
action.  See decision 28/CP.7, in Report of the Meeting of the Parties on its Seventh Session , Addendum, Part 
II: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties, vol. IV, FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.4 (2002). 
174 GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY, STATUS REPORT ON CLIMATE CHANGE FUNDS, supra note 164, 
at 3. 
175 GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY, PROGRAMMING PAPER FOR FUNDING THE IMPLEMENTATION 
OF NAPAS UNDER THE LDC TRUST FUND, GEF/C.28/18, para. 5 (2006). Thus the principle of 
financing incremental costs for global benefits and the Resource Allocation Framework are not 
applicable to the LDCF or the SCCF. However, the double-majority voting procedure is applicable.  
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benefits – that guides GEF financing under its main Trust Fund.176 In practice 
concept is contentious and, more importantly, adaptation activities by definition 
deliver local and not global benefits. The LDCF will support the “additional costs” 
arising from meeting the extra adaptation needs imposed on LDCs by the effects of 
climate change.177 In a situation where a community is planning to construct a water 
supply system, the additional costs covered by the Fund would consist only of the 
added expense of ensuring that the infrastructure can cope with the expected 
increase in flooding and droughts from climate change. The underlying cost of the 
water supply system – before “climate-proofing” – falls to the community and is not 
covered by the Fund. The portion supported by the Fund is thus the difference 
between the baseline scenario and the adaptation scenario. In short, in practice the 
additional costs requirement seems very close to the concept of incremental costs. It 
is not clear where the formula of “additional costs” leaves projects that might not be 
necessary at all in the absence of climate change, for instance planning for and 
implementing coastal defense measures. 
In order to simplify the operation of the additional cost criterion in practice, 
the GEF has proposed an optional sliding scale for determining the portion of 
financing eligible under the LCDF. Recognizing the particular vulnerability of LDCs, 
the sliding scale for use under the Fund requires less co-financing for smaller 
projects than the scale proposed for the SCCF.178 Smaller projects focusing on 
capacity building activities are almost certain to be additional – without climate 
change there would be no need for them. Accordingly, for such projects the sliding 
scale provides that Fund will cover the full, or almost the full, cost of the activity. 
The proposed sliding scale, set out in the table below, requires considerably less co-
financing than an earlier GEF proposal that was subject to criticism from small 
islands and African countries at COP-10.179 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
176 See GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY, INCREMENTAL COST POLICY PAPER (1996), available at 
http://www.gefweb.org/council/council7/c7inf5.htm. 
177 GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY, PROGRAMMING PAPER FOR FUNDING THE IMPLEMENTATION 
OF NAPAS UNDER THE LDC TRUST FUND, supra note 175, at paras. 18-20. In decision 6/CP.9, supra 
note 160, at para. 3(c), the COP requested the GEF to consider “[c]riteria for supporting activities on 
an agreed full-cost basis”, which is a somewhat confusing formulation.  However, in decision 
3/CP.11, in Report of the Meeting of the Parties on its Eleventh Session, Addendum, Part II: Action taken by 
the Conference of the Parties, para. 2, FCCC/CP/2005/5/Add.1, the COP stated that “full-cost 
funding shall be provided by the Least Developed Countries Fund to meet the additional costs of 
activities to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change”. A footnote provides that for “this 
decision ‘additional costs’ means the costs imposed on vulnerable countries to meet their immediate 
adaptation needs.”  
178 GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY, PROGRAMMING PAPER FOR FUNDING THE IMPLEMENTATION 
OF NAPAS UNDER THE LDC TRUST FUND, GEF/C.28/18  para. 29 (2006). 
179 Mace, supra note 163, at 239. The proposed sliding scale is set out in GEF, ELEMENTS TO BE 
TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN FUNDING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF NAPAS UNDER THE LDC FUND, 
GEF/C.24/Inf.7, para. 22 (2004). For projects up to $250,000 it was proposed to cover a maximum 
of half the cost and for projects between $2-5 million a third of the cost. See 
http://www.gefweb.org/Documents/Council_Documents/GEF_C24/gef_c24.html, last accessed 29 
April 2007. 
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LDC Fund: Proposed sliding scale for co-financing 
Total project cost (US$) Share covered by Fund 
<$300,000 up to 100% 
<$500,000 up to 75% or max. of $375,000 
<$6 million up to 50% or max. of $3 million 
<$18 million up to 33% or a max. of $6 
million 
>$18 million up to 25% or max. determined 
by overall LDCF funding 
availability 
Source: GEF  
 
A review of the LDCs that have submitted NAPAs - 14 of a total of 49 as of 
April 2007 - reveals that these countries have identified immediate priority 
adaptation needs of about US$ 314 million.180 This compares unfavorably with the 
US$52 million that remains available in the LDCF.181 Once remaining 35 LDCs 
submit their NAPAs, the cumulative funding required could quite possibly exceed 
US$ 1 billion. Assuming that this figure represents the total cost as estimated by the 
countries concerned – which is in fact the case with almost all NAPAs submitted to 
date – then what would constitute the approximate value of the “additional cost”? 
This is the amount to be covered by the LCDF, determined either in accordance 
with a sliding scale or on a project-by-project basis. An overview of projects 
proposed indicates that many fall in the range where financing on the sliding scale 
would be either full or three-quarters of the project cost. (In comparison, the ratio of 
GEF resources to co-financing in the overall GEF Trust Fund, which stands at 
about 1 to 4.182). Assuming conservatively that the full cost of all priority projects 
identified in the NAPAs amounts to US$ 1 billion, this could imply funding needs in 
the region of US$ 300 to 500 million, or around six to ten times the currently 
available amount from the LCDF. It must also be borne in mind that the NAPAs are 
intended to identify only the most immediate and pressing adaptation needs; the full 
extent of adaptation funding required is much higher. The first six NAPAs have 
been approved for funding, with the Fund covering US$ 15 million, roughly a third 
of the total cost.183  
In conclusion, for the LCDF to meaningfully fulfill its functions donors 
would have to substantially increase their contributions. In equity terms, the LCDF is 
intended to assist those countries who are likely to be hardest hit by climate change, 
                                                 
180 Authors calculations based on NAPAs submitted to the UNFCCC Secretariat and made available 
on the website at http://unfccc.int/adaptation/napas/items/2679.php  Of the 14 countries, the 
NAPA of Niger does not provide any costing for the projects identified.  Calculations based on 
estimated total project cost, except where countries have identified the proposed GEF share and co -
financing, as in the case of Haiti. 
181 See text accompanying note 174. Decision 6/CP.9, supra note 160, at para. 2, directs the GEF to 
support the implementation of NAPAs as soon as possible after their completion. 
182 Every $1 of GEF financing leverages almost $4 in co -financing. See GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 
FACILITY, ANNUAL REPORT 2005 3 (2006). 
183 GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY, LDCF AND SCCF PROGRAMMING UPDATE, supra note 165, at 
3-4. 
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possess the lowest adaptive capacity, and have contributed least to rising 
concentrations of GHGs. 
 
5.4.2.3 Adaptation Fund 
The Adaptation Fund (AF) was established at COP-7 in 2001, pursuant to 
article 12(8) of the Kyoto Protocol, which provides that the COP serving as the 
meeting of the parties to the Protocol “shall ensure that a share of the proceeds 
from” CDM projects is used “to assist developing countries that are particularly 
vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change to meet the costs of adaptation”. 
The Adaptation Fund is intended to finance concrete adaptation projects and 
programs in developing countries that are parties to the Protocol, which will include 
activities in the areas of natural resources management, improving the monitoring of 
diseases and vectors affected by climate change, and supporting capacity building for 
preventive measures and preparedness for disasters relating to climate change.184 
According to principles meant to guide the Fund, it will “operate under the authority 
and guidance of and be accountable to” the Conference of the Parties serving as the 
meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (COP/MOP) “which shall decide on its 
overall policies”.185 An important feature that distinguishes the Adaptation Fund 
from the other funds is that its governing body has a majority of members from 
developing countries (non-Annex 1) and follows a one-country-one vote rule, as 
opposed to the “double majority” of the other funds under the GEF voting 
system.186 At the Bali Conference in December 2007, the COP/MOP decided that 
the GEF would manage Adaptation Fund, on an interim basis.187 The parties have 
decided that the AF will fund projects and programs to address the adverse effects of 
climate change on a “full adaptation cost basis”.188  
Pursuant to article 12(9) of the Protocol, the Fund is financed by a two per 
cent share of the proceeds from clean development projects, with the exception of 
projects situated in LDCs.189 In addition to the share of proceeds, the AF is also 
intended to receive contributions from Annex 1 parties that have ratified the 
Protocol.190 The resources available from the AF depend on the total number of 
CERs issued and the value obtained when they are monetized, both variables that are 
subject to some uncertainty. A recent analysis puts the projected supply of CERs 
spanning a range from 1.9 to 4.4 billion.191 The most recent market survey reveals 
                                                 
184 See decisions 5/CP.7 and 10/CP.7, supra note 172. 
185 Decision 5/CMP.2, supra note 156, at para. 1(e). 
186 Id. See chapter 3 for more details. 
187 Decision 1/CMP.3, adopted at the Third Session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the 
Meeting of the Parties, 3-15 December 2007, advance, unedited copy available on the website of the 
UNFCCC secretariat, http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_13/application/pdf/cmp_af.pdf.  See 
chapter 3 for more details. 
188 Decision 5/CMP.2, supra note 156,at para. 1(d). 
189 See decision 10/CP.7, in Report of the Meeting of the Parties on its Seventh Session, Addendum, Part II: 
Action taken by the Conference of the Parties, vol. I, para. 2, FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1 (2002) and 
decision 17/CP.7, Report of the Meeting of the Parties on its Seventh Session, Addendum, Part II: Action 
taken by the Conference of the Parties, vol. II, para. 15(a)-(b), FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.2 (2002). 
190 See decision 10/CP.7, supra note 189. 
191 AXEL MICHAELOWA, CLIMATE STRATEGIES, HOW MANY CERS WILL THE CDM PRODUCE BY 
2012? (Discussion Paper CDM-2) 7 (2007). The Secretariat of the UNFCCC projects a supply of more 
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that the weighted average price of CERs was of US$ 10.90, with most transactions in 
the range of US$ 8-14.192 One observer estimates that the Fund may generate 
between US$ 160 and US$ 950 million, dwarfing cumulative contributions to the 
LDC and the Special Climate Change Funds, which in 2007 stood at roughly US$ 
110 million.193 Calculations based on the potential supply of CERs suggest that Fund 
could yield between US$ 414 and US$ 959 million.194 The viability of the Fund 
depends very much on the continuation of the CDM or similar interest under a post-
2012 climate agreement. 
The brief overview the three climate funds underlines the preoccupation of 
developing countries with adaptation, which is quite understandable given the threats 
they face from the adverse effects of climate change. Since adaptation activities are 
by definition local, and thus do not provide global benefits, they are not eligible for 
funding under the GEF. One might also expect that this would influence the 
willingness of donor countries to fund adaptation projects. Overall, it seems fairly 
clear that the financial resources committed to the funds are only a very modest first 
step to address the adaptation funding needs of developing countries. At the seventh 
Conference of the Parties, Marrakesh, the European Union, together with a number 
of other industrialized countries, pledged to collectively contribute Euro 450/US$ 
410 annually by 2005 to the GEF climate change activities and the climate change 
funds.195 Donor countries will need to deliver on pledges such as these if the climate 
change funds are to address the pressing adaptation needs of developing countries. 
 
5.5 Conclusions  
This chapter has analyzed the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities from a theoretical perspective. Although equal application of the law, 
derived from the principle of the sovereign equality of states is the norm under 
international law, forms of differentiation exist, particularly in the field of 
international environmental law. Various justifications have been advanced for 
differentiation: as a means to promote a “shared” compact to tackle global problems, 
                                                                                                                                     
than 2.6 billion CERs by 2012, but this is a straight extrapolation that does not account for non- or 
under-delivery by some projects.  See http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics/index.html , last accessed 6 
February 2008. 
192 See KARAN CAPOOR & PHILIPPE AMBROSI, WORLD BANK, STATE AND TRENDS OF THE CARBON 
MARKET 2007 4, 31 (2007), available at http://carbonfinance.org/docs/Carbon_Trends_2007-
_FINAL_-_May_2.pdf., last accessed 6 February 2008.  
193 BENITO MUËLLER, OXFORD INSTITUTE FOR ENERGY STUDIES, NAIROBI 2006: TRUST AND THE 
FUTURE OF ADAPTATION FUNDING 3 (2007). 
194 The figures are calculated based on potential range in supply of 1.9 to 4.4 billion CERs, as 
suggested by M ICHAELOWA, supra note 191, at 7, and applying a CER price of US$10.9, which is the 
most recent average price available.  
195 Statement by Belgium on behalf of the European Commission, its Member States and Canada, 
Iceland, New Zealand, Norway, and Switzerland, Note by the Secretariat, Statements made in connection with 
the approval of the Bonn Agreements on the implementation of the Buenos Aires Plan of Action (decision 5/CP.6) , 
FCCC/CP/2001/MISC.4. The relevant section paragraph states: “We are prepared to contribute US $ 
410 million, which is 450 million Euro, per year by 2005 with this level to be reviewed in 2008. 
Funding to be counted can include: contributions to GEF climate change related activities; bilateral 
and multilateral funding additional to current levels; funding for the special climate change funds, the 
Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund and the LDC fund; and funding deriving from the share of 
proceeds of the clean development mechanism following entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol.” 
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as a way of reflecting the responsibility for environmental degradation, and to reflect 
that notion that on account of their greater financial and technical resources 
industrialized countries ought to take the lead in combating global environmental 
problems. The conclusion reached in this chapter is that the principle of common 
but differentiated responsibilities gives effect to conceptions of equity and fairness in 
international environmental law and policy-making. The accepted view among most 
scholars is that the principle has not attained the status of customary international. 
And while it is submitted that this conclusion is correct, it should not lead one to 
dismiss the principle as of no relevance to the international legal and policy discourse 
on climate change. The view adopted here is that the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities is a background principle straddling the divide between 
the legal and the political in international forums on sustainable development. One 
the one hand the principle reflects political realities and interests, on the other it 
appears in legal instruments and is used to justify, explain and interpret legal 
obligations. 
The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities may risk being 
regarded as contributing to the lack of progress on international climate policy, 
perhaps leading some to claim in exasperation that it means no, rather than common, 
commitments for developing countries. Admittedly, for those desiring agreement on 
a climate policy that binds all major emitters to limit or cut emissions, the invocation 
of the principle can appear to be little more than a blocking maneuver. Yet in these 
circumstances the principle pf common but differentiated responsibilities provides 
the vital service of encouraging a consideration of context and differences in 
circumstances among countries facing a global threat, with widely varying resources 
at their disposal, and with varying assessments of priorities and expectations of 
impacts. In such an international system, which lacks an arbiter of last resort, it is not 
surprising that the principle of common but differential responsibilities is something 
of a messy conglomerate, subject to range of interpretations.  
What are the limits to the application and interpretation of the principle? 
Two boundaries that have been suggested are: first, the differentiation must 
contribute to the achievement of the common environmental goal, and second, that 
it must cease when the relevant differences no longer exist.196 Thus, in the context of 
the Convention, the principle must contribute to the achievement of its ultimate 
object, namely the stabilization of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere at a level that 
is not dangerous. Although historical responsibility for the accumulation of 
greenhouse gases must be taken into account, the common commitment to 
Convention’s ultimate objective places limits on the differentiation in favor of 
developing countries that are large emitters, whether measured in absolute or per 
capita terms. To avoid a slide into unfairness, the second boundary suggests that 
differentiation should be time-bound and subject to review of whether the relevant 
differences continue to prevail.197 Since countries disagree on what constitutes 
“relevant differences” justifying differentiation, this may be more difficult than it 
seems. 
This chapter also covered the practical application of differentiation in the 
climate regime, in the form of the institutions and mechanisms to promote 
                                                 
196 RAJAMANI, supra note 18, at 253-254. 
197 RAJAMANI, supra note 18, at 254. 
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technology transfer and financial assistance to combat climate change. With respect 
to options for accelerating the transfer and diffusion of clean energy technology, it 
appears clear that the general trend towards market-based solutions will continue, so 
that mechanisms such as partnerships, joint ventures, and licensing arrangements will 
be continue to be of importance. The question is whether this is enough to get the 
job done – will developing countries be able to afford cleaner technologies and adopt 
them in sectors where they have the greatest impact. At the international level, 
investment and subsidies should shifted from fossil fuels to cleaner energy, including, 
but not limited to renewables, as it should be recognized that large-scale 
electrification simply cannot, at this stage, be carried out with wind or solar energy, 
and providing access to basic energy services would have a negligible impact on 
global carbon dioxide emissions. Re-allocating subsidies and investment would apply 
to the World Bank, bi-lateral aid agencies, import-export banks. The Global 
Environment Facility would need to have its funding significantly augmented.  
In a future climate agreement, consideration should also be given to the 
strengthening the provisions related to research, development and deployment of 
cleaner technology, perhaps in the form of clean technology protocol, which would 
include provisions related to technology transfer. A greater emphasis on technology, 
whether in the form of a protocol or not, should seek to achieve three things: first, 
consensus on significant action by group of countries that are the greatest 
contributors to GHG emissions, recognizing that a different strategy of a different 
scale and scope is required; second, augmenting those funds to transfer technology 
to the least developed countries, which would assure them that they will not be left 
out, thus minimizing opposition to initiatives comprising major emitters; and three, a 
range of voluntary commitments and partnerships specifically aimed at clean and low 
emissions technology.  
Finally, the international community is in 2008 on the cusp of defining the 
next stage of the collective effort to combat climate change. It is not unexpected that 
the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities is coming to the fore 
once more. Although the world has changed a great deal since the adoption of key 
milestones in the area of climate change and sustainable development – the Rio 
Conference and adoption of the Convention in 1992 and the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 
– basic differences in wealth, perception and outlook persist among nations. 
Confronting the worsening environmental outlook demands a forward-looking 
interpretation of principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. In 
fashioning such an interpretation, the parties must creatively articulate and give effect 
to common responsibilities, while also accounting for the very real and relevant 
differences among members of the international community. 
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Chapter 6 -Evaluation of proposals for future climate policy 
 
6.1 Introduction 
There are a great number of ideas on how to design the next phase of the 
climate regime. While some proposals are variations on basic themes, a recent survey 
of approaches for advancing international climate policy counted 40 proposals.1 This 
chapter outlines the features of a number of the main proposals and assesses them 
according to equity criteria. Accordingly this chapter begins with an overview of the 
various assessment criteria for a future climate change agreement – and the burden-
sharing rules they contain – reflect general principles of fairness. Although equity is 
the subject of this study, it is only one among a range of criteria by which to assess 
climate policy proposals. Consistency with principles of equity and fairness is of 
limited use if the proposal at issue is politically unacceptable and of limited feasibility 
in policy. Accordingly, this chapter also seeks to evaluate the proposals against a 
number of assessment criteria drawn from the literature on the subject.2 The chapter 
sets out to do two things. First, it sets out a set of policy criteria that are for 
evaluating climate change proposals. Second, it assesses a small, but representative 
sample of actual proposals in the light of both equity principles and the set of policy 
criteria.  
Earlier it was concluded that no single account of equity or fairness could 
satisfy the demands placed on it by parties with competing conceptions of what is 
fair and just and divergent material interests.3 Instead a promising approach is to 
identify different aspects or dimensions of equity and apply them in the analysis. 
Accordingly, in a previous chapter the following general fairness and equity 
principles were selected as representative and useful in the climate change context: 
egalitarian; responsibility or contribution; need; and capability. Taking one step 
further it is in the analysis of equity and fairness one can usefully distinguish: (a) 
general principles of fairness and equity operating at a high level of generality; (b) 
more specific burden-sharing rules, which incorporate concrete applications of one 
or more general principles; and (c) operational indicators for putting in place of 
burden-sharing proposals.4 An example of a burden-sharing rule would be the 
“Brazilian proposal” to allocate mitigation targets on the basis of the impact of 
historical emissions on temperature increase. In this case the operational indicators 
                                                 
1 DANIEL BODANSKY, INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE EFFORTS BEYOND 2012: A SURVEY OF 
APPROACHES, PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE (2004).  
2 The following part draws on criteria used by BODANSKY, supra note 1;  AARON COSBEY ET AL 
WHICH WAY FORWARD? ISSUES IN DEVELOPING AN EFFECTIVE CLIMATE REGIME AFTER 2012, 
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (2005); JOSEPH E. ALDY, SCOTT 
BARRETT & ROBERT N. STAVINS, THIRTEEN PLUS ONE: A COMPARISON OF GLOBAL CLIMATE 
POLICY ARCHITECTURES, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE (2003); Axel Michaelowa, Kristian Tangen & 
Henrik Hasselknippe, Issues and Options for the post -2012 Climate Architecture- An Overview, 5 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS 5, 16-18 (2005). 
3 See chapter 4. 
4 CICERO & ECN, SHARING THE BURDEN OF GREENHOUSE GAS MITIGATION, FINAL REPORT OF 
THE OINT CICERO-ECN PROJECT ON THE GLOBAL DIFFERENTIATION OF EMISSION MITIGATION 
TARGETS AMONG COUNTRIES 13-14 (2001). 
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would consist of the methodologies for calculating historical emissions, as well as for 
deriving changes in average mean surface temperature. 
This part sets out a range of policy criteria for assessing climate change 
proposals, beginning with an overview of the manner in which targets and 
commitments are framed.5 The farming of the target has implications for the 
perceived fairness of a proposal, as well its political acceptability. The first approach 
is that followed in the Kyoto Protocol - fixed emission limitation and reduction 
targets, measured against a fixed baseline, with default set at 1990 emission levels. 
The setting of differentiated targets makes it possible to reflect equity concerns and 
the individual circumstances of countries. In theory, more rational methods can be 
applied to determine targets than the “climate bazaar” haggling that characterized the 
Kyoto negotiations. Because economic growth is uncertain over longer periods of 
time, such as the 5-10 years commonly mentioned, opponents point out that fixed 
targets have the potential to become straitjacket. For this reason, a number of more 
flexible types of targets have been proposed, such as indexing the emissions 
commitment to a variable such as economic growth. Another variant is a GHG 
intensity target, which allows absolute emissions to increase, but commits a country 
to reducing the GHG emissions per unit of economic output. An emissions intensity 
target is a key component of the current U.S. climate policy.6 Since uncertainty about 
economic growth and overall development is greatest for developing nations, 
intensity targets are often suggested as especially appropriate for this category of 
states. Seen more generally, such targets are regarded as a means to broaden 
participation in a future climate agreement, which has the beneficial effect of 
countering “leakage” – the movement of industries from regions subject to controls 
to those that are not, with the associated competitiveness concerns – and broadening 
the market for emissions trading, thus lowering abatement costs. Intensity targets 
tend to be set so that absolute emissions continue rising, yet atmospheric 
stabilization of GHGs requires that emissions from industrialized countries begin to 
decline in absolute terms. This suggests that such targets as more suited for 
developing countries.7  
Another approach that is designed to provide flexibility is “no lose” targets, 
which are non-binding emission limitation or reduction commitments; exceeding 
them has no compliance implications, but if emissions are held below the target, the 
difference could be sold on the carbon market. By creating an incentive to mitigate 
without punishing shortfalls, this type of mechanism could contribute to the 
mitigation objective, as well as promoting equity and inclusivity because less-
                                                 
5 BODANSKY, supra note 1, at 10-13; CÉDRIC PHILIBERT, INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, 
CLIMATE M ITIGATION: APPROACHES FOR FUTURE INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, 
COM/ENV/EPOC/IEA/SLT(2005)10 (2005).  
6 The National Climate Action Plan sets an intensity reduction of 2 per cent per year. Critics charge 
that the target amounts to “business-as-usual” and will not require any effort to meet. During the 
period 1990-2004, U.S. emissions have risen by 15.4 per cent while GDP increased by 51 per cent, 
ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION AGENCY, INVENTORY OF U.S. GHG EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990-2004 
(2006), http://epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/usinventoryreport.html . It is projected that 
emissions will grow by 11.2 per cent from 2002-2012, Andrew C. Revkin, U.S. Predicting Steady Increase 
for Emissions, NY TIMES March 3, 2007. 
7 NIKLAS HÖHNE & ESTHER LAHME, TYPES OF FUTURE COMMITMENTS UNDER THE UNFCCC AND 
THE KYOTO PROTOCOL POST 2012  (WWF Briefing Paper 8, 2005). 
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developed countries could benefit from emissions trading. The targets could be 
applied to the country as a whole or only to specified sectors.8 Reflecting the same 
rationale, but on the basis of GHG intensity not fixed emission targets, are dual 
intensity targets. A country would have two targets – one, a relatively weak but 
binding compliance target, and two, a more stringent selling target, which if bettered 
would entitle the country to sell the surplus.9  Other approaches modify a system of 
fixed emission targets through the incorporation of a safety valve, which effectively 
caps the price of permits by allowing parties to purchase additional allowances at a 
pre-determined price. Knowledge of the maximum permit price could foster 
participation and enhance compliance, but could also reduce certainty with respect to 
abatement levels.  
Rather than setting targets, mitigation objectives can also be pursued through 
laws and regulations that prescribe policies and measures. One prominent example 
of a potential policy is a harmonized global carbon tax. Economic theory suggests in 
theory that taxes are preferable to price instruments – emissions trading schemes - 
for tackling problems such as climate change.10 In many countries, not least the 
United States, political reality dictates that for all their theoretical merit carbon taxes 
are unlikely to be widely adopted. A number of European countries, among them 
Norway and Switzerland, have adopted taxes on carbon as part of their portfolio of 
climate policies.11 From the perspective of developing countries, a globally 
harmonized carbon tax would be rejected on equity grounds as regressive. Other 
policies and measures (PAMs) approaches include the setting of international energy 
efficiency standards, establishment of technology standards more generally, and a 
“soft” technology model that focuses financing for energy technology R&D, 
technology cooperation and support for the deployment of new technologies. An 
interesting variation is the sustainable development policies and measures (SD-
PAMs) proposals where countries pledge to carry out policies aimed at meeting a 
country’s economic and social development objectives, but that also contribute to 
GHG mitigation, and in the longer-term on a more climate-friendly development 
pathway.12 There is increased in SD-PAMs as a bridge between countries with 
binding targets and those without.13 The financial incentives for SD-PAMs are likely 
                                                 
8 For a recent sector-based proposal see JAKE SCHMIDT ET AL, CENTER FOR CLEAN AIR POLICY, 
SECTOR-BASED APPROACH TO THE POST -2012 CLIMATE CHANGE ARCHITECTURE  (2006), 
http://www.ccap.org/international/future.htm . 
9 BODANSKY, supra note 1, at 11. 
10 Richard G. Newell & William A. Pizer, Regulating Stock Externalities Under Uncertainty, Discussion 
Paper 99–10–REV, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, 1, 1-2 (2000). The classic analysis on the merits of 
prices versus quantities is M.L. Weitzman, Prices vs. Quantities 41(4) REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 
477–491 (1974). 
11 For details see IEA, CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION: GREENHOUSE GAS POLICIES AND 
MEASURES, http://www.iea.org/textbase/pm/Default.aspx?mode=cc, database searched for “taxes” 
under policies in force, last accessed 3 January 2007. 
12 KEVIN A. BAUMERT ET AL, WRI, GROWING IN THE GREENHOUSE: PROTECTING THE CLIMATE BY 
PUTTING DEVELOPMENT FIRST (2005).  
13 JANE ELLIS ET AL, IEA, SD-PAMS: WHAT, WHERE, WHEN AND HOW? 5 (2007). SD-PAMs have been 
extensively discussed in the climate negotiations. Interestingly, the Bali Action Plan adopted at the 13th 
Session of the Conference of the Parties (COP-13), held from 3-14 December 2007, refers to 
“Nationally appropriate mitigation actions by developing country Parties in the context of sustainable 
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to be related to the degree of oversight and review of the implementation of the 
pledges. 
 
6.2 Assessment criteria 
The next part of this chapter explores assessment criteria that have been 
proposed in the literature to evaluate international climate policy proposals. The 
coverage is intended to be representative, not exhaustive. 
 
6.2.1 Environmental effectiveness 
Environmental effectiveness is first on the list of assessment criteria. A 
proposal should be capable of achieving a particular stabilization level of greenhouse 
emissions that avoids dangerous climate change, as required by Article 2 of the 
Convention. This author supports the view that provision establishes a legal 
obligation on the parties to prevent dangerous interference with climate system.14 
However, in the absence of a common understanding of what constitutes dangerous 
interference, various parties and interest groups have advocated different views on 
what constitutes an adequate degree of environmental commitment.15 Nonetheless, 
even absent consensus, there is over time likely to be considerable convergence 
around what constitutes a long-term goal for the climate regime. Improved 
understanding of the timing, impacts and costs of climate change is likely to be an 
important driver. In this respect, the scientific input of the IPCC provides decision-
makers and the public with information on which to adopt decisions to mitigate the 
risk associated with climate change.  
Stabilization of atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases in this 
century at any level will necessitate a substantial departure from business-as-usual 
emissions.16 Studies suggest that depending on the stringency of chosen target, global 
GHG reductions of 25-70 percent below 2005 levels may be necessary by 2050, 
while by the end of the 21st century emissions must be 80 per cent below current 
levels.17 Several emission paths are possible in achieving a particular stabilization 
                                                                                                                                     
development supported and enabled by technology, financing and capacity-building, in a measurable, 
reportable and verifiable manner…” para. 1(b)(ii),  (emphasis added).  
14 See RODA VERHEYEN, CLIMATE CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: PREVENTION DUTIES AND 
STATE RESPONSIBILITY 56 (2005). But cf  Daniel Bodansky, The United Nations Framework Convention: A 
Commentary , 18 YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 451, 500 (1993). Bodansky notes that Art.2  
is phrased in declarative language. He also questions whether Art.2 falls within in the category of  
“object and purpose” of the treaty, as provided for by Arts. 18 and 31 (1) of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties. In that case all parties would be under an obligation not to defeat the 
stabilization objective. Contrary to Bodansky’s close reading, the practice of the parties in reiterating 
and reaffirming the stabilization objective in the course of climate negotiations, as well as in various 
soft law or political instruments such as the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation, have 
demonstrated the centrality of Art. 2.  
15 For instance the EU target of avoiding warming of more than 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial 
levels. 
16 Jan Corfee-Morlot &  Niklas Höhne, Climate change: long -term targets and short -term commitments, 13 
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE 277, 278 (2003). 
17 NICHOLAS STERN, CABINET OFFICE, HM TREASURY, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE, 
THE STERN REVIEW 193 (2006),  http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/independent_reviews/stern_review_economics_climate_change/stern_review_report
.cfm 
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level, leading some to argue for delayed mitigation in order to avoid the premature 
retirement of capital stock.18 An opposite view holds that early action is warranted 
due to the inertia and slow turnover of capital stock such as power plants and 
buildings, making it especially important not to “lock in” old technology.19 The 
International Energy Agency’s estimate that the world energy system will require $16 
trillion in new investments by 2030 tends to support the latter view.20 A later peak in 
emissions implies that cuts must occur at a higher rate in the future – delaying the 
peak in emissions from 2020 to 2030 almost doubles the rate of reduction for one 
widely discussed stabilization target.21 Overall, “[t]he earlier the emissions peak and 
decline, the lower the stabilized concentration level, the lower the absolute level of 
climate change and the earlier that climate change is attenuated.22 
Emissions from developing countries are set to overtake those of 
industrialized countries within the next two decades.23 Accordingly, achievement of a 
stabilization target, even one at the high end, requires the participation of at least the 
major emitters among the developing countries. There is thus a tension between 
environmental effectiveness and equity, as reflected in the differential treatment 
under the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. In case of a 
conflict, the stabilization objective enshrined in article 2 overrides applicable equity 
provisions in the Convention. Article 3(1), which contains a number of principles, 
refers to the need for parties to “protect the climate system for the benefit of present 
and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with 
their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.” In 
achieving the objective of the Convention and implementing its provisions, the 
parties “shall be guided” by the above principles and others listed in article 3. The 
principles of equity and fairness reflected in article 3(1) may thus actively influence, 
guide and possibly shape the actions and policies implemented to achieve the 
stabilization objective. However, these principles cannot direct or determine policies 
in a manner that would clash with the objective of the Convention. In sum, in legal 
terms article 2 acts as a gatekeeper with respect to at least some equitable proposals 
for combating climate change. In other words, proposals must pass a threshold of 
environmental adequacy. 
At the policy design level, environmental effectiveness is influenced by 
factors such as leakage (movement of emissions-generating activities to a region with 
weaker controls) and the efficacy of enforcement and compliance procedures.24 
Drawing on research analyzing the “pollution haven thesis”, some scholars suggest 
that economists may overstate the leakage problem, at least in the initial stages in of 
                                                 
18 Thomas Wigley, Richard Richels & Jae Edmonds, Economic and Environmental Choices in the  
Stabilization of Atmospheric CO2 Concentrations, 379 NATURE 240 (1996). 
19 Michael Grubb, Jean-Claude Hourcade & M. Ha-Duong, Influence of Socioeconomic Inertia and 
Uncertainty on Optimal CO2-emission Abatement, 390 NATURE 390, 270 (1997). 
20 INT. ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK (2004). 
21 STERN, supra note 17, at 193.  
22 Corfee-Morlot & Höhne, supra note 16, at 279. 
23 INT. ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2006 (2006). According to the IEA word-wide 
CO2  emissions may increase 55 per cent by 2030 compared with 2005 levels, and China may surpass 
the United States as the largest emitter of CO2 as early as 2010.  
24 BODANSKY, supra note 1, at 5. 
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international carbon policy.25 Leakage can be reduced by an agreement with broad 
coverage and the assumption of core emission reduction and limitation 
commitments by all parties.  
 
6.2.2 Cost-effectiveness 
An important criteria for assessing climate proposals is their cost-
effectiveness; the more cost-effective the approach the lower the cost of reducing 
emissions. This involves the least costly means of achieving a certain goal, for 
instance a particular concentration level of greenhouse gases. Cost effectiveness and 
efficiency are not the same – “[r]elying on cost-effectiveness as an assessment 
criterion can lead to the identification of a low-cost way of doing something that is 
fundamentally not sensible in economic terms.”26 The distinction between cost-
effectiveness and efficiency is important for reasons of policy analysis and law. 
Economic analysis of climate policy attempts to arrive at a socially optimal amount 
of mitigation, taking into account other needs, and using the tools of cost-benefit 
analysis. However, as we have seen in an earlier chapter such analysis is not without 
difficulties and is controversial in several respects.27 Problems are experienced with 
respect to the rate used to discount future costs and benefits, as well as uncertainty 
relating to the costs of future mitigation costs.28  
While cost-benefit analysis is widely used in analyzing climate policy 
proposals, from a legal perspective the key point is that although the Convention 
refers to cost-effectiveness, it makes no reference to economic efficiency. In this 
regard, article 3(3) provides that the “Parties should take precautionary measures to 
anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of climate change” and “taking into 
account that policies and measures to deal with climate change should be cost-
effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost.” It will be noted 
that cost-effectiveness is not self-standing, but acts here as a qualifier with respect to 
the text referring to a precautionary approach. To conclude, in legal terms the 
Convention states that the achievement of the stabilization objective shall be guided, 
among other things, by cost-effectiveness considerations. With respect to the 
definition of the objective itself, article 2 merely states that the stabilization level 
should be achieved “within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt 
naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to 
enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.” Although 
economic efficiency is likely to exert an influence on the (political) process of 
agreeing on a stabilization level, it is not an explicit principle or guideline under the 
Convention. 
In many cases the industrial and power generation sectors of most 
developing countries are less energy efficient and use older, more polluting 
                                                 
25 David G. Victor, Fragmented carbon markets reluctant nations: Implications for the design of effect ive 
architectures, in ARCHITECTURES FOR AGREEMENT : ADDRESSING GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE 
POST-KYOTO WORLD, 133, 135-36 (Joseph E. Aldy & Robert N. Stavins, ed., 2007). 
26 JOSEPH E. ALDY, SCOTT BARRETT & ROBERT N. STAVINS, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, 
THIRTEEN PLUS ONE: A COMPARISON OF GLOBAL CLIMATE POLICY ARCHITECTURES 4 (2003). 
27 See chapter 4. 
28 Axel Michaelowa, Kristian Tangen & Henrik Hasselknippe, Issues and Options for the post -2012 Climate 
Architecture- An Overview, 5(1) INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS 5, 7 (2005). 
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technologies than their industrialized country counterparts. It follows that 
developing countries, particularly large ones, have considerable potential for cost-
effective emission reductions. An approach based predominantly on cost-
effectiveness grounds might conflict with equity and fairness. Approaches that allow 
for flexibility with respect to where emission reductions are carried out, through 
emissions trading, would tend to be less costly than more rigid approaches. This is 
recognized in article 3(3), which states “policies and measures should take into 
account different socio-economic contexts, be comprehensive, cover all relevant 
sources, sinks…and comprise all economic sectors. The relative distribution of costs 
is also a key factor. If one party’s share of the costs (or benefits) exceeds that of 
another similarly situated party, then the fact that the agreement is overall less costly 
than an alternative will be of relatively little consequence.  
 
6.2.3 Dynamic policy flexibility 
Dynamic policy flexibility refers to commitments that can be adjusted – 
tightened or loosened – in response to new scientific insights and improved analysis 
of costs and benefits. With the many uncertainties in the timing and scope of 
impacts, as well as the costs and effectiveness of various responses to climate change, 
analysts, in particular economists, advocate a sequential process of decision-making 
that is able to respond to new information as it becomes available.29 The concern is 
to ensure that resources are employed in the most productive manner, by for 
instance avoiding the premature retirement of expensive generation infrastructure in 
the quest to meet targets that are too stringent in the short term. To some degree 
policy flexibility is found in the climate regime, with the Protocol having established 
a first commitment period of fives years, with the assumption that the second will be 
negotiated with regard to new scientific and economic information. On equity 
grounds it can be argued that because of the unequal bargaining positions of the 
parties a process built on frequent re-negotiation risks entrenching inequitable 
foundations.30 In this view, it is important to secure equity principles from the outset.  
 
6.2.4 Complementarity 
In analyzing a scenario that foresees multiple instruments or approaches, 
complementarity of design would facilitate linkages among them.31 For instance, a 
decentralized, bottom-up approach with a range of mitigation measures at national 
and regional levels will be more effective if the various initiatives are open and 
capable of benefiting from inter-linkages, such as linking of regional emissions 
trading markets.32  
 
                                                 
29 ALDY ET AL, supra note 26, at 5. 
30 EDWARD A. PAGE, CLIMATE CHANGE, JUSTICE AND FUTURE GENERATIONS 177 (2006). 
31 BODANSKY, supra note 1, at 5. 
32 For arguments in favour of decentralized approaches see e.g. David G. Victor, Joshua C. House & 
Sarah Joy, A Madisonian Approach to Climate Policy 309 (5742) SCIENCE 1820 (2005); Taishi Sugiyama & 
Jonathan Sinton, Orchestra of Treaties: A Future Climate Regime Scenario with Multiple Treaties among Like-
minded Countries, 5(1) INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS 65 (2005); Kristian  Tangen & 
Henrik Hasselknippe, Converging Markets, 5(1) INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS, 47 
(2005). 
  176 
 
6.2.5 Continuity with UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol 
In political terms, many countries favor continuity with the institutions and 
approach of the Convention and the Protocol. The parties have invested 
considerable time and resources into these two instruments; on the other hand, the 
United States will probably never join the Protocol. Nonetheless, the flexibility 
mechanisms and carbon trading pioneered under the Protocol are widely regarded as 
building blocks for a future agreement. Similarly, the procedures for reporting and 
accounting greenhouse gas emissions will prove of great value for any future climate 
policy. Developing countries have a strong interest in retaining the mechanisms – 
meager as they are – that exist to support adaptation activities under the current 
system, foremost the Adaptation Fund.  
On the downside, there exists the potential for policy “lock-in” - for 
instance, the switch from an approach based on targets to one based on policies, 
which could be more acceptable to developing countries, has become more difficult. 
Scholars with very different positions on the optimal international climate change 
“architecture” underline the importance of frameworks that can accommodate 
different policies – international emissions trading, sectoral policies, intensity 
measures and technology-driven approaches.33 Certainly, an approach based on 
quantified emission targets favors industrialized countries with stable populations 
and sophisticated economies. Countries with growing populations and less advanced 
economies – or more rapid economic growth, such as the United States - are more 
likely to see the current target-based system as a threat to their socio-economic 
development. In sum, quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments, 
the heart of the Kyoto Protocol, will probably remain unacceptable to developing 
countries for some time to come, so that initial commitments by this category of 
countries would need to take a different form. Instead, mitigation action by 
developing countries will in the first instance consist of slowing, and eventually 
halting, the rate at which their emissions are rising, with funding and access to 
technology playing an important role.34 
 
6.2.6 Compatibility with development goals 
Compatibility with development goals and consideration of national 
circumstances will be particularly important in the next phase, which will need to 
broaden the circle of parties undertaking mitigation commitments. Developing 
countries regard poverty eradication as their primary objective,35 with the result that 
they will be more likely to support climate policies that advance, rather than restrict, 
the goals of economic and social development, for instance the achievement of the 
                                                 
33 For an excellent summary of the various models, by leading proponents, see ARCHITECTURES FOR 
AGREEMENT: ADDRESSING GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE POST-KYOTO WORLD, (Joseph E. 
Aldy & Robert N. Stavins, ed., 2007). 
34 See Bali Action Plan adopted at the 13th Session of the Conference of the Parties (COP-13), held 
from 3-15 December 2007, refers to “Nationally appropriate mitigation actions by developing country 
Parties in the context of sustainable development supported and enabled by technology, financing and capacity-
building, in a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner…” para. 1(b)(ii),  (emphasis added). 
35 Delhi Ministerial Declaration on Climate Change and Sustainable Development, adopted at the 8th 
Session of the Conference of the Parties (COP-8), 23 October to 1 November 2002. 
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Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).36 This implies an approach that addresses 
climate change in the context of sustainable development, as opposed to viewing it 
predominantly as an environmental problem. Specifically, rather than adopting 
climate policies for their own sake, developing countries are likely adopt cleaner 
energy technologies because they reduce local air pollution, improve energy security 
by substituting for imported fuels, and reduce costs through greater efficiency. 
Mitigation is a co-benefit of these policies. The climate benefits are useful “co-
benefits” but would not constitute the primary driver for the relevant policies and 
technologies. Some observers warn that climate change policy should not be linked 
too closely to efforts to solve broader development problems.37 While it may be 
correct to point out climate policy should not be held hostage to progress on 
international development issues, such as trade or development assistance policies, it 
remains true that the nature of global development – population growth, economic 
development, and technological change – determines long-term future emissions 
profiles.38 
Adaptation to the impacts of climate change is of particular concern in the 
context of development. Policy proposals would also need to balance the effort and 
resources channeled to mitigation with those devoted to adaptation to the impacts of 
climate change. For instance, a decentralized, bottom-up approach, with its focus on 
national and regional action, may not adequately address the adaptation needs of 
poor and vulnerable countries. 
 
6.2.7 Simplicity and predictability 
Simplicity and predictability are important yardsticks for any international 
agreement. Proposals with complex formulas are more difficult to convey and 
understand, and for that reason probably less likely to garner broad agreement. It is 
therefore possible that negotiators may prefer policies that are sub-optimal in terms 
of cost-effectiveness or another important criterion, over environmentally and 
economically sounder, but more complex proposals. Some countries may also favor 
approaches that provide economic predictability with respect to the costs of 
implementation.39 
 
6.2.8 Broad participation 
A fairly widely held view is that a climate regime with broad participation 
delivers the most benefits.40 The depth of parties’ commitments, especially those 
shouldered by major emitters, however, will also determine the strength of the 
regime. An agreement with shallow commitments may secure broad participation 
and full compliance, but could fall short with respect to effective mitigation. An 
alternative is a “narrow-but-deep” agreement that results in sizeable mitigation 
                                                 
36 Jiahua Pan, Commitment to Human Development Goals with Low Emissions: An Alternative to Emissions Caps 
for Post -Kyoto from a Developing Country Perspective , 5(1) INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
AGREEMENTS 89 (2005). 
37 PHILIBERT, supra note 5. 
38 IPCC, SPECIAL REPORT: EMISSIONS SCENARIOS, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 5 (2000). 
39 BODANSKY, supra note 1, at 6. 
40 See ALDY ET AL, supra note 26. See also COSBEY ET AL, supra note 2, at 8. For an opposing view see 
Victor, supra note 25, at 133. 
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among a limited group of large emitters. Such an approach might also circumvent 
that the cumbersome process of securing agreement among a very large number of 
parties. However, a broader but shallow agreement, with less mitigation per country 
but almost full participation, has the advantage of greater efficiency because, via 
emissions trading, it lowers overall costs.41 In addition, such an approach also 
reduces the incentive for firms to relocate emissions-intensive activities from areas 
with emissions controls to regions that are not subject to restrictions. Over time, 
broadening of effective controls on GHG emissions in all regions could initially be 
contingent on, and be driven by, a combination of incentives for mitigation measures 
and access to cleaner technologies.  
 
6.2.9 Long-term target and technological innovation 
An agreement with a long-term target could stimulate technological 
innovation and enhance cost-effectiveness, as firms and individuals can make 
decisions with greater certainty about the costs and benefits associated with 
investments. For instance, achieving the European Union’s target of a maximum rise 
of 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial temperatures can, subject to uncertainties, 
be roughly related to a range of GHG concentrations. This can provide an idea of 
the expected level of ambition in terms of mitigation action required. As the science 
remains uncertain on how the climate system will respond to rising GHG emissions, 
any framework should make provision for relaxing or tightening the policy in 
response to new information. Overall, a long-term time horizon may allow a more 
comprehensive and efficient response to the climate change problem; on the other 
hand, a long timeframe may invite delay and procrastination. Some observers 
therefore argue that targets should be set over periods somewhat longer than the 
five-year commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, but beginning with only 
moderate effort and becoming more stringent over time.42  
Climate and energy policies should provide incentives to induce technological 
change. One the one hand, public funding for basic and applied energy research can 
compensate for under-investment by the private sector in research and development, 
which has been identified as a classic market failure.43 Alarmingly, indications are that 
public and private sector energy research and development has been declining.44 On 
the other hand, putting a price on the emission of greenhouse gas emissions, either 
by means of a cap-and-trade scheme or a carbon tax, should also drive firms to 
innovate in developing less carbon-intensive technologies and products. However, 
even a fairly high carbon price in cap-and-trade scheme may not be sufficient to spur 
                                                 
41 ALDY ET AL, supra note 26, at 6. 
42 Sheila M. Olmstead & Robert M. Stavins, An International Policy Architecture for the Post -Kyoto Era 96(2) 
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS 35, 36 (2006). They describe the Kyoto 
targets as “too little, too fast”. 
43 Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND 
DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS, 609-625 (Richard R. 
Nelson, ed., 1962). Because an individual firm does not reap the full reward of its investment in R&D 
– other firms stand to benefit too by adopting the new invention or process, but at little or no cost – 
it is economically rational to under-invest in such activities. 
44 Daniel F. Kammen & Gregory F. Nemet, Real Numbers: Reversing the Incredible Shrinking Energy R&D 
Budget , ISSUES IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 84 (2005). 
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the necessary changes in the development of clean energy technologies.45 This 
underlines the importance of complementary policy measures, such as the promotion 
of energy efficiency and renewable energy, which are being adopted at the state level 
in the United States, in the absence of concerted federal climate policy.46 Evidence 
from the first phase of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme suggests that because 
allowance prices were too low to make up for the price difference between coal and 
natural gas, utilities by and large did not switch from coal to less carbon-intensive 
natural gas.47 Moreover, in many cases power producers were able to pass higher 
costs on to consumers. 
The absence of any provisions to stimulate research and development in 
cleaner energy technologies and systems has been identified as a failing of the Kyoto 
Protocol.48 Some of the proposals a future climate regime propose separate 
agreements on technology,49 while others rely entirely on setting technology 
standards in order ensure wider participation and compliance.50 Proponents of a 
technology standards approach acknowledge the risks of locking in particular 
technologies and higher costs compared with market-based policies, but they also 
counter that technology standards are more likely to be successfully implemented 
than a cap-and-trade system.51 In some cases information and other barriers are 
significant – energy efficiency of consumer goods, such as air-conditioners – 
mandating standards is simply more effective than any conceivable market-based 
solution, which would rely on individual responses market signals, such as higher 
electricity prices. This realization seems to be behind the decision in several 
jurisdictions to phase-out inefficient incandescent light bulbs;52 despite their 
                                                 
45 Michaelowa et al, supra  note 28, at 17. For an overview of why emissions trading may result in 
marginal technology adoption, but not innovation with respect to zero-emission technologies, see 
William Pizer, Practical global climate policy, in ARCHITECTURES FOR AGREEMENT: ADDRESSING 
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE POST-KYOTO WORLD, 280, 292-3 (Joseph E. Aldy & Robert N. 
Stavins, ed., 2007). 
46 Michael Northrop & David Sassoon, Cap and trade and more, ENVIRONMENTAL FINANCE, June 2007, 
at 3.  
47 Trevor Sikorsky, The EU Emissions Trading Scheme: Principles and Challenges in Implementation, March 
2007, presentation at Imperial College London, on Climate Change: Science, Impacts and Responses 
(copy on file with author). 
48 Daniel Sarewitz & Roger Pielke, Jr., The Steps Not Yet Taken, in 2 CONTROVERSIES IN SCIENCE AND 
TECHNOLOGY: FROM CLIMATE TO CHROMOSOMES (Daniel Lee Kleinman, et al, eds., 2008). 
49  See Sugiyama & Sinton, supra note 32, at 65. As one part of a trio of agreements Sugiyama and 
Sinton propose a Zero Emission Technology Treaty designed to foster long-term technological 
change. 
50 SCOTT BARRETT, ENVIRONMENT AND STATECRAFT: THE STRATEGY OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
TREATY-MAKING (2003); Scott Barrett & Robert N. Stavins, Increasing Participation and Compliance in 
International Climate Change Agreements, 3 INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: POLITICS, 
LAW AND ECONOMICS 349, 366-369 (2003). 
51 Barrett & Stavins, supra note 50, at 369. Barrett and Stevens cite the exampled of the 1973 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL), which required the 
adoption of segregated ballast tanks for oil tankers and proved more effective than previous efforts to 
limit oil pollution. It should also be noted that technology standards could be subject to regular 
adjustment and evaluation, in an effort to maximize cost-effectiveness. 
52 Tim Johnston, Australia is Seeking Nationwide Shift to Energy-Saving Light Bulbs, N.Y. TIMES, February 
22, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/21/business/worldbusiness/21light.html. Claudia H. 
Deutsch, No Joke, Bulb Change is a Challenge for U.S., N.Y. TIMES, December 22, 2007, 
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demonstrated energy-saving potential, the market share of compact fluorescent light 
bulbs has remained fairly low. 
Finally, a proposal must be evaluated against prevailing political and 
institutional realities. Proposals must achieve a balance of environmental 
effectiveness, equity and cost-effectiveness. The demands they place on the 
institutions at the national and international level should not exceed what is 
reasonable. Policies that are relatively easier to implement – for instance, do not 
involve the establishment of new international institutions – and that can be 
monitored easily will be at an advantage. 
 
6.3 International climate policy - proposals 
The next section discusses and assesses a number of proposals for a future 
international climate policy. Representative proposals are briefly outlined and then 
assesses in accordance with policy and equity criteria. 
 
6.3.1 Contraction and convergence 
The “Contraction and Convergence” proposal, developed by the Global 
Commons Institute, assigns each individual an equal entitlement to greenhouse gas 
emissions, based on an overall global carbon budget.53 Stabilization of atmospheric 
concentrations of GHGs will require the contraction of emissions over time. This 
model holds that as emissions contract, they should also converge on a single per 
capita figure. Negotiations would determine the per capita convergence value, the 
path to convergence, and the timing. The convergence value would be considerably 
below current per capita emissions, which would have to be cut dramatically, while 
developing country emissions could grow for some time, allowing for economic and 
social development, before also falling to the convergence value. Trading 
mechanisms would be used, so that industrialized countries could purchase the 
necessary entitlements while they shift to a low-carbon economy. 
Assessed against the selected equity principles, the contraction and 
convergence model scores very well. Supported by the fundamental notion of 
equality, it possesses a simplicity and intuitive appeal that is easily conveyed. Since we 
accept equality as a bedrock principle in other areas of human affairs – equal 
treatment for women and minorities, human rights – it seems plausible to apply the 
same logic to entitlements to “atmospheric space”. The model also addresses, or 
does not conflict with, the responsibility, needs and capability dimensions of equity 
and fairness in climate change.54 With respect to needs and capacity, contraction and 
                                                                                                                                     
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/22/business/22light.html. The Energy Independence and 
Security Act of 2007, section 322, sets standards banning the current generation of inefficient 
incandescent light bulbs by 2012.   
53 The model is described on the Global Commons Institute website, http://www.gci.org.uk/ . For a 
recent application of the principles of contraction and convergence, see TOM ATHANASIOU & PAUL 
BAER DEAD HEAT, GLOBAL JUSTICE AND GLOBAL WARMING (2002), especially at 76-97. 
54 But cf. Michel den Elzen et al, Multi-Stage: A Rule-Based Evolution of Future Commitments Under the 
Climate Change Convention, 6(1) INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS 1, 21 (2006), citing 
as one of the cons of the contraction and convergence approach that it “[t]akes no account of other 
equity principles (capacity, responsibility for historical emissions).” Strictly speaking this is may be 
true, but this alone is not sufficient to show that in the climate change context there is an actual 
conflict between contraction and convergence and the other principles. 
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convergence allows developing countries to divert their resources primarily to 
poverty eradication and economic development, and concentrating on mitigation 
activities when they have acquired the requisite economic and technical capabilities, a 
process that could be assisted by the access to funding and clean technologies from 
developed countries. And the onus to cut emissions would be on the nations with 
the greatest historic responsibility for accumulated emissions, as well as the 
technological and financial resources to carry out mitigation activities.  
Critics argue that there is no compelling reason why the right to emit should 
be equally shared when the same does not hold true for other public goods.55 They 
contend that contraction and convergence rests on “a contestable ideological 
choice”.56 It is true that proponents recognize – and in fact advocate – the re-
distributive effect of contraction and convergence, which it is argued combat climate 
change and promote fairer world-wide economic development.57 The earlier 
discussion of equality noted that the strict application of the principle could have 
undesirable effects, including “leveling down” and the lack of sensitivity to individual 
differences.58 The possibility that implementation of contraction and convergence 
would result in dragging citizens of all states down to the same or similar level of 
economic well-being is not plausible. First, since all countries would have to agree on 
the global stabilization target, from which the convergence values are then calculated, 
they can influence the stringency, and the overall hence cost. Second, industrialized 
countries would achieve the necessary cuts with the aid of trading, among themselves 
and with developing countries. While the trading of emissions allowances between 
industrialized and developing countries would result in large resource transfers from 
the former to the latter, the overall outcome would be efficient, in accordance with 
the Coase theorem.59  Faced with the need to undertake very deep cuts in their 
emissions, at high and increasing cost, industrialized countries would purchase 
emission allowances from developing countries, whose per capita emissions would 
still be below the agreed global value. However, it is true that the model would need 
to be adjusted to account for the specific circumstances of particular regions or 
countries, for instance those in cold regions, where space-heating needs are higher. 
Such countries would be entitled to an upwards adjustment in their allocation of 
emission allowances, commensurate with their demonstrated special circumstances. 
Reference is sometimes also made to the perverse incentive that contraction and 
convergence could have with respect population growth. Given the many drivers of 
influencing population growth, it seems rather far-fetched that climate policy would 
                                                 
55 John Ashton & Xueman Wang, Equity and Climate: In Principle and Practice, in BEYOND KYOTO: 
ADVANCING THE INTERNATIONAL EFFORT AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE 61, 69 (Pew Center for 
Global Climate Change, 2003). 
56 Id. at 69. 
57 See ATHANASIOU & BAER, supra note 53. 
58 See chapter 4. 
59 In its basic form the Theorem holds that with the possibility of trading and absent transaction costs, 
the initial distribution of property rights (entitlements) does not affect the efficiency of the outcome. 
In other words, the possibility of trading means that an efficient outcome is always possible, no matter 
how the emission allowances are initially allocated.  The cost reductions achieved through global 
emissions trading are well established in the literature, see John P. Weyant & Jennifer Hill, Introduction 
and Overview, THE COSTS OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL: A MULTI-MODEL EVALUATION, SPECIAL ISSUE 
OF THE ENERGY JOURNAL vii, (John P. Weyant ed., 1999). 
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have a significant impact. In any event, putting the model into practice would require 
selecting a population reference period or periods, which could be calculated so as to 
account for any perverse incentive.  
Contraction and convergence begins with an overall target, according to a global 
emissions budget is calculated. Provided the target is sufficiently stringent, the 
approach will provide environmental effectiveness. In addition, compared to 
approaches relying on multiple stages, contraction and convergence is conceptually 
simple and predictable. In fact, as in essence a guiding umbrella principle, it leaves 
the choice of tools to achieve emission reductions open to the parties. However, it 
represents a radical departure from Kyoto model, which is built on grandfathered 
emission entitlements, and would thus require a new approach. In particular, since 
the definition of per capita convergence values requires a stabilization level, 
agreement on this point would be required. Agreement on a long-term goal would 
likely prove challenging for the political process. On the other hand, once the global 
stabilization target was agreed, the parties could use the mechanisms of the Kyoto 
Protocol, especially emissions trading, as countries with low per capita emissions 
could sell a portion of their “excess” emission allowances. In the end, the biggest 
obstacle to contraction and convergence is political acceptability – high per capita 
countries are at present not prepared to endorse the re-distribution of resources to 
low per capita countries that would follow from its implementation. This is unlikely 
to change in the near term.60  
One issue that may arise in the implementation of the proposal concerns the 
difficulty developing countries, especially the poorest, may experience in establishing 
the necessary institutional and technical capacity for emissions trading.61 Moreover, 
there exists the possibility that governments of developing countries might sell off so 
much of their stock of entitlements, leaving the next generation without reserves 
when their emissions reach or exceed the per capita convergence value. What is to 
stop a government selling entitlements, for short-term gain, without regard to the 
future? It could be argued that it makes sense to sell as many entitlements as possible 
early on, in order to develop, on the basis that in decades to come a wealthier and 
technologically advanced society will be capable of making the necessary emission 
cuts to meet the convergence target. Such decisions involve highly uncertain 
assumptions about future economic growth and rates of technological change. Many 
developing countries are poorly equipped to undertake these kinds of analyses. 
Possible responses to the potential danger of over-selling could include delayed or 
staggered vesting procedures, the need to maintain a periodically adjusted reserve 
margin and oversight by an international institution. Countries may regard some of 
these options as infringing their sovereignty. 
If the prospect for a straightforward implementation of contraction and 
convergence remain slim, it is also likely that elements of this model will be present 
                                                 
60 The German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, has proposed the long-term goal of converging emissions. 
See Chancellor Angela Merkel launches a new climate initiative , English language homepage of the 
Chancellor, 30 August 2007, http://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/Content/EN/Artikel/2007/08/2007-
08-30-bundeskanzlerin-in-japan__en.html. The Associated Press, Merkel calls for global emissions trading 
agreement to follow Kyoto , INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, October 9, 2007, 
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/10/09/europe/EU-GEN-Germany-Climate-Conference.php  
61 den Elzen et al, supra note 54, at 20. 
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in any long-term solution. Simply put, in order to arrive at a stabilization target 
consistent with the scientific findings requires some convergence of per capita 
emissions – neither a continuation of business as usual in the developed economies, 
nor an untrammeled rise in developing country emissions is remotely compatible 
with low or middle-level stabilization levels. Given its appeal to the universal ideal of 
equality, the contraction and convergence is uniquely qualified to remind all 
participants of the equity dimension of climate change.62.  
 
6.3.2 Brazilian proposal 
The proposal, originally made by Brazil in the Kyoto negotiations, is based 
on historical responsibility for temperature change.63 Entitlements are assigned based 
on historical responsibility, calculated in accordance with a climate model agreed on 
by the parties.64 The proposal was originally intended to apply only for purposes of 
differentiation among industrialized countries, but the methodology could be 
expanded to encompass all countries.65 And while the original proposal counts 
responsibility for emissions from the Industrial Revolution, it is also possible to 
estimate historical responsibility over more recent periods. For reference, according 
to recent research, the average contributions to the global mean surface temperature 
increase in 2000 are around 40 per cent from OECD group of industrialized 
countries, 14 per cent from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, 24 per 
cent from Asia, and about 6 and 16 per cent respectively from Africa and Latin 
America.66 The choice of methodology and the greenhouse gases covered may have 
considerable implications for attributed responsibility.67 For instance, including only 
the fossil CO2 emissions and not emissions from land-use change (deforestation) 
increases the contribution of the OECD group of countries by 21 percentage points 
and decreases the contribution of Asia by 14 percentage points.68  
For the simple reason that climate change is a cumulative process – historical 
emissions are relevant as matter of pure physics, not legal construct – it would be 
incorrect to regard the historical responsibility approach as giving large developing 
countries a “free pass”. The warming to date is partially a consequence of fossil fuels 
combusted one-hundred years ago. Historical responsibility is a plausible and 
defensible – if not compelling - criterion for distributing the effort of dealing with a 
global problem. Moreover, as countries industrialize, their cumulative emissions, and 
hence their responsibility, will increase. 
                                                 
62 Ashton & Wang, supra note 55, at 69. 
63 U.N. Doc. FCCC /AGBM/1997/MISC.1/Add.3, 3. The proposal remains on the agenda of the 
Conference of the Parties to the Convention whose Subsidiary Body for Technological and Scientific 
Advice (SBSTA) has sponsored continued research into contributions to climate change. See U.N. 
Doc. FCCC/SBSTA/2002/INF.14 for a summary of the research efforts carried out by various 
institutions, while up-to-date information is available at http://www.match -info.net/  
64 BODANSKY, supra note 1, at 22. 
65 Michel den Elzen & Michiel Schaeffer, Responsibility for past and future global warming: Uncertainties on 
attributing anthropogenic climate change. 54 CLIMATIC CHANGE, 29 (2002). 
66 Michel den Elzen et al, Analysing countries’ contributions to climate change: scient ific and policy-related choices, 8 
(6) ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE & POLICY, 614 (2005). 
67 den Elzen & Schaeffer, supra note 65, at 71-72. Of the methodological choices, including CO2 
emissions from land-use has and non- CO2 gases have the greatest impact on outcomes. 
68 den Elzen et al, supra note 66, at 614. 
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The responsibility approach taps an intuitive sense that those who have 
caused harm – in this case, emitted the largest stock of GHGs - should also bear the 
primary responsibility for abatement.69 It may also be loosely, if perhaps inaccurately, 
equated with the “polluter pays” principle. A responsibility approach is compatible 
with the need and capability principles, as the responsible parties are also the 
wealthiest and possess the technological capacity to spearhead the response to 
climate change.70 Overall, a responsibility approach would not necessarily conflict 
with the application of the equality principle, as in the contraction and convergence 
proposal. An exception might be countries with historically high emission burdens, 
continued reliance on fossil-fuel intensive economies, and small populations, for 
instance certain countries of the former Soviet Union.  
Measured against a number of policy assessment criteria the responsibility 
approach does not fare that well. Although the basic concept is straightforward, 
uncertainties regarding non-fossil fuel emissions and related methodological issues 
mean that putting it into practice will more complex. Environmental effectiveness 
would depend on the target that is set independently; the responsibility criterion 
comes into play in allocating the burden among the parties. This option is 
compatible with the approach of the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol, and since 
it relies on quantified emission targets it would not accommodate alternatives such as 
growth (intensity) targets. Among the disadvantages of the responsibility approach 
are that it is not very sensitive to country-specific circumstances. Where the proposal 
is applied to a limited number of countries, cost-effectiveness may be an issue, unless 
trading can be expanded through instruments such as the clean development 
mechanism (CDM). Although a responsibility model can be adjusted to account for 
new scientific and economic information, it is less flexible than some other 
proposals. 
 
6.3.3 Multi-stage and graduation and deepening 
The multi-stage and graduation and deepening are two proposals for 
involving developing countries in a future climate change agreement.71 They are 
representative of a set of “top-down” burden-sharing proposals, and since they share 
a number of common features it is convenient to discuss them together. Under the 
multi-stage approach developing countries assume progressively more stringent 
commitments, with passage from one stage to the next determined by a variety of 
criteria. (The very poorest countries, lacking in technical and economic capacity, 
would not be expected to assume targets, but would benefit from technical and 
financial assistance designed to steer them towards a low-carbon development path.) 
                                                 
69 In the same way that a polluter is assessed responsibility for the total discharge, the fact that annual 
GHG emissions of , for instance, China may rival and soon surpass that of the U.S. is not directly 
relevant – at issue here is the responsibility for a share of the total stock over time. 
70 See CICERO & CCN, SHARING THE  BURDEN OF GREENHOUSE GAS MITIGATION, supra note 4, at 54. 
The study assigns the Brazilian proposal a high equity score on need, capacity and “guilt”, but very 
low on potential for operational implementation. 
71 See BODANSKY, supra note 1, at 36, 47; Michel den Elzen & Marcel Berk, Options for Differentiation of 
Future Commitments in Climate Policy: How to Realize Timely Participation to Meet Stringent Climate Goals?, 1(4) 
CLIMATE POLICY 465 (2001); Axel Michaelowa, Sonja Butzengeiger & Martina Jung, Graduation and 
Deepening: An Ambitious Post -2012 Climate Policy Scenario, 5(1) INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
AGREEMENTS 25 (2005). 
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Several versions of the multi-stage proposals exist, but an up-to-date iteration 
sees developing differentiated according to the following three distinct stages: stage 
one, no quantitative limits and the emissions path is not subject to controls; stage 
two, countries assume intensity targets or a prescribed deceleration in emissions 
growth; and stage three, countries would be subject to quantified emission reduction 
targets.72 All Annex 1 parties are assumed to be at stage three; developing countries 
make the transition (graduate) to stage two on the basis of an index made up of per 
capita GDP (reflecting the capability to act) and per capita CO2 equivalent emissions 
(reflecting responsibility for climate change). This is termed the capacity-
responsibility index. Earlier versions used only a per capita income measure for 
differentiation.73 The inclusion of per capita emissions results in the earlier inclusion 
of low-income countries, particularly those with relatively high per capita emissions, 
such as South Africa. Transition to stage three is based on a more stringent version 
of the capacity-responsibility index; alternatively the threshold is calculated as a 
proportion of world average per capita emissions. The choice of an overall 
stabilization target determines the formulation of the “thresholds” for graduation – a 
more stringent global target would mean that advanced developing countries 
“graduate” more quickly to emission controls. At stage three, the emission reduction 
burden-sharing is in accordance with per capita emissions. Although not always 
explicit, the elaboration and implementation of the scheme would presumably be left 
to the existing international structures, in other words the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change.  
The multi-stage proposal discussed here makes a conscious attempt to 
incorporate equity and fairness. The graduation criteria reflect the equity principles 
of need, capability and responsibility. Equality is reflected in the choice of per capita 
emissions as the burden-sharing criteria in the final stage.74 On a more practical note, 
this proposal is flexible and could be adjusted to differing national circumstances and 
is compatible with the architecture of the Convention and Kyoto Protocol. Cost-
effectiveness is advanced through the use of emissions trading in the final stage, as 
well as through continuation of the clean development mechanism, enabling 
countries in stage three to invest in emission reduction projects in countries that 
have not yet assumed quantified emission reduction commitments.  
The use of intensity targets in stage two may give rise to some concerns 
about environmental integrity.75 Like other top-down proposals discussed so far, this 
one also requires the fixing of an explicit long-term target. Finally, implementation of 
the proposal would face a political hurdle because it implies dismantling the common 
front of the G-77 and China developing country negotiating group. It appears that 
sufficient flexibility exists to ameliorate many concerns, for instance by ensuring that 
adaptation to climate change – a major concern for island states and African 
countries - receives adequate resources under a new climate regime.  
The graduation and deepening proposal is similar to multi-stage in several 
respects: transition for developing countries, in this case directly to Kyoto-style 
quantified emission reductions, is on the basis of a graduation index (GI) consisting 
                                                 
72 den Elzen et al, supra note 54, at 4-5. 
73 den Elzen & Berk,  supra note 71, at 465. 
74den Elzen et al, supra note 54, at 22. 
75 Id. at 22. 
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of GDP and emissions per capita measures.76 In the multi-stage model the 
graduation threshold is a function of the agreed stabilization target. In the graduation 
and deepening scenario 550 ppm is assumed as the stabilization target, with 
agreement that emissions should peak no later than 2030. The overall stringency of 
the country targets – which are summarized below – is based on this stabilization 
goal. Arguably this approach lacks ambition – at the Thirteenth Conference of the 
Parties to the UNFCCC (COP-13), the European Union took the position that 
global GHG emissions should peak within the next ten to fifteen years and that 
Annex 1 countries as a group would need to cut their emissions by 25-40 per cent by 
2020.77 
The chosen baseline year is 2012, and there are three levels of emission 
targets: a six per cent reduction, a three per cent reduction and stabilization at the 
level of the baseline. Countries classified by the United Nations as least-developed 
countries (LDCs), receiving assistance under the International Development 
Association (IDA) arm of the World Bank, or food aid recipients are exempted from 
any targets. The GI of all countries is calculated. Differentiation then takes place as 
follows: developing countries with a GI higher than the Annex B average take on the 
most stringent reduction target, in other words 6 per cent.78 In this list would be 
Singapore, which is nominally still a developing country, as well as oil exporting 
countries with high per capita incomes and emissions, such as Qatar and the United 
Arab Emirates. Second, developing countries with a GI above that of the lowest 
Annex II (highly industrialized) countries are subject to the three per cent reduction. 
Countries falling into this group include the Republic of Korea and Saudi Arabia. 
Third, countries with a GI above that of the lowest Annex B country assume a 
stabilization target. Finally, countries that do not pass the lowest threshold of the 
graduation index – among which are China, India and Indonesia – and emit more 
than 50 million tons of CO2 can assume a intensity target with trading or participate 
in a project-based measure like CDM.  
The composition of the graduation index reflects two important equity 
principles – capability (GDP per capita) and responsibility (emissions per capita). 
Naturally the proof of any such indexes lies in the application of the relevant 
thresholds, which in this case are reasonably easy to comprehend, leading to 
groupings that seem “fair” in differentiating the group of developing countries. 
Managing and implementing the scheme – presumably the task of the 
intergovernmental climate negotiations – could prove to be altogether more difficult. 
The exemption of countries on the lowest rung of the development ladder – which 
would include most of sub-Saharan Africa – is a welcome recognition of the 
principle of need. The group of oil exporting countries with relatively high incomes 
and very high per capita emissions would not find that this scheme takes account of 
their national circumstances; it is likely to prove difficult to secure their participation, 
although the possibility of inexpensive emission reduction opportunities, and 
                                                 
76 Michaelowa et al, supra note 71, at 31-33. 
77 Summary of the Thirteenth Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC and the Third Meeting of the Parties of the 
Kyoto Protocol, 3-15 December, 12(354) EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULLETIN, 18 December, 
http://www.iisd.ca/climate/cop13/.  
78 Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol lists the countries subject to emission limitation and reduction 
commitments. 
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therefore emissions trading, could serve as a carrot. While the proposal is no more 
complex than comparable schemes, developing countries might consider the 
emission reductions arbitrary – those developing nations with the most stringent 
targets would argue that it would be more equitable to lower their targets, perhaps 
from six to five per cent, with a commensurate increase for the group with lower 
targets. This gets to the point that each set of developing countries– for instance the 
six per cent group – encompasses parties with rather different economic structures, 
such as Qatar and Singapore, with varying abatement costs. The immediate 
imposition of an absolute emission reduction target would constitute a blunt 
instrument; equity and fairness point in the direction of a more gradual transition and 
a wider choice of instruments, such as intensity or sectoral targets. 
 
6.3.4 Orchestra of treaties and converging markets 
The orchestra of treaties and converging markets proposals are examples of 
decentralized, bottom-up approaches.79 Based on the conviction that Kyoto–style 
targets give rise to adversarial negotiating stances, the orchestra of treaties aims for a 
more facilitative approach by: taking account of sovereignty concerns related to 
energy policies; building on national interests in the areas of technology and 
economic development; addressing long-term technological change, not only short-
term emission cuts.80 The proposal consists of four building blocks, three of which 
develop outside the ambit of the Convention. One, a group of emission markets 
(GEM) is developed, based on a gradual coordination of domestic emission markets, 
which takes place in the absence of internationally agreed targets. This scenario 
would feature an evolutionary, “bottom up” process of coordination and linking of 
various domestic cap-and-trade schemes. Two, a Zero Emission Technology Treaty 
(ZETT), which has its ultimate goa l zero CO2 emissions from the energy sector, is 
intended to address long-term technological change, but does so without infringing 
sovereignty because it operates on the basis of a voluntary pledge and review basis. A 
third component would be a climate-wise development treaty (CDT) to promote 
development, technology transfer and adaptation. Finally, UNFCCC would serve as 
political forum and opportunity for information exchange and funding mechanism.  
The ZETT and CDT would presumably be the result of centralized negotiations 
under the auspices of the UNFCCC. A key issue under the CDT would be the need 
to secure funding for technology transfer and other activities designed to assist 
developing countries.  
The converging markets proposal is essentially an elaboration of one block – 
the group of emission markets – of the orchestra of treaties model.  It would 
proceed through the integration of currently fragmented domestic trading systems. 
In order to be admitted to the core group, countries would have to assume 
mandatory national targets, and candidate countries could received financial 
assistance to prepare them for entry into the system.  There would be no central 
allocation, burden-sharing formulas or formally agreed stabilization target, but 
instead national emission targets would be developed on a country-by-country basis. 
It would be possible to (re)integrate the scheme under the umbrella of the 
                                                 
79 Sugiyama & Sinton, supra note 32, at 65; Tangen & Hasselknippe, supra note 32 at 47; BODANSKY, 
supra note 1 at 26, 48. 
80 Sugiyama & Sinton, supra note 32, at 65. 
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Framework Convention. Once a country has established a trading scheme with 
mandatory targets, the incentive to link with the larger market group comes from 
reduced abatement costs. The same is true for members of the group as a whole – 
expansion of the market will tend to lower the marginal costs of abatement. There is 
no conceptual reason standing in the way of link ing and integration of various 
domestic markets, provided that certain design elements, such as permit allocation 
rules, are properly designed.81 Overall a functioning market would benefit from clear 
rules and some degree of harmonization. Corporations with from sectors with high 
emissions and globe-spanning operations can be expected to be advocates of 
harmonization, preferring greater uniformity to a patchwork system of markets. 
Unlike the Kyoto Protocol, where rules are made by the parties and implemented 
with the assistance of a central bureaucracy, the converging markets approach would 
rely on market-to-market coordination and cooperation.   
Unlike the other proposals examined so far, the orchestra of treaties model 
does not consciously reflect any equity principles. The group of emission markets 
(GEM), as further detailed in the convergence of markets variant, would expand in 
accordance with market logic – lowest cost emissions reductions - and on terms 
reflecting the bargaining power of the parties. Depending on its structure, the GEM 
would probably roughly reflect the principles of responsibility and capability; that is 
not to say that major industrialized country emitters may elect not to undertake any 
emission reductions, or otherwise only very shallow ones. However, the fact that a 
number of developing countries would be obliged to assume the most stringent form 
of targets could be perceived as offending against the principle of responsibility. 
Such countries might argue that their national circumstances – for instance Qatar, an 
oil exporting country with a small population – should serve to differentiate them 
from countries with much greater historical responsibility. Due to both a lack of 
emission reduction opportunities, which are generally correlated with industrial 
activity, as well as inadequate institutional frameworks, least-developed countries are 
unlikely to benefit from emissions trading. A decentralized system is less likely to 
respect the principle of need; in particular, least-developed countries will have even 
less of a forum to press for inclusivity, consideration of their vulnerability and funds 
dedicated to adaptation needs.    
The orchestra of treaties proposal relies on bottom-up organization coupled 
with a minimum of top-down coordination, of a kind that entails minimal impact on 
sovereignty. The environmental effectiveness of the approach is uncertain, and no 
overall stabilization target is established. However, the Zero Emission Technology 
Treaty (ZETT) addresses the domain of clean energy technology development, 
deployment and diffusions, a critical area that is not integrated into the climate 
regime as it stands. It also corresponds to the approach championed by the United 
States, as well rapidly industrializing countries that regard access to technology as 
critical for development and climate goals. The broader the participation in the 
group pf emission markets (GEM), the lower the cost of mitigation is likely to be. A 
more decentralized approach will probably entail higher transaction and coordination 
costs, as more time and resources would need to be spent on ensuring compatibility 
between systems with different characteristics. Being decentralized, the approach is 
                                                 
81 See JANE ELLIS & DENNIS TIRPAK, OECD/IEA, LINKING GHG EMISSION TRADING SCHEMES 
AND MARKETS (2006). 
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very flexible, and its essentially voluntary nature allows countries to define their 
degree of participation in accordance with national circumstances. The climate-wise 
development treaty (CDT) responds to the growing understanding that climate 
change concerns ought to be integrated into development policies, and that for 
developing countries climate mitigation will often be the co-benefit of policies aimed 
at greater energy security, improved energy efficiency, and reduced air pollution. One 
of the obstacles faced by this approach is the free-rider problem; some countries may 
forge ahead, others may be content to do nothing, but without collective action 
individual efforts will have little effect. In short, there may not be sufficient glue to 
bind the blocks together into an effective response to climate change, with result that 
emission cuts are inadequate. Nonetheless, the orchestra of treaties proposal 
highlights a number of themes - technology, climate in the context of development 
concerns, and the potential for leadership among smaller groups of countries – that 
address possible shortcomings in the Kyoto Protocol and which coming to the fore 
in discussions on future of the climate regime.     
 
6.3.5 Global Triptych 
The global triptych is a bottom-up, sector-based and technology-oriented 
proposal for differentiating commitments. The triptych approach was originally 
employed by the EU to allocate its Kyoto target among member states.82 The 
reference to “triptych” reflects the focus of the original model on CO2 emissions 
from three sectors: power generation; energy-intensive industries, such as cement 
and steel; and the domestic sector, encompassing the residential sector and 
transportation.  The extended or global triptych takes the original a step further to 
cover the waste sector and agriculture, thus covering non-CO2 gases, such as 
methane and the other industrial gases controlled under the Kyoto Protocol. 
A bottom-up, technological analysis is employed to identify the emission 
reduction potential in these sectors. This analysis is coupled with projections of 
expected growth in the sector – for instance, are energy-intensive industries expected 
to maintain a their share of the economy – and population figures in order to derive 
national emission targets. For example, to calculate the emission allowance from the 
power sector for a country, assumptions are made about growth rates and per capita 
consumption, and requirements are imposed on how electricity may be generated, 
with minimum figures for renewable energy. The analysis takes account of the fact 
that countries’ generation mix varies enormously, as does the renewable energy 
potential and public acceptance of nuclear energy. 
The proposal is attractive in that it appears to offer a fairly “objective” and 
technical solution to the differentiation conundrum, while at the same time 
respecting equity principles. The approach is sensitive to the individual 
circumstances of countries, as well as the principles of need and capability. Its main 
practical drawbacks are complexity and the reliance on production growth rates in 
industry and the power sector. As an essentially forward-looking approach, it is less 
responsive to historical responsibility, with possible result that developing countries 
with low emissions and relatively efficient industry could end up with a fairly 
stringent target. Given their very low level of industrial activity, and the difficulty in 
                                                 
82 BODANSKY, supra note 1, at 35; Helen Groenenberg et al, Global Triptych: a bottom-up approach for the 
differentiation of commitments under the Climate Convention, 4(2) CLIMATE POLICY 153 (2004).  
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projecting their growth path, it seems overly restrictive to set a target for least-
developed countries (LDCs). The principles of need and responsibility – whether 
historical or current emissions – constitutes persuasive grounds on which to exempt 
LDCs. However, as its advocates acknowledge, the approach does imply value-laden 
choices with respect to the selection of long-term targets for the three sectors.83 For 
instance, having energy efficiency decline too quickly to a low value, may prejudice 
countries whose heavy industry rests on a legacy of inexpensive electricity.   
 
6.4 Conclusions 
The overview of proposals for a future international response to climate 
change demonstrates that equity concerns figure prominently in a number of them. 
In addition, equity principles are also present in the policy evaluation criteria that are 
commonly put forward – for instance in the concern that a future agreement should 
be responsive to the poverty eradication and economic development objectives of 
developing countries, and that proposals should be capable of taking country-specific 
circumstances into account. That some of the approaches reviewed contain an 
explicit engagement with equity concerns is fitting and timely, because the climate 
regime as it stands has deferred the knottier, controversial topics. In the interests of 
broadening the participation the Framework Convention did not include emission 
targets; the Kyoto Protocol did set targets, for rather short time-frame, and only for 
industrialized countries, with much of the parties’ energies devoted to fleshing out its 
provisions and bringing into operation the flexibility mechanisms. With steadily 
rising GHG concentration, the trade-offs, national interests and equity dimensions 
are ratcheted up. The longer the delay, the less time there is to begin taking the 
sensible, low-cost options in the near-term, while integrating the need to move to 
low-carbon future into public awareness, public policy and private investment 
decisions.  
On the policy side, a successful future framework would ensure 
environmental effectiveness in line with a broadly defined and widely supported goal, 
and at the same time satisfy cost concerns. This would entail the engagement of 
developing countries in the joint effort to slow and then reduce global emissions. 
The distribution of the burdens and benefits associated with combating climate, 
more specifically the basis on which to share the burden of abatement, would not be 
resolved by recourse to equity and fairness principles. But equity principles are likely 
to form at least one part of the solution, while not denying that other factors – 
market forces, technical expertise, negotiating resources, political and economic 
influence – will play important roles.   
Thus the conclusions drawn from this chapter are that proposals that seek 
actively to reflect both a balance of equity principles – responsibility, capability, need 
- and political and economic realities stand the best chance of being accepted and 
implemented by both developed and developing countries. It was noted that 
proposals that reflected a particular dimension of equity in a very “pure” form, for 
instance contraction and convergence, are partially taken up in more hybrid 
proposals such as the multi-stage convergence model. This is understandable. 
Equality is powerful notion, and in the long-run convergence of emissions pathways 
                                                 
83 Helen Groenenberg & Jeroen van der Sluijs, Valueloading And Uncertainty In A Sector-based 
Differentiation Scheme For Emission Allowances, 71(1-2) CLIMATIC CHANGE 75 (2005) 
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is a geo-physical imperative. Overall, the transition to a low carbon future suggests a 
moderating of absolute claims and a search for bridging mechanisms. Differentiation 
will be critical but must be kept within the bounds of what can be managed within 
the context of multi-party negotiations. At the same time, because hard choices 
cannot be postponed, a tendency in international negotiations, a future climate 
regime cannot be everything to all parties – difficult choices have to be made. Visible 
efforts to reflect a variety of equity principles would contribute to a shared 
perception that a new agreement is “fair”.    
The future approach should have universal participation, but be flexible 
enough to accommodate initiatives by a smaller group of countries. Fifteen countries 
are responsible for almost three-quarters of global emissions. It would be sensible 
for them to make a concerted effort to seek common ground. In going forward, 
openness to new proposals and ideas is critical. A simple and immediate extension of 
absolute targets to developing countries is neither politically feasible nor fair and 
equitable. A pledge-based system for developing countries, based on sustainable 
development policies and measures (SD-PAMs) proposal, may be one way to begin 
including the less economically advanced countries in the developing country 
category. The review mechanism could build on the existing expert reviews of Annex 
1 communications, as well as models such as the Trade Policy Review of the World 
Trade Organization, a process designed to facilitate the smooth functioning of the 
multilateral trading system by enhancing the transparency of countries’ trade 
policies.84 Differentiation among developing countries will be important – Haiti and 
Singapore can no longer be treated as falling into the same category for the purpose 
of international climate policy. However developing countries would need to be 
convinced that they are not trading group solidarity for nothing.  
Finally, one of the greatest uncertainties in projecting climate change is the 
course of future economic growth. This uncertainty is greatest for developing 
countries, whose economies are not yet fully developed. Any assumption of fixed 
allocations is therefore riskier for developing than industrialized, whose growth rates 
do over time vary, but where the basic economic structure is in place and underlying 
trends (shift towards services) are ongoing and relatively slow. On the other hand, 
who can say exactly what the industrial profile and emissions of India will be in 15-
20 years? This argues for flexibility for developing countries, at least in the initial 
stages, which can be achieved through a variety of mechanisms and policy 
instruments.  
                                                 
84 See background on the website of the World Trade Organization: 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp_int_e.htm.  
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Chapter 7 - Conclusion 
 
This concluding chapter draws together different strands of the analysis 
presented in the thesis, highlighting the role of equity and fairness in the climate 
change regime. Applying insights from the analysis developed in the thesis, the 
conclusion proposes selected elements for a post-Kyoto climate policy. These 
proposals are consistent with the fairness and equity principles as articulated in the 
prior analysis, while also taking into account what appears to be feasible politically.   
 
Equity and fairness in context 
This thesis set out to analyze and demonstrate the relevance of fairness and 
equity in the international climate regime. The purpose of this analysis is identifying 
equity and fairness principles that ought to guide the allocation of responsibility to 
avoid dangerous climate change. While these principles alone are not decisive, an 
improved understanding of, and engagement with, fairness and equity is important as 
the nations of the world move towards the next, and most important phase, of the 
international climate negotiations. Analysis of the equity and fairness dimensions 
should enrich, contextualize and complement insights gained from economics, 
international relations and other modes of policy analysis. Climate change is an 
enormously complex, multidimensional problem that mixes together science, law, 
economics, technological advancement and, recently security interests, in a manner 
that few other global problems do.  
Two quantitative disciplines - the natural sciences and economics – have to 
date played a key role in the discourse on climate change. The scientific study of 
climate change has spurred a massive international research effort that has pushed 
back the boundaries of knowledge about the behavior of, and influences on, the 
earth system. As outlined in chapter one, the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC 
concluded that observed warming is unequivocal and that human activities are the 
dominant cause. Accordingly the focus now shifts to improving the understanding of 
more precisely how these impacts can be mitigated, when, where and how severe the 
impacts of change will be, and how to deal with adaptation to the consequences of 
changes that fail to be mitigated. Yet as explored in chapter two, the interaction 
between science and public policy is far from the linear relationship of warning of a 
grave threat from an authoritative source, followed by an appropriate and timely 
response. The message is filtered by the media – sometimes amplified beyond the 
evidence, frequently undermined by the perceived need to air “opposing” 
viewpoints. Far from being subjected to cool consideration and prompting deliberate 
action, scientific findings are tossed into the fray of interest group politics at the 
domestic and international levels.  In short, while it provides an authoritative 
description of the problem and outlines the parameters for a solution, a scientific 
consensus alone is insufficient to bring about changes in society. This thesis suggests 
that another key dimension of human society’s response to climate change relates to 
equity and fairness.  
However, while there is a consensus among scientists on the gravity of 
climate change, economists have remained more divided on the costs and benefits of 
  193 
 
taking early action.1 Some of the ethical problems associated with the application of 
cost-benefit analysis in the climate change context were outlined in chapter four. 
Overall, a failure to properly appreciate the limitations of such analyses may 
contribute to obscuring ethical and value choices. Ultimately our welfare is 
dependent on the natural system, which is only imperfectly incorporated into our 
decision-making frameworks. A conclusion from this thesis is that open articulation 
of principles such as equity and fairness can usefully complement currently dominant 
modes of policy analysis, particularly economic rationality. 
Fairness and equity are part of the vocabulary we use to analyze and argue 
about everyday problems in human society. This is no less so merely because the 
concept of fairness cannot be defined as readily as, say gross domestic product. The 
contested nature of fairness is not sufficient grounds to disqualify it from 
consideration. It is suggested fairness and equity prove useful in understanding the 
climate change problem in the context of human society’s response to climate 
change for at least two reasons. First, fairness and equity in fact feature prominently 
in public discourse concerning climate change and what to do about it. Second, 
climate change directly concerns the allocation of burdens and benefits – the adverse 
effects are unequally distributed and the key question in formulating the response is 
how to allocate the costs this entails. In this respect, in its latest report the IPCC 
estimates that the costs of combating climate change range from a small net gain to a 
3 per cent loss in world domestic product - non-trivial, but certainly not prohibitive.2 
The crucial issue then is who bears the costs, namely the distribution of the burden.  
And, as we saw in chapter four, fairness is generally regarded as having two 
important forms – compensatory and distributive fairness. From this perspective, 
fairness “fits” the endeavor of analyzing responses to climate change in the context 
of human society.  
Differing perceptions of fairness represent a real constraint on the 
possibilities for international climate policy.3 The thesis has detailed the deep 
divisions between industrialized and developing countries with respect to the 
responsibility for climate change. Arriving at a comprehensive and shared 
understanding of fairness is a difficult, if not impossible, undertaking. And it is not 
the task attempted in this thesis. In chapter four, it was found that no single account 
of equity or fairness could satisfy the demands placed on it by parties possessing 
competing conceptions of what is fair and just, and animated by divergent material 
interests. Rather, a more promising approach was to identify equity and fairness 
principles particularly applicable to the climate change problem, and in so doing 
arriving at a working consensus that supports, not hinders, the required collective 
action. In other words, such a working consensus might represent the area where 
                                                 
1 See for a notable exception, NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE, THE STERN 
REVIEW, CABINET OFFICE, HM TREASURY (2006). One of the central conclusions of the Stern 
Review was that the costs of inaction outweighed the costs of action to combat climate change. 
Leading economists immediately criticized the Stern Review’s approach, see William Nordhaus, Critical 
assumptions in the Stern Review on Climate Change 317 (5835) SCIENCE 201 (2007). 
2 IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: M ITIGATION, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP III TO THE 
FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 16 
(Bert Metz et al eds., 2007). 
3 Steve Rayner & Elizabeth M. Malone, Ten suggestions for policymakers, in 4 HUMAN CHOICE AND 
CLIMATE CHANGE 109, 116 (Steve Rayner & Elizabeth M. Malone, eds., 1999). 
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several, sometimes competing, fairness claims overlap. Accordingly, chapter four 
selected a representative sample of general fairness and equity principles: egalitarian; 
responsibility or contribution; need; and capability. These general principles of 
fairness and equity operate at a high level of generality, but associated with them are 
more specific burden-sharing rules, which incorporate concrete applications of one 
or more general principles. It is these that can be applied in a more concrete manner 
to assess various international climate change policy proposals, a task carried out in 
chapter six.  
A range of principles forms an intrinsic part of international environmental 
law. Principles of equity and fairness are not only constituents of the discourse on 
climate change, but they are also embedded in the Framework Convention and its 
Kyoto Protocol. This is the conclusion arrived at in chapter five, which identifies and 
analyzes provisions of the Convention and the Protocol having a bearing on fairness 
and equity. In particular, the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, 
a cornerstone of the climate regime gives effect to equity and fairness principles. 
Equity and fairness concerns are encapsulated in this principle, which was analyzed 
in some detail. The chapter also explores how the notion of differentiation relates to 
provisions concerning the transfer of cleaner technology and financial assistance. In 
short, equity and fairness concerns are woven into the fabric of the climate regime, 
which suggests that a deeper understanding and contextualized interpretation offers 
insights for the future of international climate policy.   
Chapter six assessed a broadly representative sample of actual climate policy 
proposals against selected fairness principles and policy design criteria. The overview 
of proposals for a future international response to climate change demonstrates that 
equity concerns figure prominently in a number of them. The key conclusion is that 
proposals that reflect both a balance of equity principles – responsibility, capability, 
need – and political and economic realities, stand a better chance of garnering broad 
acceptance among both developed and developing countries. Overall, the transition 
to a low carbon future suggests a moderating of absolute claims and a search for 
solutions that takes into account differing circumstances. Visible efforts to reflect a 
variety of equity principles would contribute to a shared perception that a new 
agreement is based on a “working consensus” that melds fairness with a dose of 
political reality. The distribution of the burdens and benefits associated with 
combating climate change, more specifically the basis on which to share the burden 
of abatement, will certainly not be resolved by recourse to equity and fairness 
principles alone. But equity principles will constitute an important part of the 
solution, while not denying that other factors – market forces, technical expertise, 
negotiating resources, political and economic influence – will also play key roles. 
We have seen that the international negotiations on climate change follow the 
same fault lines as issues of international development and global debates about the 
unequal relations between states. This presents risks and opportunities. On the one 
hand, superimposing debates on global development, which tend to roughly fracture 
along North-South lines, on the climate change negotiations risks miring them in 
interminable and possibly irresolvable disputes. On the other, it is an exercise in 
futility to try and ignore the elephant in the conference room, by insisting on a pure, 
technocratic climate policy. The development dimension is a reminder that tackling 
global climate change will require more than sophisticated, but top-down, policy 
instruments such as cap-and-trade schemes. What is needed is an approach that 
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addresses the economic, social and environmental dimensions of climate change. It is 
suggested that analyzing fairness and equity provides a “language” for better 
understanding these concerns and, it is hoped, framing creative solutions.   
 
Cautionary notes on the road towards a post-2012 climate policy 
Despite not inconsiderable attention at national and international levels, 
progress in combating climate change has been halting. Pushed on this point, many 
analysts and observers will put it down to a lack of “political will”, a somewhat 
mysterious substance associated with the tendency to turn words into action. While 
serious political commitment has indeed been lacking – compare the attention 
lavished on economic growth, security threats and other public policy matters – 
framing a global response to climate change is likely to remain a difficult and 
complex task. The following are some broad implications for policy-making. 
· Retain flexibility: The climate change regime is in a transition phase, from half-
hearted action by industrialized countries, to a new stage in which the challenge 
facing the international community is the creation of a truly shared response. As 
in other transitions, a rigid insistence on particular ethical or moral claims is likely 
to prove neither helpful nor appropriate – reciprocity and a moderation of 
absolute claims provide the appropriate touchstones. With respect to equity and 
fairness, this may entail seeking out principles with the broadest agreement 
among different groups, which suggests nuanced understanding of leading 
principles such as capability and responsibility.  
· Accept second-best: Climate scientists model stabilization scenarios measured 
in increments of GHG concentrations, each one with its own “best estimate” of 
temperature increases. Economic models optimize the allocation of resources to 
maximize welfare. In their implementation, the policies flowing from these 
technical exercises will collide with society’s untidy reality, in other words with 
delays, interest group-trade-offs and unintended consequences. This suggests 
that decision-makers should strive for the most robust and effective policies, but 
without putting perfection before action. Naturally climate policies should be 
implemented in a deliberate manner, but inaction as opposed to the unintended 
consequences of precipitate action is now recognized as the greater risk.4  
· Realism about technology: Technology is rightly identified as pivotal to 
addressing climate change. Fundamentally technological advancement matters, 
because many consider making significant inroads into the other main drivers of 
emissions – population growth and rising consumption – as neither desirable nor 
practicable. Certainly, denying the world’s poor access to the next rung of the 
development ladder on the grounds of climate protection would be inequitable 
and politically entirely unrealistic. Nonetheless, questions can be asked about the 
sustainability of the continuous quest for growth in the regions of the world that 
                                                 
4 NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE, THE STERN REVIEW, CABINET OFFICE, 
HM TREASURY 193 (2006). But cf . Jason F. Shogren & Michael A. Toman, How Much Climate Change is 
too Much? An Economics Perspective, in CLIMATE CHANGE ECONOMICS AND POLICY: AN RFF 
ANTHOLOGY, 35, 43 (Michael A. Toman, ed., 2001). 
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have long attained prosperity.5 What is the potential for technology in bringing us 
to the low-carbon economy? A standard assumption is that an appropriate mix 
of public and private funding, incentives in the form of a carbon market, or a 
combination of both will deliver the necessary clean technologies. Taking an 
optimistic view of the potential, reference can be made to the torrid pace of 
transformation in the telecommunications or computer industries, illustrative of 
the potential for innovation of new technologies. Perhaps more sobering is to 
look where it matters, at the energy industry. Essentially, the record of power 
generation in the 20th century is, with the exception of the gas turbine and 
nuclear fission, one of only incremental and process improvements to a basic 
technology – the steam boiler – that dates from the 19 th century. This implies 
that unbridled optimism for the transformative effect of breakthrough energy 
technologies is probably misplaced.6 A new mitigation technology, carbon 
capture and storage, is essentially an end-of-pipe solution that may buy time; 
even its most fervent backers admit that it is not a “silver bullet”. Questions 
remain over whether it could be deployed in time to make significant difference, 
and it will require the development of new infrastructure to pipe CO2 from 
power plants to storage sites. Renewable energy excluding hydro constitutes 
about three per cent of global energy demand and, with a transmission 
infrastructure designed for large fossil fuel plants, the large-scale integration of 
sources such as wind presents problems. Overall, a pragmatic climate and energy 
policy would focus on the steady improvement and rapid deployment of a menu 
of existing technologies – renewables, energy efficiency, cleaner fossil fuel 
technologies, and nuclear. More than questions relating to, safety, long-term 
storage of nuclear waste, and proliferation threats their high capital cost is likely 
to remain a brake on construction of new nuclear facilities.  
· The twin challenges of adaptation and mitigation: From the time that 
climate change began to be of concern to scientists and policy-makers mitigation 
has received more attention than adaptation to the adverse impacts climate 
change. It is telling that although the Convention recognizes the importance of 
adaptation, and singles out particularly vulnerable groups of countries, the overall 
design of the Kyoto Protocol is almost entirely aimed at mitigation. Recognition 
of the need to address current and future vulnerabilities to climate impacts does 
not stand in opposition to strong mitigation action – it simply recognizes the fact 
that current GHG concentrations commit us to some climate change, not matter 
what. Failure to take adaptation needs seriously is also a failure to address 
fairness and equity, because it is quite clear that the poorest countries are also the 
ones that will bear the brunt of the impacts.7 The benefits of implementing 
                                                 
5 See LESTER R. BROWN, PLAN B 3.0: MOBILIZING TO SAVE CIVILIZATION (3rd ed. 2008) and JAMES 
GUSTAVE SPETH, THE BRIDGE AT THE END OF THE WORLD: CAPITALISM, THE ENVIRONMENT, AND 
CROSSING FROM CRISIS TO SUSTAINABILITY (2008). 
6 VACLAV SMIL, ENERGY AT THE CROSSROADS: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES AND UNCERTAINTIES 129-
133 (2003). He catalogues some of the wildly optimistic scenarios that respected experts and 
institutions predicted for nuclear fission. Cf. MICHAEL SCHELLENBERGER & TED NORDHAUS, BREAK 
THROUGH: FROM THE DEATH OF ENVIRONMENTALISM TO THE POLITICS OF POSSIBILITY (2007). 
7 See UNDP, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007/2008, FIGHTING  CLIMATE CHANGE: HUMAN 
SOLIDARITY IN A DIVIDED WORLD (2007). 
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adaptation measures are by definition local, not global, so that support for 
adaptation relies heavily on expressions of solidarity. In this respect the 
Adaptation Fund established under the Kyoto Protocol, which does not rely on 
voluntary contributions – essentially charity – is a welcome innovation, though it 
remains a proverbial drop in the bucket. 
 
 
A post-2012 climate policy: “muddling through” to a sustainable future? 
Drawing on the ideas developed in the thesis, this section outlines a number 
of ideas and recommendations relating to post-2012 international climate policy. 
The central failing of climate regime is that the mitigation actions under the 
Convention and the Protocol fall well short of what is required. As described, 
influential parties were well aware that the Convention did not mandate adequate 
mitigation action, leading to the launch of negotiations culminating in the Kyoto 
Protocol. The compromise that paved the way for those negotiations – absence of 
targets for developing countries – was defensible, but left a vacuum, in which 
incentives for developing countries’ mitigation efforts were not integrated into the 
climate regime. It is possible that a pursuit of Kyoto’s targets, and the years-long 
process of rule-making to implement the agreement, distracted attention from 
practical and creative ways to begin addressing developing countries’ emissions, for 
instance by giving real meaning to the technology transfer provisions of the 
Convention. Since its adoption in 1997, the parties have devoted considerable energy 
to establishing and testing the Kyoto institutions, in the process creating a valuable, 
if somewhat cumbersome legacy. Thus this thesis does not subscribe to the view that 
Kyoto represents a failed effort.8 The point is rather that complementary policies 
that integrated development and climate concerns were not explored.  
What then could be the contours of a future climate agreement? First, the 
allocation of responsibility to undertake mitigation action should be as consistent 
with a broad overlapping of equity and fairness principles – the working consensus – 
as possible. In this regard, the principles that have emerged from the analysis 
presented in this thesis are equality, responsibility, capability and need. Second, the 
agreement should aim for the greatest degree of coordination possible under the 
umbrella of the Convention, thus opting for an approach that reflects key elements 
of the multi-stage and graduation proposals. These are “top-down” approaches that 
typically apply indices reflecting rough indicators of responsibility (emissions per 
capita) and capability (GDP per capita) to determine where countries fall on the 
commitments spectrum: (a) the poorest of the developing countries receive 
international support but do not undertake binding emission limitation 
commitments; (b) emerging and middle income developing countries agree to carry 
out verifiable and reportable mitigation actions to limit emissions growth; and (c) 
industrialized commit to quantified emission reduction targets. Over time the 
measures the control measures are tightened as countries “graduate”. Aside from 
incorporating equity criteria, the multi-stage and graduation variety of proposals also 
                                                 
8 David Victor, Fragmented carbon markets and reluctant nations: implications for the design of effective architectures, 
in ARCHITECTURES FOR AGREEMENT: ADDRESSING GLOBAL CLIMATE ON THE POST-KYOTO 
WORLD 133 (Joseph E. Aldy & Robert N. Stavins, eds., 2007). 
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satisfy key policy design criteria, meaning that they should at least be good candidates 
for achieving results in the real world.  
Animated by a different – more skeptical - view of the potential of 
international cooperation and treaty making are the “bottom-up” proposals, 
spanning a focus on technology agreements and a gradual linking of domestic cap-
and-trade schemes. Advanced as the main thrust of an international climate policy, 
these proposals fail to satisfy the core equity and fairness principles and basic policy 
criteria, chiefly environmental effectiveness. Fundamentally they lack any meaningful 
engagement with dimensions of fairness, coordination and reciprocity of 
commitments and actions necessary for an effective global climate policy.  
Within the multi-stage framework described above, a future agreement 
should encourage universal participation by accommodating different commitment 
types appropriate for countries with differing national circumstances and at varying 
stage of economic development. It should be noted that the multi-track approach 
would in practice provide the guiding principles, rather a rigid prescription. 
Flexibility would entail a range of commitment types, not limited to the targets and 
timetables of the Kyoto Protocol. A future climate policy will contain a wider menu 
of commitment options differentiated along a number of axes: binding or non-
binding; economy-wide or covering only particular sectors; and degree of stringency. 
Yet the urgent need to control emissions from all major emitters means that 
flexibility cannot come at the expense of ambition. A number of things follow from 
this. First, the overall process and framework of the negotiations must set a clear 
negotiating mandate and be conducive to eliciting the maximum degree of 
commitment from all key parties. In this regard, it has been argued that an integrated, 
package approach allows parties to make tradeoffs and promotes reciprocity.9 This 
entails integrating the different issues – adaptation, technology transfer, financing – 
into one broad negotiating agenda. Second, there should be clarity on the types of 
commitments applicable to different countries.10  
How does the negotiating mandate in the Bali Action Plan compare on 
these points? It clearly confirms the Convention process as the forum for the 
negotiations and sets a clear deadline, 2009, for their conclusion. Although the 
relationship between the two negotiating tracks under the Convention and Protocol, 
respectively, is not entirely clear, it is assumed that they will converge into a “package 
deal” in 2009. The Action plan makes a basic distinction between the commitments 
applicable to developed countries (“mitigation commitments or actions” and 
developing countries “nationally appropriate mitigation actions”.11 However, the 
language is very broad and could easily span a range of commitment types. The 
mandate also refers to “cooperative sectoral approaches and sector-specific actions” 
in the context of development and transfer of mitigation technologies. The following 
mix of commitments could form part of a future climate a greement. 
· Kyoto-style targets are appropriate for industrialized countries and should be 
tightened in the post-2012 period. The consistent contention advanced in 
this thesis is that binding, Kyoto-style targets were, and remain, inapplicable 
                                                 
9 DANIEL BODANSKY & ELLIOT DIRINGER, TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED MULTI-TRACK CLIMATE 
FRAMEWORK 23 (2007). 
10 See id. 
11 Bali Action Plan, para. 1(b). 
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to developing countries, on both equity and practical grounds.12  On equity 
grounds it seems unconscionable – not to mention politically unrealistic – to 
expect that China, a country where some 300 million citizens still live in 
poverty, should assume the type of binding measures that major developing 
countries have avoided. Article 3(1) of the Convention provides that “the 
developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change”. 
From a practical perspective, in the emerging economies, the course of 
economic growth and pace of technological transformation is simply to 
unpredictable for the successful implementation of absolute emission caps. 
Instead, the key policy goal would be to begin slowing the rate of emissions 
growth and move decisively away from the business-as-usual emissions 
scenario. This would be achieved through a concerted effort to improve 
energy efficiency in all sectors, and supporting the deployment of the least 
emissions-intensive equipment in sectors with long-lived infrastructure, 
especially the power sector. As indicated at the Bali Climate Change 
Conference, such mitigation action by developing countries would need to be 
verifiable and reportable, which in turn would trigger financial and technical 
support. 
· There is interest in and support for sectoral policies, which could either focus 
on technology cooperation and transfer in certain emissions-intensive 
industries or be expanded to include a means of crediting improvements over 
and above a voluntary but benchmarked baseline (so-called “no-lose” 
policies).  This could be designed in a way to reward national mitigation 
actions, such as the Chinese climate change program that aims at an overall 
economy-wide efficiency improvement, as well setting targets in a number of 
key sectors.  
· An option that also been raised in the negotiations is a pledge-based system 
for developing countries, based on sustainable development policies and 
measures (SD-PAMs). These are policies and measures aimed at meeting the 
domestic objectives of a developing country, but that also bring significant 
benefits to the climate through reduced GHG emissions, an example being 
the Brazilian biofuels program, which was adopted on energy security and 
economic development grounds.  
 
As detailed in chapter 5, the technology transfer and financing aspects of the 
climate regime have remained underdeveloped and inadequate Article 7(4) of the 
Convention explicitly recognizes that “the extent to which developing country 
Parties will effectively implement their commitments under the Convention will 
depend on the effective implementation by developed country Parties of their 
commitments under the Convention related to financial resources and transfer of 
technology”. Accordingly the post-2012 climate policy will need to effectively 
address the issues of technology and financial resources to support mitigation and 
adaptation actions in developing countries. This issue has remained unresolved since 
the inception of the climate regime. Political realities set limits on the potential for 
                                                 
12 For a usefully detailed account of why binding targets are not practicable, see ROB BRADLEY & 
HILARY MCMAHON, THE ROLE OF POLICIES AND MEASURES FOR CLIMATE MITIGATION IN CHINA 
(World Resources Institute, BASIC Project, Working Paper no. 4, 2007). 
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direct North-South resource transfer, witness the difficulty all but a handful of 
industrialized countries have had in meeting the long-standing development aid 
target of 0.7 per cent of gross national product (GNP). In contrast, global carbon 
trading is attractive because although its effect is very similar to a tax – firms pass on 
the carbon price to other firms and consumers – it obscures the resource flows. 
Having firms in carbon intensive industries purchase credits from emission-reducing 
projects in China has the dual advantages of being cheaper than undertaking the 
same reductions domestically and potentially politically more palatable than 
providing outright aid for clean technology. This points to the need to scale up and 
expand the clean development mechanism (CDM), which has shown considerable 
growth.  
In expanding the CDM, the parties will need to consider how to remedy 
some of its shortcomings and problems, which stem from the fact that it is project-
based. First, offsetting projects such as the CDM are inherently subject to baseline 
manipulation, requiring strict verification protocols if environmental integrity is to be 
assured.13 Project developers naturally regard such rules as unnecessary red tape, and 
there is some evidence that they have been able to manipulate the rules.14 Second, 
because the CDM is project-based, it lacks scale – making energy efficiency 
improvements at one plant, as opposed to providing credits for a program or policy 
that tackles promotes improvements in a whole sector. Expanding the CDM to 
encompass programmatic or policy-level action raises verification and 
methodological issues. One option could be to create a two-tier CDM, with a 
project-style track, and second, programmatic and policy track, with its own rules 
and procedures.  Certainly, while not without problems, the CDM has spurred a 
vibrant market and unlocked emissions reduction potential, especially in major 
developing countries. As is the case now with the EU Emission Trading Scheme, 
major industrialized countries will probably allow the “import” of credits from any 
successor to the CDM.15 
Carbon trading under the CDM or a successor will not be sufficient to 
stimulate the transfer of low-carbon technology from industrialized to developing 
countries at the scale required over the next few decades. The same is true of the 
Global Environment Facility, which is mandated to carry out technology transfer 
under the Convention. A recent study prepared for the Secretariat of the Convention 
concluded that estimated global additional investment flows of $200-210 billion 
would be necessary in 2030 to return global emissions to current levels.16 In order to 
promote the rapid deployment of low-carbon technology in developing countries, 
mechanisms are required to finance the incremental costs of cleaner technology. It is 
                                                 
13 See Chapter 5.  
14 AXEL MICHAELOW & PALLAV PUROHIT, CLIMATE STRATEGIES, ADDITIONALITY DETERMINATION 
OF INDIAN CDM PROJECTS: CAN INDIAN CDM DEVELOPERS OUTWIT THE CDM EXECUTIVE 
BOARD? (2007), http://www.climate-strategies.org/uploads/additionality-cdm-india-cs-version9-
07.pdf.  
15 See e.g. S.2191, 110th Cong. Subtitle H – International Forest Protection. America's Climate Security 
Act of 2007 (Lieberman-Warner Bill) provides that up to 3 per cent of annual allowances could be 
sourced from international forestry projects. 
16 UNFCCC, DIALOGUE WORKING PAPER 8 (2007), REPORT ON ANALYSIS OF EXISTING AND 
POTENTIAL INVESTMENT AND FINANCIAL FLOWS RELEVANT TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN 
EFFECTIVE AND APPROPRIATE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE 2 (2007). 
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suggested that several of the existing mechanisms could be re-configured and given 
expanded mandates in relation to financing and the transfer of low-carbon 
technologies. The central pillar of this approach would be the establishment of a 
mechanism to promote the deployment of clean technology, drawing on the model 
of Multilateral Fund under the Montreal Protocol, which would function broadly 
under the auspices and guidance of the Convention. Linking the mechanism to the 
Convention contributes to broader buy-in, so that different countries are 
comfortable participating, and alignment with the priorities emerging from the 
intergovernmental process. The mechanism should: (a) ameliorate donor suspicion 
associated with aid, namely the risk of being diverted from intended uses; (b) the 
transaction costs and complexities associated with CDM projects; and (c) address the 
issue of scale inherent in the GEF and other existing climate change funds. The 
mechanism could be structured so has to have several “windows” serving different 
financing and technology needs.  
Technology cooperation and public-private partnerships are another area that 
could be fostered and facilitated under a new international climate policy. The 
involvement of the private sector, as the owner and primary developer of 
technology, is particularly important. While the private sector can expected to be 
most sensitive to market signals – not pious wishes expressed at intergovernmental 
meetings – there is certainly room for greater public-private cooperation to advance 
R&D priorities and pave the way for deployment of new technologies. The Asia-
Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP), genuinely positioned 
as a complement to the Convention process, could play a role in fostering 
international public-private technology cooperation.  
While greater international action on technology and financing is essential, 
national actions and priorities will remain important, but it is hoped with the 
priorities identified under the Convention having a halo effect. The export credit 
agencies (ECAs) of the industrialized countries could play a much greater role in 
aggressively facilitating the sale of clean technologies.17 
For now, the forum for future negotiations seems assured. Recent events 
have affirmed the desire of countries to conduct the multilateral climate negotiations 
under the Framework Convention, which with almost universal participation, is 
imbued with a unique legitimacy. Although legitimacy is an intangible it has real, if 
fluid, currency in international climate policy. Fifteen countries are responsible for 
almost three-quarters of global emissions. It would be sensible for them to make a 
concerted effort to seek common ground, either wholly within the Convention 
process, or aided by coordination in forums outside the multilateral negotiations. 
Going forward, greater differentiation among developing countries will be important 
– Haiti and Singapore can no longer be treated as falling into the same category for 
the purpose of international climate policy. However, developing countries would 
need to be convinced that they are trading group solidarity will not come at the 
expense of fairness. Although individual negotiators may be of the highest caliber,  
many developing countries are overmatched in terms of negotiating resources, 
                                                 
17 See EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF THE UNITED STATES, ANNUAL REPORT 2007 15 (2007). The 
estimated export value of these transactions related to power generation and transmission, oil and gas 
exploration and refineries in 2007 was US$ 1.1 billion. The same year saw US$ 2.6 million in export-
credit insurance transactions supporting U.S. renewable-energy exports. 
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seldom having at their disposal the same depth of technical resources possessed by 
industrialized countries. There is a risk that, unable to adequately evaluate the full 
import of complex and increasingly differentiated proposals, smaller groups of 
developing countries may baulk. In this regard, the open flow of information and 
analysis from think tanks and NGOs, some of which have developed a reputation 
for impartial analysis, is of great value. Fairness of the process, in addition to fairness 
of outcomes, will also assume greater importance. 
At the Bali conference in December 2007, the international community 
committed itself to negotiations on a post-2012 climate agreement, with agreement 
to be reached at the 15 th Conference of the Parties in Copenhagen in 2009. Reaching 
agreement on a framework conducive to strengthening mitigation and adaptation 
action in developing countries, especially the emerging economies, will be of critical 
importance. Similarly, a way will need to be found to re-integrate the United States 
into the mainstream of international climate policy. In this regard, it is salutary to 
bear in mind that that binding targets are not somehow antithetical to the United 
States - after all, it was the United States that proposed binding targets in the 
negotiations leading to the Kyoto Protocol. Given commitment and political will, 
positions regarding policy instruments can quickly change. The road from Bali to 
Copenhagen and beyond will surely have its share of few twists and turns, but the 
need to arrive at a fair and effective agreement is now more urgent than ever before. 
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